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# RECENT REVELATIONS OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

*By*

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Studies in Diplomacy, etc.*

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## P R E F A C E

THIS book was written in the hope of aiding students of the first world war and its causes to keep pace with the almost bewildering accumulation of material, for we know the mind and face of Europe at the close of the nineteenth century and the opening of the twentieth better than any other period. It grew out of an address to the British Institute of International Affairs in December, 1922, published in the Journal of the Institute for January, 1923. A reprint met with a considerable demand, and the author was pressed to expand the survey and bring it up to date. The first edition was published in 1927 and was reprinted in the same year. A second edition, with a supplement on the revelations of 1927, appeared in 1928. A third edition, with a supplement on the revelations of 1928-9, appeared in 1930. The text has now been revised, and a good deal of material has been omitted to make room for the contributions of the last ten years. About half the volume is new. The survey is confined to publications subsequent to the outbreak of war in 1914 and illustrating the period from the accession of William II in 1888 to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Though all chronological limits are arbitrary, there is a certain unity in the three decades selected for treatment. Bismarck's policy of limited liability was buried in his grave. Germany was not the only Great Power with ambitions in an age of rampant Imperialism; yet, partly as the result of her rapidly increasing strength, and partly owing to her temperamental ruler, she seemed to occupy the centre of the stage. With the collapse of the Hohenzollern, the Hapsburg, the Romanoff and the Ottoman Empires a new chapter of European history begins.

Though the main purpose is to summarize the testimony of other men, the author has ventured to express his opinion on books, persons and events. What is offered is a *causerie*, not a bibliography. The title is stretched to include studies of character when first-hand material is available, and when such knowledge facilitates the interpretation of policy. Purely military writings are excluded. No attempt has been made to map the literature bearing on economic and social history, which may be studied, so far as the war is concerned, in the imposing array of monographs published by the Carnegie

Endowment. Articles are only mentioned when they are of exceptional importance. Translations are cited under their English titles. The most complete collection of material on the period is to be found in the *Weltkriegsbücherei*, so nobly housed in Schloss Rosenstein at Stuttgart. The most useful guide through the maze is Alfred von Wegerer's *Bibliographie zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*, published in 1934.

G.P.G.

January, 1940.

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GERMANY



## CHAPTER I

### GERMANY

#### I

AMONG the unexpected results of the world war was the opening of the archives of the Great Powers. The Bolsheviks published some sensational tit-bits in the course of the struggle, but it was Republican Germany, the child of defeat, who took the lead in the campaign to elucidate the origins of the conflict. The Socialist Government to which Prince Max of Baden transferred the reins on November 9, 1918, acted within a few days of their accession to office. The four volumes of despatches covering the hectic weeks from the Serajevo murders to the outbreak of hostilities, commonly known as the Kautsky documents, were the first-fruits of the new policy. The selection made by the veteran Socialist was edited by General Count Montgelas and Professor Walther Schücking, and a translation was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace under the title *Outbreak of the World War*. If the documents are studied as a whole, their message is clear enough. The Kaiser's *marginalia* in no way suggest that he desired to conquer the world. He approved the prompt and exemplary punishment of a regicide State by his venerated ally, but on reading Serbia's reply to the ultimatum he exclaimed that all cause for war had disappeared. Yet he was well aware that support of Austria's demands might set the avalanche in motion, and in the days of destiny he took no effective steps to arrest its descent. The Kautsky volumes, in fact, led us to substitute one indictment for another. They disproved the legend that the directors of German policy deliberately unleashed a general war. On the other hand, they proved William II and Bethmann to have been short-sighted blunderers, encouraging an ally to enter on a dangerous path while claiming no share in the drafting of an ultimatum which involved the fate of the world. A revised and enlarged edition appeared in 1927.

This impression is confirmed by the *Bayerische Dokumente*, edited by Dirr at the wish of his fellow-members of the

Bavarian Landtag. One of them became the theme of heated controversy. A fortnight after the conclusion of the war Kurt Eisner, chief author of the Bavarian revolution and first President of the Bavarian Republic, published a despatch from the Bavarian representative in Berlin to the Premier, Count Hertling, dated July 18, 1914. On the strength of information supplied by the Under-Secretary Zimmermann, the forthcoming ultimatum was outlined, which, it was added, Servia could not possibly accept. The resolve to seize the favourable moment, even at the risk of war with Russia, was fully approved. Austria, declared Zimmermann, was now the sick man of Europe, and Russians, Italians, Roumanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins were waiting to divide his possessions. Vigorous action against Servia would restore his vitality. After the assassination of Eisner it was discovered that he had omitted important parts of the long despatch; and we may now read it as it was written, with comments on Eisner's handiwork, which was designed to suggest that Germany desired a world war, not a localized conflict. A second edition of this collection contained a long Introduction by the editor. A third added the despatches of the Bavarian Military Attaché at Berlin between July 29 and August 3. The War Office and the General Staff, reported General von Wenninger on July 29, were wrestling with the Chancellor and the Foreign Office, and demanding military measures corresponding to the political tension. The Chief of the Staff was particularly insistent, pointing out that the military situation was peculiarly favourable for German arms.

A second supplement to the Kautsky documents is the collection of despatches and telegrams of the diplomatic and military representatives of Baden, Saxony and Württemberg in Berlin, *Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte zum Kriegausbruch 1914*, edited by August Bach. European complications were not expected, reported the Saxon Minister on July 2. Military circles favoured war on the ground that Russia was unready, but he did not believe that the Kaiser would consent. On July 17, after a conversation with Zimmermann, the Saxon Chargé described the object of the Government as neither to hustle nor to hold back its ally. An energetic step would be welcomed as calculated to increase Austria's prestige and to delay internal decomposition, for only a strong Austria was of use to Germany. A localized struggle was expected, since England was thoroughly pacific, while France and Russia

seemed equally disinclined to fight. Though Servia was not expected to accept the Austrian demands, wrote the Baden Chargé on July 20, it was generally believed that Russia would merely bluff. Even as late as July 30 the Chancellor himself remarked to the representatives of the South German states that it was difficult to decide how far the measures of the Great Powers were bluff. The whole collection suggests either a curious inability on the part of the Wilhelmstrasse to forecast the reactions of London and St. Petersburg, or a deliberate intention to keep the lesser German states in the dark.

The Editor's Introduction is enriched by extracts from the papers of General von Plessen, Military Adjutant of William II, and General von Lyncker, Chief of his Military Cabinet, and by selections from the reports of the Military Attachés in Vienna and St. Petersburg. The impression of those who took part in the Potsdam discussions on July 5, wrote Plessen in his diary, was that the sooner the Austrians attacked Servia the better, and that the Russians would not come in. That the Kaiser shared this optimistic view is confirmed by a report of General von Bertrab to Moltke, then on leave. Much more realistic was the tone of a letter to Moltke from the Military Attaché in Vienna on July 7. If, as he expected, the Austrian demands proved unacceptable, Russia could not submit to such a loss of Slav prestige in the Balkans and would actively intervene.

When the German Government in the summer of 1919 commissioned Montgelas and Schücking to publish the documents selected by Kautsky, it had already resolved to reveal the secrets of German diplomacy during the years preceding the catastrophe. The onerous task was entrusted to Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Thimme and Lepsius; but the main burden fell on the shoulders of Thimme. Before the editors had proceeded far with their task they realized that it was useless to begin with the Balkan wars, or the annexation of Bosnia, or the Morocco crisis of 1905, and that the forces leading up to the world war could only be explained by tracing the policy of the Great Powers back to the creation of the system of alliances which sprang from the Franco-German collision in 1870. By the end of 1926 the gigantic edifice, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, stood erect in fifty-two stately volumes, and the editors had a right to be proud of their work. "To reveal the most secret and confidential documents, which in the ordinary course would slumber till

the scholars of a future generation broke the seals, is such a novel resolve that it must form an epoch in the history of the methods of government. A Government and a people which thus reveals its secrets displays unbounded confidence in the power of truth to reconcile and to heal."

The character and aims of the publication were further explained and defended by the principal editor in 1924.<sup>1</sup> The announcement that the secrets of the Foreign Office from 1871 to 1914 were to be exposed to the world's gaze created alarm not only among the older diplomatists but also in conservative circles, which feared that discredit might fall on the Imperial régime. Their apprehensions were increased by the polemical use which had been made of the Kautsky documents, and in particular of the Kaiser's *marginalia*. Moreover, Kautsky himself had issued a tendentious commentary, *The Guilt of William Hohenzollern*, which was hailed with delight by the enemies of Imperial Germany at home and abroad. Other critics argued that the time was not yet ripe; that passions would be intensified rather than allayed; that the volumes would be used less for the purposes of impartial history than as an arsenal for political missiles; that official documents alone afforded an incomplete picture of events; and that the victorious Powers, untroubled by revolutions, would decline to follow suit. Unmoved by such craven arguments the editors proceeded on their way, serenely confident that their activities were essential to a determination of responsibility and would drive the victors to a similar revelation. Their governing principle was the selection of the most important documents, without regard to the interpretations to which they might give rise. The Kaiser's notes, for instance, were produced whenever they possessed the slightest significance.

A task of such colossal dimensions necessarily exposes a large surface to attack. It is a compliment to the editors that they were credited by the Right with the design to attack, by the Left with the desire to shield, the Imperial Government. A few voices complained of this or that detail of editorial technique, but the *bona fides* of the enterprise is universally recognized. Opinions differ as to whether editors of official documents should express their opinions on the issues involved,

<sup>1</sup> "Die Aktenpublikation des Auswärtigen Amtes und ihre Gegner," in *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte*, June 1924. Cp. Mendelssohn Bartholdy's article, "Kleine Missverständnisse über eine grosse Publikation," in *Europäische Gespräche*, July 1926, and Thimme, "Persönliche Erinnerungen," *Berliner Monatshefte* March 1937.

particularly with such freedom and at such length as in the later volumes of this series ; but as to the interest and value of the notes there can be no question. In the eight volumes of Schwertfeger's *Wegweiser durch die grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* students will find a useful *précis*, and the arrangement of the documents in chronological order enables us to visualize the European situation at any particular moment. An abridged edition of the whole work, suggested by Hindenburg and Stresemann and carried out under the direction of Mendelssohn Bartholdy, was published in 1928 in four massive volumes. There is a French translation of the complete work.

The first six volumes, covering the period from the close of the Franco-German war to the fall of Bismarck, are introductory. Rejecting the strictly chronological method, the editors group their material in such a form that we can follow the course of policy in regard to the chief problems it had to face. Thus the first volume is devoted to the relations with France in the years following the war of 1870; the second to the Eastern Question up to the Congress of Berlin, the third to the foundation of the system of alliances; the fourth to the relations of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance; the fifth to the Bulgarian crisis; the sixth to the closing years of the Iron Chancellor. Our belief is confirmed that from 1871 till his fall in 1890 Bismarck was the chief pillar of European peace. It was his strong arm which prevented Austria and Russia from flying at each other's throats. Since France alone could never reverse the verdict of Sedan, his plan was to keep her in quarantine by establishing contacts with all the other Great Powers. Such a *virtuoso* appears perhaps once in a century, and with the dismissal of Bismarck the control of German policy passed to lesser men.

With the second instalment, in ten volumes, covering the seven years of Marschall von Bieberstein at the Wilhelmstrasse, the documentation becomes much fuller and the stage widens to the ambitions of *Weltpolitik*. The Bismarckian system of limited liability was scrapped, and the abandonment of the secret treaty of reinsurance with Russia in 1890, followed by the Franco-Russian agreement of 1891, wove a new pattern. Three policies were open to the young ruler and his counsellors. The first was to continue the practice of keeping on good terms both with Great Britain and Russia by avoiding attempts to thwart their dominant ambitions; but such self-denial was



scarcely to be expected from the strongest military Power in the age of Imperialism. Secondly it was feasible to foster economic enterprise and political influence in Turkey, neutralizing the danger of Russian resentment by the maintenance of cordial relations with Great Britain—a course favoured by Caprivi and by the Kaiser himself in the early years of his reign. A third possibility was to risk the antagonism of the Mistress of the Seas by the construction of a large fleet, at the same time disarming Russia's antagonism by smoothing her way in the Near East. It was this line of advance which the Kaiser himself, after a few years' experience of rule, would have preferred ; for the passion of his life was to build a fleet, and there are frequent indications of a desire to resuscitate the League of the Three Emperors as a bulwark against British or Anglo-Saxon dictation. Yet the short-sighted monarch never really attempted to disarm the hostility of his eastern neighbour. It was a period of perilous experiment in South Africa and the Far East, of conflicting counsels and divided control, in which decisions were shaped by the combined or competing efforts of the Emperor, Caprivi, Marschall, Hohenlohe and the mysterious Holstein.

Since the official papers failed to solve the mystery of the Kruger telegram, Thimme turned to the representatives of the actors in the historic scene, and told the full story of that "diplomatic impromptu" in his article "Die Krüger Depesche," in *Europäische Gespräche*, May 1924. In Marschall's diary for January 3, 1896, we read : "Conference with His Majesty, which the Chancellor, Hollmann, Knorr and Senden attend. His Majesty makes curious proposals. Protectorate over the Transvaal, which I at once turn down. Mobilization of the Marine infantry. Despatch of troops to the Transvaal. When the Chancellor objects 'That would be war with England,' His Majesty says, 'Yes, but only on land.' It is then decided to send Schele to the Transvaal to reconnoitre. Also an unfortunate idea. Finally His Majesty, at my suggestion, sends a congratulatory telegram to President Kruger." The diary of Admiral von Senden, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, adds that it was decided to discover what was needed for the mobilization of the two naval battalions. The verbal testimony of the widow of Kayser, Director of the Colonial Department, claims for her husband both the idea and the first draft of the telegram, when the Foreign Minister left the conference room for a few minutes to discuss the situation with his advisers.

Hohenlohe confided to his son that he had agreed to the telegram "to avert something worse."

The third instalment, in eight volumes, carries the story from 1897 to 1903. Unity of control was in some measure restored by the appointment of Bülow, a trained diplomatist, first as Foreign Minister and three years later as Chancellor ; but the improvement in the machinery of government was outweighed by the inauguration of a policy involving the estrangement of the British Empire. Though Germany had as much right to build a formidable navy as any other Power, the exercise of legal rights is not the same thing as the shrewd calculation of interests. For English readers no chapters in this portion of the work are more arresting than those which describe the course and the failure of the negotiations for an alliance at the turn of the century. While Eckardstein urged the closest possible co-operation and the Kaiser leaned in the same direction, the Wilhelmstrasse, coached by the masterful Holstein, rejected a course which appeared to involve the alienation of Russia. Time, it was argued, was on the side of Germany ; England's antagonism to the Franco-Russian group would remain, and sooner or later she would need the friendship of Berlin. Then would be the moment to present and secure the maximum demands. The miscalculation was to colour German policy till it was too late to undo the fatal results.

The fourth series, in twelve volumes, which covers the years from 1903 to 1908, records the Russo-Japanese war with its sequel the Björkö honeymoon, the hollow triumphs of Tangier and Algeciras, the farce of the second Hague Conference, the naval wrangle with England in 1908, the humiliations of the *Daily Telegraph* incident, the creation of the Triple Entente, and the Young Turk revolution. The clouds begin to gather over Berlin. Holstein is dismissed at the height of the Morocco crisis, for neither Bülow nor his master cared to fight ; but the bitter fruits of his policy remained. That which he had pronounced impossible had occurred. England had made up her quarrels both with France and Russia. Germany, so recently the arbiter of Europe, began to complain of encirclement. Even the Triple Alliance was no longer watertight, for Italy was gravitating towards the rival camp. The most brilliant performer on the German political stage since Bismarck had failed. Bülow was distrusted everywhere except in Vienna, and his unchivalrous handling of the *Daily Telegraph* crisis destroyed the Kaiser's confidence. The policy of un-

limited liability was breaking down as it always does. The Kaiser emerges ever more clearly as a blend of folly and good sense, wise in his dislike of provocation in Morocco, foolish in his refusal to dispel the anxieties of England. For the disastrous *Flottenpolitik* he must be held personally responsible. In all other portions of the field his influence proves to be less than was believed at the time and far less than he claimed for himself.

The final volumes are devoted to the six anxious years from the annexation of Bosnia to the Austrian ultimatum. The Potsdam agreement with Russia in 1911 brought a momentary appeasement in Eastern Europe, but the clouds rolled up again with the Balkan war. Bethmann's gallant attempt in 1909 to mend the wire to London came too late, for the Triple Entente had come to stay and Tirpitz possessed the ear of his master. The second Morocco crisis, like the first, brought Western Europe within sight of war and ended in retreat. The Tripoli adventure compelled Germany to disappoint both her ally and her friend. Kiderlen, the Foreign Minister, emphasized the need of keeping Italy in the camp of the Central Powers, while Marschall, the Ambassador at Constantinople, pleaded for the maintenance of the friendship which he had laboured so skilfully to build up. Bethmann appears throughout as a good man struggling with adversity. The Haldane Mission revealed not only his absolute sincerity but the narrow limits of his power, and his subordinates in the Wilhelmstrasse never ceased to regard him as an amateur in foreign affairs.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the political as well as the human interest of *Die Grosse Politik*. Numberless secrets were revealed, not in carefully selected Blue-books but in fifteen thousand authentic documents. Here was diplomacy in the making, from day to day and sometimes from hour to hour, as events and surprises came crowding in. William II and his Ministers become creatures of flesh and blood. Next to the handiwork of Bismarck himself in the early volumes there is nothing so arresting as the annotations of the Kaiser. The comments of Edward VII and Nicholas II on reports and despatches were rare, brief and colourless: those of William II were frequent and picturesque. A very unfair impression is produced by a selection of temperamental tit-bits. While some were silly or angry, many were shrewd enough, and they should be studied as a whole.

Among Ambassadors two stand out in bold relief. Bis-

marck described Hatzfeldt as the ablest horse in his diplomatic stable, but William II would unhesitatingly have assigned the first place to Marschall, little though he liked him. The longest and most masterly despatches are those in which the Ambassador, a lawyer by training, argued that to force reforms on the Ottoman Empire was to pour new wine into old bottles. Equally vigorous in expression and independent in judgment were the despatches of Metternich, in which year after year he warned his superiors of the devastating effect of the *Flottenpolitik* on British opinion. When reminded that his attitude was resented by the Kaiser and Tirpitz, he stoutly replied that he would not purchase the favour of his master by concealing the truth.

The testimony of the Foreign Office was supplemented by the fruitful labours of a Committee of the Reichstag appointed in 1919. This body divided into four Sub-Committees, the first dealing with the causes of the war, the second with reasons for not ending it sooner, the third with acts of disobedience and disloyalty to the political authorities, the fourth with cruelties committed during the struggle.

The first Sub-Committee proceeded to circulate a *questionnaire* relating to the Austro-German conversations at Potsdam and Berlin on July 5 and 6; the attitude and instructions of Tschirschky; Bethmann's and Jagow's knowledge of the progress of the Austrian inquiry at Serajevo; the existence of military and financial preparations in Germany before the ultimatum to Serbia; the extent of the Wilhelmstrasse's knowledge of the forthcoming document; the dates on which it was handed to Tschirschky, sent by him to Berlin, and reached the Foreign Office; the date and means by which it became known to the Bavarian and Saxon Governments; the reason why the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrath did not meet. The replies of the high civil and military officials, bankers, captains of industry and other witnesses were published in 1920, and a translation was issued in the first volume of *Official German Documents relating to the World War*, published by the Carnegie Endowment. The Sub-Committee pronounced no judgment on the testimony, but the legend of a Crown Council of conspirators at Potsdam disappeared for ever. On the ultimatum itself Bethmann repeats Jagow's complaint to the Austrian Ambassador that it was too severe. No part of the evidence indicated that Tschirschky exceeded his instructions. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrath had not been

summoned because Bavaria did not exercise her statutory right to propose it. The evidence was carefully analysed in the massive volume of Hermann Lutz, *Die Europäische Politik in der Julikrise 1914*, published in 1930.

The task of the second Sub-Committee was to discover whether the war could have been terminated at an earlier date, and it was to the American peace moves of the winter 1916-17 that it first turned. The evidence of Bernstorff, Bethmann, Zimmermann, Helfferich, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and other actors fills hundreds of pages in the two volumes of *Official German Documents relating to the World War*, published by the Carnegie Endowment ; and cross-examination of the witnesses rendered the inquiry unusually complete. In this case the Sub-Committee passed judgment on the material, six of the seven members finding that the action of President Wilson was sincere, that peace parleys were a possibility, and that the chances were ruined by the decision to recommence unrestricted submarine warfare. Among the documents are the memoranda of four distinguished experts. Dietrich Schäfer, the leading Pan-German Professor at Berlin, approves the U-boat decision. His colleague, Professor Höttsch, a moderate Nationalist, admits the possibility of peace, and attributes the failure not to the submarine policy but to the incapacity of Bethmann. The Liberal Professor Bonn argues that the German peace offer was a fatal mistake and ruined the chances of peace, while the diplomatist Freiherr von Romberg maintains that peace was ruled out by the unbending attitude of the Entente. In 1926 a similar inquiry was opened into the causes of the failure of the Pope's peace move in 1917.

New light is thrown on the political no less than on the military history of the last year of the war in the evidence collected by the third Sub-Committee in three stout volumes, *Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918*. The report is presented in a series of numbered paragraphs, the most important of which were not approved unanimously. The majority find no ground for blame in any direction. The Supreme Command, they assert, correctly estimated the flow of American troops, and the spirit of the German forces justified the decision to attack. As soon as the events of August 8, 1918, proved victory to be impossible, the Government did its best to end the war. Its failure was due to the military situation, for the defection of Germany's allies rendered profitable negotiations hopeless. Prince Max inherited a situation in which

he did everything that circumstances allowed. Thus the Generals and the statesmen, the old Cabinet and the new, are alike exonerated. Of far greater importance than this complacent report are the proceedings of the Sub-Committee and the voluminous memoranda of experts. Colonel Schwertfeger renews the military indictment of the Government, while Professor Delbrück once again trounces Ludendorff as the architect of ruin. "We were not strong enough for the great offensive, which was also badly carried out. And when the impossibility of success became clear, he ought to have told the Government at once, instead of waiting till September, and then acting in needless panic."

The sequel, in nine volumes, devoted to the internal catastrophe, is a formidable meal, but some of the courses are appetizing enough. *Der deutsche Reichstag im Weltkrieg*, by Professor Bredt, which appears as volume 8, was written at the wish of the Sub-Committee and was published before the investigations were complete. His thesis is that the Reichstag could have averted the catastrophe and carried out the policy of the Majority in the teeth of the military Chiefs if it had possessed a firmer will. He denounces the Right for its blind championship of antiquated principles, above all the Prussian franchise. "There was the cause of the revolution." His verdict on the Centre is scarcely less severe. If it had pursued a consistent course, he argues, and had leaned steadily either to the Right or the Left, the Reichstag would have become a real force. But first it supported the submarine campaign, then the Peace resolution, then trimmed its sails once again. Bredt's survey was discussed at length by several of the Ministers and principal figures of the Reichstag, whose contributions are published in the seventh volume. Count Westarp, the Conservative leader, denounces the Majority and its policy as one of the chief factors in undermining the patriotic will of the nation. Stresemann, who succeeded Bassermann as leader of the National Liberals in 1917, complains of Bethmann as a born pessimist, and grieves that Bülow was not his successor. David for the Socialists contends that nothing could be done with the Reichstag, whose limited powers made it a sham. Kühlmann and Michaelis explain their policy in relation to the Papal Note of August 1917, and their refusal to promise the unconditional liberation of Belgium.

The fourth and fifth volumes, which are concerned with the general causes and nature of the collapse, contain speeches by

members of all the important parties, and an appendix of letters and diaries from the front. The Resolution of the Sub-Committee, passed on November 3, 1927, summarizes the factors of discontent without reaching clear-cut decisions. "The question whether Germany's opponents would have modified the conditions of the armistice had the German people shown themselves ready to fight to the last is unanswered. The acceptance of the Armistice conditions carried with it the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles ; whether the conditions of the latter, despite the military impotence of Germany, could have been modified by political opposition remains a subject of controversy." The sixth volume contains monographs by General von Kühl, Colonel Schwertfeger, Delbrück and other specialists on the vexed question of the *Dolchstoß* or stab in the back, to which the Right attributes the final catastrophe while the Left denies its occurrence. The arguments of soldiers and publicists are followed by a lengthy report drawn up by the Ministry of Health a month after the Revolution on the debilitating results of the blockade. The unanimous Resolution of the Sub-Committee declares that the Reichstag possessed no decisive influence on the conduct of war under the Constitution of 1871, and indeed was powerless till the autumn of 1918, since the Government and the Right blocked the path to constitutional reform. Thus the contention of Brecht that the German Parliament might have made more use of its powers is rejected, and responsibility is transferred to the shoulders of those who kept it in leading-strings.

Volumes 9 and 10 analyse the part of the navy in the national collapse. Lengthy memoranda by specialists cover the ground from the first signs of trouble in 1917 to the Kiel revolt ; and the diary of the sailor Richard Stumpf, serving on the *Helgoland*, which runs to not less than 300 pages, is printed as a specimen of what the crews were thinking. The Resolution of the Sub-Committee, opposed by the Communist member alone, ends with the customary non-committal verdict. "Of all the formulas explaining the collapse by a single cause none has stood the test of investigation; the guilt can only be found in the interaction of manifold causes." Volumes 11 and 12 are devoted to similar surveys of the causes and extent of discontent in the army. The monograph on annexationist aims in Poland, Belgium and elsewhere is of particular interest.

The fourth Sub-Committee produced five substantial volumes of evidence and written statements entitled *Völkerrecht*

*im Weltkrieg.* Among the topics are the devastations in Northern France during the voluntary retirement of 1917 and the forced retreat of 1918 ; the deportation of Belgian workers to Germany and the part played by Belgian civilians in the national defence ; the gas, air, submarine, and economic war ; the treatment of prisoners ; the violation of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The verdict of the Committee, accepted by the representatives of all the parties except the Communists, is that the prohibitions of International Law were observed by Germany. Haber, for instance, the celebrated director of the chemical department of the Prussian Ministry of War, pointed out that the Hague Declaration forbade only shells whose "sole purpose" was to emit poisonous gases, adding that he would have refused his services for any project forbidden by the law of nations. In addition to attempting to rebut the charge of "atrocities," these volumes carry the war into the enemy's camp by a juridical analysis of the violation of Greek neutrality by the Allies.

*Völkerrecht im Weltkrieg* discussed the breach of Greek but not of Belgian neutrality. To fill this gap Professor Bredt wrote *Die Belgische Neutralität und der Schlieffensche Feldzugsplan*, a cool and comprehensive study of the question from the historical, juridical and military points of view. The chapter on Schlieffen's plan of 1905, the most important in the book, throws new light on the formulation of the scheme and its modification by his successor. That he intended to march through Dutch Limburg was already known ; but we now learn that he designed to force his way through Belgium without being the first to violate her neutrality. No ultimatum was to be sent. Liège was to be captured, not by a sudden rush, but after ten or twelve days of overt preparation, which, he believed, would induce the French to prepare for the coming attack by massing on the Meuse south of Namur. Though Schlieffen reckoned on the intervention of England, whether the German troops marched through Belgium or not, he was well aware of the odium which such tactics would provoke. The adoption of the plan involved political consequences of immeasurable significance, yet Bülow informed the author that he was never officially consulted.

The transition from war to peace is the theme of three official publications. *The Preliminary History of the Armistice*, translated by the Carnegie Endowment, was issued by the German Government in 1919 "to refute the spreading of false



reports." The documents, declares the Preface, should facilitate the formation of an impartial judgment on the discussions between the Supreme Army Command and the political leaders during the closing stages of the war. The White-book contains all the representations made by the Generals, and the Preface sharply condemns the "undecided and contradictory opinions of Ludendorff." The conclusion is clear. The war was lost on the battlefield, as confessed by the military leaders. The "stab in the back" was an afterthought.

We may study in detail the period of the Armistice and the work of the Armistice Commission in *Der Waffenstillstand*, 1918-1919. The preface to the first volume, which deals with the armistice of Compiègne and its successive prolongations, explains that, since widely different opinions are held in regard to the conduct of the German representatives, it was decided to publish the record in full. The second volume is devoted to the discussions involved in the execution of the various agreements. The third is the most interesting to the general reader, for it contains the report of the Committee on the activities of the Armistice Commission. No attempt at understanding was displayed by the Allies. Decisions were announced and protests were commonly ignored. "Foch, as the victor, dictated, guided by the will to annihilate and the sentiment of revenge." Only in secondary matters could the Germans obtain a hearing. The Allies ignored the terms of the armistice in relation to Alsace-Lorraine, Poland and other parts of the political and economic field over which their authority extended. The concluding pages are a bitter indictment of broken promises and ruthless administration. The impression we derive is that in the most discouraging circumstances Erzberger and his colleagues did all they could.

Even more interesting are the *Materialien betreffend die Friedensverhandlungen*, which contain the documents and correspondence exchanged between the German Delegation at Versailles and the Allies, including the well-known *Whitebook concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War*, drawn up by Professors Delbrück, Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Max Weber and Count Montgelas, and translated by the Carnegie Endowment. The official declarations of Brockdorff-Rantzau from his acceptance of the Foreign Office in December 1918 till his resignation in June 1919, when the Weimar Assembly decided to accept the Treaty of Versailles, were published by him under the simple title of *Dokumente* in 1920, and appeared in an

enlarged edition with a preface by Professor Delbrück in 1922. From beginning to end, declares the author, his policy was consistent. Having accepted the Fourteen Points, on the strength of which Germany had laid down her arms, he declined to sign a treaty in which they were violated or to shoulder obligations which it would be impossible to fulfil. Students of these pages will probably agree that no German diplomat could have presented the demand of the new Germany for fair play with greater argumentative skill. Twenty years later Professor Fritz Berber published two enormous documentary volumes, *Das Diktat von Versailles: Entstehung, Inhalt, Zerfall*, with a Foreword by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister.

The legend of a Crown Council held on July 5, 1914, which decided to precipitate a world war, was destroyed by Kurt Jagow's narrative, *Der Potsdamer Kronrat*, published in the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* of August 1928. New evidence is supplied by some of the principal actors, including William II, Count Hoyos, who brought the appeal of Francis Joseph, and Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who, in the absence of his chief, was in control of the Wilhelmstrasse; and the dry entries in the diaries of the officials on duty at Potsdam on July 5 and 6 are reproduced in full. We can now reconstruct every incident of those fateful days on which the ruler saw in succession the people whom under the circumstances it was his obvious duty to see. There is nothing in the story to suggest either a closeting of conspirators or a will to war. Among the crumbs of fresh information perhaps the most interesting are the Kaiser's testimony to the difficulty with which Bethmann persuaded him to leave for his yachting tour, and Hoyos' expression of his opinion to Zimmermann that Servia should as far as possible be partitioned between Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania and Austria. This suggestion was disapproved by Tisza, who caused Berchtold to disavow it.

In addition to the labours of the archivists and the Reichstag, students of war origins are indebted to the *Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen*, founded in 1921. The modest bibliographical *Wochenberichte* developed in 1923 into the indispensable monthly *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, later *Berliner Monatshefte*, edited by Alfred von Wegerer and since 1937 by August Bach, in which new material is brought to light, and to which scholars and statesmen of many lands have contributed. A parallel series of *Beiträge zur Kriegsschuldfrage*

includes translations of Dobrorolski's narrative of the Russian mobilization and the diary of the Russian Foreign Office in July 1914, and enlarged editions of the Russian Orange-book and the French Yellow-book. The object of the Bureau, declared the Director in a survey, *Zum fünfjährigen Bestehen der Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen*, was the scientific investigation of the question of war guilt. "It will continue in this course till a political exploitation of the results becomes practicable. In all its activities it is inspired by the great idea of putting an end to the slandering of Germany."

## II

Passing from collections of documents and memoranda to biographies and autobiographies, letters and diaries, let us begin with William II. The last of the Hohenzollerns has drawn his own portrait, not only in his annotations on official papers, but in his letters and telegrams to the Tsar, for the publication of which we are indebted to the Bolsheviks. *The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar*, edited by N. E. Grant, bear the impress of their author's personality, but the more important of them were drafted in the Wilhelmstrasse. "They were never despatched," testifies the Kaiser, "without the knowledge of the Chancellors, and sometimes at their wish." There is no scrap of evidence to confirm the once popular delusion that he was engaged throughout his reign in planning attacks on his neighbours. On the other hand, they strengthen the impression that he was a disturbing factor in the life of the world, and the story of the Pact of Björkö, the most sensational of their revelations, leaves a disagreeable taste. The deep distrust of British policy mirrored in these pages, his contempt for the French Republic, his restlessness, his credulity and his suspicions have convinced many of his late subjects, no less than more distant observers, that he was scarcely fitted for the high office to which he was born.

The Kaiser's *Memoirs*, which in their subdued colours present a strange contrast to the lurid hues of the letters and telegrams, follow the familiar practice in transferring responsibility for mishaps to other shoulders. There is no suggestion that he ever made a mistake, and we are assured that he protested against the worst blunders of his counsellors, which as a constitutional monarch he was unable to prevent. It is true enough that he disliked the Tangier demonstration, and

the Agadir *coup* was Kiderlen's work. It is, however, impossible to accept his plea that he was innocent of the Kruger telegram, and his letter to the Tsar of January 2, 1896, proves that he was as angry and excited as any of his advisers. He writes with dignity about Bismarck, with gratitude about Caprivi and Hohenlohe; but his chapters on Bülow and Bethmann are filled with sharp criticism. Bülow, he declares, was a valued friend and an accomplished Parliamentary manager, but his handling of the *Daily Telegraph* crisis destroyed his master's confidence. Bethmann, he notes, was slow in decision and played the schoolmaster, while his policy of buying back British friendship by a naval agreement was doomed to failure. The Haldane mission is dismissed as a political manœuvre, and the wisdom no less than the energy of Tirpitz is warmly extolled. The author portrays Germany as a profoundly pacific State wantonly attacked by the Triple Entente—a thesis as unconvincing as the rival superstition that Germany was the wolf in the European sheepfold.

A more agreeable impression is derived from the Kaiser's second book, *My Early Life*. The account of his diplomatic missions to Russia enables him to emphasize the fact that war was in sight in 1887 and that the rift within the lute began in his grandfather's reign. The arid pages of the *Comparative Tables*, 1878–1914, compiled for his own use in 1919, privately printed in 1920, and published in 1921, derive their meagre interest solely from the light they throw on the outlook of their nominal author. Their mis-statements, mistakes and suppressions are exposed by Appuhn and Renouvin in their volume *Introduction aux Tableaux d'histoire de Guillaume II*, which accompanied the French translation of the work. *My Ancestors* is the latest, shortest and least significant of his writings. The Hohenzollerns pass in rapid procession, and with the exception of Frederick William II they receive high marks. The volume is a political sermon, and, though the narrative ends with the Emperor Frederick, the author is constantly thinking of himself. His ideal for Germany and other countries is an enlightened autocrat.

The intellectual interests of William II are pleasantly illustrated in his correspondence with Houston Stewart Chamberlain, which fills the second half of the second volume of the latter's *Briefe 1882–1924 und Briefwechsel mit Kaiser Wilhelm II*. The author of *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* had no more attentive reader, and the ruler's interest encouraged him

to present his books as they appeared and to write letters or rather essays of enormous length. The Kaiser's replies were in his own hand. There is no sign of patronage or condescension in the outpourings of "your true grateful friend." An interesting letter, dated December 23, 1907, describes his state visit to Windsor with its happy aftermath at Highcliffe, and expresses admiration of the British national character. His mood changed with the war, and he was loud in approval of Chamberlain's hysterical laudations of his adopted country. Before the catastrophe the Kaiser used to read aloud the sermons of his favourite divine, Bishop Boyd Carpenter. At Doorn he welcomed with enthusiasm the gift of Chamberlain's *Mensch und Gott*, which was also read aloud and stirred him to a long letter of reflections on religion and religions.

The other side of the shield is presented in the *Letters of the Empress Frederick*, edited by Sir Frederick Ponsonby. While Bismarck is of course the arch-enemy, his fall brought the widowed sufferer no comfort; for his place was taken by that most tragic of figures, an autocrat unequal to his destiny. "William is so green", she wrote to Queen Victoria, "that he makes blunders which take one's breath away." "Look before you leap! I should like to write in big letters over his table, though it would be of very little use, I fear." "I wish I could put a padlock on his mouth." "He is perfectly delighted with himself." "He has no heart." Such was the shrill indictment of a gifted but ill-balanced ruler by a broken-hearted mother, who had lost everything which made life worth living, and who looked with jaundiced eyes on the occupants of the Imperial throne. To the German edition of the letters the Kaiser added a Preface, a translation of which appeared in the *Evening Standard* on February 12, 1929. In language of faultless tact and unruffled dignity the fallen monarch pays homage to the brilliant qualities and exalted ideals of his mother, while gently reminding the reader that "the Prussians were not Englishmen", and that her passionate temperament did not facilitate the task of the unhappiest woman who ever wore a crown.

The Crown Prince followed his father's example by entering the ranks of authorship. His *Memoirs* were skilfully edited by Karl Rosner, the novelist, who had shown his sympathetic interest in the Imperial family by his study of the last weeks of Hohenzollern rule entitled *The King*. The jottings of the lonely exile in the foggy little island of Wieringen began in March

1919. "It is evening. Not a soul, not a sound." He frankly confesses to friction with his father, adding that it was a Hohenzollern tradition. They differed, he explains, both in views and temperament; but he speaks with respect of the Emperor's idealism, high personal character and love of peace. Bülow, he declares, was much the biggest of Bismarck's successors, and he would probably have achieved a tolerable peace had he returned after the fall of Bethmann, who had become impossible. On both occasions in 1917 when a new Chancellor had to be found, the Crown Prince urged his claims, and we learn that the Kaiser, contrary to the general belief, was ready to accept him. Failing Bülow, the author's alternative was Tirpitz. He writes with warm appreciation of King Edward. The most interesting pages in the book describe the Kaiser's moral and physical collapse during the *Daily Telegraph* crisis in 1908. Summoned to Potsdam the young man found his father in bed, looking years older, broken and alone; and he expresses the view that he never fully recovered from the shock. Its sequel, entitled *My War Experiences*, is of military rather than political interest. A supplementary volume, entitled *I seek the Truth*, sketches the foreign policy of the Empire with the aid of the newly published materials. The author has no difficulty in answering some of the common charges against his country, and he assures us that he was "an almost daily witness that nothing weighed so heavily with the Emperor as the maintenance of peace."

An unflattering picture of William II is painted in many of the diaries, letters and reminiscences of his subjects. The three volumes of *Denkwürdigkeiten* of Field-Marshal Count Waldersee, Moltke's ambitious and intriguing successor as Chief of the Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the international force in China in 1900, are available in an abridged translation by Frederick Whyte. They reveal with extraordinary vividness the charm of the young Prince before his accession to the throne, and the growing disappointment of the diarist when power revealed the instability which alarmed friend and foe. An even more convincing portrait is painted by the most intimate friend he ever possessed, Philip Eulenburg, whose autobiography, *Aus Fünfzig Jahren*, makes the Iron Chancellor live again, and whose diary and correspondence have been utilized in Johannes Haller's fascinating work *Prince Eulenburg The Kaiser's Friend*. "Phili", whose unique favour found expression in the grant of the princely title and in being

addressed by the familiar *Du*, was not only a poet, a musician and a *charmeur*, but an accomplished diplomatist and a clear-sighted political adviser. Whatever may be thought of Haller's gallant attempt to rebut the accusations against his private character, the documents he has published set the Prince's relation to the Kaiser in a new light. The cringing courtier of popular legend largely disappears, and we discern the affectionate friend whose services were continually invoked to avert a *faux pas*. In these poignant pages "the poor dear Kaiser" provokes sympathy with his loneliness rather than anger at his mistakes. Eulenburg was a consummate letter-writer, and his reports from Munich and Vienna are full of colour and life; but it is above all as a record of the secret history of the first half of the reign of William II that this volume retains a conspicuous place among the revelations made possible by the eviction of the dynasty. An equally attractive picture of the man is painted by his later biographer Muschler.

Further light is thrown on a historic friendship in the volumes published by Eulenburg's widow in 1931, entitled *Mit dem Kaiser als Staatsmann und Freund auf Nordlandreisen*. The book, she informs us, was occasioned by gross misrepresentations and untruths in Bülow's *Memoirs*. For fourteen years Eulenburg accompanied his master on his summer cruise, performing political duties every time except the first (1889) and the last (1903). There is inevitably a good deal of repetition in the descriptions of life on the Imperial yacht, and there are no politics in these pages; but the portrait of the Kaiser in holiday mood grows in definition with the accumulation of trivial details. "You love him, so you understand I am proud of him", wrote the Empress, to whom many of the letters are addressed when, as was usually the case, she was not a member of the party.

Two volumes of *Erlebnisse*, also edited by his widow, a more substantial production consisting of reminiscences and correspondence, supplement the *Memoirs*, the biographies and the letters. William II, "the good Kaiser", "the poor Kaiser", again occupies the centre of the stage, suggesting kindness rather than strength. He is seen at his best in the library of Liebenberg eagerly discussing historical and theological problems with Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Harnack, Bülow and his host. The most valuable chapter describes the arduous and finally successful attempt of the German Ambassador at Vienna at the turn of the century to overcome the

prejudice of the heir to the throne against William II, and to wean him from his attachment to Russia which appeared to involve potential danger to the Triple Alliance. The siege began with flattery, and the fortress capitulated when official Germany smiled on his marriage. Among the achievements of his eight years at Vienna Eulenburg always reckoned the conversion of Franz Ferdinand as the most significant. Of even greater human interest is the pleasant picture of Frau Schratt as a ray of sunshine in the venerable Emperor's life.

William II appears in a favourable light in the memoirs of Valentini, *Kaiser und Kabinettschef*, edited and published after his death by Schwertfeger. Appointed Chief of the Civil Cabinet in 1908, he remained a trusted counsellor for ten years. The most interesting passages in the pre-war period describe the *Daily Telegraph* crisis. The Kaiser claimed to have acted with perfect constitutional propriety, and was therefore bewildered by the tornado of criticism. "Tell me what is going on. What does it all mean?" He was furious with Bülow for letting him down, and Valentini expected an immediate break. At Potsdam he saw the Chancellor come and go on November 17, 1908. After a conversation of two hours the Kaiser merely remarked that he had agreed to a public declaration, but his appearance told its own tale. "He was pale and agitated. I had the impression that he had only yielded under great spiritual stress, and that he would never forgive the Chancellor." A second painful surrender took place in January 1918, when he was compelled by Hindenburg and Ludendorff to dismiss Valentini for the offence of endeavouring to uphold his master's authority against military dictation.

An equally friendly picture of the Court is painted by Freiherr von Reischach in his artless volume, *Under Three Emperors*. His greatest admiration is reserved for the Empress Frederick, whom he served as Hofmarschall throughout her widowhood. As Master of the Horse to William II from 1905 to 1914, and thereafter as Oberhofmarschall, he writes with sympathy of the monarch, while freely criticizing Holstein and Marschall, Bülow and Tirpitz. Though Bethmann is often denounced for listening to the Left, in these pages he is censured for yielding to the Right. The author describes a dramatic scene at Pless on January 9, 1917. "I entered the room and found him sitting utterly broken. To my horrified question. 'Have we lost a battle?' he replied, 'No, but *Finis Germaniae*. I have spoken for an hour against the submarine war, which will bring in the



United States. 'That will be too much for us.' When I had done, Admiral von Holtzendorff jumped up and said: 'I guarantee on my word as a naval officer that no American will set foot on the Continent.' 'You should resign,' commented Reischach. 'I cannot sow dissension,' rejoined the Chancellor, 'just when Germany is playing her last card.' From this moment the author ceased to believe in victory.

The activities and emotions of the Kaiser from the turn of the tide in August, 1918, till his flight across the frontier are depicted with genuine sympathy by his adjutant Alfred Niemann in his little book *Kaiser und Revolution*. Niemann's fidelity survived his master's fall, and in his *Wanderungen mit Kaiser Wilhelm II* he records his conversations in the quiet days of exile. The monarch finds nothing of which to repent. He defends the rejection of a British partnership on the ground that it involved a break with Russia, and argues that if Germany had not stood by her ally in 1914 Pan Slavism would have produced some other weapon from its armoury. Accepting this interpretation of events, the author expresses his regret that the German people never really learned to know their ruler. Of less political interest, but tinged with the same affectionate emotion, are the *Erinnerungen* of Dr. Dryander, Court Chaplain in the sunshine of Imperial glory and spiritual comforter in the days of eclipse.

The diaries of Count Zedlitz offer a very different picture of the monarch. *Twelve Years at the Kaiser's Court* emphasizes his defects more sharply than any other work written from close observation, and these cold entries between 1898 and 1910, the author assures us, have not been touched up. We hear little of the charm and alert intelligence which struck visitors received in audience. We find instead the touchy and trivial figure-head of a Byzantine court, increasingly averse to business as the years roll on, and indulging in violent outbursts against King Edward and any other foe of the moment. Scarcely less severe is the picture of Bülow, who is depicted as clinging to office at the price of self-respect, a brilliant courtier as destitute of backbone as was his master of balance.

The *Memoirs* of the Kaiser's sister, Princess Victoria of Prussia, whose love for the chivalrous Battenberger had once threatened to embroil two empires, are singularly lacking in interest. Those of his sister-in-law, Princess Friedrich Leopold of Prussia, *Behind the Scenes at the Prussian Court*, are a frontal attack on the ruler who dominated and darkened her husband's

life. *Daisy, Princess of Pless*, by Herself, is something more than the chat of a vivacious English girl married to a wealthy Silesian nobleman. The Princess endeavoured in her unconventional way to mediate between the two countries, and her efforts were never resented by the Kaiser, whom she describes as a kind and faithful friend. He wished to keep the peace without knowing how it could be done. The establishment of Headquarters on the Eastern front often brought him to Pless, where his virtual dethronement by the war-gods was as obvious to his hostess as it was humiliating to himself. She had watched with anxious foreboding the gathering of the storm and confided her apprehensions to Lord Rosebery, whose letter of January 25, 1912, is perhaps the most interesting document in the volume. "I am indeed uneasy as to our position, for we seem to be bound on the Continent by some invisible and formidable bonds. But as this is the settled policy apparently of both political parties, it is not easy, perhaps not possible, to put things right. Anyhow I cannot. I have tried and found it a task both thankless and fruitless."

The library at Doorn contained a mass of material accumulated in Germany and enriched by memoranda written in exile. What use should he make of it? The answer was given in 1926 when Nowak, whose vivid volumes on the war years had aroused considerable interest, was invited to write the history of the reign. Stipulating for complete independence in the expression of his views, the Austrian publicist accepted the task. The documentary and oral evidence was supplemented by conversations and correspondence with the surviving actors of the drama or their families, and the results were discussed in minute detail. "You are not servile," remarked the Kaiser, and Nowak declares that no attempt was ever made to suppress or modify his criticisms.

The unfinished narrative is of value for the new material it contains and still more as embodying the version of events which William II desired the world to accept. Nowak lacked historical training, and he was too apt to believe what he was told; yet we cannot ignore his work. The first volume of *Das Dritte Deutsche Kaiserreich* (English translation, *Kaiser and Chancellor*) describes the first two years of the reign, culminating in the fall of the Iron Chancellor. Basing his narrative on the Kaiser's conversations and papers, including a commentary on Bismarck's third volume, utilizing the Vienna archives, and enriching his pages with information supplied by Ferdin-

and of Bulgaria, Prince Fürstenberg, Raschdau, and other survivors from a vanished world, he assigns all the honours to the young ruler. Siegfried von Kardoff, son of Bismarck's faithful supporter, hurried to the defence of the Chancellor and dealt Nowak some shrewd blows. Yet the notion which prevailed at the time that William II wantonly dismissed the greatest political genius of the modern world is no longer tenable.

The second and larger volume carries us from 1890 to 1905. Once again we are presented with an imposing list of witnesses, among them Tirpitz, Kühlmann and Conrad, and the Kaiser's commentary on Bülow's *Memoirs* is utilized. The most interesting pages record his version of the Cowes interview with Salisbury in 1895 and the shaping of the Kruger telegram. In the latter Marschall emerges as the prime mover, and he is credited with the plan to land marines at Lorenzo Marques for the defence of Germans in Pretoria. The Foreign Minister was the only champion of action, declares the Kaiser, who opposed his draft of a telegram and described it as incredible. Marschall, however, who talked much and fast and was greatly excited, was supported by Hohenlohe. "I, not the Emperor", declared the Chancellor, "assume full responsibility." The Kaiser reluctantly signed and threw down the pen with the prophetic words: "That was bad advice. When you, my dear uncle, are long dead, I shall have to pay the price in a war with England." Whether these oracular words were uttered in 1896 or imaginatively reconstructed thirty years later the reader may decide for himself.

The second half of the volume is dominated by Bülow, who is depicted as superficial, lazy and untruthful. At first the Kaiser was dazzled by his brilliance, but the charm wore off and his miscalculations were revealed. The ruler, we are told, desired co-operation with Russia or England, preferably the latter; but Bülow desired to keep his hands free, and his master was only partially informed of the negotiations. Not till it was too late did he discover that the Chancellor and Holstein, by lies, deceit and shortsightedness, had destroyed the chance of agreement. William II plays the same rôle of injured innocence in the narratives of Björkö and Tangier. At this point Nowak's early death cut short the Imperial apologia.

Of far greater value for the political history of the reign is the testimony of Otto Hammann, the influential head of the Press

Department of the Foreign Office, whose three volumes of reminiscences, *Der neue Kurs*, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Grossen Krieges*, and *Um den Kaiser*, bring the story down to the fall of Bülow in 1909. A supplementary work, entitled *Der Missverständene Bismarck*, summarizing the material in the preceding volumes relating to foreign affairs, is available to English readers as *The World Policy of Germany*, 1890-1912. A fifth volume, *Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit*, contains intimate portraits of Holstein, Bülow, Bethmann, Kiderlen, Tirpitz and the Kaiser himself. Among the most notable features of these indispensable volumes are the story of the British approaches during the Boer war, the scathing analysis of Holstein's activities, the affectionate study of Bülow's personality, and the full-length picture of William II. The Kaiser, he complains, never grew up, and never learned from his own mistakes; but his desire for the maintenance of peace was absolutely sincere. He was a stage hero, not a warrior. His real responsibility is to be found in the pretentious and menacing utterances, public and private, which caused the world to believe that he aimed at conquest. "The deepest tragedy of the Peace Kaiser in shining armour is that he will never understand his own share in producing the situation which led to the war."

### III

Let us watch William II at work with his Chancellors. Among the minor results of the defeat of Germany was the release of the third volume of Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences*. Unlike the fully considered masterpiece published immediately after his death, the slender supplement for which the world waited so impatiently proved a disappointment. Controversy was expected in a narrative of the quarrel with his young master, but there was little else. The book is written with a pen of gall, and throws more discredit on the author than on the monarch whom he hated and despised. Bismarck never forgave those who stood in his way.

The colourless Caprivi left no memoirs and has found no biographer, but Hohenlohe may be studied in three substantial volumes of diaries, correspondence and memoranda. The first two, published by his son Prince Alexander in 1907, offered a few tantalizing morsels from the years of his Chancellorship, but the revelations of the last phase had to wait till the Hohenzollerns had gone. The *Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichs-*

*kanzlerzeit*, edited by Karl Alexander von Müller, prove that, at any rate during the first half of the period, Onkel Chlodwig, as the Kaiser called him, was by no means a cipher despite his age. He was too much of the Grand Seigneur to descend to the Byzantine flatteries of his successor. When the Kaiser complained that he had not made a declaration to the Reichstag in the exact words desired, he wired back : " I am Chancellor, not an official of the Chancery." While recognizing the ruler's good intentions, quick intelligence and personal charm, he became increasingly conscious of his immaturity and instability. With the appointment of Bülow to the Foreign Office and Tirpitz to the Admiralty in 1897, the aged Chancellor realized that he had become a back number, and in 1900, at the age of 81, he was glad to resign. Our knowledge of his strenuous years in the Wilhelmstrasse is enriched by the reminiscences (*Aus meinem Leben*) of his son, Prince Alexander, who as his private secretary had abundant opportunities of studying the baffling personality and observing the tortuous methods of Holstein.

Though Bülow's *Imperial Germany*, first published in 1913, appeared in a new form in 1916, the addition of a chapter on "German Militarism" and the omission of anti-Socialist criticism did little to alter its character. The adroit preliminary apologia of the Fourth Chancellor was supplemented after the war by Spickernagel's *Fürst Bülow*. The biographer, who compares his hero to Hardenberg, describes him as a political Grand Seigneur, perhaps the last in Germany. The most valuable portions of the book are from the pen of the ex-Chancellor himself. Bethmann's complaint in his apologia that the situation he inherited was almost hopeless was sharply repudiated in a long letter to the editor of the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, reprinted in these pages. After defending his rejection of the British approach, his campaign against Delcassé and his support of Austria in 1909, Bülow carries the war into the enemy's camp. Agadir, he asserts, was far more resented in France than the Tangier speech, and the Liman Mission was much more disastrous to Russo-German relations than the so-called ultimatum of 1909. Bethmann's conviction that the war was inevitable recalls to his critic the rejoinder of Napoleon to a defeated General's excuse : "La Fatalité, Sire !" "La Fatalité, l'excuse des maladroits et des incapables." Of equal interest is the correspondence with Bassermann, leader of the National Liberals, who stood in the same sort of

relation to Bülow as Bennigsen had stood to Bismarck. The letters cover the period from 1911 to 1915, and are filled with criticisms of "poor Bethmann." The curtain falls on the failure of the mission to Italy. "They should have sent me to Rome four months earlier. I am like a doctor who is only called to the bedside at the last moment." The Prince's letters from the Villa Malta are supplemented by a vivid account of the development of Italian policy by the German Military Attaché in Rome, based on his despatches from October 1914, till the declaration of war against Austria in the following May.

In the vast literature of our period Bülow's Memoirs hold a place apart. Grey's *Twenty-five Years* fills two volumes of very moderate size. Iswolsky had only brought his narrative down to his appointment as Foreign Minister when he died at the age of 63. Bethmann's apologia begins in 1909, that of Sazonoff in 1910, that of Poincaré in 1912. Bülow's story, on the other hand, fills four stout volumes and covers seventy years of his life. His massive autobiography yields in interest and importance, so far as Germany is concerned, to the apologia of Bismarck alone. Nowhere else shall we find such a portrait-gallery of the Hohenzollern Empire. From a literary point of view the book is an outstanding success, for the fourth Chancellor wrote almost as well as he talked.

Bülow began to dictate in 1921 at the age of 72, and he decided to start with his twelve years of power. On his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1897 he proceeded to study the documents of the Wilhelmstrasse, and reached the conclusion that Germany had little to gain and much to lose by war. Every year that she could maintain peace with honour was a gain, for her population and wealth were growing apace. How then could peace be kept? By provoking no one and allowing no one to trample on her toes. The principle was simple enough, but the situation was far from satisfactory. In their first conversation Hohenlohe stressed the necessity of trying to undo as much as possible the mischief caused by the dropping of Bismarck's secret treaty with Russia. France and Russia, now allies, hated Germany, and England, though not unfriendly, did not recognize her as an equal. The building of a much needed fleet for defensive purposes could not be to her taste, and skilful steering was required. The problem was complicated by personal factors. Tirpitz was a big man, but he hated England and lacked judgment. There was another difficulty in still higher spheres. "Do you think the Emperor

is quite sane?" asked Hohenlohe. Bülow replied in the affirmative. "There are *nuances*," mused the old Chancellor. "In any case he needs wise counsellors more than any other sovereign."

Though no complete picture of foreign policy is to be found in these volumes, there are vivid sketches of memorable transactions. In describing his visit to England in the autumn of 1899, he rebuts the charge that he let Chamberlain down. When the Colonial Secretary urged co-operation between England, Germany and the United States in order to keep France quiet and Russia in check, he pointed out that such a partnership must not have a point against Russia, and that Germany would need guarantees against the risk of a Russian attack. Moreover, so long as the South African war lasted, German public opinion would have to be kept in view. A gradual rapprochement, in fact, was offered, in accordance with the advice of Hohenlohe and of Hatzfeldt, the experienced Ambassador, to avoid commitments without solid guarantees. Germany's relation to Russia, argues Bülow, was more vital than to England, for it was a question of life and death. He was well aware of the charge that he had missed a golden opportunity of getting closer to England during the embarrassments of the Boer war, but he refuses to recant. He quotes King Edward's expression of gratitude at Kiel in 1904 on his courageous attitude during that period, and adds his compliment: "I have confidence in you, in your love of peace and in your skill." The King, he declares, disliked Germany, but had no wish for war.

The chief topic of the second volume in the field of foreign affairs is Morocco, in regard to which Bülow and his master held different views. Just as Bismarck had encouraged France to take Tunis, so William II believed that her interest in Morocco would avert her gaze from the Rhineland and open up the country to German trade. He always desired reconciliation with France, and he went so far as to declare that Germany had no political or territorial interests in Morocco. When, however, Delcassé raced ahead, buying off Italian, British and Spanish interests while ignoring Berlin, Bülow urged a stronger policy than his master liked. "In the interest of peace we could no longer put up with such provocations. . . . I did not want war, but I did not hesitate to threaten it, since I trusted to my skill to avert it." His aim was to overthrow Delcassé, to frustrate his policy of aggression, to knock the continental

sword out of the hand of Edward VII and the war party in England, and thus peacefully to preserve German honour and increase German prestige. The Kaiser's pronouncement at Tangier was sharper in tone than he intended, owing to the excitement engendered by the rough landing and his spirited steed. This departure from the programme caused Holstein severe internal hæmorrhage. Despite this hitch, however, the Tangier policy was a success, for the eviction of Delcassé secured peace for many years. "Franco-German relations were never so good since 1871 as between Algéciras and Agadir."

The chapter on Björkö describes another conflict of wills, and once again the Kaiser is exhibited as a blundering amateur. Bülow's offer to accompany him was declined on the ground that the two rulers could best transact their business alone. The unauthorized alteration of the draft treaty produced an offer of resignation from the Chancellor and an emotional reply. "Despite our differences, I loved him with all my heart . . . I felt like a father for his son. . . . Even later, when I had no more illusions about his superficiality and vanity, his untrustworthiness and untruthfulness, even when he fled abroad, leaving ruins behind him, I could not hate him." The Björkö incident suggested a doubt whether their friendship could survive a second strain. The *Daily Telegraph* incident, which is described at greater length than any other subject in the whole work, supplied the answer.

The third volume is a sustained attack on Bethmann for allowing Germany to drift into an unwanted war. The most valuable chapters describe the author's unavailing efforts to keep Italy out of the fray. Despatched to Rome at the end of 1914 on a special mission he realized from his talks with Sonnino that speedy action was imperative. Italy, he believed, had moved far towards the Triple Entente, but was not definitely engaged. The sole chance was to concede her minimum demands, above all the Trentino. "I had to think not of Austria but of German interests." The Italians were polite, and the King remarked: "If you had remained in power, all these follies would not have occurred." He was assisted by Erzberger, whom he depicts as a rough diamond but loyal and useful. Flotow, on the other hand, the German Ambassador whose activities were temporarily suspended, conspired with the Wilhelmstrasse to frustrate the Mission, reporting that Italy would not dare to attack Austria. Macchio, "slow, formal and indolent, lacking initiative, the type of an Austrian



official of the old school," is also trounced for refusing to believe in the danger of war and the necessity of sacrifice. When Bülow told Sonnino that he would try to get the Trentino for Italy, the Austrian Ambassador refused to discuss it. The worst offender was Jagow, who showed Bülow's despatches to Vienna, where he had hitherto been regarded with friendly eyes. He left Rome on May 25, 1915, with a sore heart but with the consciousness that he had done all that man could do. "I reflected that the situation which in December, with greater energy and greater loyalty on the part of Berlin, might have been saved was ruined by the vacillation of Bethmann, Berchtold and Burian, and by the tactics of Jagow and Flotow." By the advice of Bethmann and Jagow the envoy was not received by the Kaiser, nominally from desire to spare Austria's feelings.

After completing the vital portion of his story, Bülow compiled a fourth volume on his career before his appointment as Foreign Minister at the age of 48. Though his work at Bucharest and Rome is briefly reviewed, it is with the first three volumes that the historian has to deal. Self-righteousness is the rule in political apologies, and the only mistakes to which Bülow confesses are in relation to appointments of friends or *protégés* who disappointed his hopes. What surprised and shocked the world was his malice and the discovery of a meanness of soul hitherto hidden behind a smiling *façade*. It was the first time, said a wit, that a man committed suicide after his death. By a hundred pin-pricks he revenges himself on his old master. His frontal attacks on Jagow and Monts are only less deplorable than his revelation of unsavoury details in the private life of men still alive. Very rarely does he allot high marks. His tributes to the virtues of his father, Bismarck's Foreign Secretary, the Empress, his wife, and one or two private friends, stand out in sharp contrast to his low valuation of mankind.

Bülow's claim that he left Germany in a better international position than he found her was generally rejected at home and abroad. But it was above all on his malicious misrepresentations of persons and events that the critics fell. No political apologia has evoked such a chorus of anger and such a volley of expert replies. Schmidt-Pauli was first in the field with *Fürst Bülow's Denkwürdigkeiten*, in which the most valuable item is a detailed defence of the non-renewal of the Russian treaty in 1890 by Raschdau, the only survivor of the officials of

the Wilhelmstrasse who were concerned. Far more formidable was the stout volume *Front wider Bülow*, edited by Thimme, who described its purpose as being to repair the moral damage wrought by the *Memoirs*, and himself contributed a lengthy chapter on Bülow and the Kaiser. Raschdau testifies that he was never trusted by the Wilhelmstrasse. Johannes Haller, the biographer of Eulenburg, denounces the attempt to revive the legend of his hero as a mere courtier of doubtful character. Jaeckh reveals that his friend Kiderlen, on discovering that Bülow had engineered his disgrace by showing the Kaiser extracts from his letters, wrote in 1910: "Bülow was a greater Schweinehund than I ever dreamed." Schoen corrects the account of the visit to Tangier, of which he was an eye-witness. Bülow's version of the *Daily Telegraph* incident is denounced as a tissue of untruths, including the statement that Schoen shammed illness. Zimmermann defends the Foreign Office against the criticisms of its old chief, and declares that Bülow followed Holstein's advice to the end.

The most important contribution in this valuable work is that of Jagow who, succeeding Kiderlen as Foreign Minister in 1913, discovered that Bülow's policy had been unwise. Their friendship was broken at the end of 1914, when Bülow desired to go to Rome as Ambassador, while Jagow favoured an unofficial mission. The official despatch of an ex-Chancellor, he feared, would stimulate the Italian appetite. Since, however, everyone in Berlin regarded him as the man for the job, he recommended him to the Kaiser. Bülow, he declares, never forgave him, for he envisaged the mission as a stepping-stone to power. His statement that the Wilhelmstrasse sabotaged his work was untrue, for it urged Austria to make concessions, and he had no right to offer what Vienna declined to give. The whole story of Jagow-Flotow intrigues is indignantly denied. Jagow's testimony is confirmed by Flotow, the Ambassador whom Bülow's arrival in Rome displaced. Neither Bülow, whom the King of Italy described to him as *un agréable causeur*, nor any one else, he argues, could help—only victories. Flotow denies all political activities after the arrival of the distinguished envoy in Rome. A further refutation of Bülow's version of his mission to Italy is provided by the Austrian Ambassador Freiherr von Macchio in *Wahrheit: Fürst Bülow und ich in Rom 1914-1915*.

Eckardstein joined in the fray in a slender volume *Die Entlassung des Fürsten Bülow*. His stock never stood very high,

and some of Bülow's disparaging references were not wholly without justification; yet no one could expect such slashing attacks to be taken lying down. Bülow, he declares, had three aims: to retain the Kaiser's favour, to be popular in the Reichstag, and to be praised by the press. Count Posadowsky once described him as the greatest wind-bag he ever knew. Eckardstein reiterates his familiar contention that an English alliance was within reach at the turn of the century, and that the real cause of the *Einkreisung* and therefore of the world war was Bülow himself. The larger portion of the book is devoted to the *Daily Telegraph* incident, and the author gleefully claims a share in compassing the overthrow of his hated enemy. A more attractive portrait is painted in *Fürst Bülow, Der Staatsmann und Mensch*, by the veteran Austrian journalist Siegmund Münz, based on the conversations of many years in Berlin, Rome and Norderney.

Though Bülow's *Memoirs* have been riddled with shot and shell, it would be a mistake to throw them on the rubbish heap. However unjust and ungenerous his portraits of other men he has given us a convincing picture of himself. His presentation of William II as a well-meaning *enfant terrible* is not to be dismissed as a mere spiteful caricature. When he gets away from his critics and rivals, he can do justice to Bismarck, Hohenlohe and other outstanding figures of the past. There are many letters of interest, sparkling anecdotes without number, reflections on men and books. He warmed both hands before the fire of life. However little we may like him, we can never banish him from our thoughts.

Bülow suggested Bethmann-Hollweg as his successor, but he lived to confess his mistake. The unsullied character and love of peace of the fifth German Chancellor are incontestable. But he knew little of foreign affairs at the time of his promotion in 1909, and the lack of unified control was increased by his recommendation of the masterful Kiderlen as Foreign Secretary. The first volume of his *Reflections on the World War* is pitched throughout in a minor key. We seem to hear the plaintive accents of Hamlet lamenting that the times were out of joint and that he was called to set them right. Since Russia was irrevocably lost, he explains, the only chance of escape from *Einkreisung* was an agreement with England. His policy was to meet British demands in regard to the fleet in return for a neutrality pact, but neither side proved willing to make the sacrifice. The Kaiser, with Tirpitz and the Pan-Germans be-

hind him, refused serious concessions, and the British Government, closely linked to France and Russia, merely promised not to make or join in an unprovoked attack. The negotiations began in 1909, were interrupted by the Agadir crisis, were resumed by Lord Haldane at Berlin, and broke down after his return. Though the British and German Governments co-operated in maintaining peace during the Balkan wars, and a new confidence, mirrored in the Baghdad Railway and the African agreements, began to prevail, the division of Europe into two camps remained. Thus when the murder of Franz Ferdinand provided Austria with the pretext for a final reckoning with Belgrad, Bethmann, like his master, accepted her contention that the termination of Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy was a matter of life and death and that the *casus foederis* was therefore involved. His pages on the outbreak of war depict a good man contributing by his shortsightedness to the catastrophe which he was anxious to avert. He allots the main blame to Russia for intervening in the Austro-Serb conflict, but it was his business to be aware that Russia's prestige would almost certainly forbid it to be localized.

The main interest of the second volume of Bethmann's *Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg*, which he did not live to complete, is the story of his conflict with the military and naval advisers of his master. Before the war the enemy was Tirpitz; and when Falkenhayn, who never meddled in politics, fell in 1916, his days were numbered. Ludendorff regarded him as unequal to his task and incapable of sustaining the home front. His fall was postponed by his grudging surrender to the demand for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, but the respite was brief. When in July, 1917, Erzberger announced his belief, hitherto confined to the Socialists, that the struggle must end in a compromise, and framed a peace resolution repudiating annexations, the Generals secured the resignation of the Chancellor by threatening their own. The story is told at length by their victim, who concludes his narrative with the bitter observation that henceforth Germany was governed by the military. His letters to General von Kuhl, written in 1920 and published in *Berliner Monatshefte*, August 1939, explain why he issued declarations of war against Russia and France instead of contenting himself with mobilization.

When Bethmann fell in July 1917, the Chancellorship was offered to Count Hertling, Prime Minister of Bavaria, and the

Nestor of the Catholic party. He refused, and the post was given to Michaelis, a little-known Prussian official, who describes the confused intermezzo which followed in his autobiography, *Für Staat und Volk*. When the war broke out he was Under-Secretary of Finance, and in the following year he was appointed Food Controller. In these colourless pages we find no clue to the mystery why a second-rate man, destitute alike of intellectual distinction and political experience, was called to the helm. His clumsy handling of his first problem, the Reichstag Resolution, aroused the distrust of the majority parties, to whose hostility he succumbed after three months. The most valuable portion of the long chapter on his Chancellorship describes the discussions arising out of the Pope's peace note to the Powers of August 2; and his report on the Crown Council in Schloss Bellevue on September 11, when the attitude of the German Government towards Belgium was first officially defined, is of considerable interest. On this occasion the Kaiser revealed himself once more as variable but not unmanageable; and the author devotes a special chapter to the praises of "a noble, idealistic and deeply religious man and a true friend of peace." As a staunch Conservative he expresses relief that his resignation saved him from having to support the bill for the reform of the Prussian franchise, which Bethmann had persuaded his master to promise.

When in the autumn of 1917 Hertling was again invited to shoulder the burden he could no longer decline. The story of his Chancellorship was sketched after his death by his soldier son, who was recalled from the front to serve as his secretary. The record published under the title of *Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei* reflects the ceaseless conflict between the military and the civil authority. We derive the same impression as from the testimonies of Bethmann and Helfferich—the all-devouring activity and brutal strength of Ludendorff, the moderation and impotence of the Kaiser. When the *débâcle* of 1918 led to a Parliamentary Cabinet, the tired veteran withdrew. An attractive picture of the scholar-statesman is painted in Victor Naumann's *Profile*, which contains interesting studies, based on personal knowledge, of various German and Austrian celebrities.

The *Erinnerungen und Dokumente* of Prince Max of Baden, the eighth and last of the Chancellors of William II, are at once a storehouse of material and a revelation of an attractive personality. On the outbreak of hostilities the author was on the

staff of the fourteenth army corps, but his health soon compelled him to leave the front. He joined the Red Cross and devoted himself to the care of prisoners, which brought him in touch with foreign opinion. After the hopes of an early triumph had melted away he convinced himself that a moral and political offensive was necessary. Unfortunately his efforts to obtain a satisfactory declaration on Belgium were as fruitless as those to avert the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. Bethmann was in close accord on almost every question, but he was too weak to impose his will. "I must confess," writes Prince Max, "that the events of January 1917 destroyed any uncritical reverence for the directors of our fortunes."

The appointment of Michaelis was obviously a temporary expedient. When the majority parties declared that the Chancellor must go the Kaiser was advised to appoint Prince Max, but replied that he could not take as his chief counsellor a junior member of the princely clan. The aged Hertling drifted helplessly along on the swirling current of events. The preparation of the grand offensive in the spring of 1918, in the opinion of Prince Max, so far from rendering diplomacy superfluous, increased the desirability of stating German aims in a manner which would strengthen the home front and perchance weaken the resolution of the foe. This line of thought was elaborated in a Memorandum entitled *Ethical Imperialism*. At a moment when his fellow-countrymen were expecting a final decision, he argued that complete victory was impossible; that Germany's allies might fall away; that England would never compromise on Belgium; that there was a middle way between victory and defeat; that a clear declaration on Belgium might possibly bring a Lansdowne Ministry and a negotiated peace; and that if the present opportunity was neglected it would never recur.

The moment passed, and for a brief space the voice of compromise was drowned by the plaudits of victory. The collapse of August 8 convinced even Ludendorff that peace must be sought; and Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who had shared Prince Max's scepticism as to the great offensive, advised an immediate peace offer including compensation to Belgium and the conditional cession of Lorraine. Prince Max, on the other hand, believed that a change of Government would do more for peace than a peace offer, and in the second week of September he wrote to offer his services to the Kaiser. "No one

in his senses could believe that I acted from ambition." His name and programme, he believed, would tend to division abroad and union at home, and he added significantly that it was the last chance for the monarchical idea. The Kaiser replied that their views were much the same, and that he was acting in the sense of the Prince's letter. After this polite snub there was nothing for it but to wait till the situation grew even more desperate. Bulgaria capitulated, and on September 30 Hertling was forced to resign. The post was offered to Payer, the Vice-Chancellor, who, in declining, recommended the appointment of Prince Max.

The Chancellor's programme was democratization at home, revision of war aims, and resistance to dishonourable terms. "The last thing you need expect from me is a peace offer," he remarked to his sister, the Duchess of Anhalt, with whom he was staying when he was summoned to Berlin. But it was precisely this step which he was compelled to take by a decision reached at Headquarters on September 29. Bombarded by appeals from the military leaders and his own colleagues, he consented on October 3 to sign the appeal. When once the request for an armistice had revealed both to the enemy and to the German people the plight of the army, there was little hope of resisting any conditions which the Entente might impose. "I thought I had been summoned at five minutes to twelve," he wrote to his cousin, the Grand Duke of Baden, "but I found it was five minutes after."

His intention was to go to the limit of compromise, and to summon the German people to a desperate effort if the armistice terms appeared unendurable. But whereas the Government and Headquarters regarded a superhuman national effort as the only alternative to surrender, it dawned on the nation that there might be an easier way of escape. President Wilson had repeatedly declared that he was at war with a system, and his October Notes hinted that the Kaiser must go. The Chancellor was a monarchist by conviction no less than by birth, and from the moment that the demand for abdication was raised he strove to save both the ruler and the throne. The key to the situation was in the hands of the Socialists; for if they officially demanded abdication and were rebuffed, they would withdraw from the coalition and the Government would fall. There was no majority for a Government of the Right, and the Prince declined to rule without the support of organized Labour. In this predicament he urged Scheidemann and

Ebert to avert or, if that proved impossible, to postpone a formal demand. They consented, and the breathing space was utilized in attempts to persuade the Kaiser to save the Monarchy by abdication. The endeavours proved fruitless, for the two men who might have forced a decision were for different reasons unable to act. Hindenburg refused to advise the step, and warned his master that the army might go to pieces if it were taken. The Chancellor, as a friend and a relative, declined to force his sovereign's hand.

On November 6 General Gröner informed the Chancellor that an armistice must be requested within three days, and on the home front the mutiny at Kiel was the beginning of the end. The monarch had declared that he would only yield to force, and even when, on November 8, the Chancellor telephoned "Your abdication is essential to avert civil war", he refused to move. The threatened revolution in Berlin had been held back from November 8 till November 9, and on that historic day it was a race against time. At 9.15 the news was telephoned from Spa that the Generals had resolved at once to inform the Kaiser that the army would not support him in a civil war. At 11 the news arrived that the Kaiser had resolved to abdicate, and that the formula would reach Berlin in half an hour. Meanwhile the workers were pouring into the streets, and the deposition might be proclaimed at any moment. When the half-hour elapsed without the promised formula from Spa, the Chancellor vainly endeavoured to reach the monarch by telephone. As a last chance of saving the monarchy he announced that the Kaiser had decided to resign; that the Chancellor would only remain in office till the questions involved in the resignation of the Kaiser, the renunciation of the Crown Prince and the institution of a Regency were settled; that he intended to propose to the Regent the appointment of Ebert as Chancellor and the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage. This declaration was known in the streets at midday, but it was too late to affect the course of events. At 2 p.m. Scheidemann proclaimed the Republic from the Reichstag building. A few minutes after two the declaration arrived from Spa, in which the Kaiser abdicated as Emperor, but not as King of Prussia. The crazy formula was worthy of the ruler whose obstinacy had frustrated the efforts of the last of his Chancellors to save the dynasty.



## IV

Passing from the Chancellors to the other Ministers of William II we begin with Tirpitz, whose virile *Memoirs* describe his efforts to create a German High Seas fleet. He bitterly assails those who stood in his way or those who, like Bethmann, failed to afford him the requisite support. His standpoint is that Germany required sea power, that its attainment involved the temporary antagonism of England, that attempts to purchase her amity were a waste of effort, and that friendship with Russia should be maintained or regained. The weakness of his argument is that Russia could at best only have been reconciled by acceptance of her ambitions in the Near East, involving as a consequence the virtual dissolution of the Austro-German partnership.

Tirpitz' powerful apologia, published soon after the war, was widely read at home and abroad, and a cheap abridgement enjoyed an enormous sale in the Fatherland. The historian, however, must turn to his larger work, *Politische Dokumente*, the first volume of which, *Der Aufbau der Deutschen Weltmacht*, carries the story from 1905 to the outbreak of hostilities. The Preface strikes the note of impenitent realism which colours every page in the book. A great people, he declares, can only be made and kept safe by Power, since Might has always gone before Right. The downfall of Germany was due, not to an excess of *Machtpolitik*, but to a lack of *Machtsinn*. Mainly owing to the Kaiser's support the construction of naval power was methodically carried through, but the development of the army lagged far behind both the needs of the situation and the resources of the taxpayer. With a stronger army and a wiser attitude towards Russia the position of the nation would have been unassailable. Moreover, the creation of a powerful battle-fleet, instead of rendering war with England probable or inevitable, was the best means of keeping the peace, since no softer argument would compel the Mistress of the Seas to respect the interests of other Powers. Its object was not war but an independent position in the world. A danger zone had to be traversed while the navy was weak enough to invite attack, and a temporary increase of the estrangement originated by commercial rivalry was inevitable; but the perils of a premature conflict were averted, and by 1914 England had grown accustomed to the German fleet.

The narrative is presented as a drama in four acts—the first

fleet crisis of 1905-6, the second of 1908-9, the third of 1911-12, and the *détente* of 1912-14. "England's love of peace and consideration of our interests grew *pari passu* with our fleet, as was proved by her concessions in the era inaugurated by Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin. In so far as any German was responsible for the war, it was Bethmann, who sacrificed the interests of national defence for the *beaux yeux* of perfidious Albion. It is the fashion nowadays to contrast the conscientiousness of Bethmann with the frivolity of Bülow. I reply, Bülow would have prevented the war." The mild criticisms of Tirpitz in Bethmann's *Reflections* are in strange contrast to the former's full-blooded denunciations of the "policy of impotence". The battle which raged at Berlin was reflected in Carlton House Terrace, whence Metternich sent home eloquent warnings and the Anglophobe Naval Attaché denounced him as "a national misfortune." In no German work do we find such a devastating picture of disunion in high places. Even Bülow, laments the author, was beginning to listen to the siren voice of the Ambassador at the end of his Chancellorship. The final impression we are intended to carry away is that of the Admiral standing at bay against weak-kneed civilians and finding unwavering support in his master alone.

The second volume of *Politische Dokumente*, with the provocative title *Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkrieg*, argues that there was no need to lose the war. Tirpitz laments that the fleet did not play for high stakes at the outset and that the submarine weapon was not vigorously applied in the summer of 1915. What was the cause of this fatal inertia? "I had expected that the direction of naval warfare would be confided to my charge, or at any rate that I should have a deciding influence. It was not to be. I found myself relegated to the uneasy position of a mere adviser and spectator." The responsibility for this humiliating exclusion is charged not to the Kaiser, "whose judgment in great questions was usually sounder than that of his *entourage*," but to his inveterate enemy the Chancellor. Bethmann, declares the Admiral, ought to have pressed his resignation at the outbreak of war, as the Kaiser in his heart desired, for retention of his post involved defeat. The struggle with England, he believed, was a passing storm, after which his well-meant efforts at reconciliation would be resumed. For this reason the war must be waged on the principle of limited liability, and the fleet must be kept in cold

storage to serve as a pawn in the peace negotiations. The technical superiority displayed at the battle of Jutland confirmed the Admiral's conviction that a fearless attack might have worked wonders in the early months.

The main interest of this formidable volume lies in the contention that the chief cause of defeat was the lack of the will to victory in the civilian rulers. The best brains in the service were not fully utilized, and the national enthusiasm of a "horribly unpolitical people" was not properly nourished. The real enemy was not Russia, with whom there was no reason for Germany to quarrel, but England, the strongest and most ruthless of her foes. The first half of the book describes the vain efforts of the author to set in motion the High Seas fleet, the second his demands for the continuous employment of the submarine weapon against the heel of the English Achilles in 1915 and 1916. The Kaiser's adoption of the advice to keep the United States out of the war as long as possible reduced the submarine campaign to a farce, and after the author's two resignations were refused in 1915 a third was pressed in March 1916. Though he had possessed no influence during the conflict, he explains, the public did not realize his position, and he could no longer cover with his ministerial responsibility a situation which had become impossible. The Kaiser's chilly annotations on the letter of resignation show that he parted with the greatest of his Ministers without reluctance. The closing chapter records the adoption of the Tirpitz policy of unlimited submarine warfare in January 1917, when it was too late to reap its advantages. None of the letters in these pages are more interesting than those of Ballin, who agreed with Bethmann in desiring to save the High Seas fleet and with Tirpitz in wishing a remorseless blockade of England in 1915.

The civilian attacks on the Tirpitz policy were reinforced by a member of his own profession. In a brochure published in 1908, Admiral Galster argued that Germany's defensive needs would be better served by light cruisers, submarines and coast-defences than by battleships which, however unaggressive in intention, were bound to arouse the suspicions of England. Bülow was impressed and brought it to the attention of the Grand Admiral, who replied that to change the course would be interpreted as climbing down. When the German fleet was at the bottom of the sea Galster recalled his warnings and traced the result of their neglect in his spirited volume, *England, Deutschland und die Flotte*. "In Tirpitz's eyes a State which

co-operates with England is her vassal. He confounds friendship with patronage. The fleet did not cause the war, but it caused the ranging of the Powers against Germany and Austria." Neither the Germans nor the English Government or people, he adds, desired war, and England endeavoured to prevent it. "England was not the enemy that Tirpitz painted. He turned her into one. Defence of trade, coastal defence, the preservation of peace were not his motives. His fleet was to be an instrument of world-policy." The less spectacular naval policy recommended in 1908, he reflects sadly, would have left the German Empire and the German frontiers intact.

The position of Foreign Secretary in Germany has never been one of the more coveted posts, involving, as it usually does, responsibility without power. On occasion, as in the case of Bülow under the aged Hohenlohe, and Kiderlen under the inexperienced Bethmann, the Minister may make himself felt; but as a rule he is nothing but the understudy of the Chancellor. Schoen, the most modest and conciliatory of men, never attempted to be anything else. His three years at the Wilhelmstrasse, however, synchronized with important events, including the Kaiser's happy visit to Windsor in 1907, the Bosnian crisis, and the *Daily Telegraph* incident, on all of which, as on the days of decision at Paris in 1914, he throws fresh light in *The Memoirs of an Ambassador*. The attack on Belgium is denounced as wrong and dishonourable. His verdict on the Kaiser closely resembles that of Hammann. "He was denied the gifts which would have been of most use to him as a ruler, such as capacity for cool, careful and prudent reflection. He was a man of great merits but considerable shortcomings. His was not a well-balanced mind. He was inspired by an earnest desire to administer his exalted office faithfully, full of ambitious ideas, and confident that he would be given strength to carry them out. But his restless activity repeatedly came to a standstill, unknown to the general public. He was seized with fits of despondency and had thoughts of abdication. In public life the imperious pompous ruler, in the quiet of his home life a human being like others, a good man, whose simplicity and refreshing candour were very attractive. It would be difficult to decide which was most consistent with his true character."

No two men could differ more widely in character and temperament than Schoen and his successor. That the former was a good-natured mediocrity is as undeniable as that Kiderlen

was one of the ablest diplomatists of the post-Bismarckian era. Every one was aware that his rise had been cut short by the sudden loss of Imperial favour ; that he had spent ten years in quasi-banishment at Bucharest ; that, when the Kaiser's opposition had at last been overcome by Bethmann, he had less than three years of life to show his mettle. The curtain was lifted by Ernst Jäckh, whose lively volumes, *Kiderlen-Wächter, Staatsmann und Mensch*, enriched by letters and telegrams to Hedwig Kypke, the companion of his middle and later years, reveal the rough-mannered Swabian in a gentler light. The publication of his political correspondence and memoranda enhanced his stature, though few readers are likely to share the enthusiasm of his friend and biographer. "He came too late and went too soon", writes Jäckh, "to succeed in his task of averting the great catastrophe by his Europeanization of German policy." He encouraged Bethmann's efforts for an Anglo-German rapprochement, "the most difficult of all questions," and he described himself as an opponent of Tirpitz, "because I fear his policy will bring us war with England." Yet he remains for all time the man of Agadir, a *coup* which, though provoked by the blunders of French diplomacy, brought war with England within sight and tightened the bonds of the Triple Entente. Neither in the so-called "ultimatum" to Russia of March 1909, which he drafted for Bülow, nor in the *Panther's* spring did he seek for war ; but his blows on the diplomatic table were little calculated to create confidence in the pacific aims of Berlin. The most attractive aspect of his character was his sturdy independence. Like his friend Holstein he was untainted by Byzantinism, and his nickname of "the eel" for Bülow reveals his contempt for a certain type of statesmen which the Imperial system produced.

Jagow's *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges* covers part of the same ground as that of the Chancellor under whom he served, but deals more in detail with the last year of peace. Appointed to succeed Kiderlen at the beginning of 1913, he entered energetically into the regional negotiations with Great Britain which followed the failure of the naval and neutrality discussions. On more than one occasion he publicly testified to the revival of Anglo-German confidence ; but, like Bethmann, he later declared that Grey was not a free agent. "A convinced adherent of the Balance of Power," he writes, "he fell into ever closer dependence on the Entente Powers, and thus, though unconsciously, fostered the aggressive policy of

France and Russia." Jagow's confidence in England received a shock when he discovered the Anglo-Russian negotiations for a Naval Convention in the early summer of 1914. He had no more desire for war than Bethmann or the Kaiser; but his writings leave the impression that he saw little chance of averting it, since, in his opinion, Austria was bound to ward off the Servian menace, chauvinism was in the saddle at Petrograd, and England was bound to the chariot wheels of the Dual Alliance.

In addition to supplying his own version of the causes and outbreak of the war, Jagow twice entered the lists in criticism of his contemporaries. On the appearance of Lichnowsky's *My Mission to London* he published a sharp reply in the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 23, 1918, of which a translation appeared in June 1918, in *International Conciliation*, No. 127, the monthly journal of the American Association for International Conciliation. He argues that to have ignored the vital interests of Austria, as Lichnowsky urged, would have driven her into the arms of Russia and sacrificed Germany's economic interests in Turkey. While acknowledging that Grey pursued a policy of mediation during the Balkan wars, he denies that he separated himself from his Entente associates. Germany was also a mediator, giving moderating counsels to Vienna to a far greater extent than Lichnowsky was aware. "It seems to be his constant and sole anxiety that Russia should not be humiliated. A humiliation of Austria is obviously a matter of indifference to him." The Ambassador, he declares, saw everything through his London spectacles, and in the colonial negotiations strong pressure was needed to induce him to represent the desires of his Government with more emphasis. Lichnowsky's narrative, he concludes, is so full of inaccuracies, distortions and slanders that neither statements nor conclusions can be accepted.

The publication of Grey's apologia recalled Jagow to the fighting line with his little volume *England und der Kriegeausbruch*. Confining himself to the brief period between the Serajevo tragedy and the British declaration of war, he taxes him with ignorance of conditions on the Continent, such as Russo-Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Austrian Empire, and of subsequent documentary revelations, such as Servian complicity in the murders. Admitting that he desired to maintain peace and never directly encouraged Russia and France to fight, why did he not try to hold them back? Believing direct Austro-Russian negotiations to be the best

method, why did he not urge Russia not to interrupt them? To Grey's plea that he had no *locus standi*, Jagow retorts with the inquiry whether the peace of Europe did not constitute a justification. Moreover, did Russia's interests in Servia, based on Imperialist aspirations to protect the Slav peoples, compare in importance with the vital interest of Austria to defend herself against the disintegrating ambitions of her neighbour? Again, if Germany had held back Austria, her only ally, in a vital question, would not the latter have turned away from this useless partnership? Germany did not accept the proposal for a Conference, because she did not consider it fair for the friends of Russia—and Italy was one of them—to sit in judgment on Austria in a matter which, unlike the issues presented to the Ambassadors' Conference in the Balkan wars, affected her existence. Even had Germany agreed, Austria would probably have declined.

In addition to explaining the mind of the Wilhelmstrasse in July 1914, Jagow adds to our information on two important points. His conversation with Goschen on June 16, 1914, in reference to Grey's ambiguous declaration on the Anglo-Russian naval negotiations, was intended as a polite warning to let them drop. Secondly, the Chancellor's bid for British neutrality on the evening of July 29 was, he explains, completely misunderstood in Downing Street. Bethmann was compelled to consider the possibility of war, as he feared that Russia might attack Austria. The Kaiser believed, and Jagow agreed, that Russia and France would not initiate a conflict unless they reckoned on British help, and by seeking an assurance of British neutrality the Government chose the best means to avert war. The Chancellor was not prepared for Goschen's question as to the fate of the French colonies, and Jagow admits that his impromptu reply was not altogether happy.

No civilian of the war period makes an impression of greater energy and resource than Karl Helfferich, who perished in a railway accident in 1924. The German side of the story of the origins of the Baghdad Railway may be studied in his full-length biography of his father-in-law, Georg von Siemens, and he himself played a leading part in the financial negotiations for the construction of the final portions of the line. His description of the long negotiations with the French group, of its withdrawal, and of the collective effort of German and Austrian bankers to find the capital, forms the most valuable portion of his slender volume, *Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*.

The larger drama of Germany's activities in Turkey is summarized in his brochure *Die Deutsche Türkenpolitik*, which rebuts the accusation that German policy in Turkey was in any sense the cause of the war, and illustrates its readiness for compromise by the liquidation of the Liman crisis and the equitable settlement with England in 1914.

Helfferrich's two stout volumes *Der Weltkrieg* supply an authoritative record of the economic and financial history of Germany during the critical years, for the young Director of the Deutsche Bank was appointed Minister of Finance. He was also Vice-Chancellor, and as such took his share in the general control of events. The most arresting pages in the first volume describe the prolonged struggle between the civilian and military advisers of William II in regard to the resumption of the submarine campaign at the opening of 1917. Like the harassed Bethmann, whom he loyally supported, he approved Bernstorff's efforts to keep the United States out of the fray, and deplored the triumph of the army and navy chiefs. The Kaiser, he declares, always disliked Ludendorff, but he was powerless. "Even an altogether pacific character like William II was saturated with the great military traditions of his house. Indeed one may say that the less he was by nature a warrior and commander, the more he was dominated by those who fully embodied the soldierly spirit."

The second volume, like the first, devotes special attention to the home front, but the various attempts to end the struggle by a negotiated compromise are fully described. Erzberger is hotly assailed for revealing to the Reichstag Committee Czernin's pessimistic report on Austria in 1917, and thereby encouraging the enemy. When Bethmann fell in July 1917 Helfferrich asked leave to resign office, but consented to stay for a time at the request of Michaelis. A year later, when the first German Ambassador to Bolshevik Russia was murdered, he volunteered for the dangerous post. Since the Moscow Government was too weak to keep order, he received orders after a few weeks to return. When the German Government proceeded to sign a treaty supplementing the provisions of Brest-Litovsk, he resigned in protest. His brief sojourn in Russia had convinced him that fruitful co-operation with the Bolsheviks was impossible. The German Government, declared Hertling in the Reichstag, believed in the loyalty of the Russian Government and in particular in that of Joffe, its representative in Berlin. Helfferrich, on the contrary, regarded



the Russian Embassy as a hotbed of intrigue. When Joffe's seditious activities were accidentally discovered by the bursting of a courier's bag on the platform of the Friedrichstrasse station, relations between the two countries were broken off. It was too late, for the seeds of the Spartacus movement had been sown. The book concludes with a lamentation that in the autumn of 1918 the well-meaning but soft Prince Max was called to the helm, and that no attempt was made to rally the German people to a fight in the last ditch.

The mysterious Holstein, though never a Minister, ranks with those who gave orders, not with those who carried them out. It is only in very recent years that we have been enabled to visualize the man behind the official more fully than in the brilliant sketch by Maximilian Harden in the first volume of his *Köpfe*. In 1931 Friedrich von Trotha, nephew of his intimate friend Frau von Lebbin, attempted a historical and psychological revision in a book entitled *Holstein*. The author, who saw him at his best in his aunt's salon, denies that he was in any respect abnormal. Some pleasant letters to her during 1896-8 and after his fall show that he was never a supporter of the *Flottenpolitik*, and that he believed the army, not the navy, to be vital. A masterly Introduction by Thimme analyses his policy with considerable sympathy. He advocated the non-renewal of Bismarck's secret treaty with Russia on the assumption that Germany would turn to England, a course which Caprivi was known to favour. Even during the negotiations with England he desired a rapprochement, though not very ardently and only in return for firm guarantees.

In 1932 a more substantial contribution to our knowledge of the man was made in *Friedrich von Holstein: Lebensbekenntnis in Briefen an eine Frau*, edited by Helmuth Rogge, who supplies a biographical Introduction. Throughout life Holstein corresponded regularly with his cousin Ida von Stülpnagel, who survived him by a year. The letters of the sixteen years after the fall of Bismarck reveal a position of great influence but never of omnipotence. "For the second time since Bismarck", he complained on July 1, 1899, "my advice has been ignored." The first was the Kruger telegram, the second the assent to a Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. "I cannot say I am always satisfied with the policy of the Emperor and Bülow", he wrote in 1904. He described the Anglo-French rapprochement and treaty as "the fruit of our mistaken policy in the Boer war. I urged Bülow to counterwork in the

Reichstag the unmeasured Anglophobia and above all to denounce the caricatures. But the good Bülow prefers to swim with the stream."

The first Moroccan crisis, which led to his fall, is narrated in considerable detail. "It was necessary to go to Tangier", he wrote, "but from his visit to Lisbon onwards the Emperor opposed the project. The uncertainty whether he would land made me ill. When the day came I was too giddy to stand and thought it was a stroke, though it was only stomach." Yet there was something to show for all the anxiety. In the last six months, he wrote in June 1905, they had obtained much. Delcassé, their cleverest and most dangerous enemy, had been overthrown. "I think the Morocco question will go all right. We do not want to get anything. The purpose was to show that we must not be ignored and above all to evict Delcassé." His optimism was unfounded, for at Algeciras Germany found herself alone. The Emperor had not the nerves of his grandfather, he complained on March 17, 1906, and foreigners were discovering that he yielded to strong pressure. Writing after his resignation he regrets that his master became alarmed though there was never any danger of war. "If we had stood firm, the Powers would have suggested compromises." Now that William II was known to be weak, pressure would increase. King Edward, he added, was the most skilful diplomatist of the time, William II the least. "He is indeed not a politician at all, but rather an actor."

No part of the correspondence is more interesting than that of the last three years. That he remained in touch with the Wilhelmstrasse was already known, but here we learn from his own words how close it was. "I usually see Bülow once a week", he wrote in June 1908, "and we correspond almost daily." There was no real affection between them, and Holstein had not very much respect for his chief, but he believed that no other Chancellor would allow him so much influence. Among the minor revelations in these pages is the fact that he aided Schiemann in his weekly survey of foreign affairs in the *Kreuz-Zeitung*. We await the publication of his papers, which he bequeathed to Frau von Lebbin and which she handed on to Paul von Schwabach. Meanwhile fresh material continues to accumulate, some of which is contained in Enthoven's *Fritz von Holstein en de Problemen van zijn Tijd*.

The opening years of the post-Bismarckian era come to life again in the reminiscences of Ludwig Raschdau, *Unter Bis-*

*marck und Caprivi.* The young official in the Wilhelmstrasse found favour in the eyes both of the Iron Chancellor and of William II, whom he accompanied on a round of visits in the year of his accession. "Rome belongs to me", declared Leo XIII, who resented the Imperial visit to the capital as a recognition of the Italian usurper. The Kaiser, we are told, was pleasant and modest, and it was only later that his arrogance emerged. Bismarck showed signs of age and failing memory, and the time had come for a change. His son Herbert, the Foreign Minister, had no manners and few friends. The most important chapters relate to the dropping of the treaty with Russia, concluded in 1887 for three years. Herbert, complained the Kaiser, behaved as if he was half Russian, despite the growing unfriendliness of the Russian Court and press. The question of renewal was the first great problem for Caprivi and Marschall, who naturally sought expert advice. The officials, of whom Raschdau was one, advised against renewal on the ground that it had failed to secure the friendship of Russia or to prevent a Franco-Russian rapprochement. Moreover it was not quite fair to Austria, and at any moment Russia might betray the secret. Their advice prevailed, though Raschdau's proposal to throw the responsibility of the break on Russia by demanding publication was rejected. For Holstein, fearing above everything the return of the Bismarcks, pressed for an immediate decision. Thus the right thing was done in the wrong way. The author's relations with Holstein, which had begun pleasantly enough, became increasingly strained, and in 1894, feeling co-operation to be impossible, he accepted a diplomatic post at Weimar. "The mystery man of the Wilhelmstrasse" portrayed in these pages is clearly abnormal, and Raschdau, unlike most witnesses, denies him outstanding merits even in his chosen field.

## V

The Ambassadors have as much to tell us as the Ministers and officials at home. We will begin with England, where Baron von Eckardstein played a prominent part at the turn of the century. His *Lebenserinnerungen* have been abridged and translated by Sir George Young with the title *Ten Years at the Court of St. James's*; but students require the three volumes of the original, which contain correspondence between London

and Berlin of the highest value. The story of the attempts of Chamberlain, backed by Lansdowne and the Duke of Devonshire and tepidly approved by Salisbury, to create a working partnership with Germany on the eve and during the course of the South African war had been outlined by Hammann ; but the details were revealed by the tall Guardsman who came into prominence during the prolonged illness of Count Hatzfeldt. We are now able to check his spicy narrative by the corresponding volumes of the *Grosse Politik*, which, in addition to convicting him of certain editorial liberties with his material, diminishes the importance of his rôle. Next in importance to his testimony in regard to Anglo-German negotiations is the arresting picture of Holstein at work in the Wilhelmstrasse, dominating his political superiors, corresponding privately with Germany's representatives abroad, and deciding their personal fortunes.

Eckardstein supplemented his brightly tinted memoirs by a chatty little volume entitled *Persönliche Erinnerungen an König Eduard*. It is easy to understand why the King enjoyed his company, for his pages sparkle with anecdote and fun. The monarch appears in a pleasant light, loving the unforced talk of Soveral and other intimates, yet never allowing incautious friends to overstep the invisible barrier. That he was anti-German is stoutly denied by Eckardstein, who attributes most of the friction between him and the Kaiser to the tactlessness of the latter. Ruffled vanities, we are told, weighed more heavily than high politics, and the smoothing away of such personal differences kept the author and Hatzfeldt busy. Despite the conciliatory influence of Sir Ernest Cassel and the Rothschilds, the relations of uncle and nephew grew steadily worse. The second half of the volume throws new light on Agadir. In the middle of April, 1911, Bassermann informed Eckardstein that Kiderlen had at last been persuaded to play trumps in Morocco. On May 3 the news was confirmed by Erzberger, who added that a squadron of three or four warships would probably soon be despatched to Mogador or Agadir. Eckardstein, angry and alarmed, published the information and provoked an official *démenti*. He had hoped in vain that the plan would now be abandoned, but the despatch of a gunboat was at any rate less disastrous than the original design. Though an old friend of Kiderlen he denounces his action in 1911 as an example of the "clumsiness and boundless levity of our diplomacy."

The counsels of Count Metternich from Carlton House Terrace to his Government are recorded in *Die Grosse Politik*, but the ex-Ambassador has thrown new light on the efforts of Bethmann to hold Tirpitz in check. When the *Novelle*, drawn up by the German Admiralty at the end of 1911, threatened to widen the gulf that had yawned at Agadir, the harassed Chancellor asked him to set forth the objections to the scheme. *Meine Denkschrift über die Flottennovelle*, published in *Europäische Gespräche* in February 1926, is a document of the highest importance. "A *Novelle* will drive England again to the side of France, and there she will stay. We can no longer hide from ourselves that the English Entente system and her hostile policy towards us rest primarily on the fear of our growing strength at sea. A navy policy going beyond the Navy Law leads in my opinion to war." In rescuing from oblivion this solemn warning, dated January 10, 1912, Metternich drew the obvious conclusions from the results of its neglect. "To East and West were two powerful nations united and allied against us. In this dangerous situation we ought not to have forced England by a superfluous and unlimited *Flottenpolitik* to draw ever closer to them. To the naval policy we owe in the first place the war, in that it drove England into the arms of our opponents, who, without the hope of English support, would not so lightly have risked the struggle. To it we owe also the defeat, thanks to the unlimited submarine war, which, undertaken with insufficient resources, provoked the entry of America and thereby sealed our fate. When the statesman is compelled to yield to the soldier in peace or war, a people is usually doomed." England's anxiety, he testifies, began in 1904, and was noticed by him at Kiel in that year. Bülow was too clever not to recognize the danger of unlimited construction, and was working for limitation when he fell. Bethmann longed for the friendship of England, but accepted the Navy Law and its pendants as sacrosanct, instead of vigorously attempting to alter a course which was contrary to the interests of the State.

The legend that Kühlmann was a traitor in the camp dies hard. Having failed to persuade him to tell his own story, Thomas Rhodes entered the lists on behalf of his friend in 1925. *The Real Kühlmann*, though a scrappy little book, exploded the fable that a bellicose Councillor of Legation plotted with a bellicose Wilhelmstrasse behind the back of a pacific Ambassador. "Kühlmann was never on good terms with the

German Foreign Office," writes Lichnowsky himself in a letter to the author. "The war was not premeditated, and therefore he could not be a party to a plot which never existed." Kühlmann's reading of the situation was the same as that of the Ambassadors. The charge that he was sowing tares in Ulster on the eve of the war is countered by the assertion that he never visited Ireland in his life, and by the production of holiday letters written from Bavaria during the last weeks of peace. How earnestly he desired friendly relations is revealed in a striking chapter on Marschall in his recent work *Die Diplomaten*. The death of the Ambassador after only seven weeks in London was a cruel blow for Germany. "For his dominating personality, which exerted as much influence at home as abroad, might perhaps have averted the war."

Lichnowsky was a popular figure in England before the war, and the unauthorized publication in 1917 of his sensational brochure, *My Mission in London*, rendered him the darling of the Entente. Here was an unsolicited testimonial to the high character of Grey and the pacific nature of British policy. His main themes are the negotiations during the Balkan wars, in which Grey played the part of a trusted mediator, and the amicable discussions of the problems of the Baghdad Railway and the Portuguese Colonies. That so much was accomplished in so short a time, and that such a promising dawn was suddenly wrecked by what he regards as the errors of his Government, add poignancy to a record which came straight from the heart.

Lichnowsky's apologia, *Auf dem Wege zum Abgrund*, includes *My Mission to England* and reprints from *Die Grosse Politik* the Ambassador's despatches during the years 1912-14; but there is new material of considerable interest. The message is proclaimed in the Introduction, in which the Kaiser, his advisers, and the Iron Chancellor himself fall under the lash. After completing the unification of Germany, he argues, Bismarck's diplomacy lost its sureness of touch. His supreme error was the decision in 1879 to avert imaginary dangers by leading his country into imminent peril. The Emperor, not his Chancellor, emerges as the one wise man. "He alone was right in struggling against the crazy alliance with Austria which brought us to destruction. Had he only stood fast and allowed Bismarck to go, the greatest catastrophe in history would have been impossible." The unhappy Triple Alliance led inevitably to the Dual Alliance. "The Diadochi regarded

the Triple Alliance as the foundation of our policy, the last word of wisdom. In reality it was a monstrosity hallowed by a great name. No ground of friction existed with Russia if we gave up our senseless Eastern policy." The rift began in 1875. "First we drove Russia into the arms of France, then into the arms of England."

Lichnowsky explains that his book is not an apologia, since history has been his justification. "Among our diplomatists I alone uttered continual warnings and correctly foretold events." He always reported that England would not allow a second Sedan. "Our senseless armaments disquieted our neighbours and provoked their combination. We could obtain almost anything from Grey, who was ready to meet us at every point. Only one thing I could not achieve. I could not hold him back when we declared war on France and violated the neutrality of Belgium. That was the tragedy of my mission." The Introduction concludes with a formidable catalogue of German blunders. The cutting of the wire to St. Petersburg in 1890; the challenge to Japan in 1895; the Kruger telegram; the repulse of Chamberlain's approaches; "the mad navy policy, the madder Morocco policy and, worst of all, the Bosnian crisis"; Agadir; the failure to accept Grey's neutrality formula in 1912; the Liman Mission; the rejection of Grey's mediation in July 1914; the declaration of war on Russia; the attack on Belgium; the U-boat campaign of 1917: such are some of the counts in this fierce indictment.

A short dissertation, entitled "England before the War", written directly after the outbreak of hostilities, anticipates *My Mission to London*. He recalls a talk with Bethmann after the Kiel regatta and the news of Serajevo, in which he once again informed the Chancellor that, though England was pacific, "a war with France was a war with England." Paul Cambon, he adds, had become alarmed by the Anglo-German rapprochement on the Baghdad railway and the Portuguese colonies. On one of the last days of peace he had observed: "Les Anglais interviendront, mais ils le feront quand il sera trop tard." If Belgium had not been attacked, comments Lichnowsky, he could probably have kept England out of the fray for a while. The problem of responsibility is pursued in a tract entitled *Wahn nicht Wille*, written in January 1915. Russia, he argues, had no choice in 1914. Germany would have been better off without Austria if not in control of the alliance, for the latter was unfit for a big war.

A few points of interest may be gleaned from letters to the papers reprinted in these volumes. Lichnowsky was never told of the Grey-Cambon correspondence and other secret material in the possession of the Wilhelmstrasse. The control of foreign policy, he adds, was almost wholly in the hands of Stumm, "the worthy successor of Holstein", who, "wishing to be my successor in London, did his utmost, with the willing support of Jagow, to thwart my work in every possible way." He was not even told of Ballin's mission to London in July 1914. Thus the Ambassador confirms the belief that he was not in the full confidence of Berlin, but he dismisses the fantastic legend that his employers were deliberately working for war behind his back. No reader of these volumes can fail to be impressed by his passionate sincerity and by the justice of many of his criticisms; but his enthusiasm for a Russian partnership blinded him to the dangers of dependence on a semi-civilized autocracy.

Next in interest for English readers to the German diplomats at the Court of St. James's is the testimony of Count Bernstorff, whose *My Three Years in America* is one of the most convincing apologies of our time. He argues that in January, 1917, Wilson was both willing and able to secure an acceptable peace, and that he was only prevented by the mad resolve to resume unlimited submarine warfare. His belief in the President's sincerity was shared by the Chancellor, but the latter failed to detect any signs of readiness for a compromise on the part of the Entente. Whether or not a settlement was possible in the winter of 1916-17 remains a matter of opinion. In any case the rejection of the advice of the German Ambassador in Washington made the victory of the Allies inevitable. Boy-Ed's brochure *Verschwörer?* rebuts the charges of conspiracy for which the German Naval Attaché was expelled from America in 1916.

Many years later Bernstorff published his *Memoirs*, which cover the whole of a long career. Born in London, where his father was Ambassador, he grew up in the conviction that England and Germany should live in amity. Unlike William II he realized the essential condition. "I considered an understanding was attainable provided Germany were content to be a Land Power of the first rank and did not want to attain the same position as a Sea Power." The *Flottenpolitik* was the ruin of Germany. The friendship of England was the more essential since a reconciliation with France was impossible. Bülow



never understood England. Metternich, under whom the author served as Councillor of Embassy from 1902 to 1906, is described as *un grand seigneur sans peur et sans reproche*, and his despatches are praised as the finest achievements of German pre-war diplomacy. Eckardstein, we are told, suffered from megalomania, and it was only by accident that he ever spoke the truth. "He was the greatest political mountebank I ever met."

The longest chapter is devoted to the eight years at Washington. The new evidence that had accumulated since his earlier volume, he maintains, vindicated his policy. The United States could and should have been kept out of the war. The German Government did not realize that the struggle would be decided in Washington. Wilson was no hypocrite but a high-minded idealist. On his return to Berlin Bernstorff was recommended as successor to Bethmann, and the Kaiser approved, subject to the approval of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The soldiers, however, had no use for a man who was reputed desirous of making peace and liberalizing the constitution. Since the entry of America into the war, he declares, a good peace was unattainable, but even in 1917 much could have been saved. In home policy the Government should have steered towards the Left, moderate treaties should have been concluded with Russia and Roumania, the Turkish and Bulgarian fronts should have been strengthened, negotiations with England and France should have been opened while the army was intact.

The last year of the war was spent at Constantinople, where Talaat earned his liking and respect. On the eve of the collapse he was summoned to Berlin to give advice. Daily talks with Prince Max increased his feelings of friendship and sympathy. Had he been called to office a year sooner he would have been the right man to secure a reasonable peace, for he inspired confidence abroad and in the German Left. The chief task was to save the monarchy and avert a Revolution, not for the sake of William II but for the sake of Germany. A revolution, however, could only be avoided by a timely abdication. "Who shall tell him?" asked the Chancellor. "You", replied Bernstorff. "As heir to the throne of Baden and a German Prince I cannot do such a thing." Remaining in the Foreign Office after the armistice the author helped to prepare for the peace negotiations. He reluctantly approved the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles, but declined Ebert's invitation to succeed

Brockdorff-Rantzau on the ground of his unpopularity with the Allies.

Several civilian and military representatives of Germany have given us valuable records of their activities in Russia. Fresh light is thrown on the early years of the reign of William II by the closing chapters of the second volume of the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of General von Schweinitz. The invaluable diary and letters of the German Ambassador supplement his despatches published in *Die Grosse Politik*, and vividly portray the new orientation of Russian policy which was accelerated by the fall of Bismarck, and led to the formation of the Dual Alliance. The momentous decision not to renew the secret treaty of 1887 was reluctantly approved by Schweinitz on seeing the text of the secret treaty with Roumania; but he regretted the rejection of Giers's reiterated request for "something on paper, just a few lines," to take its place. "I am a living anachronism, a Don Quixote of Legitimacy," lamented the veteran diplomatist after the tumultuous welcome of the French fleet at Cronstadt in 1891; "my political activities of thirty years end with the collapse of all the principles for which I have laboured." When he left the Russian capital in December 1891, the German hegemony in Europe which he had helped Bismarck to erect was at an end.

The success of the Schweinitz Diaries encouraged his son to publish a selection from the General's correspondence. The *Briefwechsel des Botschafters General von Schweinitz* is like skimmed milk after cream, but it contains one document of outstanding importance. On August 28, 1895, the General listened for an hour to a description of the Kaiser's celebrated interview with Salisbury at Cowes. Salisbury had declared that Turkey's day was done and that she must be partitioned. Russia was to have Constantinople, the Dardanelles and a piece of Asia Minor; Austria was to receive Salonica, Italy Tripoli and perhaps Albania, England Egypt, France nothing. "What do we get?" queried Schweinitz. "We shall get something in Africa; the chief thing is that France gets nothing and therefore falls out with Russia." Schweinitz attempted to convince his master that Turkey would not allow herself to be carved into slices, that the Turkish army was strong, and that Russia would incur grave difficulties if she embarked on a new Turkish war. The Kaiser replied that she could send her ships through the Bosphorus any day and anchor before the Palace. The Sultan knew his weakness and would yield to fate. When

the General expressed his doubts as to Russia's ability to force the Bosphorus, the Kaiser replied that he had seen the defences himself. Schweinitz admitted the possibility, but denied the feasibility of a bloodless partition of Turkey or the Balkans, adding that he was surprised that Salisbury should surrender a fundamental principle of British policy, namely the closing of the Straits. Salisbury, replied William II, could not resist the movement for the Armenians aroused by Rosebery, Gladstone and Argyll. "I am not sure of Salisbury's goal, but in any case he is down on the Sultan. My chief aim is not to be drawn into war about the Straits. I should greatly prefer if Russia expanded in Eastern Asia."

Valuable information is supplied in *Die Militärbevollmächtigten Kaiser Wilhelms II am Zarenhofe 1904-14*, by Gustav Graf von Lamsdorff. Among the fruits of the Björkö honeymoon was the exchange of officers attached to the persons of the two Emperors and reporting to their masters direct. Some of their reports were published in *Die Grosse Politik* because they were handed over to the Foreign Office by the Kaiser, and they are reprinted in these pages; but the bulk of the material comes from Doorn and is new. The first half of the volume summarizes the experiences and reflections of the author, the first of the series of *liaison* officers, and of his six successors; the second contains the reports themselves. More than half the space is claimed by those of Captain von Hintze, later (1918) Foreign Minister, for whose ability Lamsdorff professes unbounded admiration.

The chief interest of the volume lies in the picture of Nicholas II, who appears as amiable as he was weak. At the time of the Dogger Bank incident he expressed his hope for an arbitral settlement. Russia, however, he added, raising his voice, would not have to accept the English demands, for Germany was on her side. Though he exercised even less control over foreign affairs than William II, he resented the ambitions of the Grand Duke Nicholas and his Montenegrin wife. He condemned the annexation of Bosnia, though he acquitted Germany of complicity. "It was bound to come sooner or later", he remarked, "but at this moment it was highly inopportune." As regards the Straits, "I do not want the smallest stretch of territory; all I want is free exit and free entrance. There is no harm to anybody." The long conversation ended with the words: "Report to His Majesty that he may put full confidence in me, and that I am the master here." A character study

of the Tsar, dated January 28, 1909, was described by William II in a marginal note as the best picture yet painted. Nicholas II, reported Hintze, had at last recovered his spirits and self-confidence after the humiliation of the Japanese war, and he believed himself to have triumphed over the revolution. His new attitude must be taken into account, and he would have to be treated *de pair en pair*. Yet it was unlikely that he would be able to impose his will. "His Majesty is extremely intelligent and industrious, but also highly impressionable. He will continue to submit to the influence of whoever has his ear. . . . He would like to rule as an autocrat, but in fact he is entirely in the hands of his Ministers."

The full and valuable diary of the Ambassador Pourtalès from July 24 to August 1, 1914, entitled *Am Scheidewege zwischen Krieg und Frieden*, portrays Sazonoff and the Tsar as weak men personally inclined to peace but swept along by the chauvinist tide. "From the beginning of the crisis I realized that the chief danger to peace lay in the large-scale military preparations immediately set on foot. I am still convinced (he is writing in 1919) that a peaceful solution of the Servian conflict was possible if Russia had listened to the friendly warnings of Germany and had abstained from military measures while negotiations were in progress." The Russian mobilization, he adds, was a deliberate challenge to Germany, who did not desire war. The most dramatic pages describe the final conversation with Sazonoff, who on this occasion created "an absolutely helpless impression, which confirmed my view that in the last phase of the crisis he allowed himself to be carried down by the stream and had made himself the mere tool of the fire-eaters." Pourtalès, like Lichnowsky, has reprinted his despatches from *Die Grosse Politik*, though he confines himself to the brief period covered by his published diary. The despatches and the diary are combined in *Meine letzten Verhandlungen in St. Petersburg Ende Juli 1914*.

The testimony of Pourtalès is supplemented by the brochure of Lieutenant Bernhard von Eggeling, *Die Russische Mobilmachung und der Kriegsausbruch*. After describing the reforms of Suchomlinoff and the chauvinism of military circles, the German Military Attaché narrates his official activities after the news of the Austrian ultimatum reached St. Petersburg on July 24. He regrets that the Wilhelmstrasse allowed the despatch of a document "which indubitably conjured up the danger of war"; but his gravest censures are reserved for the Russian

authorities who, while inaugurating preparations for mobilization as early as July 25, deceived him in regard to their decisions. The driving forces were not the vacillating Tsar nor the timid Suchomlinoff, but the Grand Duke Nicholas and Januskevich, Chief of the Staff; and he lays the blame on the men who ordered general mobilization in the middle of hopeful negotiations.

To students of *Die Grosse Politik* the personality of Count Monts, German Ambassador in Rome, is familiar enough; but it was not till the venomous attacks on him in Bülow's *Memoirs* that a wider public began to take interest in a man who was considered for the Chancellorship in 1906, after Bülow's collapse in the Reichstag, and again in 1909. One of the keenest brains in the diplomatic service, he comes to life again in *Erinnerungen und Gedanken des Botschafters Anton Graf Monts*, edited by Nowak and Thimme. The former's Introduction describes him as the unheeded warner, who foretold that Italy would never fight on the side of the Central Powers, who urged that the useless Italian alliance should be dropped, and who saw Germany's salvation in friendship with England. His unconcealed antagonism to Bülow's policy resulted in the loss of his post in the spring of 1909. For a moment it seemed as if he might enjoy an exquisite revenge, for the impressionable Kaiser, after an interview in Venice, toyed with the idea of making him Bülow's successor. It was an impossible suggestion, as he was aware, for he lacked Parliamentary experience and his sharp tongue was not always under control.

In his fragmentary *Memoirs* Monts describes his disappointment on taking up his post at Rome in 1903, for he had believed in the solidarity of the Triple Alliance. The King was barely civil, and Prinetti, the Foreign Minister, who had just concluded a secret arrangement with France, made no effort to hide his feelings. The Algeiras Conference tore off the veil and revealed Italy on the march towards the Entente camp. When Jagow, then Councillor of Embassy at Rome, explained that the Italians could not go with Germany, Holstein, blind leader of the blind, fatuously replied: "They must." The Wilhelmstrasse seemed unable to realize that, in the words of Monts, Italy would always be found where the Union Jack waved. A series of character studies explains his differences with Berlin in greater detail. In his interview with the Kaiser on board the *Hohenzollern* at Venice in April 1909 he argued that Germany only needed an ally on land and a friend on

the sea. The Triple Alliance should not be renewed, and England's neutrality should be secured by limiting the fleet. "You are right," declared his master at the close of the conversation; that should be his policy when the new Chancellor was installed. Unfortunately William II was "unteachable", and the perilous course was continued. The volume concludes with selections from the correspondence of Monts with Bülow, Holstein and Tschirschky.

There is no more attractive figure among German diplomats than Friedrich Rosen, whose reminiscences, *Aus einem diplomatischen Wanderleben*, lead us into many fields. The story opens in 1900, when the author, a master of Oriental languages and literature, was summoned by Holstein to help in the Eastern Department at Berlin. "For it was not the Foreign Minister or the Chancellor who directed policy, but Holstein." Fortunately the great man proved friendly enough, and it was only gradually that Rosen came to realize how pathological he was. He was always anti-French, and his Morocco policy was his revenge on Delcassé for ignoring his African approach in 1898. The Kaiser, we are told, liked England till 1900, when he felt himself to have been deceived by her statesmen. He interfered little in the activities of the Foreign Office, and among the duties of Rosen, an excellent English scholar, was to draft some of the Willy-Nicky letters. Bülow was a delightful host and the friendship lasted till the end. Lichnowsky was then, as ever, Russophil. Sir Frank Lascelles is warmly praised. Even Holstein respected him, and Rosen shared the Ambassador's belief that Anglo-German co-operation was the only way to avert disaster. The Kaiser's interest in the Islamic world was aroused by Marschall's brilliant despatches; but Rosen was always sceptical about the Baghdad railway, which was unwisely transformed into a political enterprise.

The main theme of the first volume is the first Morocco crisis, in which Rosen played a leading part. France, he declares, should have consulted Germany in 1904, and Bülow should have protested directly the Anglo-French treaty was signed. The Tangier demonstration was the wrong method, and Rosen was sent on a special mission to Paris in September 1905, to get the cart out of the rut. Radolin, the Ambassador, who was not up to the task, sulked and indeed openly espoused the French standpoint. Révoil, the French negotiator, continued the intransigent policy of Delcassé. The fall of the Minister made little difference, for the officials of the Quai

d'Orsay, not Rouvier, the Premier, were in control. "I was resolved not to let it lead to war", writes Rosen, who adds that he regarded Morocco as an episode. He complains that he could not obtain a clear lead from Berlin. On the other hand he defends his Government against the charge that it lost the opportunity of a Franco-German understanding, since even Rouvier made no concrete proposals. Witte's intervention on his return from making the Treaty of Portsmouth complicated his task by encouraging the French. The agreement of September 28 was all that could be secured. "My opponent was not only France but a coalition of five Powers—France, Spain, England, Russia, Italy." The Act of Algeciras was a humiliation for Germany.

The second volume opens at Bucharest, whither Rosen was transferred in 1910 after some uneventful years at Tangier. He liked King Carol and Carmen Sylva, but describes the Crown Princess Marie as clever, ambitious and vain, "a modern Circe." Her husband was a shadow. The secret alliance with the Central Powers was wearing thin. "If Germany allows Austria to control the Triple Alliance", remarked the King in 1911, "Roumania will not be able to fulfil her obligations." He repeated this warning on several occasions, and in May 1912 asked Rosen to convey it to Bethmann. There were three causes of complaint—the treatment of the Roumanian minority in Hungary, the hostility of Austria to Servia, and the flirtations with Bulgaria. "And tell Kiderlen that I regard the danger of a swing of opinion towards Russia as extraordinarily grave. There is still time, but unless action is quickly taken Roumania's position in the Triple Alliance will be destroyed." The Chancellor and Kiderlen were not impressed, and the latter, who ought to have known better, called Carol *ein alter Trottel*. The King was annoyed at the absence of response, and ceased to swim against the stream. He was still more incensed when Kiderlen transferred Rosen to Lisbon without consulting him. The Anglophil diplomatist found some consolation in assisting to make the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of 1913, which he describes as more favourable to Germany than that of 1898.

Freiherr von der Lancken never held a high post, but *Meine Dreissig Dienstjahre, 1888–1918*, contains some thrilling pages. As Councillor of Embassy in Paris 1907–13 he witnessed the later phases of the Morocco problem at close quarters. The agreement of 1909, recognizing France's practical preponder-

ance in return for an economic *condominium*, was only accepted by Bülow after Lancken had visited Holstein at the Chancellor's wish. Since the old autocrat of the Wilhelmstrasse had always regarded an understanding with France as impossible, Lancken was agreeably surprised to discover that he approved. Why had he changed? "I confess it has all turned out differently from my calculations and wishes. We should have acted differently in 1905. The conference was a mistake. I realized my error in thinking that England could never line up with France and Russia, and therefore I wished, before the ring closed on us, to try to break it, if necessary at the risk of war." The Tangier demonstration was a mistake, since neither Bülow nor the Kaiser played up. Schlieffen, the veteran Chief of the Staff, desired to fight in the autumn of 1904, when France, deprived of her Russian ally, could easily have been smashed. Bülow never wanted war, and, after following Holstein's lead at the outset, shrank back at the edge of the precipice. In view of such divided counsels at Berlin, France was bound to score.

Lancken liquidated the Casablanca crisis with Pichon, aided by the opening of the Bosnian crisis. We catch an interesting glimpse of Iswolsky in Paris at this moment, October 1908, smarting under his defeat. In a *tête-à-tête* with Lancken, he denounced Aehrenthal as a *scélerat*, and urged Germany to dissolve her partnership with Austria, which was useless to her and would bring disaster. Russia, he added, would guarantee Germany against a French attack. New light is also thrown on the making of the Franco-German agreement of February 1909. Lancken had discussed a rapprochement with his friend Tardieu in July 1908. Radolin approved, then Georges Louis, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Quai d'Orsay, and finally Bülow. Owing to the desire to complete the transaction before King Edward's visit to Berlin, the discussions were rather hurried. The text lacked clarity, and the friction of the economic *condominium* led to Agadir. On July 23, 1911, two days after the Mansion House speech, Kiderlen summoned Lancken to Berlin and asked him what Paris thought of it. The Quai d'Orsay was glad, but Caillaux was not, replied Lancken, who volunteered to get in touch privately with the Premier and seek a solution. "All right", commented Kiderlen, "but at your own risk, and you may have to be disavowed." Lancken procured the offer of compensation in the French Congo, only Schoen, his chief in Paris, being informed.



A week later, to Lancken's regretful surprise, Kiderlen, yielding to the pressure of Pan-German and Colonial circles, developed an appetite. It was now the turn of Caillaux to say : We cannot offer more. Advances and retreats followed till the unsatisfactory treaties of November 4. After digesting these pages it is difficult to think very highly of "the Swabian Bismarck."

During the war Lancken was head of the Political Department of the German administration in Belgium, and we read of his dramatic midnight struggle with General von Sauberzweig for the life of Edith Cavell. Fresh light is thrown on the so-called Briand peace feelers. In the spring of 1917 Lancken learned from Entente circles of a desire for a non-committal talk in Switzerland between him and some prominent French statesmen. The first indication came through a Belgian widow of French birth who had known him in his Paris days. The first name proposed was Deschanel, the second Jules Cambon, the third Briand. Lancken preferred the last, whom he knew. He was encouraged to go ahead by Bethmann and Zimmermann, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The latter expressed his readiness to cede small portions of Alsace and Lorraine if peace with France could be secured. Lancken was informed that Briand was willing to meet him in Switzerland, and at this moment it was suggested by another Belgian that he should see the Belgian Premier. It was arranged in June that Briand and de Brocqueville should meet Lancken in Switzerland at the end of the month. Though a telegram postponed the interview, a fresh arrangement was made for September 22 ; but at the last moment Briand postponed his visit for a week, intimating that delay would improve the prospects. The Premier, Ribot, however, vetoed the plan, and on Clemenceau's accession to office all thought of compromise was put aside.

The papers of Prince Radolin, German Ambassador at Constantinople, St. Petersburg and Paris, were placed by his widow at the disposal of Thimme, who utilized them for a documented eulogy in *Berliner Monatshefte*, September and October 1937. The articles were occasioned by the charge of weakness contained in Rosen's memoirs, and the opportunity is taken to rebut the accusation of Bülow and Eckardstein of slavish subservience to Holstein, his life-long friend. Succeeding the almost senile Münster at Paris in 1901, Radolin strove unceasingly for a genuine rapprochement with France, which Holstein described as a will of the wisp. The first Morocco crisis,

which may be said to have started with the Anglo-French treaty of April 8, 1904, was the most critical episode of his career, and we learn that he was less pliable than was generally believed. William II showed himself at first more Francophil than the Ambassador. In a conversation at Wilhelmshöhe the latter remarked that now was the time to ask for something. "I want nothing there", rejoined the Kaiser, "but Spain must have a good share." With Delcassé there was nothing to be done, but after his fall Rouvier's conciliatory disposition should have evoked a response from Berlin. Radolin resented the mission of Rosen as a Moroccan expert, and the assurances of Bülow and Holstein that no offence was intended produced no effect. In describing the discussions of the latter half of 1905 Thimme draws freely on the private correspondence of the Ambassador and Holstein. Rosen, he concludes, was less successful than he claims, Holstein less intransigent than is usually thought. Bülow, who appears as the villain of the piece, is said to have been jealous of Radolin on the ground that he might one day be considered for the Chancellorship. The Kaiser was right throughout in refusing to risk war for Morocco, and Radolin represented the golden mean between flabbiness and bluster.

Portions of the unfinished memoirs of Hans von Miquel, son of the famous Finance Minister, were published by Thimme in the *Berliner Monatshefte*, March and April 1938. Visiting Holstein at the moment of his resignation in 1906, he listened to the old man's story. The sole cause, he explained, was that the Kaiser had been turned against him by certain Court circles and wished him to go. This was evident from the conduct of Tschirschky, the Foreign Secretary. He looked strong and well in his sixty-ninth year, and spoke without bitterness. Miquel liked and admired him, but did not always approve his policy. For instance, he was right to overthrow Delcassé, but wrong not to compromise with Rouvier. A more elaborate portrait of Marschall, under whom the author served at Constantinople, is painted in glowing colours. He was the greatest German statesman of his time, and the Baghdad railway is his monument. After listening to a masterly speech on the Kaiser's birthday, the junior members of the Embassy agreed that their chief ought to be the German Chancellor. He realized that the Kaiser's disfavour stood in his way, but he speculated on his return to the Foreign Office. His belief in the Turk was part of his unmatched influence, but he carried it

much too far. He even made excuses for the Adana massacres, and his sympathies in the Tripoli war were unconcealed. That the Turkish Empire was doomed to further partition he could not or would not see.

Herbert von Hindenburg, a nephew of the Field Marshal, has much to tell about the statesmen and the diplomatists of many countries in his chatty volume *Am Rande zweier Jahrhunderte*. Appointed First Secretary at Rome in 1911 he witnessed the making of the Tripoli war, which he attributes to San Giuliano and Tittoni rather than to Giolitti. The speedy proclamation of annexation, on the other hand, was the work of the Premier, while the Foreign Minister was ready to shorten the conflict by leaving the Sultan his shadowy suzerainty. He condemns the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia in 1914, and believes that Bülow or Kiderlen would have prevented it. He had no tenderness for Austria, and when war broke out he desired to exert strong pressure on Vienna to satisfy Italy's demands. He speaks with reserve of the Bülow Mission, but pours scorn on the amateur efforts of Erzberger to keep her out of the war. When the blow fell the author was transferred to Bern, where he ended his diplomatic career.

Freiherr von Griesinger, German Minister at Belgrad, combines reminiscences and reflections in a striking article, "Die kritischen Tage in Serbien," *Deutsche Revue*, October 1920. Austria's procedure, he declares, was so hasty and violent that she forfeited the sympathies of the world. When he read the Servian reply to the ultimatum he felt like his colleagues that Giesl, the Austrian Minister, had left too quickly, since they all considered that Serbia had gone far to meet the demands. No one could expect them to be accepted *en bloc*. At Nisch, which became the seat of Government, Griesinger was asked by the Finance Minister if he had not received instructions to negotiate. No, he replied, but he was sure that his Government would offer its services if approached, and he would gladly forward any proposals. No steps were taken, and he regrets that the Wilhelmstrasse did not sound Serbia as to further concessions. When Austria declared war the momentary depression passed away and the self-confidence of the Serbs returned. They counted on Russia, and Hartwig's efforts had not been in vain. Griesinger was courteously treated till his departure on August 7, and he speaks of the Serbs with a sympathy rare among Teutonic chroniclers.

A good deal of information is conveyed in the unpretentious

little volume *Aus meinem Diplomatenerleben* by Karl Graf von Pückler. Beginning his career at Vienna under his uncle Prince Reuss, the German Ambassador, he passed to St. Petersburg, where he was impressed not only by the hostility of Russia to Germany but by her weakness, which even Bismarck never fully realized. He approved the dropping of the re-insurance treaty in 1890, but understood that compensation must be sought elsewhere. The watchword of the book is : Look to England, not to Russia ! His two years in Carlton House Terrace, 1898-1900, witnessed the beginning of the discussions of an Anglo-German partnership. Hatzfeldt, he declares, was wrong in his forecast that England would one day need Germany and that it was best to wait. Only Eckardstein was right, though his lack of character weakened his plea. The Kaiser was kept in the dark, and the golden opportunity of the Boer war was lost. " I have always been convinced that after the making of the Franco-Russian alliance we had no alternative but to enter the English camp." The Germany of William II, he laments, was unfortunate in her statesmen. " What a catastrophe that the shaping of Anglo-German relations was in the hands of such men as Holstein, Tirpitz and Bülow ! " Equally disastrous was Bethmann's acceptance of the submarine policy which brought the United States into the war. The moral of the book is that Germany was mainly responsible for her misfortunes. As a pupil of Liszt and a man of considerable charm, Pückler was welcomed in Vienna, St. Petersburg, Munich, Rome, London, Luxemburg, Stockholm. In Munich he served under Eulenburg, whom he describes as soft and rather untrustworthy, though much more than a mere courtier. In Rome his chief was Bülow, who appears as easy-going and lacking in clear principles.

We may end our muster of diplomatists with a respected figure who served his country at home. An essential feature of the Bismarckian edifice was the maintenance of certain sovereign rights by the leading states, among them the privilege of exchanging diplomatic representatives with Prussia. *Die Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten* of Count Lerchenfeld, Bavarian Minister at Berlin for nearly forty years, are almost entirely devoted to the Bismarckian era ; but the sketch of the Kaiser's reign contains some finished portraits of the chief actors on the stage, based on personal acquaintance. Bülow was a brilliant failure, and his triumphs were only for the moment. His tragic error was in looking to Russia, not to

England. Holstein could only be explained pathologically, and Marschall is quoted as saying that he saw some one lurking behind every bush. Bethmann was a noble, well-meaning man, with a heavy touch.

## VI

Passing to the soldiers we begin with the massive volume *Aus dem Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls Grafen von Waldersee*. The first instalment of the correspondence of the ambitious officer who succeeded Moltke as Chief of the Staff covers the years 1886 to 1891 and forms a valuable supplement to the *Denkwürdigkeiten*. For the student of European diplomacy the most profitable portion is the correspondence with the Military Attachés abroad, especially with Engelbrecht in Rome and Deines in Vienna. The antagonism between the military and the civilian representatives of Germany, so familiar to us from Carlton House Terrace, centres in this instance round the problem of a preventive war of the Central Powers against Russia in the later 'eighties, when the slow mind of Alexander III was turning towards France. The soldiers, led by Moltke and Waldersee, argued that the Franco-Russian alliance looming on the horizon should be averted by force, as Frederick the Great had struck at the coalition of 1756; and it required all the incomparable authority of Bismarck to frustrate their aims.

The development of the plans of the General Staff, in preparation for the war on two fronts which it was their duty to consider, is described in the opening chapters of the first volume of the official work, *Der Weltkrieg, 1914-1918*, compiled by the staff of the Reichsarchiv. While the elder Moltke desired to remain on the defensive in the West, Schlieffen resolved to remain on the defensive in the East and to strike at France through Belgium. The intervention of Great Britain in a Franco-German conflict was anticipated, whether or not Belgian neutrality was violated, and a British force was expected to land in Antwerp.

When the younger Moltke died "of a broken heart" in 1916, his widow set to work to vindicate his fame; but the *Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente*, failed to modify the popular verdict. The nephew of the great "battle-thinker" had accepted the office of Chief of the Staff on the resignation of Schlieffen on condition that the monarch did not interfere.

The correspondence with his wife reveals a likeable personality, by no means of the "blood and iron" type; but when the blunders of the politicians had brought war within sight, he demanded rapid decisions. In a Memorandum of July 28, 1914, he argued that the interference of Russia in the Austro-Serb dispute rendered war inevitable, and urged that France and Russia should be asked their intentions. When Russia ignored the German ultimatum, a telegram from Lichnowsky reported that England would keep France out of the conflict if she were not attacked. The Kaiser jumped at the offer, and decreed that war should be waged against Russia alone. Moltke pointed out that such a dislocation of plans was technically impossible; but he was roughly overruled, though his advice to demand the occupation of Verdun and Toul was accepted. The brief crisis ended when it was learned that no such British offer had been made, but his widow assures us that he never recovered from the agonizing conflict provoked by the endeavour to hold up the military machine. After his official career terminated with his failure at the Marne, he drew up an apologia during his melancholy convalescence at Homburg. We learn that he had omitted from the Schlieffen plan the determination to march through the south of Holland as well as through Belgium, and that his draft of the ultimatum to the latter contained a conditional promise of territorial expansion which the Foreign Office struck out.

The story of the war has been told by the leading Commanders, and Ludendorff was the first in the field. *My War Memories* contain a good deal of political information, for as the struggle continued Germany's super-man increased his control over every department of state. We feel his driving force not only in his apologia but in the memoranda collected in its sequel, *The General Staff and its Problems*, the object of which is to prove that "a peace of understanding" was unattainable and to reveal how much important information was withheld from the Supreme Command. The most valuable portions of these volumes concern the peace offers and efforts of 1916-18. His sudden conversion in the early autumn of 1918 from confidence to despair increased the difficulties of his Government. The controversy between the soldier and the civilians is continued in three brochures entitled *Entgegnung auf das amtliche Weissbuch: Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes*, in which he endeavoured to shift the blame to the shoulders of his political superiors.

Ludendorff argued his case afresh in *Kriegführung und Politik*. The best results, he argues, are secured when war and policy are controlled by a single hand, as with Alexander, Frederick the Great and Napoleon; but the partnership of Moltke and Bismarck was scarcely less effective. The greater struggle of 1914 was lost by anæmic civilians who never understood that wars cannot be run on the principle of limited liability. The cause of Germany's defeat was "politics", faithfully embodied in the nerveless Bethmann, whose course was dictated by the Socialists and Democrats. It was the Chancellor who kept the fleet inactive, who allowed pacifists and revolutionaries to undermine the home front, who interrupted the U-boat campaign in 1915 in the vain hope of placating America, who encouraged the enemy by the Peace Offer of 1916 and was the spiritual father of the Reichstag Resolution of 1917. With such a leader who could not lead Ludendorff enviously contrasts the super-men of the Entente, who stamped out defeatism and raised propaganda to a fine art. Faced by such resolute foes there was never a possibility of a compromise peace: the alternatives were victory or humiliation. To the charges that the military chiefs prevented a settlement by their extreme war aims, and that they coerced the civil Government, he replies that their programme differed little from that of the Wilhelmstrasse, and that Bethmann and Hertling preferred to take their orders from the Reichstag. "The undefeated army" went down before the treacherous attacks of its blinded fellow-countrymen, not before the sword of the enemy. "Germany lost her nerve five minutes before the hour of decision." The moral of this manual of unbending Prussianism is that wars can only be won by men like himself who understand the rules of the game and are given a free hand.

To complete our survey of Ludendorff's writings we must mention the brochure *Französische Fälschung meiner Denkschrift von 1912 über den drohenden Krieg*. The General denies the authorship (with which he had been charged by the *Temps*) of the sensational document on the strengthening of the German army, dated March 19, 1913, and published in the French Yellow-book of 1914, and denounces it as a clumsy mystification. "The trains of thought were not born in a German brain, and in no way correspond to the ideas of the then Chief of the Staff." Moltke, he adds, was thoroughly pacific, and his greatest fear during the winter of 1912-13 was to be dragged into a European war by Austria, where, in his

opinion, a powerful party was urging a conflict. This brief vindication is accompanied by Ludendorff's own Memorandum of December 1912, afterwards reprinted in *The General Staff and its Problems*, on the military situation and the necessity for an increase of the army, in which the bellicose sentiments of the apocryphal document are conspicuous by their absence.

Hindenburg's autobiography, *Out of My Life*, has been overshadowed by the writings and personality of his nominal subordinate. Its appearance, he explained, was due to the pressure of his friends. Nothing was further from his mind than to write a controversial treatise, much less an essay in self-glorification. The veteran Field-Marshal, who had fought at Sadowa and witnessed Sedan, was no super-man. He is modestly aware of the fact, and he was surprised at the call which came to him. He never mentions the Kaiser without reverence. Writing in 1919 he is still under the spell of "the great personality of Ludendorff", with whom his relations were those of a happy marriage. There is not a bitter word in the book, which breathes a dignified serenity.

"Our greatest difficulty", writes Hindenburg, "was to compromise between the conflicting claims of our allies." Austria, in particular, lost her nerve, and there was never any certainty that a sudden collapse might not occur. England possessed a stronger grip over her allies through her purse than Germany over her smaller team. Turkey made a wonderful fight, to which he pays unstinted homage, though he deplors the Armenian massacres. The most valuable portion deals with the years 1916-18 when he and Ludendorff were in supreme command. "I am a non-political temperament", he confesses, and he had no inclination to be mixed up in political questions more than necessary; but he felt it his duty to utter warnings if he saw danger ahead. He regretted the acceptance of the Austrian plan of an independent Kingdom of Poland in 1916. He disapproved even more the raising of the question of peace by Burian at the end of the same year, believing that the demands of the Allies made discussion useless. Of the four co-operating states Austria alone, he declared, really wanted peace at that stage, and she was capable of far more than she herself believed. It was a mistake to be too sympathetic with her, for soft words discourage confidence and resolution. Her pessimism infected Germany, where the Reichstag Resolution of June 1917 was a fatal mistake. "We shouted our longings for peace into the ears of our enemies." Clemenceau's battle-



cry, "I make war" found the echo "We seek peace". Henceforth the main anxiety of the High Command was the home front.

Falkenhayn's *General Headquarters and its Critical Decisions*, 1914-1916, records the activities of the General Staff from the time that he superseded Moltke, after the battle of the Marne, till he was replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff on the entry of Roumania into the war in August 1916. Writing in the third person, like Julius Caesar, the Chief of the Staff is explanatory rather than controversial, and political references are rare. He considered himself the servant of the Emperor, and made no attempt to dictate to the Government; but, like other prominent soldiers, he fretted at the division of authority. During the spring and summer of 1916 he repeatedly begged to resign, on account of "differences of opinion between the highest authorities on the weightiest questions of policy and the prosecution of the war—a situation he could do nothing to change." On hearing that the Kaiser had asked Hindenburg for advice he promptly resigned his post. In the survey with which he concludes his narrative he argues that the situation bequeathed to his successor was serious—"it had never been anything else"—but in no sense desperate. His apologia is supplemented by General Zwehl's biography, *Erich von Falkenhayn*, which utilizes the family papers and endeavours to correct the popular impression that he was a failure. It is interesting to learn that he realized that the chances of complete victory vanished at the Marne.

Though his name was little known among the Allies during the conflict, the memoirs of General Hoffmann prove him to have played a part of outstanding importance. The title of book, *The War of Lost Opportunities*, prepares us for criticism both of the military and the political leadership. In the former sphere Falkenhayn is the whipping boy, blind in his strategy, jealous of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, unwilling to co-operate loyally with Conrad. A devoted colleague of Ludendorff from the outset, Hoffmann became Chief of the Staff to Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who was appointed to the command of the Eastern front when the great twin brethren assumed control in 1916. Even then mistakes continued. The U-boat campaign was begun before there were enough submarines, and Ludendorff should have remained on the defensive after the attack on Amiens in 1918 and advised negotiations for peace. The statesmen were as blind as the soldiers. When

Bethmann visited the Eastern front at the end of 1914 he asked Hoffmann how peace could be restored. "The first condition", replied the General, "is that you declare that we do not wish to keep a single square yard of Belgian soil." "You are the first soldier who has told me that", rejoined the Chancellor; "it is entirely my own opinion, but if I were to say so in the Reichstag, I should be swept away by public opinion." "I was deeply distressed", comments the author, "that the Chancellor did not dare to say what he thought right for fear of losing his post." In his account of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, where he represented the Supreme Command, he demolishes the legend that he banged his fist on the table, and assures us that he reminded the Bolshevik delegates of the inexorable facts without raising his voice.

The interest aroused by Hoffmann's book led to the publication of his *War Diaries and other Papers*, with a biographical study by Nowak, his admiring friend. The larger part of the first volume is filled with jottings of the years 1914-18, which may be regarded as the raw material for his apologia. Unlike Ludendorff, who could see nothing ahead but victory or catastrophe, the cool-headed Hoffmann realized that another alternative was not only possible but probable. "Defeat I consider to be out of the question", he wrote in March 1915, "but it is equally unthinkable that we shall be able to dictate terms—as I have told the Chancellor." The Congo State should fall to Germany, but he was opposed to large annexations in East or West. Liège might perhaps be retained, and some frontier rectification should be made on the Eastern front; but the fewer non-Germans inside the new Empire the better. With these views he naturally found Bethmann "very sensible". He regretted that the Chancellor could not reach decisions and that in consequence German policy appeared to have no fixed goal; but a far greater evil was the influence of Falkenhayn, who not only committed such terrible blunders as the attack on Verdun, but kept the Kaiser in ignorance of the situation. Ludendorff possessed the energy that Bethmann lacked, but he was no politician. "He is too impulsive. With him something must always be done at once, whereas the politician must know how to wait." Unlike most of the belligerents on either side, Hoffmann's views were not reactions to the military barometer. At the end of 1917, when Russia was out of the picture and all hopes were centred on the coming offensive in the West, he wrote: "I am convinced that we

cannot be beaten, but also that we cannot defeat the English ; so I am for a compromise peace." In the most curious entry in the diary he notes : " We cannot beat England—at any rate not yet. I shall live to see it, but not in this war."

Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria was above all a soldier, and the three volumes of *Mein Kriegstagebuch* are primarily a contribution to the annals of the Western front. But the Commander of the Sixth Army was also a cultivated, travelled, far-seeing man, and scattered through the thousand pages of his diary are political records and jottings of considerable interest. The heir to the throne of the Wittelsbachs was a personage of importance, in close touch with the rulers, statesmen and soldiers of Imperial Germany. On the other hand, though informed of everything, he was not quite high enough to secure the acceptance of his advice, and the book is filled with sorrowful complaints. He is aware of the rather melancholy impression it is calculated to make, and cautions his readers to remember that he confided to his diary his anxieties rather than his joys. The root of the trouble, he believes, was the lack of unified control. There was no civilian will in Germany to match the soldiers, and the Supreme Command interfered—and sometimes was compelled to interfere—in regions beyond its grasp.

Two decades before the war he doubted the durability of the Hapsburg Monarchy, built as it was on the ideas of bygone centuries. " The frontiers of common language and common sentiment are the natural frontiers of States." Another interesting confession is dated January 27, 1917. " How differently might the war have ended had we had the right men in the right place ! Knowing our lack of them I was always for avoiding war." Big Industry had in large measure controlled foreign policy, and profits, as in Morocco, had counted for almost as much as the welfare of Germany. The Kaiser appears as a well-meaning figure-head. Bethmann was the worst pilot to weather the storm. " What struck me most in his conversation", he writes in October 1915, " were the continual doubts which cropped up in almost every sentence, and I formed the impression that he could hardly reach positive decisions for thinking of the difficulties involved." He has scarcely more confidence in the military chiefs. Falkenhayn struck him as hasty and restless, and he helped to procure his dismissal. He opposed the short cuts to victory dear to the military mind, such as air raids on London, and he realized the implications

of the submarine campaign. After two years of fighting he began to fear that the war might not be won and that, without careful steering, it might be lost. He challenged Hindenburg's description of the situation in October 1916 as excellent. When, in the same month, the Crown Prince pressed him to urge the Kaiser to make a separate peace with Russia, giving her back Russian Poland and adding East Galicia as the German strength was ebbing away, he responded to the idea if not to the plan. On the last day of 1916 he noted that he could no longer believe in a complete military decision.

From the middle of 1917 the record becomes less exclusively military, for since the Reichstag Resolution every one was thinking about peace. The Prince found Michaelis, the stop-gap Chancellor, cool-headed and sensible; but, like Prince Max, he regretted the refusal to make the declaration on Belgium without which England would fight to the end. In February, 1918, he actually found the Kaiser arguing that the Flemings desired union with Germany, and that the solution of the problem of peace was the partition of Belgium between Germany and France; and as late as July 19, 1918, Hertling was bent on securing economic concessions as the price of her independence. There is no more interesting conversation in these volumes than that with Czernin on August 12, 1917. War and revolution, declared the Austrian Foreign Minister, were running a neck and neck race. Turkey and Bulgaria were no longer to be depended on, and peace was urgently needed. The Reichstag Resolution had removed the apprehensions entertained in Austria that German annexationist designs might prolong the struggle. Russia, however, had no dependable government with which to negotiate, and he had little hopes of England, the toughest of their enemies. An approach must therefore be made to France, the most exhausted of the Allies. Germany should offer the French-speaking portions of Lorraine, receiving in compensation a preponderant influence in a Poland ruled by a German Prince, to which Austria would add Galicia. From Servia he would only ask a slight rectification of frontier, from Montenegro the cession of Mount Lovtchen. Italy was in difficulties, and he was not in favour of buying her off. The Central Powers might well be satisfied with the restoration of something like the *status quo ante*. The Prince listened to Czernin's review with interest and a good deal of agreement.

Though the defeat of Germany was so sudden and unex-

pected that the nation was stunned by the blow, Prince Rupprecht had seen it all in advance. In vain did he criticize the "ostrich-like" policy of Ludendorff, who was intoxicated with his fleeting success. He welcomed Prince Max, while regretting that the call came so late. When the Kaiser appeared to stand between his sorely-tried people and an armistice, he desired that the German Princes should press him to abdicate. He loyally accepted his place in the Imperial system, but he was more concerned with the throne of the Wittelsbachs than with the fate of William II or the Crown Prince. A letter to Hertling of July, 1917, urged that terms should be communicated to the King of Spain or the King of Sweden, these terms to be limited to the *status quo ante bellum*. Nearly a year later, on June 1, 1918, he vainly implored Hertling to take the only path to peace by promising to restore the complete independence of Belgium. "We must be content with what we have won in the East. Even a peace which brought us no gains in the West would be a victorious peace."

No German work on the war flames with a fiercer passion than Colonel Bauer's *Der Grosse Krieg in Feld und Heimat*. "My aim", writes the *fidus Achates* of Ludendorff, "is to show that Germany could have won the war, and that she succumbed not to her enemies but to the weakness of the Government and the criminal activities of political radicalism." Schlieffen resigned his position as Chief of the Staff in 1906 because his advice to choose that moment for the inevitable war was rejected. "With him as our leader and Ludendorff as his right-hand man, we should have achieved the highest." Bauer worked for years under Ludendorff in the Mobilization Department of the General Staff. "Even then he was the great man, seeing what was coming and trying to prepare for it." Only a spirited policy could have broken down the *Einkreisungspolitik*. As a member of the General Staff throughout the war, and the author of many of the documents published by Ludendorff, the Colonel throws fresh light on the struggle with the Government. He blames his chiefs for waiting so long before telling the Kaiser that Bethmann must go. "He was instinctively the enemy of everything that savoured of manly strength, such as attack or fighting for victory. He had no comprehension of the German soul. Compromises and negotiations, with his eyes turned backwards—that was his way, and his guilt for the downfall of Germany is great. He will be remembered as Germany's grave-digger. Had a

strong man been in his shoes, we should have won. Instead of leading, he was led by the Reichstag majority. His only talent was speaking." The writer took a leading part in his overthrow, but the change came too late to be of much use. Michaelis, who worked well with the General Staff, was quickly chased off the stage, and the aged Hertling was no better than Bethmann.

Colonel Bauer condemns the Government, not only for failing to mobilize the spiritual energies of the nation, but for omitting to suppress political and economic *sabotage*. He himself had expected a revolution since 1916, when Ludendorff dismissed it as impossible, and the Kaiser, fed with sugary reports, turned a deaf ear to warnings. The Crown Prince, who also realized the need of energy, declined to work against his father, and Ludendorff rejected Bauer's plan to overthrow Hertling. Under these circumstances the revolutionaries had free scope for their fell designs. When the tide of war turned on August 8, 1918, a Dictator might still have saved the country; but instead of a Dictator there appeared Prince Max, the tool of Ebert and Scheidemann, as Bethmann had been the puppet of Erzberger. Even then something might have been saved from the wreck, for the military strength of the Entente was exhausted by the prolonged offensive; but at this moment the revolution stabbed the army in the back. An infantry division stood ready to fight the revolution, and only needed the Kaiser's word to advance; but the monarch was falsely informed that it was too late. "God punish the murderers of the German people", cries the Colonel in the bitterness of his heart.

The same lament that the Government failed to govern is voiced, though in less acrid tones, by General von Wrisberg, Director of the Supply Department of the War Office. The first volume of his memoirs, *Der Weg zur Revolution*, was written to show "the thinking portion of the German people by whom they were handed the poison bowl." Germany, he declares, was defeated on the home front. The patriotic unity of the Socialists began to fail in 1915; pacifist agitation commenced in 1916 and was fostered by the Reichstag Resolution of 1917. He flagellates Bethmann for failing to keep up the spirit of the people and for tolerating defeatist propaganda. "I wrote several memoranda on the domestic situation and its needs", he cries plaintively, "but the Kaiser never saw them. Nor was I ever summoned for an audience. His intentions

were excellent, but how could he intervene if he was not informed?" While civilian writers complain that power passed into the hands of the Supreme Command, Wrisberg regretfully records how the Reichstag gradually gained an influence to which it had no right. The naval mutiny of 1917, and the general strike of January 1918, fully described in these pages, inaugurated "the systematic preparation for revolution and peace" under the lead of the Minority Socialists, whom their Majority rivals lacked the courage to resist. Imperial Germany, he argues, was ruined not by militarism but by democracy.

The same contempt for democratic ideas and institutions appears in General von Stein's apologia, *A War Minister and his Work*. Beginning with a sketch of Schlieffen, "the acutest intellect I ever knew," he gives a friendly but less admiring picture of the younger Moltke, who told him that the Kaiser had been strongly opposed to the war and had only consented with a heavy heart. We meet the usual complaints of the flabby Bethmann, "whereas a true statesman is afraid of nothing," and of the tired Hertling; but the most interesting pages are those in which he trounces his allies. The Austrians were frivolous and incompetent. It was a favourite trick in Vienna to cry "We can't go on", when they wanted something which could only be obtained by special pressure. The Austrian press was full of attacks on Germany, while the Emperor Karl was ruled by his wife and was rumoured to receive foreign gold. If Austria was effete and disloyal, Hungary was difficult and ungrateful. The Bulgarians wanted everything and would give nothing in return. The Turks were inefficient and corrupt. "All our allies proved weak and unable to provide for themselves. For fear that they might desert us, we treated them with far too much consideration."

In *Menschen und Dinge* General Freytag-Loringhoven claims to have devoted more study to the subject of war than any other officer. Like other colleagues of Schlieffen he speaks with affectionate admiration of the famous Chief of the Staff. In Bülow he missed a "warm, big, German heart", and he censures his policy in Morocco. On the outbreak of war he was selected to represent the German army at Austrian headquarters, where he found Conrad cordial and the Archduke Frederick charming. Appointed Quartermaster-General a few months later, he formed an unusually high opinion of Falkenhayn, and expresses his pity for the lonely figure of the

Kaiser who asserted his authority in time of war too little rather than too much. General Keim's *Erlebtes und Erstrebtes* embodies the creed of an impenitent militarist, who slashes out, not only at the pacifists and Parliamentary opponents of the Armament Bills, but at the Government itself. The cause of the collapse, argues the President of the Wehrverein, was not the "too much" of his organization but the "too little" of the responsible authorities.

Another literary warrior re-entered the lists in 1927 in the person of General Bernhardi, whose *Denkwürdigkeiten* survey the rise and fall of the German Empire. The character of his countrymen, he declares, reveals a striking dualism. On the one hand we find the highest intellectual capacity and physical courage; on the other, lack of political insight and the flagging of energy when deprived of leadership. Starting with these assumptions, it is natural that he should date the decline from the fall of Bismarck. Waldersee, some of whose letters appear in these pages, understood the European situation, but was powerless. Bethmann was "a man without marrow or nerve", and the humiliations of the second Morocco crisis destroyed the remains of German prestige. It was as a warning and a trumpet-call to his countrymen that he wrote *Germany and the next War* in 1912, when he had convinced himself that a conflict was inevitable, and that the Fatherland must trust not to decrepit Austria nor to treacherous Italy but to its own right arm. We might be listening to Conrad, for the German soldier, like the Austrian, laments that the timid civilians vetoed a preventive war.

In a revealing passage Bernhardi quotes Tschirschky as saying in May, 1907, that King Edward, though not wanting war, desired the humiliation of Germany. War was therefore inevitable. "There was a group of men in Germany who wished to launch the inevitable war while there was a prospect of success, who saw through the policy of Edward VII and realized the jingoism of France. Unfortunately they had no party behind them and stood absolutely alone. The War Minister was with them, but he could not enforce his will against the overwhelming majority of the German people. Tschirschky, like a true statesman, realized war to be inevitable and worked for it with all his might, and he was supported by the Chief of Staff. But as soon as his course was observed, he was removed from his post and replaced by the peace-loving Schoen; for the Kaiser strove for peace at any price, and



cherished the strangest illusions to justify this policy to himself. In this effort he was supported by Bülow and the mass of the German people, which marched with closed eyes towards its doom." Bernhardt consoles himself with the conviction that Germany deserved to win the war. "Greed and ambition united our enemies, and our Kaiser rightly declared that the war was a struggle of two philosophies—one purely material, the other striving above all for the mental and moral advance of mankind."

General von Einem's *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933* breathes the Bismarckian tradition of an overwhelming army and limited liability abroad. As War Minister from 1903 to 1909 he used to implore Tirpitz not to endanger the army by diverting money to the fleet. The *Flottenpolitik*, moreover, was bound to antagonize England, and Bülow, "the *Jongleur*", whom he distrusted and despised, should at any rate have avoided the simultaneous estrangement of Russia. He committed the double offence of incurring unnecessary risks and missing favourable opportunities. In the first Morocco crisis, for instance, he was ready to fight, and when William II exclaimed: "I will never fight for Morocco", his resistance should have been overborne. The last and greatest of the Chancellor's sins was that in the *Daily Telegraph* crisis he left his master in the lurch. The General's hero was Schlieffen, a worthy successor of the great Moltke as Chief of the Staff, the author of the famous plan which would have won the war had it been carried out. The chief interest of the book is the naïve self-portraiture of an impenitent Prussian militarist, who records with pride that he never willingly shook hands with a Socialist.

General von Seeckt only became a celebrity when he built up the Reichswehr after the war, but his eminence as a strategist was established during the campaigns against Russia and Roumania. Since he left no reminiscences his widow invited Lieutenant-General von Rabenau, Director of the archives of the War Office, to edit his papers. The chief interest of the work entitled *Seeckt: Aus meinem Leben 1866-1917*, apart from the military narrative, is the revelation of one of the most impressive personalities of his time. The letters to his wife portray the rulers and soldiers of the Central Powers; for as Chief of the Staff of the army commanded by the Archduke Karl, soon to ascend the throne, he had ample opportunities of studying Germany's principal ally.

Russia's readiness for war is discussed with the aid of unpublished documents in *Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg*, by Gunther Frantz, once a member of the German General Staff and subsequently employed in the State archives at Berlin. He believes that Suchomlinoff had carried out a comprehensive and in large measure successful reorganization of the army, and that in certain respects Russia was more ready for war than any other Power—in the number of the mobilization tests, in eliminations of seasonal weakness, and by accelerating mobilization through the institution of the Period of Preparation for War. The Russian army, in fact, was quite up to the general level, and the German General Staff was aware of the fact. "In 1914 an army organized on thoroughly modern lines took the field, with excellent artillery and commissariat." The most important of his new documents is a lengthy memorandum by General Daniloff, written in March 1914, dealing with Russia's strength, speculating on the plans of the Western Powers, and expressing the opinion that England would take part in the event of a European conflagration.

## VII

Germany was never ruled by the Reichstag till the Hohenzollern Empire collapsed; yet its leading figures were well known to the public, and they were by no means without influence. Let us listen to their stories, beginning on the Right and passing through the Centre to the Left. The interest of the *Erinnerungen* of Oldenburg-Janitschau is their revelation of an impenitent Junker, the friend and neighbour of Hindenburg in East Prussia, who hated all concessions to the modern spirit. He alone defended the Kaiser in the *Daily Telegraph* debates. "For you the Emperor is an institution, for us he is a person. And we will serve His Majesty as long as we live, without fear but to the last breath, in the old loyalty in which we have never failed." He was too moved to say more, and burst into tears when he reached the lobby. Equally dramatic was his declaration on another occasion that the Emperor should at any moment be in a position to order a lieutenant to take ten men and close the Reichstag. The old fighter had only one complaint to make of William II. During the Bosnian crisis he urged a preventive war on the ground that Russia would attack as soon as she had recovered from her disasters in the Far East. "And you want to do that", replied General

von Einem, the Minister of War, "with an Emperor who under all circumstances desires peace?"

Another free lance on the extreme Right was Heinrich Class, the soul of the Pan-German League, who tells his spirited story in *Wider den Strom: Vom Werden und Wachsen der nationalen Opposition im alten Reich*. The young Hessian lawyer, fired by Treitschke's lectures at Berlin, became Deputy Chairman of the League in 1903 and Chairman in 1908. He defines his theme as "a forty years struggle against the tendencies, forces and persons who estranged our people from its true character and led it to the collapse of the Empire." As early as 1903 the *Alldeutsche Blätter* urged reforms in Morocco, and, if they were impracticable, the occupation of the Atlantic coast from Rabat to the Sus. After the Anglo-French treaty of 1904 he published a pamphlet *Marokko verloren?* A portion, he argued, was needed not only for its minerals but, in view of the rapid increase of population, as a home for German colonists. Though denounced as a megalomaniac, he claims to have been a far-sighted patriot. The spasm of activity in 1905 was a welcome surprise; but his satisfaction did not last long, for Algiers was a defeat. For Bülow, flatterer, egoist, muddler, he entertained "contempt and hate." With his *laissez faire, laissez aller*, he recalled "König Lustik," King Jerome of Westphalia. Class welcomed the change to Bethmann, but here again he was disappointed as the timidity of the new pilot appeared.

The most interesting pages describe the relations of the Pan-Germans to Kiderlen, who seemed to be a man after their own heart. On his appointment in 1909 the new Foreign Secretary received Reventlow at the latter's wish and Class soon afterwards. "I never understood why my predecessors were so hostile to you", he began. "It is useful for the Government in foreign negotiations to be able to appeal to the Pan-Germans." He desired to co-operate with them behind the scenes in order to end the course of failure and drift. "Watch and if necessary criticize my policy. Attack me. Then I can say that the Foreign Office is prepared for compromise, but that there are the wicked Pan-Germans, whose influence is too great to be ignored." He reserved his liberty to hit back if necessary. Thus a secret compact was made, and the Foreign Office supplied money on several occasions for the work of the League in South Eastern Europe.

On April 19, 1911, Class had a very satisfactory talk with

Kiderlen, whom he asked what Germany would do if France tore up the Act of Algeciras. "It is a question", replied the Minister, "whether we try for naval bases or for a colony, as you wish. The Admiralty is against naval bases, as they divide the fleet. Kiao-Chau is enough. Your plan of a colony is different, for the fate of colonies will be decided in Europe in the event of war. It will be useful to raise demands in the press and in meetings. Such a division of labour between the Foreign Office and the national unions is desirable. Then I can say, 'I am ready for compromise, but public opinion must be considered. We shall stand firm in Morocco though we may seem to draw back a step. You must not be disappointed. But we shall meet again before that.'" At parting Kiderlen remarked: "You can be sure that our Morocco policy will please you. You will be satisfied." The next stage was an equally encouraging interview with the Under-Secretary on July 1, as his chief was away. Zimmermann took out his watch. "In a quarter of an hour the bomb explodes. At twelve our Ambassadors announce the arrival of the *Panther* at Agadir. We have caused German firms and business men to send complaints and appeals. We chose Agadir because no French or Spaniards are there. It leads to the Sus, the richest mineral and agricultural part of South Morocco." What then? asked the Pan-German leader. "We shall take and keep this district as we need a place to settle in. We cannot lose any more Germans. We declare that we are only securing the safety of our nationals." All the more bitter was the disappointment of Class when the treaty of November 4 presented Germany with nothing more than a fragment of the French Congo. It is not surprising that he denounces the man from whom he had expected so much as a liar.

Count Westarp's *Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden und die Konservative Partei*, 1918, contains the whole evidence submitted by the Conservative leader to the Reichstag Committee, of which only a part was published in the seventh volume of *Der Zusammenbruch*. The book is a sustained indictment of the last Chancellor of the Empire and of the parties which supplied him with a majority; for in the author's eyes it was the duty of the Government, even in the moment of military defeat, to refuse the sacrifices which it had been indisposed to make while there was hope of victory. It was a monstrous error to ask for peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, which included the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and

other "impossible" demands. It was equally unnecessary to introduce Parliamentary Government, to abolish the Prussian three-class franchise, or to urge the abdication of the Kaiser. When the terms of the Allies were announced it was the duty of the Government to summon the country to a final desperate effort, which, he believes, would have secured better treatment and would at any rate have saved the national honour. The most valuable pages describe interviews with Prince Max and Vice-Chancellor Payer, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Its chief interest lies in the revelation of a mentality which, by preventing a compromise settlement and internal reform, forced the strongest Power in the world to drink the cup of humiliation to the dregs. Westarp followed up his little book with two large volumes, *Konservative Politik im letzten Jahrzehnt des Kaiserreiches*. Unlike Oldenburg-Janitschau, the leader of the Conservative party remains a rather shadowy figure. By far the larger part of the survey of 1908-1918 is devoted to domestic politics, which are illustrated by copious extracts from newspaper articles and Parliamentary debates. He finds little to praise in the rulers of his country, particularly in Bülow's conduct in the *Daily Telegraph* crisis.

Our knowledge of German policy during the war is supplemented by Erzberger's spirited apologia, *Erlebnisse im Weltkriege*. The pushing South German schoolmaster had made himself a force in the years of peace, and during the struggle he became not only the leading spirit of the Catholic party but the most influential member of the Reichstag. His aid was sought by the Government in its efforts to keep Italy out of the war, and his pages on the unavailing struggles of Bülow and himself in Rome are a contribution to history. Of no less importance is the record of his activities in carrying the Reichstag Resolution of July 1917. At the opening of the conflict he had shouted with the annexationists, but he changed his course and became the most eloquent champion of a compromise peace. When Germany was confronted with defeat in the autumn of 1918 he became a Secretary of State, headed the Armistice delegation, and with infinite difficulty converted a majority in the National Assembly at Weimar to acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles as the lesser of two evils. Few of his contemporaries made so much history in so short a time as this energetic, ambitious and unrefined man who feared neither responsibility nor unpopularity.

Less influential and less familiar to the outer world was the

veteran South German Liberal, Payer, who served as Deputy Chancellor under Hertling and Prince Max, and whose well-informed memoirs, *Von Bethmann bis Ebert*, repay careful study. An ex-President of the Württemberg Chamber and a member of the Reichstag since 1882, Payer was a champion of Parliamentary government ; but he admits that few shared his opinion before or during the early stages of the war, and adds that, if Germany had won, self-government would have had long to wait. His story begins with the Peace Resolution of July 1917, when he became chairman of the Inter-Party Committee of National Liberals, Catholics, Democrats and Socialists set up after the Chancellor crisis. The narrative broadens with the fall of Kühlmann a year later, and is of special value for the period of Prince Max. The Kaiser, he declares, had no real influence on Hindenburg and Ludendorff. "The former he revered too much, the latter he feared too much." He has, however, little sympathy with the monarch who detested the Reichstag, and scandalized a private meeting of party leaders by declaring that the struggle then in progress would be followed by a war of all the European peoples under his leadership against England. For Payer the question of Monarchy or Republic was not a matter of principle. He attributes the overthrow of his friend and hero Bethmann rather to the latter's support of franchise reform than to his handling of foreign affairs, and declares the Generals scarcely less responsible than the Junkers themselves for the blocking of a change promised in the Kaiser's Easter message of 1917.

Payer's opinions were shared by his friend and fellow-Württemberger, Conrad Haussmann, whose letters and diaries during the war were published after his death under the title of *Schlaglichter*. He too championed Bethmann against his foes, and strongly supported the Reichstag Resolution of July 1917. As a member of Prince Max's Cabinet his evidence becomes important for the closing weeks of the struggle, and he rendered valuable service to the new regime as Chairman of the Committee which drew up the Weimar Constitution. Men like Payer and Haussmann were good Europeans as well as good patriots, but their testimony reveals afresh the tragic impotence of German liberalism.

Scheidemann speaks for the Socialists as Erzberger for the Centrum and Payer for the Democrats. On the eve of war the Socialist leader was on holiday in South Germany, and, in anticipation of great events, purchased a large diary. When

all was over he published selections from his entries under the title *Der Zusammenbruch*. Though never officially employed he was in close touch with the Government, and some of his chapters, such as those on the Stockholm Conference and the Chancellor crisis of 1917, rank as original authorities. He envisaged the conflict as a war of defence, in which even victory would not justify annexations, and he was denounced by the Right for his advocacy of a "Scheidemann Peace". When the Empire fell in ruins he aided Ebert in curbing the wilder elements of the revolution, and became head of the Coalition Ministry which carried the Republic through the first half of 1919.

His diary was supplemented in 1921 by a brochure entitled *Papst, Kaiser und Sozialdemokratie in ihren Friedensbemühungen im Sommer 1917*. The evidence, he declares, proves the Kaiser to have been as eager for peace in the early summer of 1917 as the Socialists themselves—he wishing to use the Pope for the purpose, they their fellow-workers abroad. The monarch's conversation with the Nuntius Pacelli at the beginning of July, if accurately reproduced in these pages, reveals him as encouraging the Vatican to work for peace. The Pope, declares Scheidemann, took up his mission from motives of the purest humanity, and carried it out with zeal and skill, but his initiative was sabotaged by reactionary influences. "The more objectively one judges the Kaiser, the graver become the charges against his *entourage*." When it became known that his mind was moving towards peace, he was dragged back by anonymous letters and by assurances that England was on the rocks. As a member of the Committee of Seven, appointed to prepare a reply to the Papal Note, Scheidemann pleaded for an unambiguous declaration on Belgium as the first and indispensable step. The Foreign Minister argued that it would be "a mistake to give away our only card", adding that the Pope did not expect it, and that negotiations with England in regard to Belgium would soon begin. Scheidemann remained unmoved, for he knew that the opinion of the Vatican coincided with his own.

The voluminous *Memoirs of a Social Democrat* add a good many details without substantially modifying Scheidemann's reading of events or our impression of the author. Like most other actors in the drama, he looks back on his work and cries aloud: Behold, it is good! His sleek complacency is a greater trial when buttered lavishly over eight hundred pages, and his

attacks on old friends and colleagues leave a disagreeable taste. "I have never bowed the knee to any man, to King or President," he proudly declares; "as I have always striven to do my duty, I had a right to hold my head erect." The early chapters introduce us to the Socialist party and its chiefs in the last years of peace, above all to Bebel, "half lion, half fox", whose detestation of Tsarism, we are assured, would certainly have led him to support the military credits in August 1914. He adds, however, that a self-governing Germany would have been able to avert the war. He pours scorn on the firebrands who, like Erzberger, called for the arrest of Socialist editors, and, like Stresemann, shouted for annexations in East and West. Bethmann, on the other hand, appears throughout as a moderate, longing for a Scheidemann peace, while fearing to proclaim what he whispered to his Socialist visitors. On receiving the author and two of his colleagues on November 21, 1914, he sadly confessed that Germany had rated Austria too high and her enemies too low. The Russians, he added, were well armed and their mobilization was a surprising success. The French offensive was beyond expectation, and Joffre was an excellent chief. The achievement of the English was a surprise, for nobody had imagined that fresh troops would cross the Channel every day. The vigorous resistance of the Belgians was also an astonishment. The Chancellor, remarks Scheidemann, was in an almost intolerable position. "Every word he uttered was interpreted as surrender by the Right and Imperialism by the extreme Left. To myself and my more intimate friends it was clear that he was really convinced that he had done all that was humanly possible to prevent the war, and that he was honourably desirous of ending it as rapidly as possible." The launching of the submarine campaign in 1917 was vigorously opposed by the author, who saw in its adoption the doom of his country.

The second volume takes its place among our chief sources for the two crowded years which stretch from the fall of Bethmann to the forced acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles, for Scheidemann was now a maker of history. He denounces Michaelis, who, in qualifying his acceptance of the Reichstag Peace resolution with the phrase "as I understand it", trifled with the vital interests of the people. That such a mediocrity would know how to deal with the opportunity provided by the Papal Note was too much to hope. On the fall of the feeblest Chancellor that Germany ever possessed, Bülow's name was



put forward by the Prince and his friends. When pressed to meet the candidate, Scheidemann refused and only yielded to renewed entreaties. There is a contemptuous account of the wooing of the Socialist leader in the Hotel Adlon. All the arts and crafts of the veteran *charmeur* were exercised in vain. "He said Yes to everything, and approved everything that I asked." At parting he held the hand of the visitor long in his own, and insisted on helping him into his coat. The sole effect of a conversation lasting two and a half hours was to convince Scheidemann that Bülow was past his prime.

With the arrival of Max of Baden our author found himself a Minister, and it is interesting to compare his record of the last Imperial Chancellorship with the Memoirs of his chief. Prince Max made no secret of his dislike of Scheidemann, and the Socialist leader hits sharply back. "He was certainly one of the cleverest of the German Princes, though that does not say much. Flatterers had told him that he was a great politician, and he probably came to believe it. Yet never have I met a man so utterly dependent on others." He was a well-meaning amateur, utterly lacking in judgment of men and seeking counsel from advisers as ignorant of the political stage as himself. That the Prince liked Ebert is an added offence. After his brief speech proclaiming the Republic from a balcony of the Reichstag on November 9, 1918, and thereby, in his belief, saving Germany from Bolshevism, Scheidemann returned to finish his soup. Ebert was purple with anger on hearing what had occurred, struck his fist on the table, and shouted, "Is it true?" When Scheidemann rejoined that it was not only true but inevitable, Ebert retorted: "You have no right to proclaim the Republic! Whether Germany is to be a Republic or something else a Constituent Assembly must decide." Thus our author presents himself as the father of the Republic, dragging his reluctant colleague in his train. When Ebert became the first President and Scheidemann the first Chancellor, the former's conception, we are told, was that the President should determine policy and the Chancellor should take responsibility. A final disappointment came when Ebert, after declaring that he would never accept the Treaty of Versailles, allowed himself to be converted by Erzberger.

Friedrich Naumann, one of the most attractive figures on the Parliamentary stage, did not live to tell his own tale. He died in 1919, at the moment of Germany's darkest hour, at the age of fifty-nine; but a massive biography by his friend

Theodor Heuss provides an excellent substitute. The pastor who turned to politics, the gospeller of co-operation between the Kaiser and the masses, the greatest orator of his generation, was a leading figure in the Democratic party and the Reichstag before the war. But it is with the breaking of the storm that he began to play his part on a larger stage. His *Mitteleuropa*, published in 1915, and summoning his countrymen to complete the work of Bismarck, was read all over the world. When the war was lost he devoted the last energies of a dying man to the drafting of the Weimar Constitution. Though there are no diplomatic revelations, the book is essential to the study of German Liberal opinion throughout the reign of William II.

## VIII

After listening to the Kaiser, his Chancellors, his Ministers, the diplomatists, the soldiers and the politicians, there remains a group of witnesses who stood close enough to the political scene to know a good deal of what was going on but whose station or profession encouraged independence of judgment. The efforts of official diplomacy to bridge the widening gulf between Great Britain and Germany were supplemented by the semi-official mediation described at length in Huldermann's *Life of Albert Ballin*. The famous Director of the Hamburg-America line had no political ambitions, and he declined the Kaiser's offer of a portfolio ; but he threw himself with zeal into the task of averting a collision in the North Sea. When the movement for a big navy began he lent it his aid ; but as soon as its disastrous consequences became manifest in the estrangement of the British Empire, he opposed the naval race. Conversations between Ballin, the friend of the Kaiser, and Sir Ernest Cassel, the friend of King Edward, began in 1908, and the Governments were kept informed of their progress.

When the negotiations for a naval agreement and a neutrality formula finally broke down, he urged a meeting between Churchill and Tirpitz. He described the conflict as "the most stupid of all wars," and declared that no Bismarck was needed to prevent its occurrence. The interest aroused by Huldermann's biography is sustained by the slighter volume of Stübmann, a business colleague and devoted friend. The most valuable portion is the correspondence, which, though only discussing politics incidentally, reveals the insight of the writer.

His sharpest criticisms are reserved for Kiderlen. "He has played his cards without allowing for the English," he observed during the Agadir crisis. "It is a mercy that the Liberals are in power. If the Unionists were there, we should have a Fashoda or war. . . . If we only want the open door in Morocco and a bit of the Congo, why do we send a ship to Agadir and excite the whole world to white heat?" His liking for the Kaiser did not prevent him from recognizing his weaknesses, and on October 27, 1918, he cried aloud: "Why does he not resign in favour of his grandson?"

A valuable addition to our knowledge of German policy from 1900 onwards is contained in the handsome quarto, *Aus meinen Akten*, privately printed in 1929 by Paul von Schwabach, head of the financial house of Bleichröder. The relations of Germany and Great Britain form the main theme of the letters, many of which are addressed to Baron Alfred de Rothschild. Both were good patriots and good citizens of the world; both desired harmony between London and Berlin; both were in touch with the rulers of their respective countries. Fewer in number but not inferior in interest are the letters to Eyre Crowe, a friend from student days, in which sharp differences of opinion are presented in tones of unchanging affection. No one understood more fully than his Berlin correspondent that Crowe, despite his German affiliations, was British by duty and conviction.

The first and larger section of the volume, covering the years 1900-1914, traces the curve of Anglo-German relations. Signs of co-operation, such as the Yangtze agreement and the Windsor visit of 1907, are greeted with delight, and the British refusal to join the Baghdad enterprise in 1903 is recorded with regret. The resignation of Salisbury is welcomed as making way for Balfour and Chamberlain, from whom greater friendliness is expected, just as a year or two later the coming of the Liberals is acclaimed. The *Times* is denounced as a dangerous mischief-maker, and Bertie's Germanophobia is exposed to view; but the fire-eaters of the Flottenverein also hear the crack of his whip. Schwabach understood England too well not to condemn the Tirpitz policy, and he assures us that Holstein, of whom he speaks in the friendliest terms, shared his disapproval. Believing a British attack extremely unlikely but not absolutely impossible, he desired a fleet large enough to defend the German coasts and small enough to arouse no fear of aggression.

While critical of the naval policy of his country, Schwabach supported the German side throughout the Morocco controversy. He argues that German rights were deliberately ignored by Delcassé; that in demanding the maintenance of the open door Germany was asking no special privileges for herself; that neither in intention nor in fact was her action unfriendly to Great Britain. A Paris banker, to whom Delcassé explained that he had squared the signatories of the Treaty of Madrid, namely England, Italy and Spain, interjected "and Germany?" He received the revealing reply "Avec l'Allemagne, jamais de la vie!" Conversations with William II during the Algeciras Conference and later exhibit him as a man of peace. New light is thrown on the dismissal of Delcassé, on which Rouvier appears to have resolved some weeks before the Wilhelmstrasse joined in the hue and cry. An urgent request from Alfred de Rothschild to induce the German Government to express a wish for his retention was politely declined. That the fall of the Foreign Minister was not followed by the expected *détente* is explained by the discovery that the policy of France continued to be controlled by the Quai d'Orsay and that Rouvier was not master in his own house.

The material illustrating the second Morocco crisis is no less valuable than that relating to the first. Schwabach presents German policy as the defensive answer to the breach of the Algeciras Act by France, and, while admitting that the British Government had no wish to make trouble, deploras the menacing declaration of Lloyd George. An argumentative letter to Crowe dated July 28, 1911, was written with Kiderlen's consent; the reply was forwarded to him, and the rejoinder of August 11 was composed after discussing Crowe's points with the author of the Agadir *coup*. The complaint that no reply was made to Grey's communication of July 4 is met with the assertion that Berlin was unaware that an answer was expected. Carrying the war into the enemy's camp, Schwabach quotes the opinion of circles "neither Anglophobe nor chauvinist" that England was behaving as if she was *arbiter mundi* or France a British Protectorate. The French, he added, were now assured that they could reckon on British help in any dispute with Germany, whether peaceful or otherwise. This conviction filled him with anxiety for the future. He had several interviews during the autumn with Caillaux, who regretted the Mansion House speech and believed in the possibility of a lasting understanding with Germany. It was

clear that the Premier felt a little embarrassed by the warmth of the British embrace.

The first section of the volume ends with an affectionate letter of farewell to Alfred de Rothschild, dated August 1, 1914. "What troubles me most is my certainty that England will also draw the sword. You and I have done our best to improve the relations of our countries. May those who are responsible for this sad event reconcile their actions with their consciences!" The second part of the book, which covers the years of war, reveals Schwabach serving at the front and at home, opposing the cry for wholesale annexations, warning his countrymen not to involve the United States, and urging constitutional reform. The third part contains memoranda on the years before the war enriched by vivid memories of Bismarck and his successors. Students who are unable to procure the volume will find an admirable analysis of the first part by Thimme in *Europäische Gespräche*, June 1929.

Less known but not less well informed was Viktor Naumann, whose *Profile* contains portraits of Hertling, Kiderlen, Tisza, Berchtold, Burian, Czernin and other prominent figures in the Central Empires. More important is his *Dokumente und Argumente* which records his experiences during the war, for no German publicist knew so much of the inner mind of the ruling circles. The opening chapter describes the author's experiences in Vienna during the last days of peace. He records his conversations with Count Hoyos, Berchtold's Chef de Cabinet, on the day of the Serajevo tragedy and again after his fateful mission to Berlin. Hoyos had been convinced since 1911 that the decisive struggle was at hand; and, though in his opinion there was just a chance that Russia might not intervene, he believed that the Monarchy must be ready to fight for its life. He added that the evidence pointed with increasing clearness to the complicity of the Servian Government. Naumann remained in Vienna till July 12, when it was realized that Russia and France would almost certainly intervene; but the neutrality of England was taken for granted, while Italy was not expected to attack her ally in the opening stages of the conflict. Macchio, the first Sektionschef at the Ballplatz, in reply to the author's inquiry as to the state of the army, declared that the Slav troops of the Monarchy could be relied on to do their duty. When Naumann read the ultimatum to Servia he realized that the last chance of peace was gone. "Austria was absolutely right in her action; but that Russia would use it as a

pretext for war was as certain as the Amen after the prayer." The author was in the Wilhelmstrasse on August 4, when the news of the British declaration of war arrived, and the look of anguish on Jagow's face never faded from his memory. The statesmen of Berlin had been unable to convince themselves that in the hour of destiny England would stand by her friends.

When the storm broke Hertling invited Naumann to assist him with information and advice. "I should be genuinely grateful if you would report to me everything you consider of importance. Munich can mediate between Berlin and Vienna if our information is kept up to date." His reports are a mine of information on persons, policies and events, and he never hesitated to tender unpopular advice. In the settlement of Poland he supported the Austrian solution on the ground that the heavy-handed Protestant Prussian could not manage the Catholic Slavs. In the larger field of war aims, though himself a Prussian and a Protestant, he was also on the Austrian side, for his frequent visits to Vienna convinced him as time went on that the Monarchy must make peace or disappear, and that the war could only be ended by compromise.

Naumann regards the submarine campaign as absolutely justified, while regretting that it was launched at the wrong time. From the moment the United States entered the fray he worked for a settlement like 1763 or 1866. He speaks with admiration of Czernin, whom he supports against his master and the Parma influences, and who combined a desire for a moderate peace with loyalty to the German ally. When Hertling and Kühlmann were installed at Berlin it seemed as if his hopes might be realized. But the collapse of Russia tempted her conquerors to the spectacular folly of Brest-Litovsk, the Ludendorff offensive revived the waning hopes of victory, and the aged Chancellor was powerless against the military chiefs. The unambiguous declaration on Belgium, for which Naumann continually pressed, was never made, and when Kühlmann confided to the Reichstag that the war could not be won on the field of battle, Hertling allowed him to be thrown to the wolves. Thus the German people lived in their fool's paradise till the roof broke over their heads. Prince Max was called in too late, and in any case he was too "soft" to save even a fragment from the wreck. The Kaiser appears as a gilded marionette, who counted for little more in the supreme decisions than the meanest of his subjects. His chief contribu-

tion to history in the closing stages of the conflict was his rejection of the advice, tendered by Naumann and other clear-sighted counsellors, to abdicate at a moment when a personal sacrifice would in all probability have rescued the dynasty and averted the revolution.

Among German journalists of the post Bismarckian era none holds a higher place for courage and consistency than Theodor Wolff. In *Das Vorspiel* the brilliant editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt* can boast of being wise before instead of after the event. Beginning his survey in 1900 he finds little but a series of costly errors to record. He was against the *Flottenpolitik*, against the Morocco menaces, against the annexation of Bosnia. The *Einkreisung*, he holds, was Germany's own fault. Though the volume is a sustained indictment of his statesmanship, Bülow, who appears in these pages in an attractive light, honoured the fearless journalist with his friendship. In a striking letter, dated July 10, 1923, he enumerates his reasons for refusing the Chamberlain offer, which his correspondent would have desired him to accept. In the first place Salisbury never gave his consent. Secondly Chamberlain, the author of the Boer war, wanted to range Germany against Russia, in order to secure a free hand in South Africa. Thirdly an alliance was only possible if both the English political parties approved and if it included Austria and Italy. Fourthly the state of public opinion in both countries would have rendered the formation of such a partnership very difficult.

In a second and larger volume, *The Eve of 1914*, he carries his story down to the outbreak of war. Once again he is highly critical of German statesmen, even those whom he likes and respects. "As an eyewitness I was able to detect no more than incapacity and irresponsibility. . . . But is not negligence itself a serious charge when it leads to such catastrophes?" Bethmann was a schoolmaster, as Ballin called him, intensely conscientious, but apt to bore his master. Exasperated though he is by the Chancellor's errors he pays homage to his lofty character. In his seriousness and "predilection for ethics" he reminds him of Grey. There are also interesting snapshots of the minor figures in the Wilhelmstrasse such as Jagow, Zimmermann and Schoen.

The most important novelty is the story of the author's part in the revelation of the Anglo-Russian naval negotiations of 1914. The desire of Russia for such an agreement was conveyed to Grey through French intermediaries during the

King's visit to Paris, was favourably received by him, and was approved by the Cabinet on his return. Negotiations between the Admiralties commenced, and, had not war broken out, a pact would probably have been signed in the summer. While the British people knew nothing of what was afoot, the German Government was aware of every move in the game; for Siebert, a member of the Russian Embassy in London, communicated copies of the most important telegrams and despatches. To remonstrate with the Governments concerned involved a revelation of the source of information, yet to take no action was to facilitate the design. In this dilemma the Wilhelmstrasse invited the Editor of the *Tageblatt* to announce that Anglo-Russian naval discussions were in progress. Convinced that an agreement would encourage chauvinists in the Triple Entente and inflame the German naval fanatics to new demands, Wolff revealed the secret in the form of "a letter from Paris." The information might be challenged, ended the imaginary message, but the proposal was a reality; and though it might still be far from realization, it did not appear to have been definitely rejected. Iswolsky was held responsible for the whole enterprise. The article created a first-class sensation. Grey gave a designedly ambiguous answer in the House of Commons. Jagow expressed his relief to our Ambassador at Grey's declaration, adding that if the rumour had been true the consequences would have been very serious. Anglo-German relations would have lost their cordiality, and the armament fever in Germany would have burst out afresh. It was a polite warning, for the *Tageblatt* revelations had come from the Wilhelmstrasse itself.

There is nothing more moving in these six hundred pages than the talk between the journalist and the harassed Chancellor in February 1915. "When one comes to the responsibility for this war", observed Bethmann, "we must candidly admit that we have our share of it. To say that I am oppressed by this thought would be to say too little—it never leaves me. I live in it." Grey, he added, was sincerely anxious to prevent war, but slipped into it, being more concerned for the Triple Entente than for peace. But Germany was also to blame, for an overbearing spirit had developed in the people. "If there is anything that could keep me alive after this war, it would be for the purpose of changing the political spirit of the country."

A third volume, *Through Twenty Years*, which carries us through the war, the revolution and the Republic, is a gallery



of portraits, not a consecutive record. The series opens with Bülow, whose sparkling conversation, personal charm and temperamental failings are brilliantly sketched. "I did not approve the whole of your policy", remarked Wolff. "Do not forget that I inherited a very difficult situation", replied the ex-Chancellor. "I was to build a fleet—that was a condition of my appointment—and at the same time I had to preserve peace with England. And I had to deal with Edward VII, with his antipathy to the Kaiser, while Bethmann had Grey, who was free from malice and indeed rather good-natured." Bülow believed that he could have prevented the war. Since the Tsar could not leave Servia in the lurch, the German Government should have examined the Austrian ultimatum and eliminated what was clearly unacceptable. On the other hand he approved the march through Belgium. In undertaking his mission to Rome he hoped to arrange *una combinazione*, and on his return he argued that a timely concession at the outbreak of hostilities would have kept Italy on the side of her allies. Next we meet Bethmann again in July 1917, on his last day in the Wilhelmstrasse. "I know I made mistakes both in domestic and foreign policy. Who could have avoided them?" Yet the war was unavoidable. He anticipated a compromise peace in a few months to be followed by reduction of armaments. A few days later the author was invited by Michaelis, the shadowy Chancellor, whose promotion was equally astonishing to the few who knew him and the many who had never heard his name. Snapshots of Hertling, a tired old man, and Prince Max of Baden on the eve of the revolution conclude a fascinating chapter on the four Chancellors of the four war years. Among other full-length portraits in the gallery are the sharp-tongued Monts, Ballin in the years of war, and Brockdorff-Rantzau at Weimar denouncing Erzberger for accepting the victors' terms.

Before the publication of his Memoirs in 1936 at the age of eighty-four the name of Count von Hutten-Czapski was unknown to the wider world. *Sechzig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft* fills two stout volumes. A Polish aristocrat by birth, a Prussian by nationality, a zealous Catholic, a Liberal, a soldier, a diplomatist: here is a unique combination. The passion of his life was to reconcile his Polish blood and his German allegiance. In his refined and cultivated mind there was little place for violent emotions, though dislike of Russia runs throughout the book. Russia, he declares, is of the East,

while Poland should stand with Germany as a bulwark of western culture. The resurrection of Poland was a consolation to the old man for the defeat of Germany. The most vivid and intimate picture is of Hohenlohe, kindly though reserved and impersonal. His services as Secretary to the third Chancellor brought him into contact with high politics. He worked harmoniously with Holstein, whose rôle in the discussion of the Kruger telegram is here at last cleared up. Arriving at the Wilhelmstrasse on January 3, 1896, he found Hohenlohe reporting to Holstein his talk of the previous day with the Kaiser, who declared that he would not allow the status quo in South Africa to be changed. After Holstein and the author had warned against steps threatening a conflict, the Chancellor left for the decisive Conference. While the chief was away Holstein told Hutten-Czapski that Marschall had not asked his opinion. Before long the Chancellor returned with the Kaiser's draft and Marschall's addition. "I should not send it", exclaimed Hutten-Czapski. Hohenlohe, who for once was rather excited, replied that he was dissatisfied, but that at any rate the idea of a military expedition was given up. To the author's astonishment Holstein remained silent. Marschall, adds the author, always maintained that he and Hohenlohe only proposed the telegram in order to avoid something worse, since the Emperor, the Empress and the whole Court were on the side of the Boers.

If the Mystery Man of the Wilhelmstrasse was silent in 1896, he was vocal enough on other occasions. He complained bitterly of the Kaiser's attitude to France. "It is no pleasure to handle high politics under a ruler who, one is well aware, will never fight." William II was only bellicose on the surface. Fundamentally he was weak and easily lost his nerve. Holstein always believed that France intended to attack and humiliate Germany, and France was the occasion of his fall. His influence over Bülow never ceased to be immense. Hutten-Czapski confirms Bülow's narrative of his visit to the dying man, for, sitting in an adjoining room, he heard Holstein's words *Bleiben ! Bleiben !*

The second volume describes a visit to Roumania on the eve of the world war. King Carol pronounced the ultimatum to Servia too sharp and in parts unacceptable. He quoted Sazonoff's warning during his recent visit: "I shall try to maintain peace unless Servia is attacked." The Tsar had been equally explicit: "La Serbie c'est moi. Si on l'attaque on

m'attaque." It was a great mistake of Francis Joseph to send such an ultimatum, he concluded, and a still greater mistake of Germany to allow it. Equally interesting is the story of an unofficial mission to Italy in the spring of 1915, suggested by Monts and approved by the Wilhelmstrasse. He knew Giolitti, who, however, declined to see him, and it was too late to have any effect. The Kaiser had told him that Germany was pressing Austria hard, but could not press her too hard. It was this which doomed the efforts of Bülow and Erzberger from the start. The later years of the war saw Hutten-Czapski in the German administration in Warsaw.

We can study the German scene from an unfamiliar angle in the four volumes of *Lettres de la Princesse Radziwill au Général de Robilant*, 1889-1915,<sup>1</sup> edited by the latter's daughter. The writer, a granddaughter of Talleyrand's niece, the Duchesse de Sagan, was married at the age of seventeen to Prince Antoine Radziwill, friend and military aide-de-camp of Emperor William I; but she retained her French sympathies to the end and never learned to speak German. Her salon, the most brilliant in Berlin, was frequented by diplomatists who talked freely to her, and in the later years Jules Cambon was a constant guest. Through her daughters, who were married to men holding appointments at the Austrian and Russian Courts, she learned the news and the gossip of two great Empires, and through the recipient of these letters she kept in close touch with Italy. Count Robilant arrived in Berlin in 1885 as Italian Military Attaché, and his four years in the German capital laid the foundation of a friendship which endured till the death of the Princess thirty years later. In the pages of this unique correspondence we meet the main figures of Imperial Germany. While liking William II, enjoying his conversation, recognizing his excellent intentions, and taking his side in the quarrel with Bismarck, she often expressed her doubts whether his brain was quite normal, and her references to the ruler become increasingly critical. She admired the intellect of Bülow and the integrity of Bethmann, but regarded neither of them as real statesmen. She had strong personal and political prejudices, and was readier to blame than to praise. She deplored the influence and detested the methods of Holstein. Here is a snapshot of Edward VII on the last of his royal visits. "The King has just passed beneath my window. He seemed to be

<sup>1</sup> A translation of the last volume, covering the years 1908-1915, appeared in 1937 with the title *This was Germany*.

much fatter. He bowed graciously and the crowd were very silent. I got an impression of ice." She was a guest at the British Embassy at the lunch when he fainted. "You will understand everybody's anxiety. The Emperor confided to me his fears and the shock he had felt at finding his uncle so changed in the year since he had last seen him." All passed off well between the King and the Emperor, he wrote when the visit was over, but badly between the King and the Empress. "She was very sulky with Uncle Edward, whose rather worldly habits did not find favour in her pietistic eyes." Such occasions were always rather an ordeal to the excellent lady who, in Bülow's words, disliked foreigners.

How painful were the emotions of defeat may be read in *The Germans at Versailles* 1919, by Victor Schiff, a well-known Socialist journalist. Nowhere else do we find such a picture of the slow journey through France, the virtual imprisonment in the hotel at Versailles, the studied humiliations, the corroding atmosphere of hate which surrounded the delegates. Yet the author, who knew and liked France, writes with singularly little bitterness. Brockdorff-Rantzau, on the other hand, was "embittered to the soul, not only by the reception our delegation received, but also by the breach of faith of which, in comparing the Fourteen Points with the Versailles settlement, he felt he could accuse the Allies. He longed from that day on for a personal and political *revanche*, to be achieved, if by nothing else, by the diplomatic fear of possible alliance between a new and strengthened Germany and a reconstructed Soviet Russia."

Since Schiff was not an eye-witness of three memorable ceremonies—the presentation of the draft treaty, the decisive struggle in the Cabinet at Weimar, and the signing in the Galerie des Glaces—he obtained descriptions from three members of his party who were there. Brockdorff-Rantzau took two drafts of a speech to the first ceremony, the one mildly, the other sharply, phrased. On hearing Clemenceau's opening sentences he chose the latter. He spoke without rising, he explained afterwards, as he had a long document to read and could see it better sitting down; but his excuse appeared unconvincing even to the German delegation. Landsberg, the Minister of Justice, describes the last meeting of the Scheidemann Cabinet, in which eight (including himself) were against and six in favour of signature. President Ebert ruled that such a vote did not empower the Cabinet to act

and that the decision must lie with the Assembly. The third contribution, by Hermann Müller, who succeeded Brockdorff-Rantzau as Foreign Minister, describes his melancholy journey to Versailles with Bell, the new Minister for Transport, his control of his emotions during the ceremony of signature, and his nervous collapse on returning to the hotel.

## A U S T R I A



## CHAPTER II

### AUSTRIA

#### I

WHEN the realm of the Hapsburgs ceased to exist Professor Pribram obtained permission to publish the secret treaties concluded since the creation of the Austro-German Alliance in 1879. Among the jealously guarded treasures thus exhibited to the public gaze were the five phases of the Triple Alliance; the League of the Three Emperors concluded in 1881 and renewed in 1884; Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1887, which was concealed from Vienna at the wish of the Tsar; the Austro-Serb Alliance of 1881; the alliance of Roumania with the Central Powers in 1883; the Mediterranean agreements between Great Britain, Italy and Austria in 1887, and the Austro-Russian agreement relating to the Balkans in 1897. The value of *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1897-1914*, is enhanced by a masterly analysis of the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Triple Alliance in 1882 and its successive renewals and modifications, based on the Vienna archives. An English translation was published by the Harvard University Press under the supervision of Professor Coolidge, and a French translation embodied a few additional comments by the editor. No single volume has done so much to reconstruct the diplomatic framework of Europe before the war.

While the German, British, French and Russian documents appeared at intervals over a series of years, the secrets of the Ballplatz were revealed in a single flash. *Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*, published in 1930, fills eight closely-printed quarto volumes of about a thousand pages each. Eleven thousand documents are arranged, as in the French and Russian series, in chronological order. The duty of selection was entrusted to four distinguished historians, Pribram, Srbik, Übersberger and Bittner, the technical work being discharged by the last two. The starting point is the annexation of Bosnia, when Austria advanced to the centre of the stage. Henceforth her relations to Servia and her rivalry with Russia form an even more significant feature of European history than the



Anglo-German or Franco-German disputes. So convinced indeed are the editors of the paramount importance of this theme that they exclude material which has no direct bearing upon it. As a result of this limitation we can follow the policy of a Great Power on the most dangerous section of the European front with a thoroughness unapproached elsewhere.

The curtain rises in the early summer of 1908, when a single sentence in a communication of Iswolsky to Aehrenthal dated July 2 unleashed the Bosnian crisis. In the volume devoted to that controversial theme no document equals in interest Aehrenthal's detailed report of his historic conversation with Iswolsky at Buchlau on September 16. Since the version of the Russian statesman lies unpublished in the Moscow archives, the Austrian testimony cannot be checked. When Aehrenthal pressed for a definite declaration on Bosnia Iswolsky replied that, if Austria were compelled to annex, Russia would assume a friendly and benevolent attitude, on the understanding that Austria would favour the attempt to secure a passage for single Russian warships through the Dardanelles. To the inquiry when the annexation was to be proclaimed, Aehrenthal replied that it would probably occur in the first days of October, just before the meeting of the Delegations. Iswolsky remarked that he would prefer it after his return home in the middle of October, as he could then direct public opinion. Aehrenthal agreed that it would be best if his partner were at his post when the annexation took place ; but Austria was not a free agent, and he could not promise not to act before the Delegations met. In any case he should hear in good time. A few days later Aehrenthal sent Iswolsky the formula he had promised in regard to a Dalmatian railway, and expressed the hope that he would soon receive his report of the Buchlau agreements. "As for Bosnia and Herzegovina", he concluded, "I cannot at present tell you the precise date when we shall proceed to annexation. But you can rely on my promise to inform you at the earliest moment." These documents prove that Iswolsky had no right to be surprised that the annexation was proclaimed so soon ; but they also suggest that Aehrenthal broke his promise to let his colleague know his decision in good time.

To the end of his life Iswolsky denounced the perfidy of Aehrenthal, and he was not alone in the belief that the latter had not played fair. On October 2 Grey sent a circular telegram urging the Powers to warn Bulgaria against the declara-

tion of independence which, it was rumoured, she was about to make. When the British Ambassador in Vienna conveyed the message to Aehrenthal on October 3, the latter professed disbelief in the rumours, adding that he would not take action before he received definite evidence. Prince Ferdinand, he explained, was in Hungary, and his Ministers were unlikely to move without him. The rumours had not been confirmed by the Austrian Legation at Sofia, and premature remonstrance might provoke a crisis. Goschen was incensed by these evasive statements, and when the news of Bulgaria's declaration of independence arrived two days later his anger was hot. "It is quite incredible", telegraphed Grey, "that Baron d'Aehrenthal had not arranged with Bulgaria before speaking to you as he did. You and we cannot but feel justly aggrieved at being treated with such bad faith." When Goschen invited Aehrenthal to explain his expression of disbelief in the imminence of Bulgaria's action the latter replied: "I knew it must come in the near future, in a few weeks perhaps, but that it should have been made so soon was a complete surprise to me." Aehrenthal's report on his meeting with Prince Ferdinand at Budapest on September 23 and 24 clearly established collusion, though it leaves the issue of synchronization unsolved. He would make no difficulties, he declared, if Bulgaria were to realize her wishes, but he could not speak for Iswolsky. Two points should be kept in mind. Firstly, Ferdinand should avoid a policy of adventure which the Powers could not support. Secondly, Bulgaria should not miss a favourable opportunity of realizing her legitimate wishes and turning her military superiority to account. "I did not conceal from the Prince", concluded the report, "that our situation in Bosnia and the Sanjak had become more difficult owing to recent events in Turkey, and that we might therefore soon take decisions on the subject."

The second and third volumes reveal the author of the Bosnian coup transformed into the champion of the status quo, just as Bismarck had declared that Germany was satiated after three victorious wars. Their main interest lies in the struggle between the Foreign Minister, backed by the Emperor, and Conrad von Hötzendorff, Chief of the Staff, who urged preventive wars against Serbia and Italy on the ground that Austria's open enemies and false friends would ultimately combine for her overthrow. Even with the aid of three thousand pages of material it is difficult to pronounce judgment

on Aehrenthal's performance as a whole, for it was interrupted at the opening of 1912. However severely we may condemn the gamble of 1908, it is difficult not to admire the courage with which the dying man fought for his policy of stabilization when the goal was attained.

The last five volumes, covering 1912, 1913 and the first half of 1914, reveal his successor at work. Berchtold was a much smaller man, and his whole heart was never in politics, but he was far from being a mere elegant trifler. He had made an excellent Ambassador at St. Petersburg during the nerve-racking years of the Bosnian quarrel, and his despatches are from the literary point of view among the best of his time. There is no reason to believe that any other available Austrian diplomatist would have discharged his difficult task with greater success. For the main lines of policy were laid down in advance. After the annexation of Bosnia the sole aim of Austrian statesmen was to keep what they had got. Their main preoccupation was the hostility of Serbia and the encouragement of Pan-Serb ambitions by Russia. There were two methods of dealing with the problem—a friendly arrangement with Belgrad, or a frank recognition that a *détente* was no longer possible. Berchtold took the latter view and attempted to diminish the danger by cultivating Bulgaria. The victories of the Balkan League under Russian auspices complicated the problem by the aggrandisement of Serbia; but when the crusade was followed by a fierce quarrel of the allies his pro-Bulgar policy had its chance. Even now, however, it was not plain sailing, for King Carol resented the flirtation with his rival, and King Ferdinand was distrusted at Berlin.

The volumes on the Balkan wars describe the long struggle with Russia, neither Power desiring war yet deeply concerned to maintain its prestige. Berchtold's self-control won tributes from the Entente camp; but the triumph of Serbia over Bulgaria in the third Balkan war, following her victory over Turkey, convinced him that her power and ambitions were becoming a grave menace. When therefore she declined to evacuate Albania he launched an ultimatum in October 1913 summoning her to withdraw her troops within eight days. The demand was promptly though grudgingly obeyed, for at this moment Russia was in no mood to intervene.

Shortly after this incident William II unbosomed himself to Berchtold during a visit to Vienna. The power of the Slavs, he declared, particularly of the Slav states in the Balkans, had

increased in a formidable degree. War between East and West was ultimately inevitable, and in such an event a Servian attack might be disastrous. The Slavs were born to serve, not to rule. The only possible relation of Servia to Austria was that of the dependence of the lesser on the greater, like a planet on the sun. She should be attracted by money, military training and commercial privileges. When Berchtold suggested that the ineradicable animosity of the Serb race was an obstacle, the Kaiser rejoined that she would be ready to place her army under Austrian control in return for defence against attack. If she declined, force should be applied. "If His Majesty Francis Joseph makes a demand, the Servian Government must obey. If not, Belgrad must be bombarded and occupied till his will is fulfilled. And rest assured that I am behind you, and am ready to draw the sword whenever your action requires." As he uttered these swelling words, his hand moved to the hilt of his sword. Russia, he added, could not fight for six years. If war were to come, Austria could absolutely rely upon him. Whatever the Ballplatz decided was for him a command. This emphasis on the solidarity of the alliance, concluded Berchtold's report, ran like a scarlet thread through his declarations; and the interview can hardly have been without influence in the fateful decisions of 1914.

Berchtold's wooing of Bulgaria, the results of which were seen when she joined the Central Powers in 1915, was parallel with his attempts to hold Roumania. The correspondence between Count Ottakar Czernin and his chief during the last months of peace is arresting in its passionate appeal. After conversations with the King and the statesmen of both parties on taking up his post, the Austrian Minister reported that the twelfth hour had arrived. "The fact is that the treaty of alliance is worth scarcely more than the paper on which it was written, that we cannot count on Roumania's military support, and that the estrangement will rapidly increase unless the Hungarian question is quickly solved. Thus we stand at the parting of the ways and must decide whether to go right or left. We must try to recapture Roumania or we must let her go." Longer experience confirmed the pessimism of the opening weeks. "One thing is certain", he wrote early in 1914. "Things cannot remain as they are. This vague and morbid relationship can only be a stage, as in every illness, to be followed by death or recovery." The Roumanians, he believed, did not desire to march straight into the Russian camp.

They preferred the existing twilight, in which they could count on Austrian support while Austria could no longer count on theirs. Bratiano uttered sugary phrases, but he was thoroughly false. His policy was to hold on to Austria till he needed her no more. The King was old beyond his years and was losing grip. The masterful wife of his feeble heir was a Russian princess. "We are sliding down hill at a terrible rate." Berchtold was less hopeless, trusting in the good offices of the Kaiser and contemplating the offer of a guarantee of Roumania's new frontiers in return for the revelation of the alliance. It was too late, and the Tsar's state visit to Constanza in June filled the cup. Roumania was lost, though she only joined the enemies of her old allies in 1916.

The final volume contains the protocols of the discussions from which the ultimatum to Servia emerged. The Serajevo murders converted Berchtold to Conrad's gospel of preventive war. The assent of Berlin once secured, there was no looking back. At a Ministerial Council on July 7 he argued that the moment had come to render Servia forever incapable of harm. Such a blow could not be struck without diplomatic preparation. He had consulted Germany and received a promise of unconditional support. A conflict with Servia might involve war with Russia. But Russia was working for a Balkan League, including Roumania, to launch against Austria at a suitable moment. The position of the latter was bound to grow worse. A passive attitude would be interpreted by her Roumanian and Southern Slav subjects as a sign of weakness. The logic of the situation was to anticipate the blow. He knew what he was doing, but he believed that he had no choice. The sapping and mining, he wrote to his Ambassador in Rome, could only be stopped by energetic action at Belgrad. The object of the campaign was the dissolution of the Monarchy. "The responsibility of doing nothing, of letting things drift till the waters close over our heads, seems to me even greater, though for the moment an easier course, than to look danger in the face and shoulder the consequences." The diplomatic successes of 1909 and 1913 had been useless; indeed they had made matters worse. A further peaceful triumph would be of equally little avail. "I have the feeling of being chosen by Providence to rank with the Ministers who wished to pursue a policy of peace and had to pursue a policy of war, from Cardinal Fleury to Lamsdorff—let us hope with better success than the latter." These declarations of the Foreign Minister

define the exact measure of Austria's responsibility for the war.

The publication in Mr. Lloyd George's *War Memoirs* of the reports of General Smuts on his conversations with Count Mensdorff at Geneva in December 1917, led to the appearance of the latter's version in *Berliner Monatshefte*, May 1937. Feeling in England, began the General, was too bitter for public or private talks with Germany, but there was no bitterness towards Austria. He did not expect a complete victory, and the best counterpoise to a too powerful Germany would be a strong Austria-Hungary with far-reaching autonomy for the racial groups on the analogy of the British Empire. Her dissolution had never been contemplated by the Allies. The Trentino, a purely Italian enclave, ought to go to Italy, but compensation could be found in Poland. The conversations, though extremely friendly, were purely academic, for Mensdorff ruled out the surrender of territory and a separate settlement. Austria desired peace as much as England, but the blank refusal of any exchange of views with Germany blocked the way. "That is the missing link." Short of a separate peace or an act of disloyalty towards his ally, Czernin could be counted on to support any proposal which led towards peace.

## II

Francis Joseph remains something of an enigma. When Mr. Wickham Steed sought information from men who had worked with him for many years, they replied that they were unable to gratify his curiosity. Was the head of the Hapsburgs the real ruler of his dominions, or had he become with advancing years little more than a machine, conscientiously grinding out the routine business of his exalted station? For an answer to such questions we have no Waldersee or Eulenburg to guide us, no Imperial *marginalia* to dispel the gloom. *Francis Joseph as revealed by his Letters*, selected and edited by Otto Ernst, is meagre and colourless. The object of the publication is to exhibit the man, not to explain his policy; and the impression we derive is that of a prosaic personage, utterly lacking in intellectual and artistic tastes, incapable of expressing and perhaps even of feeling deep affection, and finding his keenest happiness in the mountains with his gun at Ischl and Mürzsteg. We learn more from Baron Margutti's volume, *The Emperor Francis Joseph and his Times*, in which the author, a member of the Aides-de-Camps' Department of the Imperial Household,

depicts a great gentleman, dignified, kindly and diligent, at once so simple in character and so instinctively conscious of his Imperial position that the Byzantinism of Potsdam was unthinkable at the Hofburg and Schönbrunn. Yet though the author was in almost daily contact with him for seventeen years, he never penetrated behind the veil. The most interesting pages deal with the breaking of the storm. Nothing was so important to him, we are told, as the maintenance of peace; and Margutti describes his agitation and dismay at Ischl on July 25 while awaiting and on receiving the Servian reply to the Austrian ultimatum. He had assumed that the demands would be accepted, and was horrified when the policy of the Ballplatz bore its inevitable fruit.

Margutti's assertion that the Emperor was against the war is contradicted by the testimony of Conrad and other witnesses. Had he cared to join hands with Tisza, the most powerful of his subjects, in the first week after Serajevo, the two men could have arrested the fall of the avalanche; and his omission to do so involves his responsibility for what followed. To him as to his advisers the conflict was for the defence, not the extension of his dominions, and at the outbreak of hostilities he observed to Frau Schratt that the Dual Monarchy would be lucky if it escaped with a black eye. The best brief sketch of the ruler and the reign is to be found in Friedjung's essay "Franz Josef" in his *Historische Aufsätze*. The distinguished historian had learned much secret history from prominent actors on the political stage and at Court. The Emperor, he declares, had come to regard war as inevitable, though he had no wish for it, and after Serajevo he resolved to fight. He had, however, no illusions, and in the second year he remarked: "The struggle is beyond our strength."

Josef Redlich's *Emperor Francis Joseph* was the first serious study of the man, the ruler and the system. Drawing largely on his researches for his monumental volumes *Das Oesterreichische Reichs- und Staatsproblem*, he portrays the young Emperor learning the lesson of autocracy from Schwarzenberg and Kübeck, and, after the death of the former in 1852, taking the reins firmly into his hands. We close the book with a heightened respect for his character and abilities. Without being in any sense a great man, he was far more than a machine. Everyone, declares Redlich, was won over by his simple yet impressive personality. But the precocious self-confidence which enabled the youth to confront his gigantic task prevented the

veteran from recognizing the signs of the times as the decades rolled by. In the Hapsburg realm nationality counted for more than democracy, and as the mounting tide swept round his throne he gazed with uncomprehending eyes. The Magyars alone were strong enough to enforce their demands, and the Compromise of 1867, in meeting their claims, sowed dragon's teeth. The ruling of a polyglot empire in an age of democracy and nationality was the most difficult task which fell to the lot of any European ruler, and it was easier to talk of the necessity of contenting the racial minorities than to agree how it could be achieved.

The closing decades are treated in less detail, but the author enriches his pages from his own experience. As a Member of Parliament, twice a Minister, and a scholar of European reputation he was personally acquainted with most of the figures on the public stage from the Emperor downwards. In November 1912, when Turkey was staggering under the blows of the Balkan League, he journeyed to Belgrad to discuss with Pasitch the improvement of Austro-Serb relations and the problem of a harbour on the Adriatic. Though the visit was made with the sanction of Berchtold, the Foreign Minister omitted to follow it up. The question as to how far Francis Joseph was aware of and responsible for the transactions of the years of war receives an authoritative reply, based in large measure on the evidence of the author's friend, Koerber, who succeeded the murdered Stürgkh as Prime Minister in 1916. He retained a general control of the machine, while never attempting to interfere with Conrad in the management of the war.

While Redlich is concerned above all with the analysis of a system, Eugen Ketterl's *The Emperor Francis Joseph* deals only with the man. His testimony contradicts the aphorism that no man is a hero to his valet; for Ketterl has nothing but affectionate admiration for the master whom he served for nearly thirty years. He is a miniature Margutti, and the accounts of the two witnesses are much alike. They are convinced that he was opposed to the war, and Ketterl declares that he never saw him smile again. Immured in Schönbrunn, he only gradually came to realize that hunger was stalking through the land and that his peoples had lost their stomach for the fight. According to Ketterl he had an interview with Koerber on the day he died. After learning from the Prime Minister that the people were growing more and more rebellious under the



stimulus of privation, the valet, who was in the next room, heard his master reply: "If that is the case we must make peace without taking my ally into consideration at all."

Two other portraits of the Emperor, though sketched from a greater distance, call for notice. Karl Tschuppik's *Franz Joseph: Der Untergang eines Reiches* is the work of an experienced Liberal journalist who is proud to declare that six generations of his family served the state. "We loved the old Hapsburg realm," he writes in the Preface, "but we were too modern not to mix criticism with our love." Here is a very friendly, indeed we may say an affectionate picture of the ruler whose chief fault was that he failed to realize the passage of time. Goluchowski, he argues, was as right in avoiding risks as Aehrenthal was wrong in taking them, for Austria was too weak to face a European war. A conflict with Servia was not inevitable, and Berchtold should have followed up Masaryk's *pourparlers* with Pasitch at the close of 1912. Conrad and "the war party" were still worse offenders, and indeed they were the principal authors of the conflagration. If the work of Tschuppik, the German Bohemian, is primarily the history of a reign, *Francis Joseph, a Personal Study* by Eugene Bagger, an Americanized Hungarian, attempts to visualize the man. "I owe more insight to my hours in the Hofburg, Schönbrunn and Ischl," he writes, "than to any published or unpublished material." His method is frankly impressionist. The estrangement between the Emperor and his wife is traced to the monarch's moral trespasses. Except, indeed, for his conscientious industry, Bagger finds little to admire. Francis Joseph, he declares, was "quite un-Austrian in his pedantry," and indeed a mere robot, resisting every political reform as long as he could and, "like a true Hapsburg", only giving way when it was too late.

The most recent work on the Emperor is the handsome centenary volume *Erinnerungen an Franz Joseph I*, edited by Eduard Ritter von Steinitz. Most of the two dozen contributors had personal dealings with the ruler, and their testimony proves that Francis Joseph was more than a human machine. That advancing years rendered him increasingly reluctant to contemplate drastic changes of policy or method is admitted. But with his matchless experience he understood the complexity of the problems confronting him better than any of his subjects, and there was no kind of agreement as to the direction in which vital changes should be made. His

impatient and ill-tempered heir was not necessarily the safest guide. That he dropped his Ministers without ceremony when he thought it desirable is no evidence of fickleness, and his Foreign Ministers, at any rate, could rely on steady support against the intrigues of their enemies and the clamour of the press.

There is a note of something warmer than respect in Berchtold's fine tribute, which forms the most eloquent chapter of the book. "If anything could comfort and reconcile me to the difficult years allotted me by Providence after Aehrenthal's death, which I can only describe as martyrdom, it was to be found exclusively in my direct contact with the Emperor." None of his biographers, he adds, had painted or would ever paint such a true picture of his personality, with its rich, deep, inner life, outwardly cool but inwardly warm, as his last portrait by an Austrian artist which is reproduced in this work. His memory was wonderful, and he followed every move on the European chess-board with the attention of a specialist. It is interesting to learn that the surrender of Djakova to Serbia at the height of the Balkan crisis in March 1913 was due to his direct intervention. "Do not engage us too deeply to endanger peace by forcing us to choose between war and retreat." But despite his devotion to peace there were limits to concession. He promptly accepted the first ultimatum to Serbia in October 1913, and after Serajevo he was ready to fight. In the second week of July he remarked: "Wir können nicht mehr zurück." He hoped to the end that Serbia would accept all the demands, but when the unsatisfactory reply arrived he unhesitatingly empowered Berchtold to go ahead. "Thus it was the fate of one of the noblest of men, himself without stain, to drain the bitter cup to the dregs."

Pending the publication of the papers of Franz Ferdinand we must be grateful to the writers who help us to read the riddle of the sphinx. There is a useful summary of his career in the third volume of the *Neue Oesterreichische Biographie*; but for light on his personality and policy we must turn to the testimony of his private secretary, Paul Nikitsch-Boulles. In *Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen an Erzherzog Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand* the luckless Archduke appears as an energetic and far-seeing man, his portfolio stuffed with projects of reform which, in the author's opinion, might have saved the Dual Monarchy, but which the inertia of his uncle refused to entertain. The heir was allowed no influence in foreign affairs,

and he rarely attempted to intervene; yet he never hid his convictions. He condemned the annexation of Bosnia as needless and provocative; but if in 1908 the Government appeared too rash, in 1912 it incurred his wrath by its shortsighted timidity. As a friend of King Carol and a sharp critic of Magyar domination, he desired to maintain the Roumanian alliance in full vigour, and favoured the marriage of the future Emperor Karl with a Roumanian princess. When in the early summer of 1912 Carol reported that the Balkan States were planning to attack Turkey, he begged the Archduke to support his suggestion of an Austro-Roumanian warning that no weakening of Turkey in Europe would be allowed. The Emperor, after consulting his German ally, who denied the danger of a Balkan attack, informed his nephew that he intended to remain a peaceful ruler. The resentment of the Archduke at this decision was scarcely less than that of Carol, whose country was in consequence drawn into the orbit of the Triple Entente. The Archduke was equally incensed at the rejection of his advice and that of Conrad to inform Italy on the outbreak of the Tripoli war that Austria could not tolerate the slightest weakening of Turkey, even in her overseas possessions.

Theodor von Sosnosky's *Franz Ferdinand* is no less laudatory. Readers of his larger works are aware of his devotion to the *ancien régime*; and the preface frankly confesses his sympathy for the man who seemed destined to stop the dry rot in the Hapsburg Empire. The author has used the Archduke's correspondence with his stepmother in the early years of his marriage, and the letters show him in a more human light. A vivid conception of the man emerges from these chapters—the most forceful of the Hapsburgs since Joseph II, strong-willed, self-confident, passionate. The inertia of the aged ruler exasperated the hot-blooded nephew, who had his schemes ready for the day which never dawned. Sometimes he reached his goal, as in his marriage and in the promotion of Conrad, but more often he failed to sway the Emperor, who supported Aehrenthal's toleration of Italy's infidelities and tacitly accepted Tisza's treatment of minorities. Sosnosky demolishes the legend that Franz Ferdinand was a chauvinist, and explains that the so-called war-party in Austria consisted of a single man, Conrad. Far from desiring to fight Servia, he planned a Yugoslav unit within the Empire. Instead of fighting Russia, his dream was to revive the Three

Emperors' League, the Slav Power taking the place of faithless Italy.

Still more important is *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen*, by Baron Leopold von Chlumecky, a member of the Archduke's innermost circle, who helped to shape his policy. His own material is supplemented by copious extracts from the correspondence of Major Brosch, head of the Military Chancery. The most valuable document is the latter's analysis of his master's character and views, written in 1913. When the author learned of the tragedy of Serajevo he wrote to a friend: "That is the end of Austria." The whole volume is a sermon on this gloomy text; for he is convinced that, despite the deterioration of the Monarchy in the later years of Francis Joseph, it could have been saved by the adoption of his hero's plans. He denounces the obstinacy and sterility of the ruler, whose gravest offence was to have allowed Taaffe to misgovern Austria for fifteen years. "Seventy years of neglected opportunities!" he exclaims, and in his cry of distress we catch the echo of his master's voice. Aehrenthal was rash when he should have been cautious and weak where he should have been strong. The Archduke was equally opposed to the annexation of Bosnia and to the timid handling of faithless Italy. Yet he rejected the recipe of a preventive war. His ideal was to regain the friendship of Russia by facilitating a settlement of the question of the Straits. With the wires to St. Petersburg once more in working order, Italy would be dropped. It was in vain that Berchtold, of whose character and capacity the author speaks with unusual respect, attempted to unravel the tangled skein. The wooing of Bulgaria succeeded, but the attempt to hold Roumania was frustrated in Budapest.

The second half of the volume is devoted to the Yugoslav and Hungarian problems, to which the Archduke gave unceasing attention. "First order at home, then a foreign policy in proportion to our strength!" In describing Austrian misrule in Dalmatia Chlumecky speaks with the authority of an old civil servant, and in Croatia the situation was even worse. "If things go on as they are", observed the Archduke at the end of 1913, "the Croats will one day be driven into the arms of Serbia." In Bosnia, where there was no trace of Yugoslav nationalism till the turn of the century, the blindness of Burian and other Hungarian administrators sowed dragon's teeth. The programme of the Archduke, which included his

coronation at Prague, was to give every nationality its place in the sun, and thereby, in his own words, "to awake understanding and sentiment for the common fatherland." Autonomy had no terrors for him.

Further light on Franz Ferdinand is thrown in Carl Freiherr von Bardolff's *Soldat im alten Oesterreich: Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*. As the head of his Military Chancery he stood close to events till the tragedy of Serajevo, of which he was an eye-witness. Though his testimony is mainly of a military character, political issues were constantly involved. Bardolff combined devotion to his master with reverence for the Emperor. The account of his last interview shows that the veteran of 86 retained his astonishing mastery of detail till the end. When the dissolution of the Empire was in sight Karl thought of the author for more than one high political post, but other influences prevented the appointment. The important part played by ill-health in his early manhood is explained in *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand* by his doctor, Viktor Eisenmenger, who describes his efforts to overcome the obstinacy and the melancholy of the heir to the throne.

No book on the later Hapsburgs compares in dramatic interest with Graf Polzer-Hoditz' *Kaiser Karl*. Conceived as a reply to "baseless legends and unfounded attacks", the work grew into a study of the reign. Karl, declares the Count, has always been misjudged. Having known him from childhood, he proceeds to sketch a high-souled, open-minded, hard-working, capable and loveable young man, confronted by an almost impossible task and surrounded by short-sighted counsellors. Writing as a convinced believer in the old supernatural Austrian state, he denounces the unjust stewards who dissipated a great inheritance. Reconciliation, he declares, was both the tradition and the interest of the dynasty, in contrast to the new states, born in hate, erected on its grave. Unfortunately the insight of Vienna was nullified by the blindness of Budapest. "The Austrian problem was in large measure the problem of Hungary." Since the Compromise of 1867 the Monarchy was stricken by mortal sickness; for whereas Dualism satisfied Germans and Magyars, Federalism alone could have reconciled the Slavs. Much was done for them in the Austrian half of the empire, and more would have been given but for Hungary. Tisza was the great obstacle. Karl knew that the Monarchy must scrap Dualism or die, but he realized with equal clearness that he was impotent.

Polzer-Hoditz was in some degree the political mentor of Karl before his accession, and in 1915 the heir invited him to become his *Chef de Cabinet* when his hour should strike. In those early days he struck the author as intelligent, thoughtful, eager to learn and to do right. Francis Joseph and Karl were warmly attached to one another; but the young man saw with regret that the real ruler was Tisza, and that Austria was controlled from Berlin and Budapest. Hardly was the breath out of the body of the old Emperor when Tisza appeared at Schönbrunn and persuaded Karl not to delay his coronation as King of Hungary, on the ground that only a crowned King could lawfully sanction the economic agreement with Germany which was the indispensable preliminary to peace. The real reason was that when once the new ruler had sworn to the Constitution he would be unable to change it. Franz Ferdinand had intended to postpone the ceremony till he had transformed the Constitution, and Tisza was determined to avoid the risk.

If Tisza was Karl's misfortune, Czernin was his fault. As everyone was aware, he had been destined by Franz Ferdinand for the Ballplatz, but the appointment was none the less a disastrous choice. The author burns with anger when he thinks of the vanity and rudeness of the Foreign Minister. Karl often complained that he was almost unbearable, lamenting that he could not dismiss him in time of war. We witness the conflict of Karl and his Private Secretary with Tisza and Czernin, the former sabotaging the efforts to solve the Yugoslav problem, the latter blocking the avenues to peace. Working with the Emperor for hours every day, the author found him quick, clear-headed and of more than average ability. "I know—and not I alone—how strenuously he pursued his aim to build the Monarchy on modern foundations." The Count, like his master, regrets that he could find no Minister with the courage to carry through his reforms. The stories of intrigues by the House of Parma are dismissed as Pan-German propaganda. Like Francis Joseph, Karl had never expected victory. When Italy's declaration of war was announced, the old Emperor sorrowfully remarked: "That means we are done for." On the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, which he vainly opposed, Karl observed: "If America intervenes, we shall and must be beaten." We are provided with a full account of the Sixtus negotiations and of the relations with Germany which necessitated their secrecy. The author

accompanied Karl on his visit to Homburg in April 1917, and notes the Kaiser's inability to believe the reports of Austria's sufferings. He defends the famous letter to Sixtus, written without the knowledge of Czernin, on the ground that peace was impossible without some concrete step and that Czernin lacked courage to take it. It was no worse to encourage France's desire for Alsace-Lorraine than for Germany to approve Italy's demand for the Trentino in 1915. He blames Karl for yielding to Czernin's threat to commit suicide unless he denied the letter.

Koerber, whom Karl found in office, opposed his wish to summon the Reichsrat, arguing that it would not work and that he would have to revert to personal rule. "Perhaps he is right", rejoined the Emperor. "Perhaps Austria is too sick for anything but palliatives. But I cannot admit it in the first year of my reign." Koerber made way for Clam-Martinitz, who in turn was unequal to the situation. The Premiership was now offered to the author, who replied that success was impossible without the support of Czernin and Hungary, which was not forthcoming. Karl then turned to Redlich, but at this moment Germany intervened to prevent a ministry of peace and decentralization. The next offer was to Lammasch, who declared that the burden was beyond his strength. Thus Seidler carried on, and the distracted ruler exclaimed to his friend: "Mine is a terrible heritage." Caporetto momentarily converted him to a belief in victory, and enabled Czernin and Tisza to secure the dismissal of the author as a pacifist and federalist. The Count was convinced that Caporetto was only a flash in the pan, but for the time being his policy had no friends. The two men remained on affectionate terms, meeting from time to time, and the Emperor never lost faith in the policy of autonomy and a compromise peace. "The Kaiser, like myself," observed Karl in September 1917, "is a poor prisoner in his own realm." When the news of the Bulgarian surrender arrived he declared that, if there were any justice in the world, nobody could bring the slightest reproach against William II. "He was the only man in high place in Germany who understood the situation from the beginning and shared my views on attempting to make peace. If he had his way we should have had peace long ago."

An equally intimate portrait of the last of the Hapsburgs is painted by his devoted secretary Karl Freiherr von Werkmann in *Deutschlands Verbündeter: Kaiser Karls Kampf um den*

*Frieden*. "I think very well of Karl", remarked Francis Joseph a few days before his death. "He tells me his frank opinion, but he knows how to obey when I have made up my mind." The young ruler emerges in an extremely attractive light. "Karl has a heart", declared Viktor Adler, the veteran Socialist leader. He hated the war, though he was too loyal to criticize the men who had started the avalanche, and he longed for an honourable peace. Such a ruler, explains his secretary, could not be surrounded by men who, rightly or wrongly, were regarded abroad as the makers or gossellers of war. The real reason why Conrad, the notorious champion of a preventive struggle, had to go was that his retention as Chief of the Staff would have suggested double-dealing. Unfortunately the young ruler was not always happy in the choice of his servants. Czernin, in particular, comes out very badly. Though clever, eloquent and plausible, he lacked civil courage and did not treat Karl with proper respect. His failings had become clear to the Emperor long before the breach.

Karl liked and trusted William II, but he resented the attempts of the predominant partner to control the Hapsburg Empire alike in the political, military and economic field. He reacted sharply against the plan of a commercial treaty. Its object, he wrote to Czernin in May 1917, in the most striking letter in this volume, was to bring Austria into complete dependence on the model of Bavaria. "A brilliant German victory", he continued, "would be our ruin. Germany has always felt that if things go badly Austria can furnish objects of compensation. Peace on the basis of the status quo would be best for us, for then Germany would not be too arrogant and we should not have broken irrevocably with the Western Powers, who are not in any real sense our enemies." This goal should be pursued, if necessary against the will of Germany. To perish at Germany's side simply out of loyalty would be suicide, and would not be justified by Germany's own attitude. Never would he accept an unfavourable commercial treaty, since Austria would thereby be completely tied and could never make peace. "The only way to escape from this predicament is a peace without annexation, and after the war, as a makeweight, an alliance with France as well as Germany. People will say that Franco-German differences cannot be bridged. But how was it between us and Italy?" It was all in vain, as Karl discovered to his cost in the Sixtus negotiations, here fully and dramatically described. The



closing chapter once again narrates from personal observation the last agonizing days in Vienna and Budapest.

### III

Passing from the rulers to their servants let us begin with Berchtold, whose apologia, though far advanced, has not yet appeared. The publication of Sazonoff's Memoirs induced him to break his long silence in a co-operative volume entitled *Rings um Sazonow*, edited by Eduard Ritter von Steinitz. He was stirred by the failure of the Russian statesman to understand Austrian policy, and by a bitterness surprising in one whose sympathetic personality inspired agreeable memories. He finds the explanation in the tradition of Iswolsky which led his successor astray, and fixes on what he regards as Sazonoff's damning confession that the rivalry of the two Powers in the Near East was bound to lead to a collision. No Austro-Hungarian statesman, he comments, had ever entertained such thoughts. "We always tried to find ways of agreement and to avoid war, for which the mutual respect of vital interests was of course the necessary condition." He denies that Aehrenthal was bent on the complete subjection of Serbia, explaining that he only decided on his Bosnian policy in consequence of the constitutional difficulties raised by the Young Turk revolution, and that he hoped formal recognition of the situation in the two provinces had liquidated the problem. As the host at Buchlau he speaks with authority on one of the most controverted incidents of contemporary history. Aehrenthal, he relates, described the conversation to him in detail the same evening, and on the following day Iswolsky's account confirmed the accuracy of the record. Aehrenthal was willing to accept a Conference for the registration, but not for the discussion, of the changes. When Iswolsky asked for time to prepare opinion in Russia, Aehrenthal pointed out the danger of delay, but promised a written notification of the date. That this communication was late in reaching Iswolsky was due not to treachery but to the fact that the Russian Minister was abroad.

Berchtold illustrates the difference between the provocative policy of Russia and the "eminently conservative" policy of Austria by the Balkan League concluded under Russian auspices, and described by Poincaré himself as "une convention de guerre." When Russia had thus started the avalanche,

Austria invited the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to join in keeping the peace. The attempt failed ; but throughout the Balkan wars Austria's policy was inspired, not by ill-will to Servia or desire for territory, for she was absolutely "satiated", but exclusively by considerations of national security. "Nothing was more hateful to us than the nightmare that we might be dragged into war by the upset in the Balkans which had taken place against our wishes." Russia, on the other hand, pursued a policy of aggression, which, though veiled by high-sounding phrases, led straight to bloody upheavals. "Reaction at home and revolution abroad : these conflicting extremes sent Holy Russia to her doom, dragging us along with her in mortal conflict to the grave." Berchtold challenges us to find in the ultimatum to Servia a single unfounded accusation or unjustifiable demand. The information available in July 1914, he adds, was confirmed by the revelations of Stanojevich and Ljuba Jovanovich. "The Serajevo crime was simply one of the latest examples of the work of destruction organized against us, of the sapping and mining which was to blow up the home in which we dwelt. The Monarchy was faced by the alternative : A free hand for the house-breakers or the demand for security. On the rejection of the latter only a struggle for existence remained." The Servian reply, he explains, was not, as Sazonoff suggests, a virtual acceptance, but was filled with reservations.

The Foreign Minister's apologia is followed by a contribution from his Chef de Cabinet, Count Hoyos, who summarizes Sazonoff's Pan Slavism as a virtual declaration of war against Austria. With the formation of the Balkan League, the Servian victories in 1912-13, and the rapprochement with Roumania, Russia's diplomatic position in 1914 was excellent. Austria, on the other hand, under Andrassy and his successors, pursued a policy of defence against Russia and the Slav world. With the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina she was territorially satiated ; yet she could not allow Servia to dominate the Balkans and thus become the Piedmont of the Southern Slavs. The necessity of annexation was proved by the anger it aroused, but the relief was only temporary. The Treaty of Bucharest appeared to Austria like the capture of a vital portion of the defences in time of war, which, if defeat was to be avoided, must be retaken at any cost ; and her action in 1914 is exhibited as justifiable self-defence. Germany's mistake was to drive England by her naval policy

into the Franco-Russian camp ; but for this fatal error Austria was in no way responsible.

The defence of Austrian policy is continued by Baron Macchio, who, in his long experience of diplomacy in the Balkans, found the representatives of Russia everywhere on the offensive. Her ultimate aim was the control of the Straits, to which the vassalage of the Balkan States in the name of Orthodoxy and Panslavism was an essential preliminary. The rapprochement with Russia in 1897 and 1903 altered nothing, and her agents continued to bully the Courts to which they were accredited. Macchio contests the argument that Austria's historic rôle was finished when she drove back the Turk, for the Russian danger succeeded the Turkish. Yet Austria's *Drang nach Osten*, he maintains, was purely commercial, and the coveting of Salonica was a legend. The Monarchy was not an anachronism but a structure admirably adapted to the economic interests of the peoples of the middle Danube. Yet Russian propaganda was everywhere at work along the frontiers, above all in Galicia, planting the seed of revolt in the hearts of the racial minorities. The ultimatum to Serbia was the only alternative to a lingering death.

Count Szapary confirms the testimony of his colleagues as to the ever-growing anxiety of Aehrenthal and Berchtold, since Servian irredentism under Russian patronage was incompatible with the integrity of the Austrian Empire. If, as Sazonoff declared, a conflict was inevitable, and if there was no probability of an abatement of Pan-Serb activity, why should Austria ignore the challenge of Serajevo and wait while her enemies grew in strength? Speaking as Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg in 1914, he argues that the postponement of the delivery of the ultimatum till Poincaré had left the Russian capital was intended to facilitate the preservation of peace, since Vienna held the French President to be more bellicose than his hosts. None of the Cabinets, he believes, desired a European war, but Russia was the prisoner of her big words and incautious promises. Nothing could have held her back save plain speaking from the Western Powers.

Berchtold's main task after the outbreak of war was to avert or at worst to postpone the belligerence of Italy. The difficulty of the problem is indicated in Macchio's *Wahrheit : Fürst Bülow und ich in Rom 1914-15*. The Austrian Ambassador was disagreeably surprised by Bülow's remark in their first

interview that Austria must cede territory, and that he would try to secure the best terms from Sonnino. A letter to Berchtold in January 1915 reveals his dislike of his new colleague's methods. Bülow, he adds, mobilised the press and the German colony against Austria and was guilty of disloyalty to Germany's ally. The statement attributed to him by Bülow in his Memoirs on the eve of Italy's entry into the war: "The Italians are always so excited, they will soon calm down again", is dismissed as a fairy tale.

An interview with the editor of a Vienna paper, partially reproduced in *Berliner Monatshefte*, June 1935, shews Berchtold with his conscience at ease. "I was always an opponent of war, a pacifist. My whole endeavour was to preserve the precious values of European culture. I may claim to have held off war for two years." As Ambassador in St. Petersburg he had worked for good relations with Russia and correct relations with Servia. But the new Russia of the twentieth century was not the old. The Tsar was no longer sole ruler, and Panslav influence was strong. Conrad was for preventive wars, and some of the older Generals, Potiorek among them, agreed with him. During the Balkan conflicts Francis Joseph and Franz Ferdinand were for peace. Berchtold's policy was the Balkans for the Balkan peoples, with Austria claiming to be consulted. After Serajevo it was not in her power to prevent war. The military experts declared that a modern war could not last more than two or three months. When the conflict assumed gigantic dimensions Berchtold strove to keep Italy neutral, for Tisza was opposed to compromise. The day before the Italian Ambassador was to begin detailed negotiations Tisza and Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, visited the Ballplatz. In an excited conversation the Foreign Minister told the Hungarian Premier that in view of the military situation he dared not be intransigent. Since Burian and Merey, till recently Ambassador at Rome, supported Tisza, he resigned. His successor was Burian, who had urged the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, which Berchtold, it is interesting to learn, had regarded with critical eyes on the ground that it would cause mistrust of Austria's aims and therefore tighten the bonds between her foes.

Burian begins his record, *Three Years*, with his summons to the Ballplatz at the opening of 1915 when Italy was trembling on the verge. The Central Powers, he confesses, did not expect their ally to join them in a European war after the Alge-

ciras Conference and the Racconigi plot, and indeed "the presence of England among our foes was decisive for Italian policy." He complains not of her neutrality but of her use of it as a screen for preparations to fall on her allies. In regard to Austria's other partner he declares that the alliance proved itself in war as well as in peace. It was formed for defence, and it was used for defence. "Austria wished to fight out her quarrel with Servia alone, and it was not her fault if Russia intervened." The most novel part of his story describes the genesis and development of the peace move of the Central Powers. As early as July 1916, he planned a concrete offer. Action was postponed by the entry of Roumania into the fray, but Francis Joseph approved in September and Bethmann was consulted in October. The Chancellor expressed general agreement with the proposed terms, but declared that they must not be divulged, since German opinion was deeply divided and it would be difficult to accept less than had been publicly offered. Burian's demands for Austria were for modifications in her favour of the Russian, Roumanian, Serb and Italian frontiers, with the sole object of practical security. The German refusal to announce the terms of the Central Powers ruined the chances of the offer, as he had always argued that it would. It was generally believed at the time that he had to make way for Czernin when the young Emperor succeeded in November 1916. We learn from his own lips that at the death-bed of Francis Joseph he was invited to remain. The cause of his resignation a month later was his opposition to the renewal of the ruthless submarine war, which he regarded as involving the intervention of the United States and the certainty of defeat. Recalled to the Ballplatz in the summer of 1918, on the fall of Czernin, he found little to do but to hoist the signal of distress.

While Burian's apologia reveals a conscientious official, that of Czernin, *In the World War*, is a work of art. His portraits are drawn with a master hand, and his attitude is singularly detached. An introductory chapter admits the existence of alarm caused by German policy, though he does not believe that it aimed at world dominion. England and France did not desire war; but England and Germany suspected one another, and Austria, being tied to her ally, was mixed up in the quarrel. There was a war party in Russia, headed by the Grand Duke Nicholas, but the Tsar was a man of peace. No one in a responsible position willed the world

war, for which the Entente was no more and no less responsible than the Central Powers. Berchtold did not expect a general conflagration. England, he believed, would remain neutral, and in that case victory was assured. Tschirschky worked for the conflict which he felt to be inevitable in any case, and went about saying Now or Never! Czernin blames the method by which the ultimatum to Servia was flung in the face of Europe without diplomatic preparation. Still more disastrous was the attack on Belgium, which in mobilizing England decided the issue in advance. Yet even without the war Austria was doomed. "Her watch had run down. We were bound to die. We were at liberty to choose the manner of our death, and we chose the most terrible." She lost her independence to her stronger ally at the outset of the struggle, which she was powerless to end at her own time.

The second chapter, entitled Konopischt, contains a finished portrait of Franz Ferdinand. He possessed good abilities and some excellent qualities, but he lacked balance. He knew no middle course. He could love or hate—and he hated far more people than he loved. The hard and bitter strain in his nature made him the most unpopular man in the Empire, and he despised his fellows too much to care. He could not control himself, and there were angry scenes even with faithful friends. He had, however, an exceptionally fine political *flair*, and he realized that the nationalities must be considered if the Empire was to survive. He detested the Magyar magnates as the main obstacle to his federal plans. He used to exclaim: "Their very language (which he vainly tried to learn) makes me feel antipathy for them." Far from being anti-Serb, he desired to meet Belgrad half-way and thus to remove the chief obstacle to Austro-Russian friendship.

The portrait of William II, in the third chapter, though less intimate, is equally fair. No ruler had better intentions, and he lived for his work of making and keeping the German people great and happy. Yet he dwelt in a world of illusion and Byzantine flattery which was only invaded by harsh realities during the *Daily Telegraph* crisis. War was not in his programme though he helped to produce it. The Emperor Karl was no less anxious to do right, but he lacked political training and experience, and, like other monarchs, he mistook the curiosity of his subjects for devotion. The chapter on Roumania describes the agony of Carol at his inability to fulfil his treaty obligations. "The poor old King fought the

fight to the best of his ability, but it killed him. . . . I recollect one particularly painful scene where the King, weeping bitterly, flung himself across his writing-table and with trembling hands tried to wrench from his neck his order *pour le mérite*."

Czernin's chapters on his tenure of the Foreign Office make a depressing tale. His first trial was the submarine campaign, which he, like Karl, disapproved, and in the success of which he never believed. His second was to watch the failure of the attempts at peace inaugurated by Burian in the autumn of 1916. Looking back on his efforts he realizes how futile they were, since the distrust of German intentions in London and Paris was too strong and too well justified to overcome. He disliked the Pan-Germans and the Fatherland Party as much as they detested him. "The only difference between Foch and Ludendorff is that one is a Frenchman and the other a German. As men they are as like as two peas. . . . Neither the Entente nor the all-powerful military party in Germany wished for a peace of understanding." Karl shared his conviction as to the need of a speedy compromise peace, and the unhappy breach resulted from differences of method not of aim. Czernin recognized the honourable intentions of President Wilson, but he never believed he could carry them out. The volume concludes with vivid chapters on the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. In the decisions of the former he had but little share. The latter, he declares, compared with Versailles, was a peace of understanding. The curtain falls in an atmosphere of gloom. "Neither at Versailles nor St. Germain has any lasting work been done. The germs of decomposition and death lie in this peace. The paroxysms that shattered Europe are not yet over."

The name of Dumba became familiar during the world war when he was expelled from the United States, and he tells his story in *Dreibund- und Entente-Politik in der Alten und Neuen Welt*. Appointed to Belgrad early in 1903, he describes the murder of Alexander and Draga and analyses Austro-Serb relations. The collapse of Russia in the Far East made Pasitch for a time a little more respectful to Austria. Servia's future, he explained, lay in the south. If Austria would support her claims to the Serb portions of Macedonia he would create an Austrophil party. No response came from Goluchowski, who was anxious to maintain the Austro-Russian entente in the Balkans, which rested on the status quo. Dumba regretted

this negative attitude, though he had no illusions about the deeper tendencies of Servian policy. Serbs, he declared, expected a conflict before long, and Pasitch was a master of perfidy. "His deeds never corresponded with his words." Possessing a mystical belief in the unification of the Yugoslav race, he exploited the internal weakness of the Hapsburg realm and worked like a mole for its disintegration. Looking back on the past the author argues that Austria's policy towards the nationalities was much too liberal, stimulating as it did their separatist aspirations.

After an interval at Stockholm Dumba was appointed to Washington in 1913. Wilson, who was cold and stiff, struck him as a conceited doctrinaire, a man of words, lacking tact and the sense of realities. Fortunately Colonel House possessed these qualities, besides being a good judge of men, pleasant to work with, unselfish and discreet. The diplomatists, who saw much more of him than of the President, called him Père Joseph. Bryan was the worst possible Secretary of State but the most sympathetic of American politicians. The Ambassador's career was brought to an end by his own carelessness. That skilled Hungarians should be employed in the Bethlehem steel works, which produced munitions for the Allies, seemed highly improper to the representatives of the Central Powers in the United States, who determined to hinder the output by strikes and sabotage. The strings were pulled by Papen, the German Military Attaché. The Austrian Ambassador incautiously entrusted the relevant documents to a pro-German journalist just starting for Europe, including a letter to his chief containing the following passage: "I have the impression that we can, if not actually prevent, at any rate disorganize the production of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, and hold it up for months." The whole *dossier* was seized at Falmouth and published as a White-book. When Dumba called at the State Department to explain, Lansing listened in silence and did not shake hands. His expulsion immediately followed.

Sir George Franckenstein's *Facts and Features of My Life*, "dedicated to the resurrection of Austria", reveals an attractive and highly cultivated aristocrat who served a mighty Empire and a little Republic with equal devotion and tact. He learned his trade at St. Petersburg under Aehrenthal—"perhaps the greatest man of our time"—of whom he speaks with loving gratitude. In their first conversation the Ambassador com-



plained that his programme of friendly relations with Russia was jeopardized by her aggressive policy. Austria merely desired to keep her possessions by preventing any Balkan developments which might threaten them. The best method of averting a clash was to stress the common interests of the Austrian, Russian and German dynasties, all of which would be threatened with collapse in the event of defeat. When Aehrenthal became Foreign Minister the author offered his services as his secretary. A conversation with William II in October 1909 records his anticipation of a war between the Teuton and the Slav within five or six years. Russia, he declared, was working for a Balkan Slav Union, and Austria should make a military agreement with Turkey. He regretted that she had not marched into Servia immediately after the annexation of Bosnia. The author witnessed the outbreak of the world war from the Austrian Embassy in London, and was then attached to the German administration in Belgium. The Governor-General von Bissing, whom the Belgians detested as a second Alva, is depicted as "a passionate Imperialist but, so far as war-time conditions allowed, full of paternal regard for the country entrusted to his care." Though Franckenstein liked Berchtold, he considers that he was better fitted to be an Ambassador than a Foreign Minister, since he lacked toughness and tenacity. Yet there is no doubt in the author's mind that Austria had no choice but to take up the Servian challenge implicit in the Serajevo crime, and he pronounces the reply to the ultimatum radically unsatisfactory.

The most sensational diplomatic revelation during the war was that of the negotiations between the Emperor Karl and the Entente. The first task of the young ruler was to get in touch with his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, who was fighting in the Belgian ranks. Of the Prince's journeys to Austria, his conversations with Poincaré and Ribot in Paris, his visits to Downing Street and Buckingham Palace, Karl's letter recognizing the "just claims" of France to Alsace-Lorraine while refusing to make substantial sacrifices to Italy, and the consequent failure of the negotiations, we may read in *The Austrian Peace Offer*, written by Manteyer from materials supplied by the Prince. When Clemenceau published Karl's most compromising letter in *facsimile*, Germany angrily accused her ally of treachery. But Bethmann was informed of the negotiations, though not of the name of the negotiator, and the German Government was urged to

terminate the war by surrendering Alsace-Lorraine, finding territorial compensation at the expense of Russia.

The respective parts played by Karl and his Foreign Minister in their approaches to the Entente are revealed in a new light by Demblin, an ex-official of the Ballplatz, in his brochure *Czernin und die Sixtus-Affaire*. "With the exception of the Emperor and Czernin," he declares, "I alone know the truth"; for he was the sole channel of communication between them in the critical days which preceded the breach. Czernin, he testifies, was a sharp-tongued and difficult chief, but he was not the "liar" of Clemenceau's historic outburst. The indictment of the French Premier should have been directed against the Emperor Karl, who in his own handwriting recognized the *justes revendications* of France to Alsace-Lorraine. The letter was written without the knowledge of Czernin, and its author, after lying to his Minister, actually allowed him to issue a *démenti*. When his trick was exposed by the photographic reproduction of the letter in *L'Illustration*, Czernin decided that he could no longer serve such a master. So shattered was he, indeed, by the revelation that he proposed the temporary withdrawal of Karl from the direction of affairs and the establishment of a Regency. The embarrassed Emperor, we are told, seemed not disinclined to follow his advice; but the Empress intervened and Czernin resigned. Karl, adds Demblin, also corresponded secretly with the Vatican, while Czernin's gloomy report on conditions in Austria in 1917, written for the confidential use of the German Government, was communicated to Erzberger, with Karl's assent, probably through a member of the Parma family.

It is a relief to turn from these discordant cries to the noble figure of the last Austrian Premier. The memorial volume entitled *Heinrich Lammasch*, edited by his daughter Marga and his colleague Hans Sperl, is of importance both for the domestic history and the foreign policy of Austria. The famous jurist felt that the Dual Monarchy must be reconstituted on a federal basis, and that the struggle must be ended by the creation of a League of Nations. When the young Emperor and the elderly Professor met in 1917 they were deeply impressed by one another, and Lammasch was offered the Premiership, which he declined on the ground of inexperience. Regarding with equal dread the complete victory of either side, he secured Karl's approval of the plan of announcing federal autonomy for the races of the Empire under the auspices

of President Wilson, and discussed the scheme with Professor Herron, an unofficial emissary of the President, in the house of Dr. Mühlön at Bern in February 1918. Peace, he believed, could be restored by the Emperor and the President working together, but by them alone. The negotiations, described in these pages by both parties, filled Lammasch with joyful expectation of a rejuvenated Austria and a speedy end to the carnage. The decree was prepared, but the Emperor pleaded for delay and finally succumbed to the warnings of Berlin. When the Professor was called to the Premiership at the end of October it was too late. The war was lost, the Empire was in disruption, and the only service he could render was to transfer the reins to the Socialist leaders. The events of this heartbreaking fortnight are sketched by Professor Joseph Redlich, his Minister of Finance and life-long friend. A shorter chapter describes the work of Lammasch as member of the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain, including his fruitless efforts to save South Tirol.

The atmosphere of official Vienna in the last weeks of peace is conveyed in the volume of Freiherr von Musulin, *Das Haus am Ballplatz*. Entering the Foreign Office in 1903, he was struck by the contrast between the policies of Goluchowski and Aehrenthal, or, as he phrases it, between pessimism and optimism. The former, believing the Dual Monarchy to be incapable of a great effort, played for safety, while the latter was ready for risks. The annexation of Bosnia was planned as the preliminary to a far-reaching structural transformation in the direction of trialism; but its author died too soon to carry out his scheme, leaving the international position of Austria worse than he found it. Berchtold fought against his own nomination, and he endeavoured to resign when the Balkan wars created a situation beyond his control. When the news of Serajevo reached Vienna the universal feeling was expressed in the words: "We cannot stand that sort of thing any more; something must be done." Though the military authorities never doubted that war was inevitable, the Foreign Office hoped to avoid an appeal to arms. As the draftsman of the ultimatum he argues that it did not necessarily involve war. "The Minister did not suggest making it unacceptable. No demand was incorporated till it was agreed that it could and would be accepted. . . . The leading statesmen of Austria believed that in 1914, as in 1903, the solidarity of conservative and dynastic interests would manifest themselves, above all

in Russia." Tisza imagined that at the worst Russia would engage in limited hostilities to save her face, if Austria left the integrity and sovereignty of Servia unimpaired, and would soon consent to an honourable compromise. Musulin's opinion of the Servian reply as "the cleverest piece of diplomacy I ever saw" is of peculiar interest. It was a brilliant sham, since it rendered the Austrian demands illusory while appearing to yield.

A second high official of the Ballplatz, who knew better than Musulin what was going on in Berchtold's mind, excites instead of satisfying our curiosity. Count Hoyos, his Chef de Cabinet, was chosen to carry the Emperor's appeal for support to Berlin on July 5, 1914. Yet all he tells in his little book, *Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns*, is that he and Szögeny, the Austrian Ambassador, formed the impression that the German Government wished immediate steps to be taken against Servia, though they were well aware that a world war might ensue. Yet he regards the policy of the Central Powers as purely defensive. "The Balkan war was the first stage in a grandiose Panslav design for the union of all Slavs under Russian rule and therewith the dissolution of Austria." Servia was the tool of Russia, and Austria would have been wiser had she solved the Yugoslav problem when Russia was engaged elsewhere. He disclaims all aggressive intentions on behalf of the Dual Monarchy, which asked only for the right to live. "Cet animal est très méchant : quand on l'attaque il se défend."

That not every Austrian diplomatist approved the official policy we learn from Szilassy's *Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie*. Appointed to St. Petersburg when the Austro-Russian entente in the Balkans was scrapped by Aehrenthal, the Baron recounts his efforts to restore the wires to Vienna. When Iswolsky shrieked at him, "Non, le Baron d'Aehrenthal n'est pas un gentilhomme," Szilassy, instead of telegraphing the insult to Vienna, related the incident to Sazonoff, who observed: "Vous avez très bien fait de ne pas prendre au sérieux ce que vous a dit M. Izwolski." When Sazonoff became Foreign Minister he assured the author that the relations of the two countries could now improve. Berchtold's nomination to the Ballplatz, however, filled him with apprehension, not on account of his views, which were still Russophil, but because his terrifying incapacity made the appointment seem like a bad joke. His fears were confirmed when the

new Minister, on the outbreak of the Balkan war, recalled him to Vienna. "To my horror I discovered that a large party desired war with Servia and, if necessary, with Russia as well. Most of the officials were aggressive and played with fire. The Minister vacillated between sensible and bellicose inspirations." The soul of the war party was Conrad, whom Francis Joseph described to the author as "clever but not wise", and against whose driving power "the absolutely childlike mentality" of Berchtold had no chance. The pressure of the Chief of the Staff became so strong that the Minister invited the author to argue with him at his house. That a conflagration was averted in 1912-13 was due neither to Berchtold nor to Conrad but to Francis Joseph and Franz Ferdinand. The outbreak of the world war, which he attributes in part to the waning energies of the Emperor, found him far away in the Legation at Athens. On his return in 1916 he endeavoured by memoranda and personal interviews to strengthen the hands of the Emperor Karl, who hated the war no less heartily than himself, but lacked the power to overcome the obstacles to peace.

No less critical are the *Fragments of a Political Diary* of Baernreither, perhaps the most intelligent statesman of the closing years of the Dual Monarchy. A sympathetic sketch by his friend Joseph Redlich introduces us to the Civil Servant, Deputy, Minister of Commerce and Member of the Upper House; but the volume is mainly concerned with foreign affairs during the last six years of peace. The first part, entitled "Jugoslav Policy", is an illuminating contribution to the history of a problem which Baernreither was one of the few Austrians to study on the spot. Revisiting Bosnia early in 1908, after sixteen years, he was distressed to find how completely the attempt to Austrianize the province had failed, how imperfect was the boasted material improvement, how rapid the growth of Pan-Serb propaganda. The juristic anomaly of "occupation" had prevented the grant of a Constitution; but annexation, he declared, was inevitable. Yet annexation without reform was useless; for though the Austrian Serbs had not yet embraced the Pan-Serb faith, they would require careful handling. Friends and foes alike of the annexation realized that it was the turning point, and even the old Emperor seemed excited when he read the King's Speech in the Delegations at Budapest. "One must have lived through these days to realize the feeling of relief and

hopeful anticipation which the clever diplomatic solution of the conflict inspired. Aehrenthal seemed destined to lead us out of the lethargy and shallows of our policy." Diplomacy, however, had only prepared the way for the statesman whom Baernreither summoned to "win Bosnia," and no one answered his call. To win Bosnia it was necessary to win Servia. Aehrenthal ignored the approaches of Milovanovich, the Servian Foreign Minister, which the author reported to him at the end of 1909; and the tragic blunders exposed in the Friedjung trial widened the gulf which began to yawn in 1908.

The second part of the volume, covering the period from the Balkan wars to the early summer of 1914, is mainly concerned with the nationalities. Servia's victories over the Turk aroused not only the enthusiasm of the Bosnian Serbs but hopes of Yugoslav union. The statesmen of the Dual Monarchy had two courses open to them—to trample on Servia or, as Milovanovich desired, to make friends. Aehrenthal and Berchtold did neither. Baernreither urged a Zollverein with the enlarged Balkan States, and supported the demand for access to a neutralized harbour; but even the Balkan wars failed to open Hungarian eyes to the significance of the Yugoslav problem. The Ballplatz was little wiser, for Berchtold repulsed the offers of Pasitch which Masaryk brought from Belgrad in December 1912. Berchtold, like his master, had no wish for war, but he lacked the courage to pay the price of peace. Roumania, meanwhile, was edging away from Austria owing to the maltreatment of Transylvania by Budapest. And all the while Conrad was pressing for war, speaking gaily even of the reconquest of the "Quadrilateral" from Italy. The war party became so violent that Frau Schratt was commissioned to warn the Emperor. Franz Ferdinand desired the restoration of the Dreikaiserbund, but he had no great following. The real ruler of the Dual Monarchy was Tisza, who had learned nothing and forgotten nothing.

Baron Giesl's *Zwei Jahrzehnte im nahen Orient* opens with Hamidian Turkey, and the stage widens till almost all the Balkan actors are passed in review. King Ferdinand appears as a first-class intellect and a third-class character. His conversation was brilliant but malicious, the sharpest satire lurking behind, seemingly innocent phraseology. King George of Greece presents himself in his usual rôle of the victim of the injustice and indifference of Europe. Exchanging his military

duties for diplomacy, Giesl was appointed Minister to Montenegro in 1910. The little Court at Cetinje, with its semi-savage but *rusé* old monarch, is brilliantly portrayed, and we share the emotions of the Balkan wars. The interest culminates in the chapter on Belgrad, to which the author was transferred at the end of 1913. Information about Hartwig is always welcome, and the picture of the Russian Minister is drawn with an unexpectedly sympathetic hand. Any suspicion of foul play or quick words at the Austrian Legation should be set at rest by the straightforward account of his sudden collapse. Unlike most Austrian officials, Giesl did not feel war to be inevitable at the moment of the Serajevo murders; but the swelling tide of anger in the following days converted him to the arbitrament of the sword. The account of the presentation of the ultimatum, of the slow passing of the two allotted days, of the receipt of the reply, and of the hurried departure of the Legation staff is a precious addition to our knowledge of some of the most fateful hours in history. He regards Serbia's reply as a clever evasion of the demand without which her promises would have been worthless. It is a surprise to learn his opinion that the Russian Minister would have secured the unconditional acceptance of the Austrian terms. "If Hartwig had been alive on the fateful 25th of July, the world war would not have occurred."

When Giesl exchanged the position of Military Attaché in the Turkish capital for the Legation at Cetinje, he was succeeded by Pomiankowski, an Austrian Pole. *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches* opens with the Young Turk revolution, and he repeatedly criticizes the superficiality and ruthless egotism of the triumvirate Enver, Talaat and Djemal. His special aversion is Enver, whose one thought was himself, and who seemed incapable of adjusting his plans to the resources of his country. The reorganization of the army had hardly begun when the Balkan States fell upon Turkey. A second period of reorganization opened with the arrival of Liman von Sanders at the end of 1913, which the Russian Military Attaché excitedly described as a veiled annexation of the Straits. The author was convinced that the defeat of Turkey would be followed in due course by an attack on Austria, and that in the ensuing world war Turkey would assist the Central Powers. This consideration did not escape the Russians, and he connects the prospect of a thorough reorganization of the Turkish army with Russia's decision to

fight in 1914. Liman's efforts were in some measure frustrated by the jealousy of Enver, who was supported by Wangenheim, the German Ambassador; but the result of his labours receives unstinted praise.

It is interesting to learn the opinion of Pallavicini, the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, that the annexation of Bosnia was a cardinal error. "This wholly unnecessary act was the first attack on the integrity of Turkey, for the partition of which Aehrenthal gave the signal." The author agrees with his chief, but adds that a still graver mistake was the passivity during the Balkan wars. "Berchtold failed to recognize that the existence of Austria demanded the prevention of the Balkan war and a further weakening of Turkey. Her veto in 1912 would hardly have led to a world war, since Russia was not yet ready and Italy was weakened by Tripoli. Even had the intervention of the Monarchy led to a general conflagration, our chances were decidedly better than in 1914." The larger part of the volume is devoted to the war and to Turkey's relations with the Central Powers. Friction with Germany was incessant. Liman and the veteran von der Goltz, who was recalled to the scene of his former exploits, receive high marks; but Enver's crazy schemes were encouraged by Wangenheim who possessed the ear of Berlin. On Wangenheim's death in 1915 the wire to Berlin worked less easily, and Metternich, his successor, was recalled after a year at the express demand of Enver, who resented his disapproval of the Armenian massacres. The Turks were well aware of the danger of their country becoming a German satrapy in the event of complete victory, but at the Austrian Embassy hopes of a dictated peace never soared very high.

A vivid picture of the working of the Austrian administrative machine is painted in Rudolf Sieghart's *Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht*. The author was a high official in the Chancery of the Austrian Prime Minister, and ended his career as head of the Boden-Credit-Anstalt. Looking back on the old system he pronounces it far better, above all from the economic point of view, than the mosaic of sovereign states which took its place. The hero of the story is Koerber, who is described as possessing every statesmanlike quality except the energy to force through the needed reforms. Sieghart preferred Goluchowski's watchword *quieta non movere* to Aehrenthal's high stakes. His objection to the annexation of Bosnia was shared by his chief, Beck, who wrote that it sent a



cold shiver down his back. Elaborate chapters are devoted to Francis Joseph and Franz Ferdinand. It was difficult to admire both, for their temperaments and policies were very different. The author's sympathies are entirely with the first. Some of the old man's utterances were not less revealing because they were terse. He was charged with a message to the Emperor when the bill for universal suffrage was to be discussed in the Herrenhaus. "Do you think it will go all right?" asked Francis Joseph. "Certainly I do", replied Sieghart. "I don't", was the rejoinder; "in Austria nothing goes all right." When the news of Serajevo reached him he was silent for a time and then remarked: "Yes, it is terrible. But Karl is a nice fellow, isn't he?" Sieghart is not among those who saw in Franz Ferdinand the future saviour of the Empire, among other reasons because he was no judge of men.

Bilinski's Memoirs, published in Polish at Warsaw in 1924 and not yet translated, cover a long career of public service. The first volume, bringing the narrative down to 1914, becomes valuable during the last two years of peace, when he was Joint Minister of Finance and *ex officio* Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Being on friendly terms with Jovan Jovanovich, the Servian Minister at Vienna, he was consulted by Berchtold during the Balkan wars; but the policy of the Ballplatz is sharply criticized. The gravest mistake of the Foreign Minister was to decline the offer of Pasitch to come to Vienna at the end of 1912, and indeed Bilinski goes so far as to suggest that the great catastrophe might have been averted by a different response. The second volume covers the period of the war and the evening of his life, which ended in 1922.

The third volume of the monumental *Erinnerungen* of Ernst von Plener, though mainly devoted to internal affairs, contains a few points for the student of diplomacy, for the veteran statesman began life as a diplomat. The chapter on the reign and character of Francis Joseph supplies a not unsympathetic estimate of his old master, who, he believes, did not wish for war and at the end of his life was the tool of his advisers. When Aehrenthal sent for him on August 18, 1908, as an ex-Minister and an influential member of the Herrenhaus, and informed him of the intention to annex Bosnia, Plener strongly opposed the plan. In 1914 he found himself again out of sympathy with the Ballplatz, since he desired the acceptance

of the Servian reply. His opinion of the later Foreign Ministers of his country is low. Berchtold was "a passive, indolent nature"; and when Count Wedel arrived from Berlin in January 1915, to persuade the Ballplatz to buy off Italy, Burian was unable to realize the danger in time. The moral of most Austrian apologies, whether drawn by their authors or by their readers, is: Too late!

The lack of co-ordination in the highest spheres of government during the war is described in a booklet entitled *Der Politische Zusammenbruch und die Anschlussfrage*, by Freiherr von Spitzmüller, ex-Minister of Finance. Austria and Hungary, he complains, were the only belligerents where the heads of the internal departments were not in contact with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and War. "There was no organic institution for creating a common state will." Of some important acts of the Ballplatz, for instance, he only learned when the war was over. Cabinet discussions, he believes, might have prevented some of the worst mistakes. For instance, in view of the almost universal disapproval in Austria of the resumption of the unlimited submarine campaign, a joint protest by the Ministers could hardly have been overruled. A similar impression of the invertebrate character of the State is derived from the thoughtful volume, *Der Untergang der Oesterreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie*, by Kleinwächter, an old official of the Ministry of Finance. A sombre picture of the crumbling of the home front has been painted in *The Austrian Revolution* by Otto Bauer, Foreign Minister in the first Republican Government. Only the fear of German invasion, declares the Socialist leader, kept the Hofburg from making a separate peace at an earlier date.

#### IV

Grey regarded Aehrenthal as the stormy petrel of European politics, but to Conrad von Hötzendorff, the Austrian militarist *par excellence*, he was the incorrigible pacifist. Conrad was discovered and promoted by Franz Ferdinand, and from the moment he assumed office he bombarded the Foreign Office and the Crown with exhortations to war. When the Empire was gone he restated his convictions and recorded his activities. In describing his work *Aus meiner Dienstzeit* as "a mosaic, not a picture", the author forestalls the complaint of the reader that he has to struggle through thousands of pages of wear-

some detail in which political nuggets of the highest value are imbedded. The Preface proclaims him an impenitent realist. The individual, he declares, counts for little in history, for men and nations alike are dominated by the struggle for existence. He proceeds to depict the situation of Austria at the time of his appointment as Chief of the Staff, with four hostile neighbours on her borders—Russia, Roumania, Servia and Italy. Servia and Italy were the two most immediate dangers, and Aehrenthal's *coup* of 1908 provided a golden opportunity of removing the first. "If Austria desired to retain Bosnia, war with Servia was inevitable. Russia was behind her, but in 1908-9 neither Russia nor Servia was ready to fight. Austria was ready, but she missed her chance."

The second volume, which carries us to 1912, finds Italy in the foreground of the picture. Convinced that she was only biding her time, Conrad demanded measures of defence. Aehrenthal, however, was in control, and the opportunity of falling on her flank while engaged in Tripoli was allowed to pass. In November, 1911, the Emperor, angered by the importunity of the Chief of the Staff, lectured him like a naughty boy. "I forbid these attacks on Aehrenthal," he cried. "They are directed against myself. I make the policy. My policy is a policy of peace. It is possible, indeed probable, that there will one day be war, but it will not occur till Italy strikes." Conrad was removed from his post and appointed "Inspector of the Army"; but Aehrenthal was a dying man, and three months after his victory he was dead. Berchtold proved "more open to ideas", and on the outbreak of the Balkan war Conrad was reinstated. Among the plums of the second volume is the account of a mission to Bucharest in November 1912, to arrange for military co-operation in case of need. Not only King Carol, whose loyalty to the Central Powers was never in doubt, but the public opinion of Roumania, reported the envoy, was ready to fight against Russia.

The third volume, covering 1913 and the first half of 1914, revolves round Russia and Roumania. Germany's devotion to peace throughout the Balkan wars, argues the author, was bad for herself, bad for Austria, and bad for the cause of European peace. For in 1912 it was still possible to destroy Servian irredentism in the germ, though the opportunity was less favourable than in 1908-9. 1913 was the last chance of success. "I tried to get it used, but in vain. After the Treaty of Bucharest I ceased to urge war, and indeed attempted to post-

pone it till our military preparations—the only chance of saving Austria—improved. We could now merely wait till our enemies attacked us. The initiative had passed to the Entente.” Austria was despised as timid and weak. Roumania, recently so friendly, was lost. The Triple Entente displayed an enviable unity and clearness of aim, unfettered by scruples or hesitations. While Conrad desired to postpone a conflict till the Austrian army was stronger, Moltke, whom he visited at Karlsbad in May 1914, argued that delay diminished the chances of the Central Powers, since Russia was steadily regaining strength.

The fourth volume, though covering only the last month of peace and the first two months of war, contains valuable material on responsibilities. The murders of Serajevo, argues Conrad, were not the act of an isolated fanatic, but Serbia's declaration of war against Austria. Such a challenge could only be answered in one way—a war not of vengeance but of self-defence. Austria's patience had diminished her prestige and encouraged her enemies. To take no action at such a moment would have stimulated the disruptive tendencies within the empire. That Francis Joseph agreed proves that it was in truth inevitable. “The monarchy was seized by the throat, and faced the alternative of being strangled or trying to ward off the attack.” On receiving the news of the murder Conrad urged instant mobilization. He told the Emperor that the time was bad, but that it would become worse. Berchtold argued that the result of the inquiry must be awaited. Tisza, whose vision was dominated by the interests of the Magyar aristocracy, at first opposed war on the ground that Roumania would attack Hungary, and that annexations of Serb territory would diminish Magyar influence. Giesl preached war on the ground that Serbia not only hated but despised Austria. Francis Joseph was not a pawn, and was quite aware of what he was doing. These attitudes were generally known at the time, but Moltke's intervention at Vienna was a piquant revelation. “Austria must at once mobilize against Russia, Germany will mobilize,” he telegraphed early in the morning of July 31. At the same time the Austrian Military Attaché wired from Berlin: “Moltke says the situation is critical unless Austria mobilizes at once against Russia. Refuse England's new peace offer. Germany unconditionally with you.” These telegrams were shown by Conrad to Berchtold, who exclaimed: “Who is in command? Moltke or Bethmann?” Berchtold had interpreted a telegram of William II

to Francis Joseph on the previous evening as a sign of retreat, "but now I have satisfactory assurances from the highest military authority." Later on July 31 came a further telegram from Moltke: "Will Austria leave Germany in the lurch?" These frantic appeals were unknown to the Chancellor and produced no immediate result; for Austria postponed her declaration of war against Russia for a week to suit her military convenience.

The fifth volume, covering the last three months of 1914, was published after the death of the author in 1925. Disdaining the attempts of his contemporaries to "veil their failures and focus the lime-light on their own successes," Conrad prefers to send his diary and portfolios to the printer, exhibiting the actors "without their masks," and enabling the reader to view the military situation as it developed day by day. But with the outbreak of war the book loses its political interest. The volume ends with a retrospect from which we learn that the author was not informed of the real character of the catastrophe on the Marne; that his advice to transfer the main struggle to the East was refused by Falkenhayn; that Berchtold secured the diversion of an unnecessary number of troops to Servia from the Galician front, where they were urgently needed. The mistake of the Central Powers was that they lived in a world of illusions. "A policy which aims only at peace is doomed, for it tries to evade the struggle for existence which holds us all in its grip. While the pacific ruler thinks to maintain peace by alliances, treaties and royal visits, the man of action makes straight for his goal, cuts the knots and attains his end. Contrast the negative policy of Francis Joseph and the no less pacific William II, aiming only at the preservation of their territory, with the energetic policy of a Poincaré, the aggressive policy of a Pasitch, the sly policy of a Bratiano, the deceitful policy of a Salandra, and the forward policy of the Russian Pan-Slavs, and one understands the isolation and defeat of Germany and Austria."

Conrad is vividly pictured by General Stürgkh, brother of the Premier, in his unadorned record, *Im deutschen grossen Hauptquartier*. Himself most anxious for cordial co-operation, the Austrian representative watched with anxiety the growth of sentiments in the bosom of the Austrian Chief of Staff which boded ill for victory. "Well, what are our secret foes, the Germans, doing?" asked Conrad bitterly at the opening of 1915, "and what of that comedian, the German Emperor?"

He went on to complain of the German officers who were "sniffing about like spies." So deeply did dependence on German arms rankle in the breast of his chief that Stürgkh resigned the task of *liaison* which such a mood rendered sterile. Nor did "the Prussian temperament" facilitate the discharge of his duties. Moltke, modest and mediocre, but a *persona grata* with Conrad, was quickly superseded by Falkenhayn, who cared nothing for the susceptibilities of his allies. The Kaiser, a bundle of emotions, deeply wounded in his pride by the invasion of East Prussia, impatiently demanded an Austrian offensive to relieve the strain. The initial Russian successes in Galicia, indeed, destroyed the romance of a brotherhood in arms, Conrad complaining that Germany had left him in the lurch, while the Germans openly blamed their allies for the loss of Lemberg. Even more wounding to Austria's pride were the reiterated counsels to part with portions of her territory. The Kaiser told Stürgkh that South Tirol must be sacrificed for Italian neutrality, and Bethmann urged the cession of part of the Bukovina as a *douceur* to Roumania.

The first Austrian commander to take the public into his confidence was General Auffenberg. *Aus Oesterreich-Ungarns Theilnahme am Weltkrieg* records his experiences of an intolerable situation as commander in Serajevo 1909-11, where frequent frontier conflicts arose, provoked by Serbs, Montenegrins and Turks. Serbia, he declared, should have been attacked directly after the murder of the Archduke, when instantaneous action might possibly have averted complications. *Aus Oesterreichs Höbe und Niedergang*, a longer and more important volume, describes his services during fifteen months as Minister of War in 1911-12. The Dual system, he admits, made Austria's neighbours her enemies, and it was vital to create a Yugoslav state within the Empire while there was still time. The chief obstacles were the Magyars, with their crass national egotism and provincialism. He agreed with Conrad that Italy would join their enemies in the event of a European war, and urged the Emperor to terminate an alliance which created a false sense of security. Aehrenthal's belief in Italy seemed to him insane, and his welcome of the Tripoli war as diverting attention from Trent and Trieste revealed his lack of foresight. At his first meeting with Tschirschky Auffenberg told him that the Dual Monarchy would have to fight the world, and the German Ambassador agreed. Franz Ferdinand is portrayed as by far the ablest of the Imperial family. Had he

come to the throne it would have been a great, if not a happy reign, for he was at all times more feared than loved.

Conrad was dismissed by the Emperor Karl in March 1917. His easy-going successor, General Arz, in his book *Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges*, tells us that he was glad to be under the supreme direction of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and indeed he has a good word for everybody. Karl, he assures us, was much abler than was generally believed. The young ruler is described not only as clever and humane, but as possessing military talent. His visits to the front, revealing his qualities of bravery and kindness, were of the utmost value in counter-working the poison of racial propaganda, and the last days at Schönbrunn revealed greatness of soul.

No Austrian soldier complains so bitterly of civilian errors as General Alfred Krauss. *Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage* is the Austrian equivalent of Ludendorff's *Politik und Kriegsführung*; for while Ludendorff sets Bethmann in the dock, Krauss denounces Czernin. The causes of defeat, he argues, were political, not military. Himself a successful commander, he pays high tribute to his troops; but their heroism was in vain, for one political error followed another. Bethmann's confession of wrong-doing in Belgium presented the Entente at the outset with a moral victory; Germany's cold-blooded neutrality when Italy stabbed Austria in the back lost the opportunity of a decisive campaign against the faithless ally in the autumn of 1915; Tisza, the only strong man in the Dual Monarchy, thought more of the interests of Hungary than of the Empire; the accession of Karl, with his almost morbid desire for peace, paralysed the will to victory, while his insane political amnesty restored traitors and defeatists like Kramarz and Rasin to the scene of their nefarious activities. The faults of the young Emperor were inexperience and a weak will, but Czernin was clever enough to forecast the result of his actions. His despairing Memorandum in 1917 was unjustified by the military situation, and its revelation by Erzberger destroyed the last chances of a negotiated peace. He was a brilliant talker, and nothing more. That his gloomy prophecies came true was largely due to his own mistakes. "This man was the misfortune of Austria, of the Emperor Karl, and of the German people."

Shortly before the disappearance of Austria in 1938 the story of her armies during the war was told in *Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg*, 1914-18, in seven large and sumptuous volumes,

each with a companion volume of maps and appendices. The ambitious project was launched by Vaugoin during his tenure of the War Office, and the general supervision was entrusted to Glaise-Horstenau, himself an officer, a historian and Director of the archives of the Ministry. The work takes high rank among military narratives, and its personal criticisms are commendably reserved. That Conrad's strategy had to be subordinated to German plans is deplored, for Austria never fully recovered from her losses in the early Galician campaigns; yet the references to the German High Command are tactful enough. Though politics are excluded, the mounting difficulties of a desperate struggle on several fronts supply the key to the war weariness expressed in Burian's peace initiative in 1916, the despairing Czernin Memorandum of 1917, and Karl's secret approaches to the Western Powers. An eighth volume, *Oesterreich-Ungarns Seekrieg, 1914-1918*, concludes the work.

## V

The Hungarian side of the story is less known, but some of the Magyar magnates have entered the witness-box. In his little book *Wer hat den Krieg Verbrochen?*, published in 1915, Count Julius Andrássy declared that the true cause of the conflict was the ambition of Russia, whose unchanging goal was hegemony over the whole of the Balkans. Russian patronage of Serbia—in other words interference in the Western Balkans—meant war. Austria, on the other hand, played the game fairly, for neither the elder Andrássy nor any of his successors ever dreamed of Salonika. He admits that her mistakes strengthened the emotional tie of Serbia and Russia and added to the tension; but the Bosnian crisis was much ado about nothing, since “the Russian Protector, to my knowledge, offered us these provinces unconditionally on seven occasions between 1876 and 1908.” He does not believe that Russia wanted war in 1914, but he argues that her policy made it inevitable sooner or later. On reaching the Serajevo murders he remarks that it was impossible to wait a moment longer. “The duty of self-preservation commanded us to act. I say this, not knowing whether we shall win.”

When the verdict was pronounced Andrássy wrote a larger and more important work, *Diplomacy and the War*, tracing the explosion to Russo-Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. On the other hand, he is an unsparing critic



of the policy of Germany, who, he maintains, ought to have chosen between the North Sea and Baghdad ; and he sharply condemns the attack on Belgium. In October 1918, when the German retreat and the surrender of Bulgaria announced the approaching doom of the Central Empires, he succeeded Burian at the Ballplatz. But the situation was past recall, and the harassed Minister held for a month the high office which his father had adorned for eight years. A later work, *Bismarck, Andrassy and their Successors*, traces the development of the European situation since 1871, enriched by personal memories of the Iron Chancellor and other actors in the drama. The volume extends to 1905. The sub-title in the German original is *Betrachtungen zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*, and the standpoint is sufficiently detached to give interest to his musings. He makes no attempt to divide the Powers into sheep and goats, merely remarking that the German Government took least trouble to veil the selfish aims and interests which guided all the nations alike.

Tisza's critical attitude in the first half of July, 1914, was unknown to his countrymen or to the world till after his death, when the story was outlined in documentary form by Bishop Fraknoi in his little book *Tisza und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges*. From this we learn that the Premier, on reaching Vienna on the day after the Serajevo murders, was horrified to find Berchtold resolved to provoke a war with Servia ; that Hoyos was despatched to Berlin without securing his assent ; and that he finally assented to the ultimatum, finding no support either with the Emperor or with the civil and military chiefs. If Tisza had been Foreign Minister, comments Fraknoi, there would have been no war. His great and indeed unpardonable error was that he did not resign on the failure of his policy of peace, for at the head of a powerful opposition he might possibly have prevented or shortened the strife. During the conflict he continued to oppose the annexation of Servia, not from any tenderness to the Serbs but because he had no wish for more Slavs in the Monarchy.

Additional information is supplied in Professor Marczali's article, "The Papers of Count Tisza", in the *American Historical Review*, January 1924. The distinguished historian relates a striking conversation with the fallen Minister. "What did you do after Serajevo?" asked the Professor. Tisza rose, and, with a voice full of emotion, said: "My whole being revolted against the horror of war. Religion and

patriotism alike commanded me to avert this infernal trial from humanity and our country. I was sure that, if the conflagration began here, it would spread all over the world, and I did everything I could to avert its outburst." When Marczali sent a record of this conversation to Tisza, the latter replied (January 25, 1918): "I never dreamed that the assassination would lead to war. To my infinite regret and grief I was obliged to conclude from the investigations which established the guilt of the Servian Government, and the statements of Pasitch and the Servian diplomatists as well as of the whole Serb press which ridiculed and belittled the Monarchy, that we should have to proceed against Servia. I urged that our first note should not be an ultimatum. I joined in the ultimatum, but modified the text, and at the Council on July 19, when it was decided to send it, I wished to substitute for the first condition that we would guarantee the integrity of Servia if the Entente did not intervene, and that, even in the event of general war, Austria would make no territorial conquests except isolated strategical rectifications of boundary."

The monument raised to the memory of Tisza by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences includes his more important speeches and writings, but the German version of the first volume of his letters omits many concerned with purely Hungarian affairs. The selection, we are told by the editor, Oskar von Wertheimer, was governed by their political importance and their value as illustrating the qualities of the man. An instructive biographical Introduction exhibits him not only as the greatest Hungarian since Andrassy, but as one of the supreme embodiments of the genius of his race. Though free from vanity and personal ambition he felt himself born to rule, hoping to restore the sentiments of duty, hard work and patriotism to their former high estate. He despised Austria's political incapacity, and hoped after a victorious war to see Hungary more than ever in command of the Dual Monarchy. The melancholy spectacle of an Austria torn by racial quarrels strengthened his resolve to maintain Magyar control at Budapest.

The volume opens with his Memorandum of July 1, protesting against Berchtold's intention to seize the opportunity for a reckoning with Servia. The few letters written before the outbreak of war throw no light on the cause of his rapid conversion, which the editor attributes to Berchtold's crafty exaggeration of Germany's promise of support. "It is bitter

for me to take part in the direction of such a great war," he wrote on August 26; "the noose was round our neck, with which, unless we sever it now, they would have strangled us at their own time. We could not act otherwise, but it is grievous that it had to be." He found comfort in the belief that, after terrible ordeals, a better future would dawn for Hungary. For twenty years he had been tormented by the thought that the Monarchy and the Hungarian nation were doomed; but the last year or two had brought a change, and the pious Calvinist felt assured that his beloved nation would not be condemned by Providence to death. Having burned his boats he never looked back.

Next to the pressing task of defeating the Russians and the Serbs, there was the problem of keeping Roumania and Italy, "the two friends", as he calls them in bitter irony, out of the fray. Cessions of territory were unthinkable, partly because there appeared to be no military need, partly because the mere suggestion would be taken as a revelation of weakness, not only by the enemy and the neutrals but by the German ally. Though a convinced believer in the Dual Alliance, Tisza was determined to resist German patronage and preponderance. He was certain of victory, and believed that a heavy defeat of Russia would bring Bulgaria into the field. So long as King Carol lived a treacherous attack seemed inconceivable, despite Czernin's reports from Bucharest that he might yield to Russian offers. On the other hand, it would be madness to allow Roumanian troops to occupy the coveted land of Transylvania under the pretext of keeping the Russians out. Italy, again, could be kept in order were she told from Berlin that if she sprang at her ally she would find Germany in her path. Suggestions in the German press of territorial concessions moved him to protest, and Bülow's mission filled him with angry alarm.

At the end of 1914, with a new monarch at Bucharest, the Austrians chased out of Servia, and the Russians streaming over the Carpathians, the letters grow less confident. Tisza was informed by Burian, the Hungarian representative in Vienna, that Italy would very likely attack at the beginning of March; but they both continued to oppose the offer of the Trentino, believing that its sole effect would be to encourage her to ask for more. The sky, however, looked so threatening that he advised the Emperor to entrust the Foreign Office to stronger hands. He explained his action to Berchtold,

who, far from taking offence, smilingly remarked that he would be most grateful if Tisza could make his master believe what he had constantly told him. Francis Joseph offered the post to Tisza, who declined it and recommended Burian. With a steadier hand at the helm his confidence revived. Italy, he wrote to Conrad on January 15, 1915, was out for a bargain and in her heart peacefully inclined, while an attack from Roumania seemed to him extremely improbable. A frontier rectification in Bukovina might be made the price of her active support. "After many sleepless nights," he wrote on January 24, "I feel at last that the worst is over."

At the opening of March, 1915, he woke up to the gravity of the situation. "I beg you in Heaven's name", he wrote to Burian, "see to it that the two robbers do not combine in a joint assault. If we must satisfy Italy with the Trentino it is a blow; if we must give more and even throw Roumania a bone, it is a catastrophe." On April 11 he wrote to Avarna, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, "as a friend of Italy to a friend of Austria-Hungary," pointing out that if Italy joined the Entente Russia might establish her hegemony beyond the Adriatic and France in the Mediterranean. Acceptance of Austria's offers, on the other hand, would secure real friendship and steady support in all the great issues essential to her future development. Such blandishments were useless, and on April 16 he wrote to Conrad a letter which sounds like a cry of despair. "If Italy declares war, Roumania will promptly follow suit, without our being able to count on Bulgaria. Then all the devils will be loose, and there will be nothing for Germany and us but to make peace as quick as we can." From this panic he recovered when the rupture of the Russian front at Gorlice removed the fear that Roumania would strike at the same moment as Italy. He now believed that if she remained neutral victory was assured; and when Czernin warned him that Bucharest might declare war at any moment, he expressed his readiness for concessions in Bukovina. The sacrifice of Transylvania, however, would destroy the position of the Monarchy in Eastern Europe as a Great Power, and nothing could justify it but total defeat. When Erzberger, fresh from his mission in Rome, begged Tisza to grant concessions to his Roumanian subjects, he was snubbed for his pains. The volume closes in the summer of 1915, when the Magyar statesman had regained his equipoise. His stormy career is admirably described in Gustav Erenyi's *Graf Stefan Tisza*,

which depicts a Calvinist of iron will and deep human feeling.

Most autobiographies produced by the war mix criticism of erring fellow-countrymen with attacks on enemy Powers, but Count Michael Karolyi's arrows are exclusively directed against the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy and their allies in Berlin. Written in exile his book is well named *Fighting the World*, for it is a story of unceasing conflict. No prominent actor in the great drama has been more bitterly attacked than "the Judas of Hungary", the Magyar magnate who broke away from the feudal traditions of his peers, who denounced the diplomacy of the Ballplatz, who ingeminated peace while his countrymen expected victory, who grasped the helm at Budapest when the Empire crumbled into dust, and whose brief rule smoothed the path for Bela Kun.

Proud of the rebel traditions of his family and glorying in the memories of 1848, Karolyi's earliest aim was the reform of the franchise; but he gradually learned that the problem was bound up with the grouping of the Powers, since the Dual Alliance of 1879, like the *Ausgleich* of 1867, perpetuated the suppression of the racial minorities. In 1913 he determined to "approach the nations with which the Prussian alliance must one day bring us into conflict." Desiring to reach Russia through her ally, he explained in Paris his policy of freeing Hungary from the German entanglement by the achievement of independence, and a rapprochement with the Slavonic races by the grant of universal suffrage. When war broke out he argued that the victory of the Central Powers would rivet the German yoke on both halves of the Hapsburg Empire, while defeat would spell dismemberment. To avert these horrifying alternatives he advocated a compromise peace while there was still time, if necessary at the cost of leaving Germany in the lurch. In the summer of 1918, when the sands were running out, he demanded a separate peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points; but Tisza, Andrassy and Wekerle rejected the notion of territorial sacrifices.

The closing chapters are intensely dramatic, and the picture of the Emperor Karl, worn out with fatigue and conflicting counsels, haunts the memory. After at last screwing up courage to appoint Karolyi Premier, he proceeded, without a word, to nominate somebody else, and the author finally received his investiture from the Archduke Joseph. The passing of the old regime at home and abroad was symbolized by the murder of Tisza—"the first bloodstain on our glorious revolution." No such brilliant picture of the Magyar trium-

virate—Tisza, Andrassy and Apponyi—in the last days of their power has ever been painted ; and though their policy is denounced, they remain impressive exponents of an outworn creed. For the inside history of the short-lived Karolyi regime *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*, by the distinguished scholar and publicist, Professor Oscar Jaszi, Minister of Nationalities, is of primary importance.

The *Memoirs* of Prince Ludwig Windischgraetz are no less controversial. Attacks on his public and private character induced him "to tell the story of my criminal career, how I tried to save Austria-Hungary, an Empire and its peoples, aye and its throne too, when it was far too late." Though the grandson of the soldier who suppressed the Revolution in 1848, and a hereditary member of the House of Magnates, he entered public life a few years before the war as a free lance, sharply attacking the Tisza dictatorship and the Slavophobe policy of the Ballplatz. Berchtold, he declares, should have made friends with Servia and accepted the offer of Pasitch to discuss a rapprochement. The most valuable part of the story is reached with the accession of the Emperor Karl, who appointed him Food Minister in the Wekerle Cabinet in January 1918, and with whom he was in close contact until the end. The young ruler cried aloud "We cannot go on, we cannot go on," but was unable to achieve the peace for which he longed. The author depicts the rivalries of the leading figures on the Hungarian stage, whose discordant appeals to their monarch rendered impossible any consistent policy at home or abroad. Andrassy, he declares, should have been taken as a pilot from the first. He has no love for Tisza ; but it is against Karolyi, once his friend, that his fiercest accusations of treachery and ambition are hurled.

The names of Windischgraetz and Karolyi frequently occur in Count Theodor Batthyany's *Für Ungarn gegen Hohenzollern*. A disciple of Kossuth and a member of the Independence Party, he disliked not only the Hapsburgs but the Germans to whom they were tied. While Francis Joseph ruled in Vienna and Tisza in Budapest such men had no chance, but when Karl came to the throne the outlook changed. In his first conversation with the young Emperor Batthyany implored him to end the conflict without delay, if necessary without the consent of Berlin. The war, he declared, was already lost, and only large territorial sacrifices could avert the dissolution of the Empire and the fall of the dynasty. Karl agreed, but what could he

do in face of the counsellors who urged him to fight to the end? The author held posts in the Esterhazy, Wekerle and Karolyi Ministries, but was never able to influence policy. The picture of the last of the Hapsburgs, well-meaning but impotent, buffeted like a cork in the raging waters, lingers in the memory.

*Die Memoiren des Grafen Tamas von Erdödy*, a Hungarian noble, utterly devoted to the person and cause of the Emperor Karl, throw fresh light on the Sixtus negotiations. After briefly describing the accession of the young ruler, his dislike of the new submarine policy, and the dismissal of Tisza, which is ascribed to the dislike of the Empress Zita, he begins a thrilling narrative with his affirmative answer to the Emperor's inquiry whether he was prepared to undertake a very difficult and dangerous task. To his surprise the Empress gave him a plan of Neuchâtel, with the route from the station to a certain street marked in ink, and the number of the house written above. He realized that he was not to ask his way, since Switzerland was full of spies. The owner, explained Zita, was M. Boys de la Tours, who would introduce him to her brothers Sixtus and Xavier. Two letters were entrusted to the envoy, who was solemnly commanded to answer no political questions. "Nobody except our three selves and Czernin knows of these letters", declared Karl. "This is a mission of peace. My only aim, as you know, is to end the frightful slaughter. I wish to force my allies to compromise though not to leave them in the lurch." All went well till Erdödy, having delivered his precious cargo to the Princes and received two letters in reply, left the house for the station. As the big white envelopes peeped out of his pockets a spy lurking in the shadow tried to grab them, but was beaten off with a vigorous box on the ear which sent him spinning down some cellar stairs. When he told Karl of his adventure, the kindly monarch, instead of saying "Thank God, the letters were not stolen", remarked, "Let us hope he did not break his neck."

A month later Erdödy was despatched to Geneva. "This time it will be a harder task", observed the Emperor. "You must bring my brothers-in-law to Vienna." When they arrived at the Castle of Laxenburg they found Czernin, who made an unfavourable impression on Sixtus. A month later Erdödy was despatched for a third time, delivering letters to the Princes, who were accompanied by Manteyer, a French officer. Karl's project was doomed from the outset, mainly

because the claims of Italy were ignored. A year later an incautious speech of Czernin provoked Clemenceau to publish the facsimile of Karl's letter about Alsace-Lorraine. The horrified Foreign Minister summoned Erdödy and declared that he must take the blame on himself and announce that Czernin knew nothing of the letters and interviews. The Emperor, he continued, had compromised himself, and must either deny or abdicate. Erdödy should use his influence to extract a denial of the whole story. When his visitor declined these propositions Czernin exclaimed: "If you decline I am a dead man. There is nothing left but the pistol." "There it is", cried Erdödy, contemptuously taking his pistol from his pocket, flinging it on the table, hurrying away and banging the door. Shortly after this exposure the author accompanied his master to Spa, where their reception was friendlier than they expected. Yet the end was near. "Does your Majesty know what the Viennese call you?" asked Erdödy. "Karl der letzte". The Emperor turned pale and remained silent.

The *Memoirs* of Count Albert Apponyi, the Grand Old Man of Hungary, are rather slight, but they contain one chapter of real importance. "How Peace was made after the Great War" describes the experiences of the delegation to Paris of which he was the head. "I could not refuse this saddest of duties, though I had no illusions as to there being any possibility of securing some mitigation of our lot." His request for oral negotiation was refused, but he was permitted to make a speech. Disdaining emotional lamentations, he argued that the principal demands of the draft treaty were unacceptable, and that some of the territorial clauses infringed the principle of nationality. As he proceeded he noticed that Clemenceau's face soon lost its expression of mockery and assumed an almost benevolent look. When he had finished speaking, first in French, then in English, Mr. Lloyd George asked for further details on the distribution of races in the territories which were to be detached from Hungary. He produced an ethnographical map, and was comforted to notice the effect of his explanations on the vivisection that was proposed. "You were very eloquent", whispered the British Premier. "If there was any eloquence", replied Apponyi, "it was not mine but the eloquence of facts." Clemenceau promised careful consideration and Nitti subsequently strove for some changes, but he was told that the whole new map would collapse if an alteration was allowed in any part. Apponyi's gallant efforts



were in vain, for the Treaty of Trianon confirmed the worst anticipations.

Field Marshal the Archduke Joseph, called Father Joseph by his soldiers, published five volumes on the world war based on his diary and official papers, which are only available in Hungarian. Admiral Horthy's activities during the war, and his leading part in the creation of the new Hungary, may be studied in Owen Rutter's *Regent of Hungary*, based on the authorized biography by Baroness Lily Doblhoff.

## VI

Though we are now aware that the most formidable foe of the Hapsburg Empire was Masaryk, it was the leader of the Young Czechs in the Reichsrat who appeared to Austrian patriots in the heat of the struggle to be the arch traitor within the gates. *Dr. Karl Kramarsch Der Anstifter des Weltkrieges*, by Friedrich Wichtl, conveys its message in its flamboyant title and in the frontispiece, which portrays him gazing prophetically at a map of Central Europe across which sprawls an elongated Czechoslovakia. The authors of the war of 1914, as of the Balkan wars, we are told, were the leaders of the new Pan-Slav movement, founded in 1907 by Kramarsch to liberate the "oppressed" Slav races of Turkey and Austria. Independent Czechoslovak and Yugoslav states were to be erected on their ruins with the aid of Russia, under whose aegis they would live. Kramarsch was an Austrian subject with a Russian wife and a Russian heart, who wrote for Russian Pan-Slav journals and was in touch not only with the Tsar and his Ministers, but with notorious Austrophobes in England and France. This angry volume is based on the evidence presented during the protracted trial of the Czech leader for treason in 1915-1916, when the documents seized in his house and the testimony of witnesses revealed his machinations in peace and war.

We are fortunate in possessing a narrative of the creation of Czechoslovakia by its principal founder. Among the numberless autobiographies produced by the war Masaryk's *Die Weltrevolution, Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen*, 1914-1918 (in English dress *The Making of a State*) occupies a place apart. "I never wished to be a Professor," he writes of his youth; "my plan was to be a diplomat and politician." His lectures at Prague made him the oracle of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav

youth ; his books carried his name all over Europe ; his years in the Landtag and the Reichsrat introduced him to the problems of domestic and foreign policy with which the Dual Monarchy was vainly endeavouring to cope. It is a truism that without a world war Bohemia would have remained an Austrian province ; but it is almost equally certain that without Masaryk—thinker, scholar and man of action—there would have been no Czechoslovakia.

The revelation of the forgeries in the Friedjung trial convinced him that the Monarchy was an unclean thing, and Berchtold's rejection of the advances of Pasitch at the end of 1912 proved that it was blind. While the majority of his fellow-countrymen would have been content with the coronation of Francis Joseph at Prague as King of Bohemia, Masaryk had come to believe that there was no future for them under the yoke of a dynasty "morally and physically degenerate," and that Austria must die in order that Czechoslovakia might live. The outbreak of war supplied the opportunity. Crossing the frontier in December 1914, he began his four years Odyssey through Italy, Switzerland, France, England, Russia, Siberia and America, which ended in his return to Prague as President of the Czechoslovak Republic. It is an astonishing story of mental effort, physical endurance, successful propaganda, organizing capacity, hairbreadth escapes. Unlike the Russophil Kramarsch and the majority of his countrymen, he knew that the Russian colossus had feet of clay, and he therefore sought salvation in the West instead of the East. The little Balkan peoples, he declares, were to Russia no less than to Austria a means to an end. He pays generous tributes to his two chief helpers, Dr. Benes and General Stefanik ; to the scholars and journalists in France and England who procured him a hearing ; to Briand, the first Prime Minister to sympathise and encourage. The partition of Austria, he argued, was the chief task of the war ; but the world was still Austrophil, the history of Bohemia was little known, and it needed three years to convert the Allies. He frankly confesses that with a rapid victory of the Entente the Czechs would not have won their independence. No part of his story is more romantic than the creation of a Czech army in Russia in 1917 and 1918, which convinced the world of the existence of a Czech nation. The volume closes with reflections on Democracy and Humanity, culminating in the declaration that the former is the political embodiment of the latter.

Readers of Masaryk will find much that is familiar in Dr. Benes' massive volume, *My War Memoirs*. The two men had believed in democratic institutions and national self-determination before the war, and they saw in the conflagration the opportunity of destroying an Empire whose existence had, in their opinion, become an anachronism. Whatever may be thought of their aim, no one can deny the sincerity and courage of these scholar-patriots who risked their lives as much as any soldier in the field. For them the goal of the war was the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire; for Frenchmen, Englishmen and Americans the supreme aim was the defeat of Germany. If it had been possible to ensure or accelerate the overthrow of Germany by detaching Austria, the Allies would have been glad to keep her alive. The "danger" was averted by the long duration of the struggle, the grip on Vienna by Berlin, the refusal of Austria to make the necessary sacrifices, and the unflagging efforts of Masaryk and Benes (and their friends in London and Paris) to convert the Allies to the gospel *Delenda est Austria*. The conversion was only effected in 1918 just in time for the claims and authorities of the new State to be recognized. How different would the result have been, muses the author, "if, the differences of interest and opinion among the Allies being what they were, and in view of the unfamiliarity with conditions in Central Europe, they had negotiated about us and not with us."

## VII

Valuable information can be gleaned from the writings of the Austrian historians and publicists in close touch with the makers of history. The portions of Friedjung's three volume work *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus* which deal with Austrian foreign policy while Aehrenthal was at the helm rank as a primary rather than a secondary authority. For some years he was on friendly terms with the Foreign Minister, and during the Bosnian crisis he vigorously championed the ideas of his patron in the *Neue Freie Presse*. Of scarcely less interest and authority is Molden's admiring tribute, *Graf Aehrenthal: Sechs Jahre Auswärtige Politik*.

The most authoritative survey of the functioning of the Government machinery during the war is in Josef Redlich's *Oesterreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkrieg*. Though the work forms part of the Carnegie Series on Economic and

Social History, its interest is mainly political. While the Generals complain of the anæmia of the Government, the Professor denounces the military dictatorship which lasted till the accession of the Emperor Karl—"the baneful political activity of the Supreme Command, which was more responsible than all other factors for the disintegration of the structure of the Monarchy and consequently for the inevitable collapse." In no other belligerent country, he declares, was the suppression of civilian and constitutional rule so complete. Francis Joseph was too old to grasp the reins, and the sole idea of the Premier, Count Stürgkh, "the classic embodiment of the Austrian system," was to prostrate himself at Conrad's feet. Since Parliament was never summoned contact with the racial minorities was lost, and the rulers in Vienna and Budapest seemed determined to show that the war was a struggle for preserving the hegemony of Germans and Magyars. Thus vanished the last hope of the minorities for a brighter future within the Monarchy, and the soil was prepared for the propaganda of the Entente. The murder of Stürgkh, the death of Francis Joseph, the dismissal of Conrad, the summoning of Parliament, and the amnesty of political offenders produced a welcome atmospheric change; but it was too late for the young ruler to repair the errors of the past, and his choice of advisers was ill-judged. As a member of the Reichsrat and later Minister of Finance in the short-lived Lammasch Cabinet, Redlich ranks as an eyewitness as well as a recorder of the decline and fall of the Empire.

Of no less value is *The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire* by Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, who was supplied by many of the actors with information. As an officer during the long struggle and subsequently Director of the War Archives, he speaks with special authority on military affairs. Vivid pages describe the misery of the army in 1918 and the battle of Vittorio Veneto, for which he drew up the Emperor Karl's Army Order—the last he ever issued. Next in importance is the account of the sentiments and activities of the nationalities at different periods of the conflict. As a loyal servant of the Empire he is deeply moved by the story of its decline and fall; but he speaks as a rule in quiet tones, though the mention of Michael Karolyi moves him to wrath. He quotes General Cramon's testimony to his fidelity to the German alliance; yet he is highly critical of Falkenhayn's strategy, and regrets that Conrad was not allowed a freer hand. It was the price of

German aid in an Austrian quarrel that Austrian interests should be sacrificed, yet he never spares criticism of his countrymen. Czernin's vacillations are deplored, and Tisza's policy was condemned by events. While admiring Karl's simplicity and good intentions, he regrets his combination of obstinacy with undue submission to personal influences such as that of the anti-German and anti-Magyar Polzer-Hoditz. He is deeply interested in the Smuts-Mensdorff conversations of December 1917, "the most important peace-move of the war," but he doubts whether the Hapsburg Empire could have saved itself by deserting its ally. Both countries, he believes, were the victims of a mistaken policy, which failed to measure what could or could not be realized.

No foreign critic of Austrian diplomacy is more bitter than Heinrich Kanner, whose *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik* records his efforts by tongue and pen to avert the coming storm. The editor of *Die Zeit* had the courage of his opinions, fearlessly denouncing the policy of the Ballplatz before and during the war till he was silenced in 1917. His acquaintance, however superficial, with the principal actors in the drama makes him a witness as well as a critic, and his acid pages help us to visualize Aehrenthal and his successors at the Ballplatz. His most finished portrait is that of Berchtold, the aristocratic *dilettante*, whose thoughts turned constantly to the race-course, and who took scarcely less interest in his clothes than a society beauty. The Minister's tragic incapacity was strikingly revealed when in December 1912, at the high-tide of Serbia's success against the Turks, Masaryk unofficially informed him that Pasitch was willing to come to Vienna to arrange a rapprochement between the two countries. Without taking a moment to reflect, Berchtold rejected the advance. When Kanner asked a mutual friend to discover the reason, the Minister explained that he had heard that Masaryk was a "poor devil", who was probably anxious to "earn something" by his errand. It is also interesting to learn that on July 21, 1914, Francis Joseph, when asked by Bilinski whether the ultimatum might not have far-reaching consequences, replied: "Russia cannot swallow it. There's no mistake about it, it will be a big war."

No Austrian publicist scored such resounding successes with his pen as Nowak, afterwards the historian of William II. How the struggle appeared to Conrad we learn from *Der Weg zu Katastrophe*, based on material supplied by the Chief of the Staff and certified by him as a correct account of events.

In a second volume, entitled *The Collapse of the Central Powers*, to the English version of which Lord Haldane wrote a Foreword, he continues his narrative from the dismissal of Conrad to the end of the war. Though few are likely to share his enthusiasm for the Field Marshal, no student can afford to neglect these volumes or their sequel *Chaos*, which describes the crash of the Teutonic Empires. A fourth work, entitled *Versailles*, is less successful, but the closing chapters provide a dramatic account of the humiliating experiences and bitter emotions of the German delegates.



R U S S I A





## CHAPTER III

### RUSSIA

#### I

NO sooner was Kerensky evicted by the Bolsheviks in November, 1917, than Trotsky began to publish tit-bits from the Russian archives with the object of compromising the Tsarist regime and other "capitalist" Governments. In his little book *The Secret Treaties and Understandings*, published in April 1918, Mr. Seymour Cocks introduced English readers to the treaty which brought Italy into the war, the agreements relating to Constantinople, Asiatic Turkey, and the left bank of the Rhine, and other unsuspected commitments. Over fifty documents, published in Russian between December 1917, and February 1918, appeared in an abridged translation in 1919 by Emile Laloy, under the title *Les Documents Secrets publiés par les Bolcheviks*. The practice of selective publication was continued in the *Krasny Archiv*, founded in 1922, to which we owe a mass of valuable information, most of which is still accessible only in Russian. The correspondence of Lamsdorff with the Russian Ambassadors in Paris and Berlin during the various stages of the Björkö negotiations is translated in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, November 1924, the material on the Algeciras Conference in *Berliner Monatshefte*, March, April, May, July 1931, and that on the making of the Serbo-Bulgar pact of 1912 in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December 1925. A volume entitled *The Red Archives*, edited by C. E. Vulliamy and furnished with an Introduction by Dr. Hagberg Wright, contains selections from the *Krasny Archiv* illustrating the years 1915-1918. The place of honour is given to police reports on the daily life of Rasputin, and the coming of the revolution is reflected in diaries and correspondence. Some letters of Mme. Rodzianko describe her husband's plain speaking at Tsarskoe Selo and its ungracious reception.

The first large-scale contribution to our knowledge of Russian diplomacy in the last years of peace was the massive volume published at Berlin in 1921 by Siebert, and translated with the title *Entente Diplomacy and the World, 1909-1914*.

The text was in German, but the editor declared that the originals could be produced if its accuracy were challenged. He did not explain how he procured the documents ; but he was for some years Secretary to the Russian Embassy in London, and copies of important despatches which passed between London and St. Petersburg between 1908 and 1914 were forwarded to Berlin, where they were translated by Professor Schiemann. The work opens with the Bosnian crisis, passes on to the creation of the Balkan alliance of 1912, deals at length with Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia, throws light on the prolonged negotiations relating to the Bagdad railway, reveals Russia's rapprochement with Italy at Racconigi, emphasizes the tension of the Balkan wars, records the excitement created by the mission of Liman von Sanders to Constantinople, and traces the discussions of 1914 in regard to a secret Anglo-Russian Naval Convention. A greatly enlarged edition in three volumes appeared in 1928 with the title *Graf Benckendorffs Diplomatischer Schriftwechsel*, the 1070 documents being printed in chronological order for the first time.

A valuable supplement to Siebert appeared under the ominous title *Un Livre Noir*, mainly composed of the telegrams and despatches of Iswolsky from Paris, whither he was sent at his own wish on ceasing to be Foreign Minister at the end of 1910. Here there is no mystery, for the Moscow Government published in 1922 (in Russian) *Materials for the History of Franco-Russian Relations, 1910-1914*, and placed the originals at the disposal of a French journalist, René Marchand, who received the assistance of Professor Pokrovsky, Director of the Archives. The first volume covers 1911 and 1912, the years of Agadir and the first Balkan war. As a professional diplomatist Iswolsky looks down on the ignorance and incompetence of the Foreign Ministers, Cruppi and de Selves, with whom he had to deal, and rejoices when the reins are grasped in the firm hands of Poincaré, who was "not afraid of responsibility". His opinion of the French press is indicated by his demands for a bribery fund, following, as he explains, the successful operations of Austria in the same field. The second volume contains the correspondence from the beginning of 1913 to the outbreak of war, and adds the elaborate reports of Sazonoff to the Tsar on the Potsdam meeting of November 1910, Poincaré's visit in August 1912, the Foreign Minister's conversations at Balmoral in September 1912, the visit to Roumania in June 1914, and similar notable occasions. Among

other treasures in this storehouse are memoranda on the Straits and foreign loans and the Protocols of the Franco-Russian Military Conferences in 1911, 1912, 1913.

A much more complete and satisfactory collection of the exchanges between Paris and St. Petersburg was published in a German translation by Friedrich Stieve, an official of the German Foreign Office. *Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis*, 1910-1914, fills four volumes, and over five hundred of the 1376 documents are new. A companion volume by the editor, entitled *Iswolski und der Weltkrieg*, weaves the correspondence into a narrative in which the Ambassador is represented as the guilty accomplice of Poincaré. "Iswolsky worked for the world war from 1911, Poincaré from the autumn of 1912, and from the end of 1913 Sazonoff saw in European complications the path which should lead Russia to the Straits." An Appendix contains the draft Russo-Bulgarian Conventions of 1902 and 1909, the Bulgar-Serb agreements of 1912, and the Ministerial Conferences of the winter of 1913-14 arising out of the Liman crisis. A supplementary volume by the same editor, entitled *Iswolski im Weltkriege* 1914-1917, provides over three hundred documents, mostly new, dealing with the attempts of the Entente to procure allies in the desperate struggle and with the problem of war aims. Five-sixths illustrate the war months of 1914, and after May 1915 the stream shrinks to a trickle. "The so-called defensive war against the German aggressor," writes Stieve in a closing chapter summarizing his argument, "was in reality a war of conquest in the grand style, a strong concentric onslaught on the political equilibrium of Europe, the status quo, the maintenance of which was in the interests of the Central Powers alone."

*The Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*, edited by Baron Romberg, established the fact that the official publication was disfigured by numerous alterations, and printed the original and the published version of the despatches between Paris and St. Petersburg in red and black type. The object of the changes was to remove passages suggesting a pacific tendency on the part of the Central Powers or an absence of such tendency on the part of Russia. The volume issued by the Russian Government at the outbreak of war contained seventy-nine documents. A fuller edition with a Preface by Alfred von Wegerer in 1925 contained 208. All the documents known to the *Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen* were given, and a few of

them, though none of great importance, appeared for the first time. An enlarged edition of the Second Russian Orange-Book (an English version of the original was included in the *Diplomatic Documents* published by the Carnegie Endowment) was issued in 1926 by Stieve with the title *Das Russische Orangebuch über den Kriegeausbruch mit der Türkei*.

A welcome edition to our knowledge of Russian policy on the eve of war was made by the publication in 1923 of the Foreign Office Diary from July 16 to August 2. A German version, with a preface by Wegerer, comments by Pourtalès, and a brief reply by Baron Schilling, appeared in 1924; an English translation, with the title *How the War began*, was published in 1925. In a brief Foreword Sazonoff emphasizes the value of the diary as a contemporary record compiled without thought of publication, and rebuts Jagow's conjecture that it was put together at a subsequent date. Russia, he adds, was pitifully backward in strategic railways, and her belated attempts to improve them were no menace to Germany, who was thoroughly prepared. He disclaims all desire for war on the part of his country, whose offer to guarantee the integrity of Turkey in return for neutrality rebuts the charge that she desired a conflict in order to secure control of the Straits. "I made notes", writes Baron Schilling, "while Director of the Chancellery of the Foreign Office and Chef de Cabinet to the Minister. After seeing the Tsar, the Ambassadors or his colleagues, he told me all that he had said or done. These separate sheets, written or dictated day by day, were probably disturbed during the period of confusion, for some which I remember are not here." Perhaps the most interesting item is the long undated report of Sverbeiev, Russian Ambassador in Berlin, probably written during his journey home, describing events from his return to Berlin on July 29 till his departure on August 2, and summarizing his conversations with Jagow, whom he paints in unyielding mood. On July 18 the Austrian Ambassador, "gentle as a lamb," told Sazonoff that there was no intention whatever of rendering relations with Servia more acute. "His assertions," commented Schilling, "were so positive that they entirely removed the Minister's apprehensions. When, however, Sazonoff heard of the ultimatum a few days later, he cried *C'est la guerre européenne*." The exact chronology of the telegrams exchanged between the Kaiser and the Tsar is established, and we discover that on July 30 a telegram to London urged the detention of the two Turkish

warships as a matter of immense importance to Russia. The diary exhibits Sazonoff as anxious for peace, though quite prepared to fight for Servian integrity and independence.

*Das Zaristische Russland im Weltkriege*, a collection of documents from the Russian archives on the entry of Turkey, Bulgaria, Roumania and Italy into the war, published in 1927, contains a useful introduction by Professor Pokrowski. This volume, the German edition of which we owe to the *Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen*, reveals Russia's diplomatic attempts to secure the glittering prize of Constantinople. On August 9, 1914, Enver informed Giers, the Russian Ambassador, that Turkey was not yet tied to the Central Powers; that he desired an alliance with Russia; that he was prepared to move Turkish troops from the Caucasus to Thrace and to fight one of the Balkan states, or, in union with Bulgaria, to wage war against Austria; and that, if an agreement were signed, he would on the same day expel all German officers in the Turkish service. His terms were the restoration of Western Thrace and the Aegean Islands, and a treaty of defensive alliance for five or ten years. Giers urged instant acceptance of the offer—"any day may be too late". Sazonoff declined, hoping to win Bulgaria for the approaching struggle with Turkey, and not seriously fearing a Turkish attack.

The documents on Bulgaria reveal Ferdinand and Radoslavoff playing a waiting game, well aware that Macedonia could only be won by war. Servia was not easy to squeeze, and Spalaikovich, the Servian Minister in France, sulkily declared that he would rather surrender the whole country to Austria than a fragment of Macedonia to Bulgaria. At the end of August, 1915, Pasitch was alarmed, and negotiated with Sofia on his own account; but he offered too little to avert hostilities. This edition is enriched by some stolen despatches from the Austrian Minister at Sofia and some surreptitiously deciphered telegrams from Madjaroff, the Bulgarian Minister at St. Petersburg. The Roumanian section exhibits Bucharest in the same attitude of greedy expectancy as Sofia; Russia indignant at Bratiano's demands; France, impatient with the obstinacy of Sazonoff, hinting that she cannot support Russian claims on Constantinople and the Straits unless her ally plays her cards more skilfully in the Balkans. In the Italian section Russia envisages Italy as the rival of Servia, disapproves

British suggestions of a high price for her assistance, and speaks of "admitting" her to the war. Throughout the volume Sazonoff appears stubbornly indisposed to any sacrifice of the aims of Russia or his Servian *protégé*.

*Les Alliés contre la Russie, avant, pendant et après la guerre mondiale*, by a number of officers and officials who rallied to the Bolsheviks, is propagandist as the title suggests. Its purpose is explained in the preface to the French translation by Victor Margueritte. "The book attempts to show that, since 1892, the Franco-Russian alliance on the part of our successive Governments, from Ribot and Freycinet down to Poincaré and Viviani, was nothing but an instrument of war, forged and reforged in view of the *Revanche*. It also tries to show that Russia, throughout the massacre, was bled and ruined by and for the exigencies of the military policy of Paris and London, and that neither Paris nor London supplied all the munitions needed for victory. The conclusion is that the Russian Government need not thank us nor repay us the milliards lent to the Tsarist regime for our bellicose purposes. Remember the warnings of Jaurès as to the risk, no less than the scandal, of the loans to the most barbarous of tyrannies."

The first and most important contribution is a study of Franco-Russian relations before 1914 by Zaiontchkovsky, an army commander in the war and subsequently Professor at the Military Academy. He depicts Russia as a loyal ally and France as disloyal, since she interpreted and transformed the alliance through the Staff agreements purely in her own interests. Russia is exhibited, after the first few years, as playing second fiddle. The original military agreements were modified and completed by conferences of the Chiefs of the General Staffs. Those of 1911, 1912 and 1913 were published in the *Livre Noir*, and Zaiontchkovsky fills in the gaps, dividing them into two periods, 1892-1901, and 1906-1914. The first shows French initiative and Russian reserve, Obrutcheff resisting the efforts to serve exclusive French interests. In the second period these efforts succeed, Obrutcheff's modifications of the original French project being swept away as the price of new French loans for strategic lines.

The important conference at Paris in April 1906 revealed not only the weakness of Russia and the bargaining power of the big loan but the new factor of the *Entente Cordiale*. France was now in control and the plans were modified in her favour. Henceforth German mobilization automatically involved

French and Russian mobilization, Austria and Italy being regarded as mere satellites of their ally. In agreeing to concentrate their attack on Germany, complains Zaiontkovsky, Russia lost her freedom of movement, for Austria was her chief enemy. Thus all France's wishes of 1890 were realized. General Palitzin formed the impression that she lacked sincerity, and attributed little importance to the alliance, placing all her hopes in England, with whom she wished to link up her ally. She was lukewarm throughout the Bosnian crisis, and in 1910 Nelidoff, the Ambassador at Paris, wrote that the Franco-Russian friendship no longer existed. In 1911 France actually lent Turkey money for railways in Asia Minor, and in 1912 her support in the Liman crisis was very slack. The Appendix contains a conversation of Millerand, Minister of War in Poincaré's Cabinet, with Ignatieff, the Russian Military Attaché, in December 1912, in which the former expressed surprise at Russia's apparent willingness to leave Serbia to her fate. It was not France's fault, he remarked. "We are ready and you should note it."

A mass of valuable information is contained in *La Chute du Régime Tsariste: Interrogatoires des Ministres, Conseillers, Généraux, Haut Fonctionnaires de la Cour Impériale Russe par la Commission Extraordinaire du Gouvernement Provisoire de 1917*, translated by J. and L. Polonsky in 1927. The French version contains only the most important parts of the Russian original in seven large volumes. Two days after the abdication of the Tsar, we are informed in the Preface by B. Maklakoff who describes himself as a Cadet of the Extreme Right, a Commission was appointed to examine the illegal acts of the old regime. It worked till the following October, when the Provisional Government was overthrown, but the reports were published by the Bolsheviks. Its members were jurists of high standing. Everything, he declares, was ruined by the abdication of the Tsar's brother Michael, which was advised by the representatives of the Duma whom he consulted. Miliukoff and Guchkoff opposed the step but submitted. At the wish of the Duma representatives he also signed a Manifesto declaring the throne vacant till the meeting of the Constitutional Assembly. With the Monarchy went the Constitution and the Duma. The Declaration by the Lvoff Ministry made the great mistake of not urging calm and obedience to the existing authorities. Thus the Provisional Government ruined itself and Russia. Kerensky, the Minister



of Justice and the chief author of the Constitution, had urged Michael to abdicate, but he worked for co-operation and reconciliation.

Let us glance at a few of the witnesses as they file past, beginning with old Count Fredericks, the respected Minister of the Court from 1897 to the end. "I did not meddle in affairs of state. . . . I often begged the Tsar, for the love of God, to dismiss Rasputin." He replied: "You have told me more than once you had enough to do without meddling in politics, so do not raise that question. It is my affair." He never gave advice on political questions. Indeed he could not form opinions, as he was not informed. "You know you were considered a partisan of the German party?" "I have heard so, but I always said it was the most colossal lie. Far from it. I always said the Tsar should not have so many Germans at Court. I am not a German. Our family is Swedish. We came to Russia in the time of Peter the Great. I was polite with the Germans who surrounded the Tsar, but was never intimate." The Tsar said: "I love you as my second father, and I know I can count on you."

The testimony of Guchkoff, leader of the Octobrist party in the Duma, suggests an able, energetic and patriotic man. He soon discovered that Russia was governed by irresponsible and secret influences. "I tried to get rid of them in connection with my work for national defence, but the only result was a breach with the Tsar. Even in the time of Stolypin I had lost all faith in the peaceful evolution of Russia. After my attack on Rasputin and the dark forces in the Duma, the Tsar said to a Minister, who told me: 'Guchkoff deserves the gallows or worse.'" At an early period of the war he realized that Russia would be beaten unless there was a change. "But I was up against a wall." Long before the revolution he was convinced that the Tsar would have to abdicate. When the time arrived he volunteered to the Duma to secure his abdication, and he describes the interview in the royal train. A Committee of the Duma, he explained, wished Prince Lvoff to be President of the Council of Ministers. The Tsar consented and wrote an order to that effect. "No pressure was put on him, though I said it would be madness to resist by force. He was so calm that I wonder if he was normal." Guchkoff confesses that he and others had thought of a *coup*, stopping the Tsar's train, forcing him to abdicate and arresting his Ministers, certain that the army would have supported

their action. Such drastic measures proved unnecessary, for the ruler was resigned to his fate.

The performance of Goremykin, President of the Council of Ministers at the outbreak of war, was pitiable. Cross-examined as to governing without the Duma and committing illegalities, the old reactionary could only reply that his memory was bad, that it was a time of war, and that it was the Tsar's will. Stürmer was asked to explain why the German press was delighted at his appointment to the Foreign Office: "Because I was unknown and had a German name. I held my head high and did nothing contrary to the laws." Asked about his many talks with the Empress and her views on foreign policy he replied: "The most solid friendship with England. Everything she said and did pointed to complete accord with the Allies." "Did she think it necessary to make peace with Germany as soon as possible?" "Nothing of the sort. I never saw such contempt for William II." "And France?" "All possible sympathy." One of Stürmer's shady intimates, Manassevich-Manouilov, a journalist, knew Rasputin and described his position at Court. The Tsarina, he testified, was not pro-German, nor was Rasputin. He would not have gone to war, but he wished to keep on to victory. Anna Vyrubova, the confidante of the Empress, declared that she was interested in Rasputin but not his adorer. She never saw or heard him do or say evil. She herself took no share in politics. Prince Galitzin, the last President of the Council before the revolution, describes how the Tsar forced him to take office, despite his complete lack of experience. "I had never concerned myself with politics, only with the Red Cross." Khvostoff, Minister of the Interior during the war, Protopopoff, who was in power when the revolution exploded, and Bieletski, head of the police, add their testimony about Rasputin. Chteglovitov, Minister of Justice and later President of the Council of Empire, defended his support of illegal measures on the ground that anarchy and murder were rampant. Not a single witness defended the old regime.

An immense mass of material illustrating Russian diplomacy in regard to Turkey and Greece during the war was published by Professor Adamoff in the 'twenties. A German translation, enriched by additional documents, appeared between 1930 and 1932 in six volumes, the first five of which are entitled *Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei während des Weltkrieges*. The Editor's valuable introduction, surveying the question of

Constantinople and the Straits as a problem of European diplomacy from the Bosnian crisis to the victory of Lenin, fills the first volume. He writes with contempt of the growth of Russia's appetite when Turkey's declaration of war presented a possibility of realizing her historic ambitions. The second volume opens with a series of elaborate memoranda on Russian aims in the Straits. The longest is by Basili, interim Director of the Chancery of the Foreign Office; the second by the head of the Black Sea section of the Admiralty; the third by Neratoff, the assistant Foreign Minister. All three, while naturally desiring the control of the Straits, recognize the difficulties and disadvantages that the possession of Constantinople would involve.

How eagerly all Russian eyes turned towards the glittering prize is suggested by a telegram of February 26, 1915, from the Russian Minister in Servia. "For our allies the occupation of Constantinople and the Straits is an instrument in the general scheme of the war. . . . For us the Straits are not a means but the end which gives meaning to the whole war and its sacrifices. For me the conflict with Germany and Austria, like the alliance with France and England, is only a means to this end. From this standpoint it cannot be a matter of indifference to us who possesses the Straits—we or our allies. Even the fact that they are partners in this enterprise is regrettable, since they thus obtain rights to a share in the final settlement which may be dangerous for us. The occupation of the Straits without us would be fatal, and in that case Constantinople would be the grave of our present alliance." A fortnight later the same Minister wrote to Sazonoff that he was thinking of the Straits night and day, and praying that his chief might accomplish the task in the way all Russians expected of him. "For we must not indulge in illusions. An unfavourable solution of this question would produce results quite different from a mere ministerial crisis. The whole of Russia would demand an explanation why the blood of our nearest is being shed. . . . If we can reach our goal in agreement with France and England against Germany, so much the better. If not, let us reach it in agreement with Germany against them." These views were not shared by the military chiefs, and we find Alexeieff arguing that the chief task was to defeat Germany. If peace with Turkey were necessary for this purpose, the control of the Straits would have to be postponed. The story ends with the Provisional Government, which inherited the Imperialism of the

Tsars, and the victory of Lenin, who broke with the foreign as well as the domestic system of the past.

The third volume is filled by Professor E. D. Grimm's detailed survey of the political, military and naval difficulties involved in the conquest of Constantinople and the Straits, based on the documents contained in the fourth. A fifth volume, entitled *Die Europäischen Mächte und Griechenland während des Weltkrieges*, is devoted to the relations of the allies to the Greece of Constantine and Venizelos from the beginning of the Gallipoli adventure in the spring of 1915 to the fall of the Kerensky Government. The reports of the Russian Minister in Athens during these troubled years are indispensable to the study of the domestic as well as the external affairs of Greece. The sixth volume, entitled *Die Aufteilung der Asiatischen Türkei*, completes the story of the dealings of the Allies with Turkey, enriched by documents from the French Embassy in St. Petersburg. For English readers no items are more interesting than the reports of Benckendorff and Nabokoff from London. Italian ambitions emerge, by no means to the satisfaction of St. Petersburg. "Our demands regarding Constantinople, its environs and the Straits were clear," minuted the Tsar on a despatch from Rome at the opening of 1917, "whereas Italy's aspirations in Asia Minor are comprehensive and vague." He rarely commented in writing on the papers laid before him, and a month later his opinion ceased to count.

In 1928 Pokrovsky, Director of the State archives, announced a Commission for the publication of the most important documents not only, as in other countries, on the origins of the war but on the war itself. The plan embraces the four decades from the Congress of Berlin to the fall of the Provisional Government. The first series is to extend from 1878 to 1903, the second to the end of 1913, the third to 1917. A beginning was made with the last as possessing the most immediate interest. We are indebted to Professor Hoetzsch and his colleagues of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Studium Osteuropas* for a German translation and a mass of useful notes.

A contentious Introduction by Pokrovsky explains the spirit in which he approached his task. The Soviet Government, he reminds us, had promised from the outset "to unveil the work of secret diplomacy which led to the frightful catastrophe of 1914." The whole drama appears to him like the explosion of a mine that had long been laid; but

the situation from which a European war was the only escape developed in the winter of 1913-1914. "Anybody who at that time had possessed all the political and military information at the disposal of both sides could have anticipated the war with their watch in their hand." The murder of the Archduke, he argued, merely gave the signal. "All these days and weeks, to which bourgeois historians and editors attach so much importance, are for us of third-rate importance, since we know that the war was not the work of evil-intentioned individuals or groups, but that it arose with iron necessity from the system of monopolist capitalism." Despite this polemical purpose there is no reason to suspect the authenticity of the material.

The first volume of *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus* reveals the wide sweep of Russian diplomacy in the opening weeks of 1914. In the Far East it played a waiting game in the hope of better times. In Persia, on the other hand, the watchword was : Full steam ahead ! We find Sazonoff approving the extension of Russian settlements in the north, both for economic and political reasons. He felt himself cramped by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which recognized the integrity and independence of the country; and new light is thrown on the Anglo-Russian friction which caused so much anxiety during the closing months of peace. The Russians had set their heart on a trans-Persian railway, which, like the Bagdad enterprise, was to carry with it valuable economic concessions on both sides of the line. The project was distasteful to the British Government, for Anglo-Indian opinion remained suspicious of Russian designs ; and our chilly attitude aroused the annoyance of Sazonoff. Still worse were Russian ambitions in Azerbaijan, where the separatist activities of the Governor were fostered and autonomy, it was hoped, might open the way to a Russian Protectorate. In regard to the trans-Persian scheme the British Government, unable to veto it, played for time ; but in the case of Azerbaijan Grey put his foot down, and Benckendorff advised his chief to draw back. Another source of friction was the disposal of the Aegean islands, particularly of Lemnos, which England desired for Greece and which Russia wished the Turks to retain.

The catastrophe lay six months ahead, but we seem to hear the roar of the avalanche in an appeal of Pasitch during his visit to St. Petersburg for Russian aid in equipping the Serbian

army. "Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria-Hungary are dissatisfied with the status quo", he wrote to Sazonoff on February 2, "and await an opportunity for its overthrow." Serbia, he added, would do her best to preserve peace, but her efforts might fail. Since the Treaty of Bucharest she had therefore resolved, mainly in order to discourage the ardour of the dissatisfied states, to perfect her armaments as quickly as possible. Since her need of guns and rifles could only be supplied in four or five years, and since she must secure the needed weapons "before next spring", he entreated Russia to furnish weapons and munitions, clothing for 250,000 soldiers, and materials for telegraphs, telephones and four wireless stations. The request was urgent since Bulgaria was busy with her armaments and was receiving war material from Austria. The letter was forwarded by Sazonoff to the Minister of War with the request that Serbia's needs should if possible be supplied. Despite the urgency of the appeal the answer was postponed till after the murder of the Archduke, the delay being due, in the opinion of Pokrovsky, to the fact that Russia did not desire her to fight till British support was assured.

The second volume, extending from the middle of March to the middle of May, covers the visit of King George to Paris, the initiation of the Anglo-Russian naval discussions, and the tightening of the Triple Entente. In reporting the immense efforts to improve her army the Russian Military Attaché declared that France was now at the height of her military strength. "A diminution of her importance as a Great Power must be expected", he added in a curious passage, "if only as the result of the degeneration of the nation." An even more interesting document is the report of the Military Attaché in Brussels and the Hague, dated May 6, in which, alarmed by the political tension in Western Europe, he discussed the possible violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg by German troops. In case of war, he concluded, a march through Liège, Namur and Luxemburg was very probable. To such a sudden advance the Belgian army would be unable to offer any serious resistance, even if it desired. The Russian Ambassador in Berlin reported that the German Government was already worrying about the renewal of the Commercial Treaty in 1917 on more favourable terms, but added that in his opinion it did not share the views of bellicose circles.

The main interest is in Eastern Europe, where the relations

of Russia with Servia and Montenegro were almost those of allies. On March 30 Suchomlinoff, the Minister of War, wrote to Sazonoff that he regretted to be unable to supply the Serbs with what they required, since the political situation made it necessary to think first of the Russian army. Sazonoff forwarded the disagreeable decision to Belgrad, but shortly afterwards announced that, if it endangered the Servian Government, something like half the need could perhaps be supplied. Among Hartwig's despatches from Belgrad the most striking is that of April 25, describing the almost despairing attitude of the Montenegrin Minister in view of the discontent and poverty of his country and the consequential desire for an alliance with Servia. Pasitch, though not unsympathetic, was cautious, and insisted that no step should be taken without the approval of Russia, which, needless to say, was forthcoming. The volume ends with a report by Sazonoff on the visit of Talaat to Yalta at the beginning of May. When the Turkish statesman proposed an alliance, he was told that such a matter required consideration, but that Russia was always ready for a rapprochement.

The third volume carries the story to the eve of the Serajevo murders. Since the most important documents from the Russian side relating to the naval discussions had already been published in whole or in part, we were aware that the pressure came from Russia and France; that the British Government, after a prompt acceptance of the principle, shewed no disposition to be rushed; that the final stages of the negotiation were postponed till Prince Louis of Battenberg should visit St. Petersburg in August; and that the war broke out before a detailed agreement was reached. The possibilities of co-operation were discussed in a conference of Russian naval experts on May 26. If England could hold the larger part of the German fleet in the North Sea, a Russian landing in Pomerania might be attempted, though British transports, despatched before the opening of hostilities, would be almost essential.

The German Government's suspicion of what it knew to be going on was equalled by the apprehensions of the Entente Powers aroused by the visit of Tirpitz and the Kaiser to Konopischt. The significance of the Admiral's presence, wired the Russian Ambassador from Berlin, was denied by nobody except the semi-official press, suggesting as it did a new pact for co-operation at sea and an increase of Austria's naval

power. The importance of the incident was stressed in a despatch from the Russian Naval Attaché in Berlin, who explained the desire of Germany to occupy a portion of the British fleet in the Mediterranean and thereby to reduce her inferiority in the North Sea. "One must remember", he concluded, "that the Germans had long been dissatisfied with the slow and insufficient increase of Austrian armaments on land and water. Austria is constantly reproached with attempting to reach her political aims almost entirely by resting on the German army, for which the German people has to pay."

The Balkans as usual were full of competing ambitions and alarms. At the opening of June the impatience of Pasitch for Russian munitions became almost feverish, both Hartwig and Sazonoff supporting his request. The most dramatic event in the Near East, however, was the visit of the Tsar to Constanza, which inevitably aroused the apprehensions of Vienna. Franz Ferdinand was particularly incensed, and he denounced the "treason" of Roumania, though recognizing that it was largely due to Hungarian policy. In another despatch the Ambassador in Vienna reported that the sharpest attacks on Russia emanated from the entourage of the Archduke, though they might be explained as an attempt to clear the air by inducing her to make reassuring declarations.

The fourth volume describes the first reactions of the Serajevo murders. We had always aspired to read the reports of Hartwig, whose influence in Servia was supreme and who had never been content merely to carry out the instructions of his chief. Since it had been stated that most of the Hartwig material had been removed in the first days of the Bolshevik revolution, it is satisfactory to learn that there is no gap in the numbered official communications. His personal letters, on the other hand, were neither numbered nor registered, and it is impossible to be sure whether they are complete. In this volume there are only a few documents in his hand, for he died on July 10. The most interesting item describes the reception in Belgrad of the news of the murders. All Servia, he reported, expressed sympathy and strongly condemned the crime of two madmen. But, as was to be expected, certain circles in Vienna and Budapest were already using the tragedy for an attack on Serb political associations, which in turn would doubtless provoke reprisals. Thus Austro-Serb relations, which had recently assumed a peaceful and normal character, would again become strained. More important is a



letter of the acting Chief of the Russian Staff informing Sazonoff that on June 30, two days after the murder of the Archduke, the Tsar had approved the request for munitions for the Servian army which Pasitch had made earlier in the year. A second sign of the coming storm is found in a letter from Sazonoff, marked "very secret and urgent", to the Minister of Marine, inquiring how the decisions of the Conference of February 21 for the strengthening of Russia's naval forces in the Black Sea had been carried out.

The despatches from Germany suggest that so far as public opinion was concerned, Austria could look for no encouragement to violent courses. Berlin, wired the Chargé on July 17, was relieved that Vienna had made no demands in Belgrad, and the business world had no wish to lose the profitable Servian market. Six days later the Foreign Minister assured the Chargé that he was unaware of the Austrian demands, though he had no reason to expect that they would be extreme. "On my remarking that he had signed a blank cheque which he left Vienna to fill up, Herr von Jagow said that he had not desired, by a preliminary examination of the Austrian demands, to expose himself to subsequent reproaches on the ground either that they went too far or not far enough. He believed himself to have chosen the right course in leaving the allied Power to shape its own policy in a question of vital interest." Neither the Russian Chargé nor the French Ambassador, to whom a similar statement was made, believed that Jagow was quite as ignorant as he pretended. Meanwhile the Ballplatz was forging its thunderbolt. "The Government keeps silence as usual", reported the Ambassador in Vienna on July 8. "The investigation into the murder is nearly concluded, and the next few days will show who has the upper hand—the sensible element which works for a restrained attitude to the sad event, or the bellicose people who are not clear what they want. The Emperor will decide, and one assumes that he will be on the side of reason."

The fifth volume carries us from July 25 to August 4. The proportion of new material for these critical days falls from about nine-tenths to one-third, for we enter the zone of the Orange Books. But no excuse is needed for reproducing the published documents, several of which had been given to the world in an incomplete or misleading form. It is of particular interest for English readers to have the whole series of Benckendorff's telegrams and despatches precisely

as they were received. England, he reported on July 25, would not declare herself before the outbreak of a general war, which would raise the issue of the Balance of Power. "I can give you no formal assurance of her military co-operation; but I have found no single sign—either in Grey, the King, or any one of importance—that she seriously intends to remain neutral. I cannot conscientiously say more." Though the forecast came true, he had his moments of anxiety. As late as August 1 Grey remarked that there was no movement of public opinion for military intervention. "I replied that, if the war ended without England drawing the sword, it would be one of the greatest historical revolutions in the relations of peoples. He rejoined that the Government could promise nothing which it was not sure of being able to perform." The confidence of the Ambassador returned when Grey added that the fleet was virtually mobilized, and that German efforts to purchase our neutrality had been categorically declined.

What light do the new documents throw on the relations between Russia and her *protégé* at the time of the Austrian ultimatum? Professor Hoetzsch sets forth precisely what the archives contain, but the harvest is disappointing. Dr. von Wegerer has argued that Serbia's refusal of part of the Austrian demands was due to the arrival of two telegrams from St. Petersburg on July 25. But did they come from the Russian side or from the Servian Minister Spalaikovich? We cannot answer, for they are not here. Our nearest approach to a clue is a wire from the Russian Chargé in Belgrad on July 27, stating that Serbia was disinclined to accept Sazonoff's suggestion on July 25 that she should seek England's mediation. "I have the impression that the Servian Government, after a reply to Austria containing the maximum concessions, fears that a request for mediation might suggest that she could make a further advance. Moreover I believe that the Ministers, influenced by the telegrams of Spalaikovich describing the enthusiasm which has seized Russia, consider it undesirable in Serbia's interest to transfer the issue from St. Petersburg to another European capital." No trace is to be found at Moscow of telegrams from Sazonoff to the King, the Servian Government or the Russian Chargé at Belgrad concerning advice on the answering of the ultimatum. Nor is there any reference to such a communication in Strandtmann's detailed survey of the whole crisis dated August 6 from Nish. The key must be sought in the archives at Belgrad, the opening of which was

promised years ago but of which we have heard no more. That the Servian Government desired a conflict with Austria at this moment there is no sign in these documents. The Russian Chargé describes the consternation of the Prime Minister on receiving Giesl's rejection of a reply which he hoped might avert war.

With the sixth volume we enter on a period in which new material is particularly welcome, since the British, French, German and Austrian collections stop at the outbreak of hostilities. Here we have an almost day to day survey of Russia's relations with her partners, including Japan, during the first five months of the conflict. The first task was to ensure that the members of the Triple Entente should stand by each other to the end, for England was bound by no treaty either with Russia or France and was unaware of the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance. Sazonoff begged Delcassé, who had returned to the Quai d'Orsay, to persuade Grey to fall into line. Grey accordingly worked out a formula, signed by the three Powers on September 5, binding them not merely not to make peace independently but also to abstain from putting forward peace terms without consultation and agreement. The new treaty, he explained, must not modify the obligations of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Though over four years of desperate struggle lay ahead, the Allies at once began to discuss the division of the spoils. Turkey's entrance into the war enlarged Russia's demands, and henceforward the control of the Straits was the first item in her programme, though opinions differed as to whether Constantinople should be left to the Turks, annexed, or, like Tangier, placed under international control. British war aims, reported Benckendorff, would probably include the annexation of the German colonies and the surrender of the German navy in order that the warships should be sunk. "Reparations should be paid by Germany within the bounds of possibility. There is no disposition to interfere in the future organization of Germany. . . . To sum up, England sees the only foundation of a lasting peace in a settlement based on ethnological factors. For this reason it is hoped that ambition will not cause France to try to obtain the Rhine frontier, which would give rise to new conflicts in the future." Russia's chance of imposing her terms was further diminished by the entry of Bulgaria into the fray in October 1915, when the eighth volume of the German translation stops. The ninth and tenth volumes are

only available in Russian. Two double volumes of the Second Series (described as XVIII and XIX) covering the Agadir crisis and the opening months of 1912, published in 1938, are only available in Russian. Fortunately the despatches of Benckendorff and certain other diplomatists are in French.

## II

While the last of the Hohenzollerns sought the limelight, the last of the Romanoffs hated crowds and ceremonies. For this reason we know less about him, and indeed there is less to know. Intimate pictures of his happy family life are painted in *The Court of the last Tsar* by Mossolov, head of his Civil Chancery under Baron Fredericks, the Minister of the Court, and by Pierre Gilliard, the devoted French tutor of the Tsarevich, in *Thirteen Years at the Russian Court*. He was not a simple personality, and it would be as false to say that he was the real ruler of Russia as that he was a mere figure-head. Like William II and Francis Joseph he usually followed the advice of his Ministers in foreign affairs, though in the Far East he went his own way, and at any moment he might change his advisers without warning or excuse. The *Journal Intime de Nicolas II* is of negative rather than positive interest, revealing an amiable mediocrity destitute of the qualities of mind and will required in a ruler of men. The enormous manuscript preserved in the Moscow archives, from which the Russian editor Melgounov published a volume of extracts at Berlin in 1923, covers the period from 1890 to the end of December 1917, six months before his death. Each year fills about a hundred pages, and integral publication is unnecessary since the entries are of the driest character. Even the passages selected from the period of the Japanese war, the revolution of 1905 and the world war, oppress the reader by their monotony. The weather, the walks, the family and official visits, the reviews and other happenings of each day, however trivial, are recorded. It is but rarely that an audience is described or an emotion expressed. The ruler of scores of millions appears as an automaton rather than an autocrat, discharging the routine business of his office in a mechanical way, accepting disasters and defeats as "the will of God." From time to time, however, we stumble on interesting entries, such as those which record the happy meeting with the Kaiser at Björkö in 1905, and still more the tragic days of March 1917, when, "surrounded by

treason, cowardice and knavery," the last of the Romanoffs went down before the storm.

The pathetic *Letters of the Tsaritsa*, enriched by an admirable Introduction by Sir Bernard Pares, cover the period from the outbreak of war to the end of 1916. They reveal both the devotion of the unhappy invalid to her family and her unceasing interference in defence of the supposed interests of autocracy. The volume is dominated by the sinister figure of Rasputin, who appears as The Holy Man, an oracle of wisdom human and divine. A thick haze of oriental superstition hangs over the scene, paralysing the efforts of the Duma to win the war and to save the state.

The publication of the Empress's letters was followed by a Russian edition of *The Correspondence of Nicholas and Alexandra Romanoff*, edited by Golbrowsky. *The Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa* are available in English though not in the original, for they have been retranslated from the Russian version. A few unimportant telegrams have been omitted, and a few intimate passages suppressed. An Introduction by Dr. Hagberg Wright summarizes the impression which the volume will make on most of its readers. The Tsar, he concludes, emerges unscathed as a man and ally, while his unfitness to rule is stamped on every page. His worst mistake was his decision to take command of the army. The letter of August 25, 1915, describes the parting with the Grand Duke Nicholas. He never shared his wife's infatuation for Rasputin, and occasionally attempted to pour water into her wine. "Our friend's opinions of the people are sometimes very strange, as you know yourself," he wrote in September 1916; "therefore one must be careful, especially with appointments to high offices." A few weeks later he remarks that Protopopoff is said to have been not quite normal for a time, and that it was risky to leave the Home Office in such hands. On the eve of the revolution he gently rebuked her importunity. "You write about my being firm—a master. That is quite right. Be assured that I do not forget; but it is not necessary to snap at people right and left every moment." A few days later the "master" and his imprudent adviser were prisoners, and the correspondence ends on March 7, 1917.

Nearly half the volume entitled *Archives Secrètes de l'Empereur Nicolas II* (Traduit du Russe et annoté par K. Lazarevski, 1928), is devoted to the Tsar's correspondence with his mother between May 1905 and November 1906. (An English edition

entitled *The Secret Letters of Tsar Nicholas*, appeared in 1938.) It was a pleasant and tender relationship, and the letters reveal much more personality than those to his wife or his diary. Both the ex-Empress and her son suffered keenly during the Japanese war, but the consequential granting of a constitution caused the ruler scarcely less pain. He speaks of his "horrible decision. . . . You cannot imagine what torments I went through first. . . . It is not days but years we have lived through, so great have been the torments, the doubts, the struggles." He soon turned against Witte, whom he had never liked. "Witte has made a *volte-face* after the events in Moscow," he wrote in January 1906. "Now he wants to hang and shoot everybody. I never saw such a chameleon." Mother and son were often at variance on political issues, foreign and domestic. The ex-Empress was more liberal, more Anglophil and much more hostile to Germany.

The larger part of the miscellany is devoted to the years of the war. A section entitled "The Political Situation in Roumania at the beginning of the war and the Treason of the Russian Minister at Bucharest" records the quarrel between Poklevski and Arsenieff, his Councillor of Legation, as to the terms which Roumania should be offered for neutrality or support, and illustrates Roumanian feeling as the military fortunes of the Allies waxed or waned. Another section, entitled Servian Grievances against Russia 1915, contains a sharp protest by the Crown Prince Alexander to the Grand Duke Nicholas, dated April 22, 1915. "I learn that Slav interests, in the name of which this war was undertaken, have been sacrificed in favour of Italy. . . . So far as we are concerned, Italy would take the place of Austria. . . . It seems too that Roumania will demand the whole Banat, where there is a Serb majority. And an attempt has been made to force Servia into considerable territorial concessions to Bulgaria." To this complaint the Russian Generalissimo replied that it was beyond his competence. Among other items in this instructive volume are British laments at the dismissal of Sazonoff in 1916 and documents on the belated Inter-allied Conference at St. Petersburg in February 1917. Doumergue, for instance, who led the French Delegation, suggested a Japanese expedition to the Persian Gulf.

Our knowledge of the court is enlarged by the Memoirs of General Spiridovitch, *Les Dernières Années de la Cour de Tsarskoie-Selo*. Appointed during the anxious winter of

1905-6 to secure the personal safety of the Tsar, the author fulfilled his responsible duties with utter devotion for more than a decade, accompanying him on all his journeys and co-operating with the secret police. There is little political information to be gleaned from this artless record of nearly a thousand pages, which carries us to the outbreak of war; but the harmonious and unpretentious life of the Imperial Family rises before our eyes. "I have had the great happiness and the great honour to watch over the noblest of monarchs"; and he gives instances of the Tsar's spontaneous kindness to humble folk in distress. While the hysterical Tsarina fills him with pity, her only friend, Anna Vyrubova, is depicted as a self-seeking intriguer, disliked by the Princesses and closely linked with Rasputin in pursuit of their common interests.

A volume of letters covering the last decade of the reign, published in Russian in 1925 and in a French translation in 1926, entitled *Lettres des Grand-Ducs à Nicholas II*, throws light on the character, position and influence of the leading members of the Imperial family. The most interesting are those of Nicholas Mikhailovitch, the historian of the Romanoffs, who aspired to represent Russia in the peace negotiations, and who, like several other Grand Dukes, adjured the ruler to avert the approaching revolution by calling to office men whom the nation would trust. Count Paul Benckendorff's little book, *The Last Days of Tsarkoe Selo, March 1—August 1, 1917*, translated by Maurice Baring, is a simple and touching record of adversity bravely borne. The General A.D.C. and Grand Marshal of the Court and his wife shared the captivity of their ex-rulers, and would have accompanied them to Siberia had they been allowed. The Count, who was the brother of the Ambassador in London, loved his master and was pained by the visits of Kerensky, whom he disliked; but he was aware of the indecision and other failings which rendered the last Tsar unfit to govern.

### III

Most of the leading Ministers of Nicholas II have left some sort of record, and we will begin with the Foreign Secretaries. Two volumes of Lamsdorff's diaries, edited by Rotstein, are only available in Russian, covering the years 1886-1892. Their main theme is the rapprochement with France, on which the evidence of Giers' right hand man is of the highest value.

The future Foreign Minister possessed the same profound knowledge of the Russian archives as Holstein of the secrets of the Wilhelmstrasse. The diary, written with no thought of publication, is very full, and it contains reflections as well as a record of events. The most important passages concerning the non-renewal of Bismarck's Secret Treaty of Reinsurance in 1890 are translated in *Berliner Monatshefte*, February 1931. Extracts from the second volume, illustrating Russo-German relations in 1891-2, are given in *Berliner Monatshefte*, May 1936. Lamsdorff, like his chief, was by no means enamoured of the new orientation; but neither of them stood up to the Tsar, who shared his wife's dislike of Germany and in particular detested William II. The initiative throughout came from Paris, where the Russian Ambassador Mohrenheim, in his zeal for an alliance, sometimes exceeded his instructions.

It is unfortunate that Iswolsky only lived to complete the first volume of his *Memoirs*, which brings the narrative down to his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1906. Fragment as it is, however, the autobiography paints vivid pictures of Russia during the Japanese war, including the Dogger Bank incident, the Treaty of Björkö, the creation of the Duma, and the rise of Stolypin. An affectionate Introduction by his daughter describes the closing years of the author, who transferred his home from Paris to Biarritz when the Russian revolution ended his official career.

New light has recently been thrown on the earlier years of Iswolsky at the Foreign Office by the first volume of his *Correspondance Diplomatique*, 1906-1911, arranged and—where the original is in Russian—translated by his daughter. Except for some of the letters of Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London, published in the *Revue de France* in 1934, the whole collection is new. In addition to the official despatches and telegrams between a Foreign Minister and his representatives abroad there are numberless private communications, and it is these which the present work contains. Though Iswolsky's own letters are relatively few, there are enough of them to indicate his brilliant intellect and the general outlines of his thought. An Introduction by Professor Chklaver summarizes the story of his life and puts the best construction on his record. The correspondence is arranged under the headings of the five Great Powers, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and England. The section on Germany, containing the letters of Count Osten-Sacken, deals mainly



with the years 1906-7, and illustrates the slow worsening of Russo-German relations as the outlines of the Triple Entente began to emerge. The section on Austria, containing the letters of Prince Ourussoff, deals almost entirely with the same two years, and depicts the atmospheric change when Goluchowski was replaced by Aehrenthal. The section on France contains the letters of Nelidoff, one of the oldest and most experienced of Russian diplomatists. The letters of Muravieff from Rome only cover the year 1906. To English readers the most interesting item is the correspondence of Benckendorff during 1906, describing the earlier phases of the rapprochement culminating in the Convention of August 1907. The Ambassador was deeply impressed by the honourable character of Grey and by the interest in foreign affairs manifested by the King.

Sazonoff lived just long enough to complete his apologia, *Six Fateful Years*. The narrative opens with his appointment by Iswolsky as his chief assistant in May 1909. The Bosnian crisis was just over, and the Foreign Minister, we are told, was extremely depressed owing not only to the check to his ambition but also to his notorious weakness for discovering personal ill-will in the contacts of life. "He had only one wish, one dream—to exchange St. Petersburg for one of the less responsible Embassies." At the first interview Sazonoff was informed that his chief had decided in principle to resign, and that he was to succeed him. During the eighteen months that elapsed before the death of Nelidoff opened the doors of the Paris Embassy to Iswolsky, the assistant controlled the Foreign Office for no less than seven months owing to the absence of his chief. His first duty on assuming full responsibility in the late autumn of 1910 was to accompany his master on a visit to Potsdam. The Kaiser expressed his pleasure at the disappearance of Iswolsky; Bethmann made a more favourable impression than later experience was to confirm; and Kiderlen's grossness was in some measure compensated by his coolness toward Austria. The author explains the sacrifices to which he consented in regard to the Bagdad railway by his desire to restore friendly relations with Berlin, and by Stolypin's reiterated warnings that European complications must be avoided for many years, at least till Russia had re-organized her means of defence. "I never suffered from Germanophobia," adds Sazonoff, "even in the mildest form of this political disease."

The visit of the Kaiser to Baltic Port in 1912 was memorable for an extraordinary conversation in which he counselled Sazonoff to turn his gaze towards the East. "The Yellow Peril has not ceased to exist but is more threatening than ever, above all for Russia." The only way to avert the danger was for her to develop the military strength of China as a break-water against the Japanese tide. Sazonoff rejoined that it was impossible for Russia to turn her back on Europe, and that she had no wish for another tussle with Japan. Since her defeat in the Far East she had returned to Europe, and it was with the Near East that the new Minister was speedily compelled to occupy himself. The historical mission of Russia having been fulfilled by the emancipation of the Balkan States from the Turkish yoke, they could now, he explains, work out their salvation. They were not yet, however, strong enough to dispense with Russia's aid if bellicose Teutons were to attack their national existence. "Her sole aim was to prevent the Balkan peoples, liberated by the sacrifices of centuries, from falling under the influence of hostile states and becoming the tool of their political intrigues." The Balkans for the Balkan peoples—such was the unselfish policy of St. Petersburg. He adds that a necessary aim for Russia was to secure free access to the Mediterranean, and at the same time to safeguard her Black Sea coast against the threat of a raid through the Straits.

On visiting his ally in the summer of 1912, Poincaré read with dismay the text of the Serbo-Bulgar treaty concluded under Russian auspices in the previous February, and exclaimed: "C'est une convention de guerre." Sazonoff argues that he had no alternative. "Not to help Servia and Bulgaria to realize their aims meant not only the abandonment by Russia of her historical mission, but the surrender without a struggle to the enemy of the Slav peoples of positions won by the efforts of centuries." He adds that he realized the possibility of a war, "with all its possible complications"; but the Balkan states could not be expected to neglect the golden opportunity of the Tripoli campaign. A conflict being thus inevitable, it was Russia's duty to diminish the risks of defeat for her Balkan *protégés* by facilitating their union. "It was impossible for us to turn our back on the Balkan Slavs at a critical moment and to divest ourselves of the obligations imposed upon us by the whole past of Russia as the leading Slavonic Power." Turkish rule in the Balkans, he adds, was a hideous anachronism. From this frank confession we learn

that Russia was as ready to risk a European conflagration in 1912 as was Austria in 1914; for the veto she reserved to herself on the action of Sofia and Belgrad was a mere scrap of paper. The Balkan war produced the anticipated tension. Sazonoff sharply blames Hartwig for encouraging Serbia to seize and hold a port on the Adriatic, and it was his unpleasant duty to inform her that he declined to fight for Durazzo. Her passionate excitement, however, spread to Russia, where the nationalist press shouted for war, and at the opening of 1913 the Minister feared that he might lose control. He found support in Kokovtsoff and the Tsar, but the imminence of a European war during 1912-1913 has never been more vividly described.

The chapters on the rapprochement with Roumania and the Russian attempt to introduce reforms into Armenia contain little known information, but with the Liman Mission we return to the beaten track. The despatch of a German General with extensive powers to Constantinople in the autumn of 1913 filled Sazonoff with the same fierce anger which the annexation of Bosnia had inspired in his predecessor. These, we are told, were the two great political aggressions of the Central Powers. Constantinople was the one place where Russia could tolerate no changes threatening her vital interests. The German excuse that the mission was military, not political, is brushed aside. The Turkish capital would pass into the control of Germany, and at a critical moment "the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente would run the risk of physical dependence on a German General." A shrill protest secured the diminution of Liman's powers; but Sazonoff argues that the compromise was far less satisfactory than it appeared, since the Berlin-Bagdad programme required German domination of Turkey and control of the Straits. The alarming situation was discussed at a Crown Council on February 8, 1914, the resolutions of which are interpreted in a purely defensive sense; and an attempt was made to strengthen the Triple Entente by turning it into an alliance. The invitation was declined by England, but the project of a Naval Convention was approved.

The longest chapter is devoted to the outbreak of hostilities. The initiative, declares Sazonoff, came from Austria, not Germany, where neither the Kaiser nor his Chancellor desired a breach. Berlin is charged not with a will to war, but with ignorance of the situation, criminal levity in giving rein to the Austrian steed, and timidity in the eleventh-hour attempts to

slacken the pace. The Servian Government, he declares, knew nothing of the Serajevo plot ; and no responsible person in Russia ever dreamed of launching a war for the control of the Straits at a time when her armaments were only beginning to recover from the Japanese war. Even though, in the words of King Carol, Vienna had lost its head, it was still possible to avert the conflagration by an unequivocal British declaration like the Mansion House speech. The account of the interview in which the Foreign Minister persuaded the Tsar to decree general mobilization is dramatic in the extreme. We learn that the ruler, of whom Sazonoff speaks with affectionate devotion, invited the Kaiser to refer the dispute to the Hague Tribunal without consulting or informing his Minister.

The later part of the apologia deals with the problems arising from the outbreak of war. The first was the question of the Straits. That the Western Powers withdrew their veto on the Russian occupation of Constantinople was announced in 1915, but we learn how difficult a task it was to secure the assent of France. Sazonoff, unlike most of his countrymen, had no wish to make the Turkish capital a Russian city. The second pressing problem was that of securing new allies. He is disgusted at the ingratitude of Bulgaria and the greed of Rome and Bucharest. The two closing chapters describe with sorrowful indignation the triumph of "the dark forces" over the feeble will of the Tsar, which led to the fall of the Foreign Minister, the rejection of his healing policy for Poland, the overthrow of the Empire, the Bolshevik revolution and the humiliations of Brest-Litovsk.

The *Memoirs* of Witte, who died in 1915, could not be published till Nicholas II had ceased to reign. The interest of the book was in large measure forestalled by the appearance in 1918 of Dillon's *The Eclipse of Russia*, which was dedicated to Count Witte, "my friend and Russia's unique statesman", was based on his confidences, and supplied the first detailed account of the Björkö romance. The autobiography is rather disappointing ; for his memory plays him strange tricks, and his monotonous depreciation of the men with whom he worked leaves a disagreeable impression. He despised the Tsar, and the Tsar detested the greatest of his Ministers. Alone of leading Russian statesmen, Witte had the insight to realize and the courage to proclaim that the Russian Empire was too rotten to wage war either with Japan or with the Central Powers.

*Graf Witte, der Steuermann in der Not*, by Wladimir von

Korostovetz, adds some valuable information derived from members of the author's family and other untapped sources, above all the papers of Prince Meschtscherski, the intimate friend of the last two Tsars and editor of the reactionary weekly *Grazhdanin*. The revelation of the influence of the man behind the throne is the outstanding feature of the book. Though Witte and Meschtscherski differed in home politics, the former desiring a limited monarchy on the German model, the latter favouring autocracy, they agreed on foreign affairs. They were convinced that Russia was unequal to the strain of a great war, and they looked for friendship not to London but to Berlin. As the friend of both the Prince mediated between Nicholas II and the greatest of his Ministers. "Why should I want a portfolio", he exclaimed, "when I can control not one but all departments?" Yet there were limits to his power. The Tsar had his way in the Far East, and after defeat he allowed Benckendorff, Iswolsky and Sazonoff to construct the Triple Entente. Yet the old friendship remained, the Tsar continuing to read the *Grazhdanin* and the Prince to offer advice. He urged moderation during the Balkan wars, and when the Austrian ultimatum brought war within sight the old man hurried to Tsarskoe Selo and implored his master to keep the peace. He returned happy, as he had the ruler's word of honour that there would be no war. He died on the day that the ultimatum expired.

Witte's closing years were darkened by the gathering of the storm which he had vainly striven to avert. "The Revolution will come", he remarked to the author's grandfather, "because the Government does not meet the needs of the people." To the same confidant he explained his tortuous attitude in regard to the Björkö pact. Returning from America after signing the Treaty of Portsmouth in the summer of 1905 he found such indignation prevailing that he realized the uselessness of mere modifications of the document and advised repudiation. His conduct was purely tactical, for he remained the champion of Russo-Franco-German co-operation. It was his last decisive intervention in foreign affairs, for the opportunity of rebuilding what he had helped to destroy never occurred. Six months later he fell from power, and the Anglophil Iswolsky was called to the helm. His admiring biographer admits that he was egocentric, a difficult partner, and lacking in consideration for the Tsar. But he has no doubt that Witte alone knew how to avoid both revolution and war.

We may read in Michael Florinsky's article in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1929, entitled *Russia and Constantinople: Count Kokovtsov's Evidence*, a considered statement, dated April 23, 1929, of his relation to Sazonoff and his policy. It has been generally assumed that Stolypin's successor was the strongest advocate of a conciliatory and unadventurous policy, and that the Foreign Minister, though not a chauvinist, was at any rate more of a "nationalist" than his colleague. This assumption is now emphatically repudiated. "During the term of almost three years when I was the President of the Council of Ministers, no divergency of opinion on any question of importance arose between myself and M. Sasonov." The Foreign Minister, he testifies, was never in favour of an aggressive policy against Turkey. His famous report to the Tsar in the last winter of peace, which has been widely interpreted as evidence of a bellicose spirit, is pronounced an "academic discussion of future preparations absolutely remote from the idea of directing Russia along the path of immediate and aggressive policy in the Turkish question."

Happily we now possess Kokovtsoff's own story in a slightly abridged American version of the massive autobiography published in Russian in 1931. In *Out of the Past* he writes modestly of his long and faithful services, both as Minister of Finance and Stolypin's successor as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1911. He loved his work, hated corruption, and kept as tight a hold of the purse-strings as he could. Final decisions rested with the ruler, whose judgment was swayed by a hundred influences. The worst of his counsellors was the Empress, who strove to maintain autocracy unimpaired for her ailing son. When Rasputin established his nefarious influence, his enemies became her enemies and were marked down for destruction. Thus it came about that the best servants of the State, the author among them, were replaced by adventurers and reactionaries.

Very few of the leading actors emerge with credit, and Witte comes out worst. His moral sense, we are told, was completely atrophied. In his unceasing struggle to regain power he stuck at nothing, and the story of his lies is a sorry tale. Equally contemptible was the character of Suchomlinoff, who continually demanded fresh credits for the army and could not spend them when he got his way. Kokovtsoff, though devoted to peace, was as determined to strengthen the national defences as any of his colleagues; and he never opposed

military demands. Suchomlinoff endeavoured to hide his notorious inefficiency, and to explain the unpreparedness of the army, by reiterated declarations that the Finance Minister had refused his requests. Yet he was retained in office when Kokovtsoff was dismissed at the opening of 1914. At the parting interview with his master neither could restrain his tears. The Tsar must have known that he was doing wrong, for he liked and respected his old collaborator. His offices were divided, Goremykin, a nerveless old reactionary, becoming Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Bark, an inexperienced official, taking charge of finance.

Though by far the larger part of this very valuable book is concerned with domestic affairs, and Cabinet responsibility did not exist in Russia, Kokovtsoff's offices brought him into touch with foreign affairs. We learn that the Tsar promised diplomatic support at the Algenciras Conference in return for the loan which the Minister of Finance arranged with Rouvier at Paris. Iswolsky's bargain with Aehrenthal at Buchlau took his colleagues completely by surprise. When Kokovtsoff accompanied his master to the meeting with the Kaiser at Baltic Port in 1912, he complained of the increase of German armaments to Bethmann, who struck him as an unassuming, sincere and truthful man, and who explained that his own position was far from being as influential as it looked. During the first month of the Balkan war Suchomlinoff and the Tsar decided to mobilize on the Austrian frontier without consulting the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, whose horrified protests killed the crazy project. As the complexities of the Balkan struggle developed, "Sazonoff came to me more and more for advice. He found in me an ardent advocate of peace. I perceived only too well our unpreparedness for war, the weakness of our military organization, and the consequences of a war with Austria." The Tsar, he adds, did not like his intervention in foreign affairs; but it proved impossible to exclude him completely, and he describes his conciliatory part in the dangerous Liman crisis of 1913-14 when Sazonoff lost his head. The narrative of the years following his dismissal is very brief, for he could render only minor services to the State. His last interview with his old master in January 1917 filled him with foreboding. "During the year I had not seen him he had become almost unrecognizable. His face had become very thin and hollow and covered with small wrinkles. His eyes, usually of a velvety dark brown, had become quite

faded, and wandered aimlessly from object to object." He smiled helplessly, and Kokovtsoff doubted whether he knew what was going on.

An illuminating analysis of the years before the war is furnished in Baron de Taube's *La Politique Russe d'avant la Guerre et la Fin de l'Empire des Tsars* (1904-1917). The narrative opens with the International Commission of Inquiry on the Dogger Bank incident. Martens, the veteran Legal Adviser to the Russian Foreign Office, was convinced that his country had no case, and delegated the disagreeable task to the admiring pupil who had succeeded him at the University of St. Petersburg. Towards the end of the wearisome discussions the young jurist was chosen by Delcassé as the channel of a significant communication. "Happily this war will not last for ever, and then we must think of a natural extension of the *Entente Cordiale*." When Taube inquired whether he might report his observation to Lamsdorff, Delcassé replied "I expressly authorize you to do so. To speak formally to Nelidoff (the Russian Ambassador) would no doubt be premature. The question is not ripe. I only wished to mark out the ground." The message found no response in St. Petersburg, where Lamsdorff stiffly informed the author that he would continue his "policy of independence," and that he would never take a step towards Potsdam or Buckingham Palace. With such views it was natural that he should oppose the Treaty of Björkö, which Taube declines to regard as a German snare, since the Tsar was as eager as the Kaiser himself.

The change in 1906 from the timid, modest, conservative Lamsdorff, "a perfect gentleman and a perfect mediocrity," to the brilliant, ambitious, adventurous Iswolsky, "a complete egoist, intelligent, but without heart," opened a new chapter in European history. His Anglophilism alarmed Taube, who, when asked for his opinion on the new programme, replied that it might involve Russia in trouble with Germany. While Russia, in his view, needed many years of repose before she could afford to play for high stakes, Iswolsky was burning to act. He vainly attempted to remove the veto on the fortification of the Aland Islands and the passage of Russian warships through the Straits. Ignoring Taube's advice *Quieta non movere* he plunged into the Buchlau morass, from which he emerged bedraggled and embittered.

The appointment of Sazonoff in 1910 was a welcome relief to the officials of the Foreign Office, where Taube had



succeeded Martens as Legal Adviser in 1909. The new chief possessed scarcely any of the faults or merits of his predecessor. Modest, disinterested and deeply religious, he was better fitted to be Procurator of the Holy Synod or even a prelate than Foreign Minister; for he was swayed by his feelings, weak, changeable, inexperienced and short-sighted. He allowed Hartwig to create the Balkan League, and vainly endeavoured to hold back the avalanche which it unleashed. Compared with Iswolsky at Paris he was pacifist, though less so than Kokovtsoff, who opposed all steps tending to war. The monarch, after wavering for a moment during the intoxications of the first Balkan war, came to realize the danger of premature activity, and resolved to utilize his visit to Berlin in the summer of 1913 for the marriage of Princess Luise to propose the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Near East. The good seed sown at Berlin never ripened, for the outbreak of the third Balkan war changed the map, and Sazonoff encouraged Servian dreams of a Promised Land within the Hapsburg realm. The dismissal of Kokovtsoff in February, 1914, removed a bulwark of peace, and Sazonoff, angered by the Liman incident, moved towards the party of action. In an historical lecture in March, 1914, Taube, now Minister of Education, warned the Monarch, who was among his hearers, of the danger of drifting into war. The volume ends with a critical and dispassionate analysis of the immediate causes of the conflict. No Russian, he declares, could have admitted that the Austro-Serb quarrel did not concern his country. Sazonoff's supreme offence was the general mobilization, which he compelled his distracted and peace-loving sovereign to accept. But the worst offender was Iswolsky, who evidently desired war and who observed to a relative of the author a few days after its outbreak, "Félicitez moi, madame, c'est ma petite guerre qui commence." A German edition of 1937 entitled *Der grossen Katastrophe entgegen* contains a fresh analysis of responsibilities in the light of the latest revelations, and allots a larger share of blame to Russia and Servia than in the first version.

Vladimir Gurko, brother of the General, represented the old hardworking and highly educated Russian bureaucracy at its best. As an official in the Ministry of the Interior and an agrarian specialist, the author of *Features and Figures of the Past*, translated as volume XIV of the Hoover War Library, has little to say about foreign affairs. He saw the leading

political actors at close quarters, and his book is a gallery of portraits. He felt the charm of Nicholas II, but realized his utter unfitness for his post. Autocracy as a system of government no longer existed. There was only a group of quarrelling Ministers, none of whom receives high praise. Witte, by far the ablest of them all, was rough and arrogant, interested in industry but not in the peasant. Moreover he was chiefly responsible for the disastrous Far Eastern adventure by building the Trans-Siberian line. Stolypin tried to correct his one-sided policy of industrialization by bold agrarian reform, but he came too late and he was far from being a superman. Miliukoff is dismissed as vain, ambitious and *doctrinaire*. Kokovtsoff, perhaps the best of the lot, was conscientious but pettifogging, without much imagination or initiative. Gurko, though not a party man, favoured the Octobrists or Liberal Conservatives of the Guchkoff school. The bulky volume is melancholy reading, for we watch the ship of state drifting helplessly towards the rapids. In the author's opinion there was no chance of co-operation between Government and people after the summer of 1915.

Kerensky's contribution began with his evidence in the Korniloff episode before the Commission of Inquiry set up by the Government of which he had become the chief. The thesis of his volume, *The Prelude to Bolshevism: the Korniloff Rebellion*, is announced in its title. It was Korniloff, he argues, not himself, who prepared the way for the Bolsheviks, though the brave soldier erred from political inexperience, not from lack of devotion to Russia. The book was not easy to read and was little read; but his considered apologia, *The Catastrophe*, is a spirited performance, carrying us through the eight months which separated the fall of the Tsar and the rise of a new tyranny. So rotten did the structure of Imperial Russia appear to the author that he believes the war to have postponed, instead of accelerating, the revolution which was due in 1914 or 1915. We watch the formation of the Government of Prince Lvoff with eager sympathy; but the sky darkens with ministerial dissensions, and Miliukoff is quickly evicted from the Foreign Office. "The Russia which had to declaim daily about the Dardanelles and the cross on St. Sofia ceased to exist on March 12, 1917. Russia was not only physically tired of war. New Russia revolted spiritually against further bloodshed." The unexpected German attack on the Stokhod, however, "ended the pacifist period of the Revolution," and

"the period of defence" began, in which Kerensky concentrated the chief offices of State in his own hands and organized the Brusiloff offensive. "My entrance into the War Ministry marked the end of the period of destruction, not only in the army but in the country as a whole." Like most other makers of history, he piles incense on his own altar.

The story of his single-handed work of reconstruction is interrupted by "the mad mutiny of Korniloff, which opened the doors of the Kremlin to the Bolsheviks and to Brest-Litovsk." The Commander-in-Chief, he asserts, was the tool of the Right, and the blow was struck rather at the Revolution than at himself. Lenin completed what Korniloff had begun, and these architects of ruin tore down the edifice which the master-builder had raised. "This tragedy occurred just at the time when all our sacrifices were about to find their justification. The Austro-Hungarian Government, having realized that the situation of Austria-Hungary was untenable, addressed to the Provisional Government a request for a separate peace. The move was made without knowledge of Berlin. It was particularly significant, because the Foreign Minister Terestchenko had long been preparing, with the co-operation of the diplomatic representatives of the United States in Bulgaria and Turkey, a plan for negotiations which would have meant their exit from the war. There could be no doubt, with Austria's example before them, that similar peace proposals would have followed from Sofia and Constantinople. The road to the Mediterranean would have been opened for Russia, the blockade would have been broken, and Germany would have stood completely isolated in Europe. Russia was on the verge of her greatest victory."

Trotsky's monumental *History of the Russian Revolution* closes with the seizure of power in October 1917. For our present purpose his earlier work, *My Life*, is of greater importance, since two of its chapters describe his brief tenure of the Foreign Office and the conclusion of peace at Brest-Litovsk. The first Soviet Delegation had been headed by Joffe, who dined with the Germans. When Trotsky took control he broke off such familiarity. "The circumstances of history", he complains, "willed that the delegates of the most revolutionary regime ever known to humanity should sit at the same table with the representatives of the most reactionary caste among all the ruling classes." Kühlmann, he declares, was head and shoulders above Czernin in ability, and the two

men were not on good terms. "Czernin, in his own clumsy way, played second fiddle to Kühlmann. General Hoffmann brought a refreshing element into the negotiations. . . . We never doubted that his boot was the only reality to take seriously." The General made no attempt to conceal his contempt for his civilian superiors. When Trotsky mentioned the German Government, Hoffmann interrupted him in a voice hoarse with anger: "I do not represent the German Government here, but the German High Command." The author confesses that his aim was to delay the negotiations. "That was my object in going to Brest-Litovsk." It was Lenin who insisted on making peace.

## IV

Passing from the Ministers at St. Petersburg to Russia's representatives abroad we begin with the *Correspondance Diplomatique du Baron de Staal*, admirably edited by Baron Meyendorff, which covers his closing years. His soberly tinted reports from London throw light on the strained Anglo-Russian relations during the Salisbury era. In the second volume, which opens with 1889, it is curious to find Rosebery considering disarmament and sounding St. Petersburg in 1894, four years before the Tsar invited the nations to the Hague. The Premier, reported Staal, regarded the Emperor Alexander as the strongest guarantee of general tranquillity, and would take no step without his moral support. Giers replied that he must consult his master, that "this vast project" bristled with difficulties requiring prolonged study, and that in consequence a sympathetic but non-committal reply was all that could be given at the moment. Encouraged by the hints that any practical plans for the limitation or reduction of armaments would be favourably considered, Rosebery suggested a conference of the Great European Powers. "The Emperor of Russia by his high, pure character and his single-minded desire for peace is the Sovereign who appears to me to be marked out as the originator of such a meeting." A few months later Alexander III was dead, and it fell to his son to summon the nations to the Hague. Next in interest to this abortive proposal is Osten-Sacken's report of his sensational conversation with the Kaiser in Berlin on January 13, 1900, relating to concerted action against Great Britain, of which a portion was

published in the official biography of Edward VII under the wrong date.

The story of the making of the Dual Alliance was authoritatively told for the first time by Baron Boris Nolde in 1936 in his monumental *L'Alliance Franco-Russe*, for which he was allowed to use the papers of Giers, Staal and Nelidoff. The most interesting of the new documents is a memorandum of April 1891, by the latter, Ambassador at Constantinople and one of the authors of the Treaty of San Stefano. He had long been a champion of the Russo-German partnership, but he explained to Giers, the Foreign Minister, the reasons for his change of front. If the renewal of the Triple Alliance could not be prevented, Russia must guarantee herself against its evil consequences by an alliance with France. Unless it was made, Germany would try to seduce France by far-reaching sacrifices. The Franco-Russian alliance should be modelled on the Triplice, but both parties should be free to travel beyond its defensive aims. For instance Russia might attack Austria if she wished. To complete this work of political insurance it would be useful to consider the aims of England, who, without being a member of the Triplice, had engagements with the group which emphasized its menacing character. France should seek to block her expansion, and, if the balance of power in the Mediterranean was destroyed, should make sure of her own share. Russia should look after her interests in that sea, which led to her possessions in the Far East. "Thus we have the same interest as the French in preventing the partition of the Mediterranean and the Archipelago between the members of the Quadruple Alliance." Four months later, on August 27, 1891, the agreement with France was signed.

Baron Rosen's *Forty Years of Diplomacy* will always rank among the authorities for the collapse of the Russian Empire. A statesman of the school of Witte, he represented his country at Tokio, whence he sent home unheeded warnings as to the result of thwarting Japanese ambitions in Korea. Of the policy of Iswolsky and Sazonoff, which sought compensation in the Near East, he has no better opinion. Russia, he argues, was unfit for war, and should have kept aloof from the quarrels of the Powers. Her initial mistake in tying herself to France and thereby needlessly antagonizing Germany was followed by an endeavour to secure hegemony in the Balkans, which involved the hostility of Austria. Such a policy, he declares,

led straight to war. His contempt for Sazonoff is unbounded, and he saddles him and Suchomlinoff with the crime of deciding on general mobilization, which, he admits, involved war. From the outbreak of the struggle he foretold revolution, and laboured to convert the Tsar and his Ministers to the idea of a general peace before it was too late.

Nekludoff's *Diplomatic Reminiscences* are scarcely less interesting. Appointed Minister to Sofia early in 1911, he assisted in the formation of the Balkan League which in 1912 fell upon Turkey and in 1913 quarrelled over the spoils. On taking leave of the Tsar a remarkable incident occurred. After an intentional pause, stepping backwards and fixing his visitor with a penetrating stare, he said: "Listen to me, Nekludoff. Do not for one instant lose sight of the fact that we cannot go to war. It would be out of the question for us to face a war for five or six years, in fact till 1917. If the most vital interests and the honour of Russia were at stake, we might accept a challenge in 1915, but not a moment sooner, in any circumstances or under any pretext whatever. Do you quite understand me?" On reaching his post he found the Balkans in a ferment, and endeavoured to penetrate the mind of the suspicious and irresolute Ferdinand. Though the Tsar himself had no desire for war, the Serbo-Bulgar pact concluded under Russian auspices lit the fuse, and the *fête* of the Shipka veterans on August 24, 1912, indicated that the moment was near. "One saw pale faces, shining eyes, tears coursing down the cheeks of aged men. All eyes were bent on the flag of Samara; the veterans gathered round it; with tears in their eyes they kissed the staff, the drapery, the streamers. A thought flashed like lightning through my mind: it is war. When I drove to the Legation I was cheered with cries of Hurrah! and Russia for ever!" For the break up of the Balkan League he holds the short-sighted Daneff mainly responsible, and he sharply condemns the treachery of Bulgaria. The second half of the volume describes the author's service at Stockholm from 1914 till the fall of the Tsardom in 1917.

Savinsky's *Recollections of a Russian Diplomat* open with Lamsdorff, whom he admires, and whose opposition both to the Japanese war and to the Björkö Treaty he approves. The most interesting experiences of his years in the Foreign Office were the visits of his master to Müritzsteg, Racconigi and Potsdam, though he saw little more than the surface of events. More important is his account of Iswolsky's journey to

Paris and Berlin in October 1908, when he failed to induce the Kaiser to discuss the Bosnian crisis. "He was very discouraged, especially as he had found neither in France nor in England the support he had expected." Moreover, he was upset by Stolypin's message that Russian opinion was incensed and that he must furnish explanations on his return. He observed to the author that it was impossible to retain his post, and that he would ask for an Embassy. At the end of the crisis the disgruntled statesman expressed a desire for Madrid, where he could avoid taking part in great affairs and could write his Memoirs, hoping to re-emerge in a few years.

Savinsky's recollections during his decade at the Foreign Office are scrappy and occasionally inaccurate, but on his appointment to Sofia at the end of 1913 his testimony becomes of first-rate importance. He received only verbal instructions from Sazonoff, but they were clear enough. "Stand aloof from the Radoslavoff Government and work for its downfall. If possible, help to overthrow it—if without risk of exposure, all the better. Then negotiations can be resumed." Never had he had so many failures with anybody as with the Bulgars in 1913, added Sazonoff. Since the Embassy archives were burned by order when war broke out in 1915, and the documents at St. Petersburg were disarranged, the account based on the Minister's diary, which embodied the chief telegrams, despatches and reports of conversations, is of unusual interest. Despite Ferdinand's German sympathies, the entire country was Russophil. No one would admit the possibility of war against Russia, and money and letters reached him from the remotest villages. The King and Radoslavoff were polite but chilly. Despite his assurance that the Tsar's feelings towards the nation would never change, the Minister was powerless, since his advice to his superiors was ignored. When he argued that only a Franco-Russian loan could avert a German loan, Sazonoff replied, "Not unless there is a change of Cabinet," and only relented when it was too late. The Duc de Guise was sent on a mission from France in January 1915, but the King kept his cousin waiting for a week in a hotel opposite the Palace. In July Savinsky reported that only the occupation of Macedonia would secure Bulgarian support. "If eventually Bulgaria joined our enemies," he comments, "it was entirely our own fault." The narrative closes with the account of "an extraordinary, almost incredible visit" paid by the King to the Minister, who was detained in Sofia

by illness after the outbreak of war. "It is I," declared Ferdinand, "who have destroyed with my own hands the bridge between the two countries, but it is I alone who can rebuild it." Was it an intimation of hypothetical treachery to his new allies if fate played havoc with his plans?

Tcharykow's *Glimpses of High Politics: Through War and Peace*, 1855-1929 record a long diplomatic career which closed in revolution and exile. He describes the terrible night in which King Alexander and Queen Draga were murdered in Belgrad almost under his eyes, for the Russian Legation was close to the Palace. The conspirators had forced their way in but failed to discover their prey. "Suddenly a window was opened in the lower story of the Palace facing the street, and we heard the Queen's voice calling to the soldiers for help. This showed them where the Royal couple had taken refuge." Invited by his school friend Iswolsky in 1907 to become Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, he witnessed the Bosnian crisis from behind the scenes, and took his chief's place when the latter left for the fateful interview with Aehrenthal at Buchlau. Neither Stolypin nor Kokovtsoff had been informed of the plan, and when Tcharykow reported the deal Stolypin protested against Russia giving her official consent to the subjection of two Slav provinces to German and Hungarian domination. He added that if the negotiations were continued he would offer his resignation. Kokovtsoff shared Stolypin's objection, and Tcharykow, desiring to keep him in office, took the same side. The Tsar, who had sanctioned the deal, grudgingly consented to send new instructions to Iswolsky, but Aehrenthal's impatience brought the discussions to an end. Five months later the author urged his chief to swallow the diplomatic ultimatum from Berlin demanding the recognition of the annexation. "I expressed the opinion that, just as Japan accepted the Russo-Franco-German ultimatum but at once began preparing for a war with Russia for which she was not then ready, so Russia should now accept this German ultimatum, knowing as we did that we were not ready for a European war." A fuller account of divided counsels during the Bosnian winter is supplied in "Reminiscences of Nicholas II" in the *Contemporary Review*, October 1928.

When the Bosnian crisis was over Tcharykow was sent as Ambassador to Constantinople to win the Young Turks. The deposition of the Germanophil Abdul Hamid afforded the Triple Entente an opportunity of regaining influence



which the author strove to turn to account. He complains that he was not backed up by his Government, which frustrated the plan of a visit to the Turkish capital by the Tsar on the way to Racconigi in the autumn of 1909. Still graver was the failure of the so-called "Tcharykow kite", on which welcome light is thrown. Early in 1912 Sazonoff, convinced of the incapacity of the Young Turks for constructive statesmanship, dropped the scheme, on which the Ambassador had been working, of concluding a direct agreement concerning the opening of the Straits to Russian warships on the same basis as Iswolsky's proposition to Aehrenthal in 1908. "My plan had coincided in September, 1911, with one elaborated by our Foreign Office itself, but it was introduced by me as due to my own initiative. In this way I meant, in case I did not succeed, to shield my Government from any responsibility in this connection. As Sazonoff, on recovering from a long and serious illness, met with considerable opposition to our plan concerning the Straits on the part of the British Government, he decided not to pursue it any further. So, I was recalled from Constantinople and appointed Senator in March 1912." It was some consolation that, when the war came, Sazonoff took up the question again and secured the assent of England and France to the possession of the Straits and Constantinople. In Tcharykow's opinion a more skilful handling of Turkey after the Young Turk revolution would have kept her from joining Germany in 1914.

Tcharykow's meagre outlines of Turkey before the war are filled in by the massive volume *Le Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*, by Mandelstam, First Dragoman of the Russian Embassy. Defining himself as a Russian Liberal, he hated Abdul Hamid and his regime from the moment of his arrival in 1898 as much as he liked the Turkish people. He rejoiced at the Young Turk revolution of 1908, believing in their desire for a civilized state; but the revolution of 1909 converted him. "All that the people gained was to have several Abdul Hamids instead of one." They disdained the advice of their friends, and their worst instincts were encouraged by the Germans. The Ottoman Empire was a vampire and a nightmare. The foreign policy of the Young Turks is denounced as anti-national, involving vassalage to Germany. "Le Turc propose, l'Allemagne dispose." The three months of neutrality at the outbreak of the world war were a tragi-comedy, a time of bad faith, knavery and insolence. Said Halim, the Grand Vizier,

was vain and feeble. Djemal was a Turkish Fouché. Talaat, the outstanding brain, entered the war with reluctance. Enver was merely a *condottiere* favoured by fortune. Wangenheim, the German Ambassador, who understood Orientals, handled him with incomparable skill. The Armenian massacres were not suggested by Germany, but she made no attempt to stop them. Writing in 1917, before the end of the war, the author declares that the empire must disappear and its races, including the Turks themselves, receive self-government. "Delendum est Imperium Ottomanorum" is the concluding sentence of the book.

*The Ordeal of a Diplomat*, by Constantin Nabokoff, describes his activities as Councillor of Embassy in London from the end of 1915 and Chargé d'Affaires from the death of Benckendorff in January 1917. When the Anglophil Ambassador heard of the eviction of Sazonoff and the appointment of Stürmer in his place, he cried: "C'est de la démente." The abdication of the Tsar was hailed with relief by the author, who confided to Balfour that he rejoiced at the change. At his suggestion Lloyd George sent a cordial telegram to the new Government; but the Foreign Office was sceptical, fearing internal convulsions and a waning interest in the war. The attitude of the British Government during the eight months of the Provisional Government is described as passing through three phases—benevolent expectation, distrust and irritation, disillusion and resentment. "I had ceased to be a *persona grata*—if I ever had been." Sazonoff, Baron Meyendorff and Prince Trubetzkoi were spoken of as successors to Benckendorff, but none of them arrived.

The most valuable chapter is concerned with the Stockholm Conference. As an ardent supporter of the war, Nabokoff did his utmost to prevent the meeting of German and non-German Socialists on neutral soil. "I was and I remain convinced that it would have led to a peace by compromise which Germany already desired. And I should be proud to feel that I had, even to a small degree, contributed to averting such an international catastrophe." He was, however, in no position to judge. He was not informed of the political and military condition of Russia, as the Foreign Office telegrams were merely bluff and he received no private letters. Believing the army to be strong, he persuaded Terestchenko, the Foreign Minister, to declare that the Russian Government regarded the Conference merely as a party concern, and would not

consider its decisions as binding. While Henderson favoured the meeting, Lloyd George was against it and thanked the Chargé for extracting the declaration. England, he testifies, was infinitely more generous and magnanimous than any other of Russia's allies, but he has less praise for the British Government. When the news of the Bolshevik revolution reached London Nabokoff, like almost all his colleagues in the diplomatic service, declined Trotsky's invitation to serve the new rulers, whom they regarded as criminal usurpers. When Litvinoff, "that impudent Bolshevik adventurer who pretended to represent Russia," demanded the surrender of the Embassy, he was angrily repulsed. Neither Nabokoff nor Litvinoff was officially recognized, but the Government was in constant touch with the latter. Balfour told Nabokoff that he could not formally receive him, but would be glad to hear his views. The brilliant and attractive author, who made England his home, lived long enough to witness with anger and disgust our official recognition of a regime which he hated more than the German foe.

Baron Shelking's *The Game of Diplomacy*, written after the author's escape from Russia in 1917, though carelessly compiled makes a few additions to our knowledge of Russian and German statesmen from 1890 to the outbreak of war. His twenty years' experience in the diplomatic service, mainly in Berlin under Count Osten-Sacken, followed by political journeyings as the correspondent of leading Russian newspapers, put him in touch with makers of history in Central and Eastern Europe. Like most other witnesses, he charges Iswolsky with snobbishness and egotism, and tells us that his nickname in the salons of St. Petersburg was the Prince of the Bosphorus. Sazonoff is more gently handled, but the biggest bouquets are presented to Witte and the aged Goremykin.

## V

The echoes of the Suchomlinoff trial, which began in August 1917, were only faintly heard in Western Europe during the turmoil of war, and indeed it was no easy task to piece together a coherent story from newspaper reports of the speeches of the fallen Minister, his principal enemy, Yanuskevich, Chief of the Staff, and other witnesses. The most sensational episode was the defendant's confession that he had disobeyed

the Tsar's instructions to countermand the first order for general mobilization. This astonishing assertion, which was apparently advanced to rebut the charge of slackness in the hour of danger, was later disproved by the testimony of Dobrorolsky. The evidence was carefully analysed in Höninger's *Untersuchungen zum Suchomlinow-Process*, in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, April 1918.

With Dobrorolsky's brochure, *Die Russische Mobilmachung*, we are on firmer ground. The Director of the Mobilization Department explains that partial mobilization was a technical impossibility and a strategic danger, but that the decision remained throughout in the hands of the Tsar. On July 28, the day of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, ukases for general and partial mobilization were prepared for signature. On the morning of July 29 Yanuskevich, Chief of the Staff, handed to Dobrorolsky the ukase for general mobilization, signed by the Tsar. After securing the signatures of the Ministers of War, Marine and the Interior, he proceeded to the central telegraph office about nine p.m., to despatch telegrams throughout the empire. "But at this moment, about 9.30 p.m., Yanuskevich called me to the telephone and ordered me to hold back the telegrams, as the Tsar had commanded the substitution of partial for general mobilization." Orders were accordingly telegraphed to the four military districts affected by partial mobilization. On the following morning, July 30, Yanuskevich convinced Sazonoff of the dangers of partial mobilization, and the Foreign Minister converted his master. Fearing that the Tsar would once again change his mind, he telephoned to the Chief of Staff, "Give your orders, and then disappear for the rest of the day." Dobrorolsky's record destroys the contention that the order for general mobilization was only given after the arrival of the false report in the *Lokalanzeiger* that Germany had ordered mobilization. He regarded the step, which it was his professional duty to initiate, as the equivalent of war. "The time of mobilization mechanically determined the beginning of the war." A few additional details of the critical days were given by the General in an article in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, August 1924.

In his *Erinnerungen* Suchomlinoff claims the chief merit for the reform of the army after the Japanese war, disclaims all share in the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and repudiates the charges which led to his fall. The voluminous autobio-

graphy becomes interesting with his appointment to the War Office in 1909. He denies that his famous declaration in 1914, "Russia is ready, France must be ready too," was either a boast or a threat. Far from being a pace-maker in the critical days, he was kept in the background by the partisans of war. Sazonoff, he complains, addressed his inquiries not to the Minister of War but to the Grand Duke Nicholas and the Chief of the Staff, "my subordinate, who went behind my back and declared that the army was readier than it really was. The Tsar knew my view, and for that reason Sazonoff and the Grand Duke dealt with Yanuskevich over my head. Of the latter's doings I knew nothing." The villain of the piece is the Grand Duke Nicholas, whom he denounces as the chief author of Russia's misfortunes no less than of his own. The army, he declares, was only equal to a war of six to eight months; but the Tsar was at the time under the domination of his uncle, though his failure was soon to disprove his military capacity. The people sought for a scapegoat in 1915, and instead of selecting the Grand Duke its wrath was skilfully diverted against the innocent Minister of War, who was condemned to life-long imprisonment.

A very different portrait of Suchomlinoff is painted by his colleague Daniloff, the Quartermaster-General of the Grand Duke Nicholas, in his important work *Russland im Weltkriege*, 1914-15. Russia, he declares, was pacific. "War seemed so improbable that I started in the middle of July 1914, for the Caucasus on my usual tour of inspection, and the head of the Department of Operations on the western front also went on leave to a Crimean spa. I offered to postpone my journey, but Yanuskevich refused." When the Crown Council of July 25 agreed to mobilize against Austria if the situation grew worse, Suchomlinoff, he argues, should at once have protested against so dangerous a decision. Returning to the capital next day, he found the General Staff in doubt whether it could thus risk upsetting the plans for general mobilization. He thereupon secured a meeting of experts, who forwarded a report to the Tsar, pointing out that partial mobilization had never been worked out. When it was ordered on July 29 he endeavoured to convince Sazonoff through Basili, a high official of the Foreign Office, that to delay general mobilization beyond July 31 would be dangerous. Nowhere do we see so clearly how large a part in the Tsar's final decision was played by the technical arguments of the military authorities.

Unlike Dobrorolsky, Daniloﬀ denies that general mobilization meant war. His comments on men and things are of some interest. The five years following the Japanese war, he asserts, were a period of military impotence. Army reform only began in 1910, and in 1914 Russia was even less prepared than Suchomlinoff suggests. Germany was aware of the situation, and decided not to wait ; but "the collision of the peoples of Europe was inevitable sooner or later." Russia was uncertain of England and not absolutely certain of France, and it was expected that Germany would march through Belgium. Suchomlinoff is portrayed as clever but frivolous, obstinate, suspicious and revengeful, not a traitor yet utterly unfit for his post. The Grand Duke Nicholas, on the other hand, was very popular both with the army and the people, and his dismissal is described as a gigantic mistake.

The sequel *Dem Zusammenbruch entgegen* attributes the collapse above all to the weakness of the feeling for the State and to the mistake of ignoring the voice of the masses. The Government, declares Daniloﬀ, was obstinate, insincere, short-sighted and increasingly influenced by dark forces. The narrative opens with the dismissal of the Grand Duke Nicholas, whom Daniloﬀ admires as the outstanding personality of the Romanoff family. The jealous Empress detested him, and at Court he was sometimes ironically nicknamed Nicholas III ; but the author assures us of his absolute loyalty. The Sovereigns liked old Goremykin to be Prime Minister because he always yielded to their will. Alexeieff, the Chief of Staff, was a competent soldier, but lacking in resolution. The reconstruction necessitated by defeat in the Far East had only begun. Suchomlinoff's pronouncement in the spring of 1914, "Russia desires peace but is ready for war," was mere bluff. It was impossible to win with a ruler like Nicholas and a worn-out reactionary like Goremykin. The murder of Rasputin came too late to save the dynasty or the country.

The most dramatic portion of the book is the account of the abdication of the Tsar. Daniloﬀ had been recently appointed Chief of the Staff of the Armies of the North under Russky, whose headquarters were in Pskov. When the Revolution broke out the ruler travelled thither at once. Russky and Daniloﬀ visited him in his train and found him calm. He wished to return to Tsarskoe Selo, but the way was blocked. During the night Rodzianko, President of the Duma, telephoned to Russky that he must abdicate, and on the following

morning a similar communication from Alexeieff in the name of the Generals arrived. The message was delivered by Russky in presence of the author, and both, when asked for their opinion, confirmed the necessity. After a painful silence, with trembling lips, the Tsar said in a firm voice: "I have decided to abdicate in favour of my son." When Guchkoff and Shulgin arrived with a message from the Duma that he must abdicate, he replied that he had already done so, adding that he had transferred the crown to his brother Michael, since the doctor had told him that the illness of his son was incurable. With the abdication of Michael, which quickly followed, we reach the end of Daniloff's story. A later work, *Grossfürst Nikolai Nikojewitsch* pays a further glowing tribute to the Generalissimo.

Broussilov's *A Soldier's Notebook*, published after his death with a Preface by General Niessel, opens with an outspoken chapter entitled "Before the War". The quarrel with Japan, a tragic error, ended the reforms of the two preceding decades. He describes the Fourteenth Army Corps, which he was appointed to command early in 1909, as lacking in the most elementary requirements, and he is convinced that the others were no better. "It would have been impossible to fight even if Germany had wished to annex Poland or the Baltic Provinces." Suchomlinoff was plausible but superficial, and though he rendered some service to the army, the supply of munitions was sadly neglected. The author's hero, and, if we are to believe him, the hero of the army, was the Grand Duke Nicholas; but he had no power. A struggle with the Central Powers was inevitable, but the material preparation was inadequate and there was no moral preparation at all. The people were deliberately kept in ignorance, and the seeds of revolution were sown throughout Russia. "The German reigned in every field of national life." When the conflict began the Tsar should have granted a real Constitution, promised liberty to Poland, and rallied the nation around the throne. His incompetence was now revealed, no longer merely to the few who saw him at close quarters, but to all eyes. When he visited the ranks he had no idea what to say to the soldiers, and the sole result was to destroy an illusion. The eviction of the Grand Duke Nicholas destroyed all chance of victory, for Alexeieff, though useful as Chief of Staff, lacked the stature of a Generalissimo.

The partial success of the large-scale offensive on the south-

west front increased Broussilov's prestige, and in the following winter he wrote to Count Fredericks that if Russia was to be saved a constitution must be granted at once. To this appeal, intended for the eyes of the Tsar, he received no reply. His brother, the Grand Duke Michael, of whom the author speaks in warm terms, promised to urge it when he saw the Tsar; but he added that he was powerless. "He is subject to an influence and to pressure which nobody can break." When the inevitable crash occurred and Alexeieff and Rodzianko invited the Generals to advise abdication, none responded with more alacrity than Broussilov. The revolution came too late. The General was appointed Commander-in-Chief by the Provisional Government; but he was speedily replaced by Korniloff, and soon there was no army to command. An unfriendly portrait of Suchomlinoff is painted in the Memoirs (not translated) of his assistant and successor, General Polivanoff, who holds his chief mainly responsible for the military failures of the war. That he had his faults but that he raised the standard of the army and was in no sense a traitor is the verdict in General Lukomski's *Erinnerungen*. General Gurko's *Memories and Impressions of War and Revolution in Russia* and General Golovin's *The Russian Army in the World War* are spirited and instructive narratives.

General Artamonov, the Russian Military Attaché in Belgrad, published his reminiscences in *Berliner Monatshefte*, July 1938. He arrived at the end of 1909, soon after Hartwig, whom he describes as Germanophil. Russia's influence on the Balkan Governments, we are assured, was much smaller than was generally believed, for the young states went their own way. Early in 1912 Crown Prince Alexander asked his opinion about a war of the Balkan states against Turkey. In such an event, he replied, Russia would be unable to help. Servia emerged victorious from the Balkan wars, but she failed to renew her munitions, and Russian supplies only reached her after the Austrian invasion had begun. So little did she expect a conflict with the Central Powers that on July 22, 1914, two days before the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum, the War Office concluded an agreement with a German firm for shrapnel. The author had gone on leave in June, and after the Serajevo murders Hartwig wrote that he could enjoy his holiday with a good conscience. At the same time the Minister of War allowed a number of officers to go on leave. The narrative concludes with a denial of the legend that the



author was a warmonger and co-operated with Dimitrievich in the organization of the Serajevo plot. He had official dealings with him in his capacity as chief of the Information Department of the Servian General Staff, but in no other way. What interest had Russia and Servia in the death of Franz Ferdinand? Neither was ready for war, and Suchomlinoff's proud announcements to the contrary were regretted in Russian military circles.

## VI

In addition to the testimony of civilian and military officials, we glean a few facts and impressions from well informed independents. From time to time a great journalist became a power in the state. Katkoff had helped to make the French alliance, and after his death Suvorin, editor and proprietor of the *Novoje Vremya*, the Northcliffe of Russia, was the terror of Ministers. Selections from his diary, entitled in the German translation *Das Geheimtagebuch*, illustrate the years 1893-1907. The Government feared him, for the ex-schoolmaster had become rich and wanted nothing which it could give. Moreover the Tsar read his articles. His policy was changeable, for he believed neither in autocracy nor democracy, and he had no heroes. Nicholas II is compared to a driver who lets the reins go when driving downhill and cannot stop the cart. Stolypin had not the mind of a statesman, and the Cadets were Catilines. The biggest figure is Witte, "a man of much talent and brains, but with little culture and no moral principles." Russia could not fight, he remarked during the Japanese war, unless the enemy were on Russian soil. The latest entries reveal a man without faith or hope. "Things will not mend," he wrote in 1907, "while we have no statesmen. The country cannot govern itself. We criticize everything, and now we have anarchy." The most interesting reference to foreign affairs occurs in a conversation with Iswolsky on August 19, 1907, on the morrow of his Russo-Japanese treaty and on the eve of the Anglo-Russian Convention. "Events are ripening in Europe", remarked the Foreign Minister, "and we must secure our flank. We shall only become powerful again through a successful war—it does not matter with whom." To a question about the Straits he replied that England would go with Russia. Russia's prestige had begun to recover. "Last year the Germans spoke to me as if I represented Turkey or Persia. Now I can

speaking quite differently. Already in Swinemünde I could take a firmer tone on account of our agreement with Japan. Some day we shall become the heirs of Austria."

Rodzianko's memoirs (the English edition is entitled *The Reign of Rasputin*) describe the struggle between the President of the Duma and "the dark forces" which led Russia to her doom. If the author's reports of his audiences are to be trusted, he repeatedly and fearlessly informed the Tsar of the real character of the adventurer whom the neurotic Tsaritsa worshipped and obeyed. Nicholas appears as a kind, good man, earnestly desiring to do right, and on occasion grateful to the President for the frank expression of his views. Had he been master in his own house, the reign of Rasputin would have been brief; but he was dominated by his wife, whose influence waxed with the growing peril of the State. The unavailing efforts of a patriot to avert defeat and revolution by the creation of a Ministry enjoying the confidence of the Duma and the people make sad reading. The murder of Rasputin, whom he believed to have been a tool of Germany, made the situation worse instead of better, for henceforth his *protégé*, Protopopoff, backed by the Empress, reigned supreme. At the last audience on February 10, 1917, the Tsar replied to the familiar complaints by an angry threat to dissolve the Duma. "There is still time," rejoined Rodzianko; "a responsible Ministry can still be appointed. But Your Majesty does not agree with me, and everything will remain as it is. In my opinion that will lead to revolution and anarchy." The Tsar made no reply, and coldly dismissed his visitor. A month later he was a prisoner in his own palace, and the exciting narrative comes to an end.

The apprehensions of approaching doom during the last years of peace are mirrored in the *Journal de la Générale Bogdanovitch*. Though her salon was the meeting-place of high officers and high society, her diary of three reigns, 1879-1912, recording the comments and opinions of the hostess and her guests, darkens as the years advance, and closes with angry denunciations of "the reptile" Rasputin. In her *Memories of a Shipwrecked World* Countess Kleinmichel, once known as "the mother of diplomats," and the presiding genius of a rival political salon, tells us less than we have a right to expect; but the chapter on Count Fredericks records an interesting conversation with the Court Chamberlain on the outbreak of war. The Tsar, we are told, was urged on by Suchomlinoff, Yanus-

kevich and the Grand Duke Nicholas. The Count advised his master not to mobilize, but Sazonoff argued that war was the only means to preserve his life and to hand on his throne to his son. "I have the courage," added the Foreign Minister, "to assume the responsibility for a war which will make Russia stronger than she ever was." The fullest narrative of the brightly tinted dawn and the darkening close of the first year of the Revolution is to be found in Mrs. Tyrkova Williams' *From Liberty to Brest-Litovsk*. The authoress, herself a Russian, looks at events through the spectacles of the Cadets in whose counsels she played an active part. *Memories of the Russian Court* by Anna Vyubova, the tool of Rasputin and the Tsarina's only intimate friend, reveal a woman of commonplace intellect and colourless personality.

We can now reconstruct every detail of the murder of Rasputin. The diary of Purishkevitch, published in a French translation with the title *Comment j'ai tué Raspoutine*, may be compared with the more elaborate work of his fellow-conspirator, Prince Youssouppoff, entitled *Rasputin*, which appeared in English dress in 1927. The Introduction describes Anna Vyubova as sincerely but not disinterestedly devoted to the Empress. "Cunning, servile and hysterical," she turned her mistress against everybody, isolating her from other influences in order to increase her own. Too unintelligent to have any definite political designs, she was intoxicated by her power, and Rasputin used her as his willing pawn. The first idea of removing him occurred to the Prince in 1915. As the plan took shape he cultivated his acquaintance, pretended to be his follower, and encouraged him to talk. The more he knew of him the firmer grew his conviction that he was too strongly entrenched in the favour of the Empress to be removed except by force. "I can do anything I want, and everybody obeys me. All the Ministers do as I tell them." The Empress, he declared, was a wise ruler, a second Catherine. His contempt for Nicholas II was openly expressed. "Alexandra shall be Regent for her son, and we'll send him (the Tsar) to Livadia for a rest." Rasputin had been opposed to the war, and was always trying to end it; but he laments that he had made no converts at Court, where the Tsar, on this point at any rate, was immovable. On the question whether the impostor was in German pay these pages throw no direct light, though some secret agents whom the Prince once saw in his flat may possibly have been German spies.

In his autobiography *Seed and Harvest* Korostovetz develops the argument expounded in his biography of Witte. Entering the Foreign Office in 1913 he found the champions of the Triple Entente firmly installed. Russia's policy was dominated by "the Benckendorff, Sazonoff, Iswolsky party." The Ambassador in London was "more English than the English". His policy was to side with England in everything. His despatches were full of "Grey thinks", "Grey desires". Sazonoff also firmly believed in the omnipotence of England. Both the European groups felt a struggle to be inevitable, but tried to postpone it till they were better prepared. Even had Germany and Austria been opposed to war, Russia would have begun it owing to her desire for Constantinople. Kokovtsoff alone strove to preserve her from dangerous adventures, but he was never in control. Her general mobilization on July 30, in the author's opinion, was equivalent to a declaration of war. As Secretary to Miliukoff in 1917 he regretted to find the Cadet Foreign Minister as great an Imperialist as the men whom he had helped to overthrow. He talked incessantly of Constantinople at a moment when the Russian people hungered for peace. The moral of the story is that Russia's misfortunes were due to the blindness and ambitions of her own sons. *The Memoirs of Baron Wrangel 1847-1920*, offer slight but vivid reminiscences of Russian history from the days of serfdom to the Bolshevik Terror. The only imposing figure on his stage is Witte, who, he declares, was a greater and better man than his apologia would suggest. Though Wrangel detests not only Lenin but Kerensky, he is well aware of the faults and follies of the old regime, and the last of the Tsars is contemptuously dismissed with the rhetorical question: "What can one say of a nonentity?"

We make acquaintance with the greatest of Polish patriots in *Joseph Pilsudski, The Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier*, translated and edited by D. R. Gillie, a selection from autobiographical writings and addresses which fill four volumes in German and ten in Polish. Reddaway's authoritative *Marshal Pilsudski* summarizes all the material up to 1939. It is regrettable that the memoirs of Dmowski, leader of the National Democrats, and of Daszynski, leader of the Socialists, are only available in Polish. A useful summary of the writings of Polish statesmen is provided in Smogorzewski's little book *La Pologne et la Guerre*.



## THE NEAR EAST



CHAPTER IV  
THE NEAR EAST

I

EVERY member of the Balkan family has contributed to our stock of knowledge. Beginning with Serbia let us put the Chargé d’Affaires at Berlin during the last years of peace into the witness box. Bogitschevich attacks the adventurous policy of his country in his little book *Causes of the War*. While Austria, after the annexation of Bosnia, desired nothing so much as the maintenance of the status quo, Serbia, “financially tied to France and politically mortgaged to Russia,” planned to extend her boundaries at the expense of Turkey and Austria successively. Convinced by his intercourse with Kiderlen and Jagow of the desire of the Wilhelmstrasse for peace, and by his conversations with Pasitch of his desire for war, he attributes the main responsibility for the conflagration to the ambitions of Russia and her latest Balkan *protégé*. An appendix contains reports and declarations of Servian and Russian statesmen from the Bosnian crisis to the outbreak of war in 1914.

Far more important is his massive work *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens 1903-14*. The views of the editor, some of whose despatches from Berlin are included, are indicated in notes and in the large print which calls attention to certain passages. The collection opens with the telegrams exchanged by King Peter and Francis Joseph on the accession of the former, and with the protocol of what may be called a Crown Council in Belgrad in 1905 to discuss the principles of foreign policy; but the consecutive story begins with the Bosnian crisis. The conversations of Gruitch and Milovanovitch with Grey and Hardinge are full of exhortations to Serbia to confine herself to reasonable demands, and Hardinge argued that she had interests rather than rights. The reports from Rome show Tittoni and the King on the side of Russia against Austria; but Aehrenthal held the winning cards, for he knew that Russia was unable to fight. When Pasitch, during his visit to St. Petersburg, quoted the Tsar as declaring that he would not



recognize the annexation, Iswolsky rejoined that, if his master had really said so, he could not have fully considered the matter. The advice both from diplomatic and military circles to Belgrad was to wait for better days. Giolitti is reported as wishing that Servia should become the Piedmont of the Serb race ; and Iswolsky, while declaring that even an Austrian occupation of Servia would not make him fight, realized that a struggle with Germanism was ultimately inevitable. Meanwhile Servia could without difficulty promise a change of policy ; and she was exhorted from many quarters, as the first step in her military and diplomatic ascent, to seek a close understanding with Bulgaria. The effect of these documents is to suggest that the danger of war was less than was commonly believed at the time, but that Aehrenthal's *coup* planted seed which ripened in 1914.

The obvious rejoinder to Austria's triumph was a Balkan *bloc* under Russian patronage, and it is with its formation that many of the documents are concerned. The difficulties were great, for Ferdinand was believed to be Austrophil, and the sentiments of King Nicholas towards Belgrad were not exactly cordial ; but the Tripoli war, aided by the diplomacy of Hartwig, cemented the discordant elements into a fighting unit. Meanwhile dust was thrown in the eyes of Austria and Turkey. When the Austrian Military Attaché in Sofia asked whether a Bulgar-Serb agreement was under discussion, General Fitcheff blandly replied that such an understanding was impossible. It was agreed that hostilities should under no circumstances begin till the autumn of 1912 ; and while statesmen in the West were endeavouring to bring the Tripoli campaign to an end, the Balkan plotters strove to keep it alive. The Servian Minister in Sofia, for instance, warned the Turkish Chargé that the surrender of Tripoli would teach others how easy it was to make a meal off Turkey. There was never any doubt where Russia's sympathies lay, and Nekludoff, her Minister in Sofia, shed tears of joy when the efforts of the Powers to avert hostilities were ignored. The Tsar was rumoured to have said that public opinion would almost inevitably compel him to intervene if fortune were to frown on the Balkan League ; and he remarked to Suvorin, Editor of the *Novoje Vremya*, that the annexation of Bosnia had been such a humiliation for Russia that a repetition was impossible. The Russian Government, however, remained throughout a moderating influence. As Sazonoff explained at the end of 1912, Servia should regard

the existing situation as merely a stage. When, a few weeks later, at the height of the dispute about the frontiers of Albania, he bluntly declared "We will not fight over Djakova," Pasitch telegraphed back his "consternation that no one is capable of defending us from Austrian demands."

A second volume, entitled *Diplomatische Geheimakten aus Russischen, Montenegrinischen and Sonstigen Archiven*, collects the most important documents relating to Servia which have appeared in the publications of various states. The most arresting novelty is a long letter from Plamenatz, ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs in Montenegro, dated May 23, 1917. Montenegro, he declares, emerged from the Bosnian crisis with rancour in her heart. Bosnia was lost for the time, but the Sanjak might be recovered from Turkey. The latter could only be defeated with outside help; yet the Serbo-Montenegrin Treaty of September 23, 1912, was aimed above all at Austria. The war with Turkey was rendered more difficult by the fact that in 1911 Russia had suspended her subsidy for the army; for "Pasitch, by his intrigues, had supplanted us at Petrograd, and established a monstrous legend that King Nicholas was Austria's man." Appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 1913, Plamenatz vainly begged for money at any rate to pay the officers. A year later, in April 1914, he was agreeably surprised to learn from the King that Russia would renew the subsidy, pay the arrears, and supply arms and clothing for 50,000 men. The King made inquiries as to the reason of this *volte-face*, and was informed that a war against Austria was not far off. When the news of Serajevo reached Cettinje, the Serb Minister observed to Plamenatz: "This cartridge will bring liberty to the whole Serb race." Russia, he added, in response to a question, would stand by them. Plamenatz believed that Pasitch, "un fourbe sans foi ni loi," had staged the murder in order to furnish a *casus belli*. A third volume is devoted to a survey of Servian policy as revealed in the collection of documents.

Bogitschevich has also thrown light on the most sensational figure on the Servian stage. In *Le Procès de Salonique* he describes the trial and execution in 1917 of the man who embodied Serb nationalism in its most militant form, and in *Le Colonel Dragoutine Dimitrievitch Apis* he traces the earlier phases of a stormy career. "Dimitrievitch was the instigator of the Serajevb plot, and thus caused the world war." He adds that a growing number of his fellow-countrymen attribute to him

the principal merit of Yugoslav unification, and in consequence resent the conduct of the Pasitch Government in hounding a great patriot to death. His narrative is based on the unpublished memoirs of an unnamed comrade of Dimitrievitch and on personal knowledge. The book is a curious mixture of eulogy and blame, but the former predominates. The name Apis, he asserts, is inseparably linked with the regeneration of Servia. "His greatness resides in his spirit of revolutionary nationalism. He breathed the revolutionary flame into the officers' corps." Yet his footsteps were stained with blood from the terrible night of June 11, 1903, when he, the soul of the conspiracy against King Alexander, was gravely wounded by bullets in the chest, to the world war, which was the price of the fulfilment of his aims. Though King Peter was compelled by diplomatic pressure to frown on the regicides, his influence among the officers remained predominant. The dynasty felt itself eclipsed by him, and for the next decade Pasitch and Apis, the Government and the Black Hand, fought for control. The crafty Premier won, for he was supported by Prince Alexander. It is the conviction of Bogitschevitch that the conspiracy against the Crown Prince at the end of 1916 was a mare's-nest, and that the pretext was seized to silence a witness who knew too much.

No more enthralling book has reached us from the Balkans than Loncarevich's *Jugoslaviens Entstehung*, which records the struggles and aspirations of Servia from 1903 to 1914. As the Belgrad representative of the official Vienna Telegraphic News Agency, an Austrian citizen but a Serb by blood and sentiment, he was in close touch with the Servian Government and the Austrian Legation. He owed his appointment to the murder of King Alexander, and, despite his disapproval of the policy of the Ballplatz, he retained his post till the outbreak of war. His thesis is that the accession of Peter opened a new and glorious era; that it was his desire to live on friendly terms with Vienna; that Austria could never forgive him for declining to be a pawn; that the little state was bullied and threatened till its patriotism boiled up in passionate hatred; and that war was rendered inevitable by the determination of Vienna to cut the knot with the sword. King Peter appears as a hero, the restorer not only of national self-respect but of constitutional liberty. The two chief pilots, Milovanovitch and Pasitch, are depicted as skilful, high-minded and pacific men, who exhibited admirable patience. Aehrenthal and

Berchtold, on the contrary, had a genius for making mistakes and neglecting opportunities. The almost entire omission of the factors of Jugoslav ambitions and Russian encouragement throws the whole picture out of focus.

Peter, we are told, realized that the peaceful renaissance which his country needed was only possible on the basis of good relations with Austria, and he sought an invitation from Francis Joseph before visiting any other Court. It was the first of Austria's many errors to reject his advances ; and when he was at last invited to Budapest several years later public opinion compelled him to cancel his acceptance. The next costly blunder was the attempt to bring Serbia into economic subjection by closing the frontier to her pigs. When asked for his opinion on this measure by the Austrian Councillor of Legation, the author declared that it would strengthen the national resistance. "You are wrong", was the reply ; "when the peasant finds he cannot sell his animals, Serbia will be on her knees within a month." "On the contrary," retorted Loncarevich, "he regards the closing of the frontiers as a threat and will resist." He was right, for Serbia refused Austria's conditions and found markets elsewhere.

A yet graver mistake was "the rape of the two Serb lands", which he describes as a Pyrrhic victory ; for it enlarged the Servian into a European problem, and transformed Jugoslav unity from a dream into a programme. Every Serb was aware that the struggle for Bosnia was merely postponed and that the ensuing years must be spent in preparation. When the author asked Pasitch his opinion, he replied "It is war." A remarkable declaration was made by Milovanovitch, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to a few friends when the collapse of Russian resistance in 1909 involved the submission of Belgrad. "The fate of us Serbs is hard indeed. We must give way. They recognize our rights, but tell us they cannot help us to gain them. Europe, too, is in a bad way, and cannot go on much longer as it is. Violence will bring its nemesis. How the upheaval will occur we cannot tell. But one thing, my dear friends, I do know. Bosnia and Herzegovina will not remain long in the possession of Austria. It may be two, three or several years. But I stake my head that by 1920 Bosnia will be free." The chapter on the Bosnian crisis summarizes the reports to the Skuptchina in secret session on the missions of Milovanovitch to the Western capitals, of Pasitch to St. Petersburg, and of Novakovitch to Constantinople.

Austria's errors continued without interruption, among them the episode of the Vasich forgeries, which is described in detail. Loncarevich is amazed at the Monarchy sending to Belgrad a man like Forgach, who made no secret of his contemptuous hatred for Serbia. When, after a discreet interval at the Court of Saxony, he became Berchtold's principal adviser on Balkan policy, the Serbs expected a policy of revenge. How different was Hartwig, who loved Serbia and gained her love ! That the Ballplatz was incorrigible both in hostility and stupidity was proved during the Balkan wars. In regard to the Prohaska case, which was used to whip the Dual Monarchy to a paroxysm of fury, we are told that the Consul had made himself hated, and that a demonstration was held against him, but that he received no personal insult. Masaryk hastened to Belgrad to learn and report the truth, bringing back an offer from Pasitch to visit Vienna and clean the slate. Austria was to recognize Serbia's right to a commercial harbour on the Adriatic, while Serbia was to enter into a lasting friendly relationship with Austria, granting her economic concessions, and assuming the same attitude to the Yugoslav subjects of Francis Joseph as Germany adopted to the Austrian Germans. With the rejection by Berchtold of this advance, which the author believes to have been entirely sincere, the last chance of a *détente* was gone. Pasitch and his colleagues, he assures us, were absolutely pacific in 1914, and he accepts the belated denial of the statement of Ljuba Jovanovich that he was aware of the Serajevo plot. When the ultimatum arrived, Serbia sought counsel in St. Petersburg ; and had a discouraging reply arrived, or no reply been received in time, Loncarevich declares that the demands would have been unconditionally accepted, since resistance without Russian support was unthinkable. When the author returned to Vienna he heard from Forgach that the demands had been framed in such a manner as to ensure rejection.

In *The Aspirations of Bulgaria* the Serb statesman Stephan Protich, concealing himself under the name of Balkanicus, describes the collapse of the Balkan alliance in the spring of 1913, and traces it to the treachery of Bulgaria. With the aid of Bulgarian documents he sketches the development of a policy of aggression till the sudden attack on Serb and Greek troops in Macedonia on June 29. The villain of the piece is King Ferdinand ; but General Savoff's active participation in the crime is established, and the statement of Daneff, the

Premier, that he had no knowledge of the order is received with scepticism. Even the relatively pacific Gueshoff, the chief author of the Balkan League, who was dismissed to make way for Daneff, does not emerge unscathed. "It seems as if duplicity was more or less the characteristic attribute of all the Bulgarian statesmen and politicians."

The planning and execution of the murders at Serajevo were described by Prinzip, Cabrinovich and the other conspirators at their trial in the Bosnian capital in October 1914. *Der Prozess gegen die Attentäter von Serajevo*, edited by "Professor Pharos", with an introduction by the Berlin jurist, Professor Josef Kohler, contains a German translation of the evidence of the conspirators, who spoke with the greatest frankness, while General Potiorek and Count Harrach, the principal witnesses who accompanied the Archduke and his wife, recalled the last scenes. An unabridged and more satisfactory edition of the evidence is provided in the large volume of Albert Mousset, *L'Attentat de Serajevo*, with an Introduction by the Editor. The soil from which murder sprouted is analysed in Jevtic's *Memories and Impressions of the Attentat of Serajevo*, published at Belgrad, and translated into German in the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, October 1926. The author approves the murder and the conspirators, whom he describes from personal knowledge. "Sarejevo was the work, not of an individual, but of the whole youth of Bosnia—not an improvisation but a deed of long design." The peasants being too primitive to conspire, the lead was taken by poets, journalists, and university students. In reading of Gacinovich, the chief preacher of assassination, and his young colleagues, we are transported back to the atmosphere of the *Risorgimento*. The record of the movements of Prinzip, of his doubts and moods in the days and hours before the fatal act, is a convincing study of the political criminal.

Our knowledge of the part played by Servian citizens in the events leading up to the murders has been enriched by a series of sensational revelations. In his brochure, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand*, translated and edited by Hermann Wendel in 1923, Professor Stanojevich describes the foundation of the two societies of National Defence and Union or Death. The former was public and constitutional, the latter, commonly known as the Black Hand, secret and revolutionary, controlled by Dimitrievich. The Colonel, who, we are told, planned to murder Francis Joseph or his heir in 1911, Ferdinand of Bulgaria in 1914, King Constantine and the Crown

Prince of Serbia in 1916, was the leading organizer of the crime. As Chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, he declares, he was informed by the Russian General Staff that at Konopischt the German Emperor had promised to support the plan of Francis Ferdinand to fall upon Serbia, and he believed that the removal of the Archduke was the only means to avert the attack. When at this moment two youths from Bosnia presented themselves as the representatives of a group which had resolved on his murder, he instructed his factotum, Tankosich, to teach them the use of arms. The Colonel informed the executive of his organization of the plan, but nearly all the members expressed disapproval. He therefore promised to countermand the murder; but either it was too late or the order was disobeyed.

Still more sensational was the revelation made by Jovanovich, Speaker of the Skuptchina, in an article published in Belgrad in 1924 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of war. A translation, entitled *The Murder of Serajevo*, appeared in 1925 under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs. "At the end of May or the beginning of June 1914," declares the author, at that time Minister of Education in the Pasitch Cabinet, "the Prime Minister said to us that there were people who were preparing to go to Serajevo to kill Francis Ferdinand, who was to go there to be solemnly received on Vidov Dan (St. Vitus' Day, June 28, the anniversary of the battle of Kossovo). Pasitch and the rest of us said, and Stojan Protich (Minister of the Interior) agreed, that he should issue instructions to the frontier authorities on the Drina to deny a crossing to the youths, who had already set out from Belgrad for that purpose. But the frontier "authorities" themselves belonged to the organization, and did not carry out Stojan's instructions, but reported to him (and he afterwards reported to us) that the order had reached them too late; for the young men had already got across. Thus the endeavour of the Government to prevent the execution of the plot failed, as did also the attempt made on his own initiative by our Minister in Vienna, Joca Jovanovich, in an interview with the Minister Bilinski, to dissuade the Archduke from the fatal journey. . . . On the afternoon of Vidov Dan an official telephoned to me from the Press Bureau, and told me what had happened at noon at Serajevo. Even though I knew what had been prepared there, nevertheless I felt, as I held the receiver, as though someone had dealt me an unexpected blow."

This assertion by a Cabinet Minister that the Premier informed some of his colleagues of the conspiracy a month before the event, and took no steps to warn Vienna, aroused consternation among Serbia's friends. After allowing Pasitch several months to reply, Professor Seton-Watson appealed to him in *The Times* to disprove the charge if he could. No response came from Belgrad, and it was not till April, 1926, that the veteran statesman publicly denied the statements made by his colleague in August 1924. The testimony of Jovanovich is discussed in the learned volume, *Serajevo*, by Professor Seton-Watson, who concludes that he invented the story. Whether or not we accept this verdict, we owe him gratitude for the new light which his researches have thrown on the aspirations of the Yugoslavs, and in particular of the Bosnian student circles among whom the idea of assassinating the Archduke originated. Yugoslav nationalism is presented in a very different light in Miss Edith Durham's lively works, *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle* and *The Serajevo Murder*. What the one traveller and student regards as a new *Risorgimento*, claiming the approval of all friends of its Italian model, appears to the other an incident in a ruthless Pan-Slav campaign against the Teutonic Powers. A comprehensive survey of the history and aspirations of the Southern Slavs is to be found in Hermann Wendel's *Der Kampf der Südslaven um Einheit und Freiheit*, a massive volume distinguished by its Yugoslav sympathies.

*Gavrilo Princip's Bekenntnisse* contains two very short manuscripts of the murderer, with notes of his conversation recorded by an Austrian psychiatrist attached to the prison. The two passages written at the wish of Dr. Pappenheim, dated May and June 1916, are reproduced in facsimile with a translation into German. The first describes a discussion of the social revolution with his friends, who, like himself, "though we had read socialist and anarchistic writings," troubled themselves little with this question, "since we held that each of us had another duty, a national duty." The second passage is concerned with the Komitadjis or armed bands, Turkish, Serb and Bulgar. Of wider scope and importance are the doctor's notes of his talks with Princip in the first half of 1916, relating to his life, studies, and aims, as well as to his fellow-conspirators and the preparations for the plot. Princip is described as an intelligent youth, consumed by patriotism as he understood it, a sentiment composed in equal measure of love and revenge. He alone was responsible for the plot, and he did not regret his



deed, since he was convinced that the world war would have come without his aid. A vivid account of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, the framing of the reply and the flight of the Government to Nisch was written for a Belgrad paper in 1934 by Gruitch, General Secretary of the Foreign Office, and appeared in a German translation in *Berliner Monatshefte*, July 1935.

## II

Two Bulgarian Premiers have given evidence of the highest interest. In *The Balkan League* Gueshoff describes the crowding events of 1912-13, when the intoxication of victory was swiftly followed by the bitterness of defeat. "As the treaties were concluded in Sofia, Bulgaria standing at the head of the Balkan Alliance and making for it during the war against Turkey greater sacrifices than all the other allies put together, it is only right that the Bulgarian statesman who conducted the negotiations should be the first to break silence and tell what he did for that alliance, how hard he tried to save it from destruction and how little was the Bulgarian nation responsible for its downfall." Having witnessed the "Bulgarian atrocities" in 1876, and having convinced himself that the Young Turks were aiming at the extermination of the Macedonian Bulgars, Gueshoff approached Serbia in the autumn of 1911 as the first step towards the formation of a Balkan League. A month later negotiations began with Greece, whose desire for an agreement had been unofficially communicated through Bouchier, the famous Balkan correspondent of *The Times*. When victory was achieved and the treaty with Turkey was signed, he resigned. "My policy of coming to an understanding with our allies without bloodshed, of keeping the Balkan Alliance intact, of having recourse to arbitration with Serbia and Greece, did not meet with approval. I was not in unity with the Crown." His worst fears were realized, for on June 29, without the knowledge of the Daneff Cabinet, "the Second and Fourth Bulgarian armies, acting on orders from Headquarters, attacked the allies. Is it possible to make the nation answerable for a criminal folly, accomplished without the consent of the legislative body and even without the knowledge of the responsible Government?" A second edition, with a new preface, was published in 1919 under the title *La Genèse de la Guerre Mondiale*, adding the Serbo-Greek

treaty of May 19, 1913, by which the signatories agreed to partition Macedonia and to support each other in the event of Bulgarian resistance.

The two volumes of the Bulgarian Orange-book on the negotiations of 1914-15 have not been translated, but a selection covering June 28-August 5, 1914, appeared in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, March 1928. In these circumstances we should be grateful to Radoslavoff, whose apologia *Die Weltkrise* not only sets forth the point of view of the Sofia Government, but furnishes important documentary material. Summoned to the Premiership when the crazy adventure of the third Balkan war ended in the Treaty of Bucharest, the new pilot, in agreement with his master, gave a sharp turn to the wheel. Russia, he argues, had never intended to hold the balance fairly between Bulgaria and Serbia in 1912, and in 1913 "the high protector of Slavism" encouraged Roumania and Greece to enter the fray. The Treaty of Bucharest—the second partition of the Bulgarian people—registered the bankruptcy of Russo-philism, and further co-operation was impossible with Serbia, who had plotted to cheat her ally of Macedonia. Whither, therefore, could Bulgaria turn? Austria alone had protested against the harsh settlement of Bucharest, and German banks supplied a loan. Still smarting under the Treaty of Bucharest, when Bulgaria was "broken and humiliated by the Great Powers", Radoslavoff watched with scornful eyes the wooing of his country on the outbreak of the world war. Copious extracts from the Bulgarian Orange-book reveal the bribes and threats with which Russia endeavoured to recover lost ground; but the patrons and allies of Serbia were unable to make the clear-cut promise of Macedonia which secured the Bulgarian sword for the Central Powers. In accepting the offer, which fully satisfied the national aspirations, the Government acted in the firm belief that it was fulfilling its holiest duty to the Fatherland. Writing when defeat had condemned his master and himself to exile, Radoslavoff upholds his decision. The most interesting feature of the later chapters is the account of Bethmann's attempt to negotiate with Russia through the medium of the Premier's son-in-law Rizoff, the Bulgarian Minister at Berlin, who journeyed to the Scandinavian capitals both before and after the fall of the Tsar. There is a vivid picture of Radoslavoff at the moment of signing the treaty with the Central Powers on September 5, 1915, in the memoirs of the Bulgarophil Richard von Mach, *Aus bewegter Balkanzeit*.

"It is done. Let the blessing of God, the lord of chance and destiny, rest upon it! God and the Germans—we have confidence in both."

An article contributed to the volume *Rings um Sasonow* by Dimitry Jotzow, former Bulgarian Consul in Hamburg, comments bitterly on the Russian statesman's account of the Balkan wars. Sazonoff, he complains, deserted the Bulgarophil policy of San Stefano, listened to Servian whisperings of "the Austrian danger," and in creating the Balkan League sought to dominate the peninsula. He confided to Poincaré that the victory of Turkey was desirable since her advance could at any moment be held up, whereas a resounding Bulgarian success would involve not only a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans, but also the intervention of Austria. How much, asks the indignant author, is there left of Slav sentiment after such a confession? He stands revealed as a false friend, hating King Ferdinand and hostile to Bulgaria as a potential obstacle to Russian ambitions. The third Balkan war is attributed to Russia's encouragement of Serbia to demand the revision of the Serbo-Bulgar agreement, and to claim Macedonian territory as a *solatium* for exclusion from the Adriatic. Thus when Russia proffered her services it was not as an impartial arbitrator but as a partisan whom Bulgaria could no longer trust. "Expect nothing from us", exclaimed Sazonoff on June 25, 1913. His advice was taken by the Bulgarian people, and when he asked Sofia for help two years later it was refused.

We breathe the atmosphere of Ferdinand's Court in the pleasantly written *Recollections of a Bulgarian Diplomatist's Wife* by Anna Stancioff, née Comtesse de Grenaud. Her husband Dimitri Stancioff was Political Secretary to the Prince, later represented his country at Rome, Paris, St. Petersburg and London, and was Foreign Minister in 1906. The author accompanied the Princess Clémentine as Lady in Waiting to Sofia, where the clever old lady helped her son to establish himself on the throne. The daughter of Louis Philippe is not less attractively presented than Ferdinand's first wife, Marie Louise, of the House of Bourbon-Parma, the mother of King Boris, whose baptism into the Orthodox Church broke her heart. Ferdinand is depicted as a man of boundless ambition, a brilliant talker, a hard worker and a *gourmet*. Despite the breach with the King when Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in 1915, Mme. Stancioff writes in a kindly spirit of the ruler

who was once a friend. Mme. Petroff's *Trente Ans à la Cour de Bulgarie*, 1887-1918, which covers the same ground, is less gentle in tone, for her husband, General Ratcho Petroff, Minister of War in many Cabinets and Prime Minister, was a party politician. All the leading Bulgarian statesmen and members of the diplomatic corps cross the stage, but Bouchier, *The Times* Correspondent, is singled out as the best friend of the country. Ferdinand is painted in glowing colours, and the author's friendship survived her sovereign's fall. While the papers of King Ferdinand remain under lock and key, we must be grateful for such scraps of information as are provided in Madol's biography. Though in no way official, the author received help from the fallen ruler, whom, however, he does not hesitate to criticize. It is regrettable that the Memoirs of Madjaroff are only available in Bulgarian, for they throw valuable light on the Balkan wars as viewed from the Bulgarian Embassy in London. When his country joined the Central Powers in 1915 the Russophil Madjaroff, at that time Minister in St. Petersburg, sent Sazonoff a heartbroken message of farewell.

### III

None of the Balkan States presents such difficulties as Greece owing to the passions of rival camps. During the conflict, and indeed until the electors recalled Constantine, Venizelos was regarded in Western Europe as the voice of his country. Everyone knew that he was on the side of the Entente, and nearly everyone believed that the King was in league with our enemies. When the former returned from Salonica to Athens in 1917, supported by the bayonets of the Allies, he presented his case to the world in two collections of documents. His historical survey in the Chamber in August 1917, formed the kernel of a volume translated under the title of *The Vindication of Greek Policy*, 1912-1919. A more formidable propagandist influence was exerted by the two Greek White-books, covering the years 1913-17, of which an English translation was published by the American-Hellenic Society. The most sensational items were the communications of the King and Queen with the Kaiser during the winter of 1916-17. After the fateful collision with Entente troops outside Athens on December 1, 1916, Queen Sophie in desperation asked her brother when the offensive in the Balkans would begin. The Kaiser replied with

a command to attack Sarrail's left wing, to which the Queen rejoined that the distance was too great, and that an attack would only become possible if he were driven south by the Central Powers. On January 6, 1917, Constantine, answering an inquiry of Hindenburg, explained that Greece would be crushed the moment she began to move, and inquired whether an offensive against Sarrail was contemplated. To this question no reply was received.

After Constantine's death people began to realize that the Minister was not always and necessarily right. The volume entitled *A King's Private Letters* contains letters to Paola, Princess of Saxe-Weimar, from 1912 till his death in 1923. In the opening weeks of the first Balkan war he foretells an inevitable struggle with Bulgaria. The refusal of aid to Servia in 1915 is vindicated by her refusal when Greece had asked for support in the early summer of 1914 in view of a then imminent struggle with Turkey. Admiral Mark Kerr, the head of the British Naval Mission in Greece, who contributes a laudatory preface, testifies that the monarch never contemplated the possibility of fighting against Great Britain.

The trials of Greece are graphically described from the Royalist standpoint by Prince Nicholas in *My Fifty Years*. His testimony becomes of importance with the Balkan war, and provides first-hand material till the overwhelming catastrophe of 1922. Throughout these moving pages the impulsiveness, short-sightedness and insolence of Venizelos are contrasted with the cool statesmanship and prescient patriotism of Constantine. The Minister, we are told, was utterly lacking in judgment, at one moment timidly urging the cession of Kavalla as a sop to the Bulgarian Cerberus, at another plunging into the highlands of Asia Minor. The Prince describes himself as a friend of the Entente from the outset, and dismisses as a childish calumny the legend that his brother was pro-German. His policy was to maintain neutrality or, if neutrality were abandoned, to support the Entente on the basis of agreed conditions. That he ever contemplated support of the Central Powers is disproved by the fact that Greece would immediately have become the prey of the Powers in command of the sea. The King was the true spokesman of the nation's sentiments, and the devotion he inspired was revealed in the amazing blockade of the Palace when Jonnart, the French envoy, hustled him out of the country in 1917.

In his *Political Memoirs* 1914-1917 Prince Nicholas completes

his story. The book is dedicated to the memory of King Constantine, "in the hope that it may clear the name of a man cruelly wronged, a great king, a great gentleman and soldier, a great Hellene." His brother, he declares, was grossly slandered. His idea was to enter the struggle not at the outset but at a later period, when a united nation, after preparing its army for the ordeal, would have been able to hold its own against Turkey and Bulgaria. When war broke out Nicholas was in Petrograd on his annual visit to his mother-in-law, the Grand Duchess Vladimir; and the Tsar, of whom he always speaks with respectful affection, expressed his conviction that England was bound to come in. The Prince shared the universal indignation at the violation of Belgian neutrality. Returning home at the end of August he found Constantine angered by the attitude of the Kaiser, who had appealed to him as a brother-in-law and a Marshal of the German Army. "Does he take me for a German? Besides he forgets his geography—forgets that Greece would cease to exist within twenty-four hours after she had declared herself Germany's ally. For the present it is imperative that we should remain neutral. As to joining Germany, that is and will always be an impossibility." The King and the General Staff expected a long war, Venizelos a short one. The latter was blind to military considerations, whereas Constantine, whose neutrality he labelled pro-Germanism, saved his country. He never doubted that Turkey and Bulgaria would join the Central Powers, and that it would be useless to yield Kavalla in return for vague promises in Asia Minor, which Greece could neither conquer nor hold.

In the summer of 1916 the King sent his brother Andrew to Paris and London, and Nicholas to St. Petersburg, to explain the situation which followed the landing of the allies at Salonika and to counterwork the Venizelist legends. "I want you particularly to give Nicky my word of honour," said the King, "that I never thought of attacking the Allies in the rear. Were I to do so, Greece would cease to exist forty-eight hours later. Tell Nicky also that I never have had and never will have any secret understanding with the Bulgarians, and how hurt I am that Sarraïl's groundless suspicions should be believed, while I pass for a liar and a traitor." Nicholas II, cordial as ever, declared that he had never approved pressure on Greece to sacrifice Kavalla, and had never believed in a secret agreement with Sofia. At the end of their first interview the Tsar put his

hands on the shoulder of his visitor, and, looking him in the eyes, said: "I have entire confidence in Tino. I know how true and loyal he is. I trust him implicitly. I shall do all I can for him." The mission was a failure, for every month tightened the grip of the Allies on Greece. The author returned to Athens in time for the conflict on December 1, 1916, when French shells shrieked over his roof. He attributes the bloodshed to the Allied policy of attempting to impose Venizelos on the country by force.

The return of Constantine in 1921 enabled Royalist historians to supplement the White-books of Venizelos by their own researches in the archives. The task of describing the part of his country during the world war was entrusted to Frangulis by Baltazzi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, shocked by the legends of the Great War, invited him to reveal the truth. Himself an ex-Minister, a jurist and a historian, Frangulis was well fitted to discuss the juridical complications of his theme. The two volumes of his richly documented work, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale*, are a fierce indictment of Venizelos, whom he charges with recklessness abroad and faction at home. The King, he believes, was not only the better statesman in desiring to save his country from the risk of annihilation, but the truer interpreter of the national sentiment. The Minister, he declares, worked for his personal ends, and the eviction of Constantine was followed by a reign of terror.

No less eloquent a champion of the King is "Cosmin," whose *L'Entente et la Grèce pendant la Grande Guerre, 1914-1917*, based on the archives, argues that there was never the slightest shadow of truth in the formidable charges of the Entente. An immense edifice of injustice was erected to justify the punishment of a little people whose neutrality it was necessary to override. The King was on more than one occasion ready to join the Allies; but, unlike his headstrong Minister, he refused to plunge into war at a moment when disaster was inevitable. "Posterity will retain the word Venizelism as a synonym of opprobrium and treason." The Minister, for instance, invited the Allies to embark at Salonika without telling the King. Constantine, on the other hand, whom Venizelos denounced as "Boche from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot," but who is credited by our author with "perfect loyalty to the Entente," appears as a martyr who unselfishly saved his country from invasion at the cost of his throne.

## IV

In her delightful volumes, *The Story of My Life*, Queen Marie of Roumania put her country on the map. The first describes the Courts of her grandmother Queen Victoria, her uncle the Tsar Alexander, and her odious great uncle Ernst, Duke of Coburg, whose heir was her father the Duke of Edinburgh. The second contains an impressionist picture of the Court at Bucharest, dominated by the unbending will of King Carol and only partially alleviated by the florid romanticism of Carmen Sylva. For a woman with ideas of her own and throbbing with vitality it was torture to be kept in a gilded cage, though, as she grew to maturity, her respect for the ruler's fine qualities steadily increased. Prince Ferdinand emerges as a kindly mediocrity, paralysed by the authority of his uncle. With Roumania's intervention in the Balkan conflict and the accession of Ferdinand in 1914 the stage widens and the author becomes a national figure. The third volume, fortified by copious extracts from the Queen's diaries, gives a dramatic picture of the world war seen through Roumanian spectacles—the long hesitation of Bratiano, the plunge in 1916, the collapse and sufferings of the army, the dictated treaty, the re-entry into the struggle when the tide turned, and the triumphant return to Bucharest. Throughout these terrible years the spirited, talented and beautiful Queen was the soul of the national defence.

No contrast could be greater than between Carol and Ferdinand or between Ferdinand and his wife. Roumania's second King is a pathetic figure, destined to a throne in a strange land without the aptitude or the ambitions of a ruler. Carol held all the threads firmly in his hand for nearly half a century, and his daily task engrossed his thoughts. Ferdinand had been so repressed while waiting for his call that, when the moment came, he remained the modest, colourless person he had always been. "Nando is not a man of action", writes his wife. The leader in the hour of agony was not the shadowy Hohenzollern monarch but the full-blooded granddaughter of Queen Victoria. It was a joy to her to note his growing popularity despite the ill success of the war. "He is now loved and appreciated by his people. They have at last understood how honest, unselfish and loyal he is." It was inevitable that such a feminine nature should turn for counsel and encouragement to the more masculine personality of his wife, and equally



inevitable that the world should believe that she swayed her husband's policy. She disclaims the desire to dominate, though she confesses that she had "something of the joyful warrior who never shuns a fight." Her task was to bring the King, who, like his uncle, could not conceive the possibility of a German defeat, to accept the inevitable. Nine-tenths of Roumania, she declares, were for the allies. She was supported in her resolve by her unshakable belief in England and by her devotion to the ideal of Roumanian unity.

Roumania was courted by both sides, but after she had proclaimed her neutrality nobody imagined that she would join the German camp. The only question was whether and when she would fight for the Allies. At the opening of 1915 Ferdinand warned the Kaiser that if Italy broke her neutrality Roumania would probably follow suit. At the end of 1915 a harrowing scene took place between the Austrian Minister and the Queen. The fate of Roumania, argued Czernin, was in her hands, for the King would follow her advice. Now was the time to join the Central Powers, who were everywhere victorious. It was the last chance of coming in on the winning side. The Queen was reduced to tears, but her will was unbroken. "You say that it is my word which can be decisive. I do not know if this is true, but I do know I cannot act otherwise. Nothing can shake me. . . . I should die of grief if Roumania were to go to war against England." England, she reminded her visitor, always won the last battle. Her letters to her cousins George V and Nicholas II, appealing for aid, are reproduced in these pages, and the Tsar's reply expresses the amazement of Russia at "your country's enormous demands."

The chapter entitled "The Decision for War" describes the fateful Council in August 1916 which determined to take the plunge, and portrays the King's agony of spirit. Yet he never looked back, bearing in dignified silence the attacks hurled at him from Vienna and Berlin. Roumania was crumpled up in the twinkling of an eye by the Central Powers, whom she had so rashly challenged. The Royal Family fled to Jassy, where the remains of the shattered army held on to the northern fringe. For a time it was possible to hope that Russia would aid, but in 1917 the colossus with its feet of clay toppled to the ground. It was now, after more than twenty years of residence in her adopted home, that the author took Roumania to her heart. "I feel myself", she wrote, "the mother of an enormous family." When the King, Bratiano, Averescu and all the

leading men had virtually given up hope, she retained her faith in the triumph of the allies.

The picture of King Ferdinand painted by his wife may be supplemented by the touching and intimate study in Princess Marthe Bibesco's *Royal Portraits*. We are introduced to a modest and lonely man who was forced to sacrifice his convictions and whose life was a Calvary. "Sire", remarked Carp, the Germanophil leader, in 1916, "it is not possible to vanquish the Hohenzollerns." "You are mistaken", was the reply, "I have already vanquished one." The Princess describes how her friend Iswolsky, in the autumn of 1913, urged Roumania to draw nearer to Russia. Prince Carol must be looking round for a wife. Olga was over eighteen, Tatiana over seventeen. "An alliance, a marriage? Why not? Speak about it when you go home." Unfortunately for Iswolsky's plan, neither of the Princesses desired to marry the heir to the Roumanian throne. On arriving at Constanza with their parents in June 1914, they displayed mahogany coloured faces, as brown and ugly as those of peasants. They had deliberately concealed their charms by getting sunburnt.

In his articles in the *Revue des deux Mondes* December 15, 1927, and January 1, 1928, entitled *La Grande Guerre vue du versant oriental: un nouvel homme malade en Europe*, Diamandy argues that the determining cause of the struggle was to be found in the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy. He quotes with approval the celebrated prophecy of Albert Sorel: "Quand la Turquie sura quitté le lit de l'homme malade, c'est l'Autriche qui viendra l'y remplacer." With the decline of Islam Austria lost her historic mission as Defender of the Faith. The foundations of her strength were crumbling, and she was unfitted for the test of war. Visiting his colleague, Jagow, in Rome on November 24, 1912, he was amazed to hear from the lips of a German Ambassador opinions identical with his own. "There is, my dear Minister, a new *Homme Malade* in Europe—our Austro-Hungarian ally. The internal situation of the Dual Monarchy is very grave. Anything may occur. What a difficult position for you in regard to Transylvania, and for us with Bohemia!" He added, as if talking to himself: "But Galicia must be left to Russia." Jagow went on to observe that now they all saw the annexation of Bosnia to have been a mistake. Shortly after this unsolicited declaration by the man who was soon to be called to the Wilhelmstrasse, the Roumanian Minister at Constantinople reported a

very similar conversation with Wangenheim. The growing weakness of the Hapsburg realm was openly confessed at the end of 1913 by the Austrian Ambassador in Rome in a farewell conversation with Diamandy, on the transference of the latter to St. Petersburg. "Till now," began Merey, "our relations have rested on a tacit accord not to speak of Transylvania. To-day all that is changed, and our good relations will only continue if we do." The prospects, he added, were disquieting. If Austria were to fight, she would have to punish some Polish and Czech regiments, but she was strong enough to win. "If we wait some years longer our domestic situation threatens us with complete paralysis. What is the good of a fleet and an army, and what will remain of our power without the possibility of expansion towards the South? We should be a big Switzerland and nothing else."

The next point of interest is a letter of John Bratiano, written in 1927, in reply to a question by Diamandy as to what occurred during the visit of Franz Ferdinand and his wife to King Carol at Sinaia on July 10, 1909. The Archduke, we learn, breathed fire and fury against the Magyars—*misérables* who could only be convinced by force. He had no wish for his son to succeed him, as he believed that his nephew Karl would continue his policy. His aim was not to break up Hungary but to reduce her power. He desired a close alliance with Roumania, which would help him in his struggle with the Magyars. It was all in vain, for Tisza, the arch-enemy of the Roumanians, was in control. Bratiano informed Carol in 1913 that if he were called to power he would be unable to renew the treaty with the Triple Alliance. When 1914 dawned Roumania had drifted far away from Vienna, but the two countries were still united to some extent by a common distrust of Russia, whose seizure of Bessarabia was unforgotten. It was one of the major objects of Sazonoff to win back Bucharest, and with this aim in view the Tsar and his Foreign Minister journeyed to Roumania in June 1914. A notable feature of the visit was an excursion of Bratiano and Sazonoff across the frontier into Transylvania. On the journey back from Sinaia to Bucharest a conversation of extreme interest took place. "We know you are bound by treaty to the Triple Alliance," remarked Poklewski, the Russian Minister at Bucharest; "but what would you do if Austria-Hungary were to attack Serbia? Would the *casus foederis* arise?" Bratiano asked Sazonoff if he intended war. "No, but if Serbia were to

be attacked Russia would not stand aloof." The Premier had now had time to prepare his answer. "If, unfortunately, Poklewski's sombre apprehensions are realized, Roumania would act according to her interests." On the strength of this conversation he reported to Berlin that Russia would not stand aloof if Servia were attacked.

A new instalment of Diamandy's Memoirs, entitled *Ma Mission en Russie*, 1914-1918, opened in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, February 15, 1929. When the news of the Austrian ultimatum arrived Sazonoff remarked that if a Conservative Government were in power in England he could count on it, but that with a Radical Government there was no hope. Diamandy argued that Germany should moderate her ally, but Pourtales replied: "Austria is a Great Power; we cannot dictate to her." He added that no one must intervene and that the Servian nightmare must be ended. When war began he remarked to Sazonoff: "I fear both your sovereign and mine will lose their crowns." As early as August 5 Sazonoff gave Diamandy the draft of a military alliance, promising to fight till the territories of the Dual Monarchy inhabited by Roumanians should be united to Roumania. Bratiano replied that he could not at present go beyond neutrality; but he was already, the author assures us, favourable to action. On October 2 Sazonoff made a further approach, suggesting a treaty of benevolent neutrality, Russia engaging to oppose attempts on the territorial integrity of Roumania and recognizing her right to annex the Roumanian territories of Austria-Hungary, with the exception of Bukovina, whenever she wished. The closing pages contain extracts from the scrappy diary of the distracted King from June 28, 1914, to October 9, two days before his death.

The second instalment of *Ma Mission en Russie* (*Revue des deux Mondes*, November 15, 1930) opens with the change of ruler at Bucharest. Ferdinand is depicted as a *déraciné*, performing his duty conscientiously but in a mood of melancholy resignation. Bratiano, whose cautious diplomacy receives high praise, used to calm his impatient critics by showing them in confidence the passage of the Russo-Roumanian treaty of neutrality of October 1, 1914, which reserved the right of Roumania to choose the moment of her belligerence. The account of the negotiations with Italy during the opening months of the war is highly critical. The plan of co-ordinated action was excellent, but Sonnino went his own way and

entered the fray without waiting for his partner. Russia's attitude finds even less favour, for as the champion of all Slav peoples she disliked certain Italian and Roumanian claims. When Diamandy begged Şazonoff to be more conciliatory towards Rome the Foreign Minister rejoined that the Italian representatives, pretending only to speak for themselves, displayed such appetites in Asia and Africa as well as in Europe that it was no wonder if the negotiations languished. He was forced to give way, for Italy's support was sorely needed ; but his resentment was unconcealed. Diamandy had no love for and little confidence in Russia, whose unreliable policy and unbusinesslike methods justified the hesitations and " tergiversations " for which Bratiano was widely blamed.

Two leading statesmen have entered the witness box. A brochure entitled *L'Origine de la Guerre*, published in 1915, explained the whole-hearted devotion of Take Jonescu, an independent Conservative, to the cause of the Entente, and on the conclusion of peace he published a selection from his articles during the conflict. *Some Personal Impressions* contain snapshots of Goluchowsky, Aehrenthal, Berchtold, Czernin, Kiderlen, Venizelos, Talaat, Lichnowsky, Mensdorff, and other celebrities. After the Treaty of Bucharest the author, at that time Prime Minister, assured President Poincaré that the events of the summer had made it certain that Roumania would never fight against France. The world war, he argues, was mainly due to Austria, for whose statesmen he expresses profound contempt. He describes his painful conversation with the Royal Family at Sinaia on August 2, 1914, before the Crown Council whose decision for neutrality broke a Hohenzollern heart. On the eve of hostilities Czernin, the Austrian Minister, astonished the author by remarking that if he were a Roumanian he would attack Austria. " It is your interest and your duty ". Of German statesmen, above all his friend Kiderlen, he has a much higher opinion ; but it is Venizelos alone whom he admires " without restriction ".

Less accessible to Western readers but far more substantial are the five volumes of Marghiloman's *Note Politics*, published at Bucharest in 1927. Fortunately some important passages are in French, and the accounts of the Crown Councils of August 3, 1914, and August 27, 1916, are reproduced in *Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale*, 1928. The Conservatives were divided, but his section was the largest and most influential. The veteran Carp, like his old master King Carol, was too

Germanophil to be representative. At the decisive Crown Council of August 27, 1916, attended by the ex-Premiers in addition to the members of the Bratiano Cabinet, Carp alone opposed the entry of Roumania into the war on the side of the Allies. Marghiloman believed that the Central Powers would win, and he was suspicious of Russian designs on Constantinople. He informed King Ferdinand that he could not approve the declaration of war, but he had no wish to break the national unity. If things went badly, he added, he would be there to help. When the Germans marched in he told the Queen that there was still time to save the country and the dynasty, to which she proudly rejoined that this alternative had never been considered. While Carp wished to propitiate Berlin by the dethronement of the King, Marghiloman stood by his master. Though he was in a minority his patriotism was incontestable, and when he was recalled for a brief space to the Premiership he strove to use his Germanophil reputation to mitigate the victors' terms. To his secretary's complaint of the severity of the Treaty of Bucharest a high German officer replied: "A harsh peace? Just wait till you see what we are preparing for France and England." When the tide turned once again in the autumn of 1918 and Marghiloman made way for Bratiano, he remarked to the King: "Thanks to my Government the dynasty is strong, and the country possesses an army, munitions and Bessarabia." A full and vivid account of the debates at the Crown Council of August 27, 1916, was written by one of its members the same evening and is reproduced in Recouly's *Les Heures Tragiques avant la Guerre*.

Djuvara's slender volume *Mes Missions Diplomatiques*, 1887-1925, despite his length of service and his academic attainments, is disappointing. Educated in Paris he shared the customary devotion of the Roumanian *Intelligentsia* to France. The most finished portrait in his gallery is that of Ferdinand, whose tortuous character he heartily despised. "Take care of your watch", remarked the Prince at a Court reception, "Bulgarian Ministers are present." To Paléologue, the French Minister, he remarked: "Triste valetaille! Ils viennent boire mon vin et c'est tout juste s'ils n'emportent pas mon argenterie." In the course of an audience he repeatedly held up his hands, laden with rings, to Djuvara's face. When no notice was taken he exclaimed: "Mais M. le Ministre, vous ne remarquez pas mes bagues." During his four years at Constantinople (1896-1900) the Roumanian Minister appears to have been *persona*

*grata* with Abdul Hamid, who regularly, after the melting of the snow, confided his apprehensions of revolt. Bulgaria fighting alone, Djuvara used to reply, had no chance of victory. Only a coalition of all the Balkan states (to which category Roumania was presumed not to belong) would be dangerous. Turkey should arm quietly and not worry. The world war found the author at Brussels. Following the Government to Antwerp, Ostend and Havre, he displayed his ardent sympathies with the Allies before as well as after his country entered the fray. Knowing the duplicity of King Ferdinand he deplored the vain attempts of Russia to humour Bulgaria. He warmly welcomed the decision of his Government to enter the Entente camp.

## V

In *La Turquie, L'Allemagne et l'Europe*, 1878-1914, General Mukhtar Pasha discusses the relations of his country with the Powers before the war, utilizing his own experiences and the archives of the Porte. His thesis is that Turkey owed her downfall to the Germanophil policy pursued both by the Old and the Young Turks, instead of co-operating with England and the Entente. As Commander of the First Army at Constantinople he witnessed the Young Turk revolution and defended it against a series of minor revolts. After the failure of the counter-revolution of 1909 the new regime degenerated into a corrupt military dictatorship, whose mania for centralization set the empire aflame. Neither Germany nor Austria, though aware of the Serbo-Bulgar pact of 1912, gave timely warning to their friends on the Bosphorus. Appointed Minister of War in the summer of that disastrous year, he urged the need of immediate reforms, and strove to avert a conflict in which he knew that his country would be defeated. Appointed Ambassador at Berlin in 1913, his distrust of Germany was confirmed on discovering that the Wilhelmstrasse was discussing with the Powers the partition of the empire into zones of influence. Turkey, he argued in his despatches in 1913, must buy off the enmity of Russia with concessions in the Straits as the only way to avert the attack planned for four or five years ahead. His final charge against the Young Turks is that they omitted to make peace in 1917, when the Russian claim to Constantinople was withdrawn.

Of equal significance are Djemal Pasha's *Memories of a*

*Turkish Statesman.* The most interesting of his revelations is that as early as August 2, 1914, Turkey signed a treaty with the Central Powers pledging herself to intervene on their side. Thus the negotiations with the Entente (which are described in the British White-book containing Sir Louis Mallet's despatches from Constantinople and in the second Russian Orange-book) were an elaborate farce in which the Grand Vizier's assurances were designed to cover preparations for attack. The most revealing chapter describes the Young Turk policy of solving the Armenian problem by exterminating the Armenians. No man was less of a religious fanatic than the cool-headed Talaat, the organizer of the massacre, before whose bloody achievements the efforts of Abdul Hamid fade into insignificance.

The writings of Djemal and Mukhtar are supplemented by the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of Marshal Izzet Pasha, who held the highest military and civil posts. The narrative begins with the Young Turk revolution, of which, though he detested Abdul Hamid, he speaks without enthusiasm; and, indeed, the whole volume is a sustained criticism of the Young Turk leaders. Izzet shared the indignation of his countrymen at the action of Austria and Bulgaria in 1908; but when the question of war was discussed by the Army chiefs, and Ghazi Mukhtar, the hero of 1877, volunteered for the front, he explained to the Grand Vizier that the state of the army, above all the lack of munitions, would involve disaster. Being convinced, however, that a Balkan war was inevitable, he desired to diminish the danger to Turkey by securing the alliance or at any rate the neutrality of Greece. His advice was neglected by Shevket, whose centralizing policy he sharply condemns. It is interesting to find him suggesting that Turkey might have averted the Tripoli war by allowing Italy to undertake its economic exploitation under the Turkish flag. A graver mistake was to allow the struggle to continue long after all chance of avoiding territorial sacrifice had passed, and thus to give time to the Balkan States to organize a combined attack. Izzet returned from a second term of command in the Yemen at the end of 1912, when the early battles of the Balkan war had sealed the fate of Turkey in Europe. No one knew better than the Chief of the Staff that the army was not yet equal to a life and death struggle, and it is his gravest indictment of the Young Turks that their policy led straight to a conflict for which the empire was unprepared.



When Shevket was murdered in 1913 Izzet succeeded him as Minister of War ; but he was unable to prevent the Mission of Liman von Sanders, remarking bitterly that if the command of the army was given to a German, the posts of Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister could equally well be entrusted to foreign hands. The antagonism of the European groups was increasing, and when the author accompanied Talaat on a visit to Yalta in 1914, he learned from certain remarks of the Tsar, and from the tone in which they were delivered, how deep was the hatred of Germany at the Russian Court. On the breaking of the storm, which he considers that Germany alone of the Great Powers seriously attempted to avert, he once again urged the safer policy of neutrality, at any rate for a time. He was supported by almost all the Ministers, but Enver's ironical smile showed that his mind was made up. "Our entry into the war was a colossal error, indeed a grave crime against the nation. . . . The will of a single man—not particularly clever—sufficed to hurl our poor, sorely-tried people once more into a catastrophe greater than any which had preceded it." The Young Turks, he declares, were responsible for the moral dethronement of the Empire, and made it the plaything of the ambitions of Enver and his friends. "Thus we steered for the abyss till the world war came and gave us the *coup de grâce*."

Ahmed Emin's *Turkey in the World War*, a volume in the Carnegie series, provides much more than social and economic history. The author was Professor of Statistics at Constantinople during the first part of the conflict, but exchanged his calling for that of a War Correspondent and Editor, and was interned at Malta for twenty months after the Armistice. Among his comrades in exile were over a hundred prominent Turks—Ministers, Governors, Senators, Deputies, Generals, from whom he gained useful information. To the men in power in July 1914, he writes, the world war seemed to be firstly an exceptional chance to end the undignified *rôle* Turkey had played so long, namely of being merely so much booty to be divided as the Great Powers might see fit ; secondly a chance once more to become an aggressor. The attempt to resume this *rôle*, so out of proportion to her resources and equipment, ended in her collapse.

With the aid of unpublished material from Raouf Ahmed, Councillor of Embassy at Paris, Ahmed Emin describes how his country entered the war. When a defensive alliance with Germany was signed, only three Ministers were informed.

Since its purpose was defined as the preservation of peace, Said Halim, the Grand Vizier, was not aware that Turkey's signature would involve her in war, and he continued to argue that it left her the right to maintain neutrality. Talaat and Enver alone realized its real purpose; but while the former had his qualms and regarded it as a gamble, the latter rejoiced in the possibility of taking part in a great war on the German side. The only excuse was that the Entente was inactive while Germany pressed hard. It was in vain that Rifaat Pasha, the Ambassador at Paris, wired warnings in September not to intervene. Of equal interest is the account of the outbreak of hostilities. On October 28 Admiral Souchon, having obtained leave to engage in manœuvres in the Black Sea, fired the first shot without the knowledge of any member of the Cabinet.

## VI

The *Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey*, edited by Somerville Story, survey the reign of Abdul Hamid from the detached standpoint of a Liberal Albanian, who as a friend of Midhat found himself a lonely figure both among the Old and the New Turks. Having gained official experience in various parts of the Empire, he often gave advice to the Sultan which was not accepted. He left the public service in 1900, as he found it impossible to serve both Abdul Hamid and Turkey, but returned after the revolution of 1908 and sat in the new Parliament. Though not a Young Turk he helped in the negotiations during the Bosnian crisis, and renewed acquaintance with the Sultan, who, he assures us, was not the author of the counter-revolution of 1909. His Turkish memoirs end at this point, but an article on Albania reprinted from the *Quarterly Review*, July 1917, concludes the work. Having vainly striven to prevent the Ottomanization of his countrymen, he became President of the Provisional Government of Albania during the first Balkan war. He deplored the narrow frontiers assigned to the little state, and accepted the Prince of Wied without enthusiasm. In January 1914, he handed over his power to the International Commission of Control. When the Prince at last arrived he proved an utter failure, and made no attempt to understand his subjects.

Prince William tells his own tale in his *Denkschrift über Albanien*, privately printed in 1917. It is a pitiful record of domestic anarchy, the greed of neighbours, the rivalries of the

Powers, and the interference of the Commission of Control. Knowing the difficulties in the way he at first refused the offer of the throne but yielded to the wishes of Italy and Austria, from whom the suggestion had come and who promised a small loan. Essad Pasha appears as an accomplished villain, while Aliotti, the Italian Minister, pulled the strings to which the rebels danced. No reader of the third chapter, entitled *The Time in Albania*, will doubt that the Prince did his best for what he calls "my Albanian people" and "our Albanian Fatherland". He is convinced that the majority desired him to remain, and he tells us that in July his situation slightly improved; but at this moment the world war began. A month later he left Durazzo, but without resigning the throne. The people, he believed, wanted his return. His endeavours to keep in touch with Albania were frustrated as far as possible by the Ballplatz, which spoke only of autonomy. Thus the *Denkschrift*, which opens with the intrigues of Italy, closes with the ambitions of Austria. Students who are unable to consult the Prince's apologia should turn to Swire's massive volume *Albania, The Six Months Kingdom*, by Major Heaton-Armstrong, the Prince's Private Secretary. Wied himself contributes two pages, describing how the disunion of the Powers doomed his work, though he adds that he had not the least reason to complain of the attitude of Great Britain.

## ITALY AND SPAIN



## ITALY AND SPAIN

## I

NONE of the Great Powers of Europe has contributed so little to the elucidation of the origins of the war as Italy. In 1926 the Italian Government announced its decision to publish a selection of documents from 1871 to 1914 under the editorship of Senator Salata, but nothing more has been heard of the plan. The Green-book issued in May, 1915, is available in the *Diplomatic Documents* published by the Carnegie Endowment. The most important of the treasures in the archives of the Consulta, namely the Secret Treaty of London, was withheld, and was only revealed two years later by the Bolsheviks. The Green-book was supplemented by a volume entitled *L'Intervento dell' Italia nei documenti segreti dell' Intesa*, published by the Bolsheviks in 1923, containing correspondence between the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and the Consulta. A few details are added in Professor Toscano's monographs, *Convenzioni Militari* and *Il Patto di Londra*.

Tittoni was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1903 to 1909 and Ambassador at Paris from 1910 to 1916, whence he continued to influence Italian policy, since at critical moments his opinion was invited by San Giuliano. He has given a few tantalizing peeps in a little volume of speeches and articles entitled *Who was responsible for the War?* He reveals his part in preventing the Bosnian crisis developing into a European war by the plan of a Conference limited to the points on which the Powers were agreed, and regrets that his proposal, which had been welcomed by the Chancelleries, should have been wrecked by an "ultimatum" from Berlin. "Even now I do not understand it." He describes the visit of the German Ambassador on March 25, 1909, who announced "a most important communication," namely a demand for the immediate recognition of the annexation. Tittoni expressed surprise, since his plan of a Conference had been approved. "That is needless," replied Monts, "since Russia, at the request of Germany, has recognized it already." In a later Balkan crisis

Austria seemed on the point of coercing Montenegro without securing the approval of Italy. On April 13, 1913, San Giuliano telegraphed to Tittoni at Paris, suggesting that if Austria took action in the northern Adriatic Italy should make a temporary landing in the south. If Austria occupied any part of Montenegro, replied Tittoni, Italy must go to Durazzo or Valona, even without her consent. "The day on which Austria in any way disturbs the equilibrium of the Adriatic," he added, "the Triple Alliance would cease to exist." The danger was averted by an international occupation of Scutari; but the ultimatum to Servia in July, 1914, appeared to him the breach of an alliance which required consultation, stood for peace, the balance of power and territorial disinterestedness, and enabled Italy to live at peace with France and England. In answer to the charge of treachery he rejoins that it was the policy of Austria, not of Italy, which had changed.

Since the Italian archives are still closed, *L'Italia alla vigilia della guerra: La Politica estera di Tommasi Tittoni*, by Francesco Tommasini, is peculiarly welcome. The author, an ex-diplomatist, was his secretary. Half the first volume is devoted to a retrospect of Italian policy, with special reference to the Francophil orientation embodied in the agreements of 1900 and 1902. When Tittoni took charge in 1903 he found that the Triple Alliance had lost most of its vitality. He disliked the change, but it was impossible to put back the hands of the clock. The chief figure on the stage is not Tittoni but the French Ambassador, whose ambition it was to wean Italy from the Central Powers. It is interesting to compare the despatches of the Foreign Minister to his Ambassador at Paris with Barrère's reports to Delcassé. Tommasini shares his chief's disapproval of the activities of the brilliant diplomatist, but he pays homage to the skill with which he turned every opportunity to account.

The second volume deals almost entirely with the Morocco crisis and illustrates the drift away from the Central Powers. Austrian policy in Macedonia was criticized with a freedom which was sharply resented, and the Wilhelmstrasse is blamed for rebuffing Italian efforts to mediate in the Franco-German dispute. Monts, the sharp-tongued German Ambassador, was *persona ingrata* with Tittoni, who was only dissuaded from asking for his recall by the Ambassador at Berlin. Italy's ambiguous position, with a foot in both camps, presented unusual difficulties to her representatives abroad, as the Germanophil

Lanza at Berlin complained. When Sonnino, at that time a pillar of the Triple Alliance, entered on one of his brief Premiership, he desired to inform his allies of the secret treaties, but the proposal was vetoed by France. Tittoni himself was not altogether enamoured of the new orientation. He doubted the wisdom of sending Visconti-Venosta, its main author, as the Italian plenipotentiary to the Algeciras Congress, and would have preferred a more colourless diplomatist.

The third volume, entitled *Towards the Triple Entente*, deals with the *détente* between the close of the first Morocco crisis and the annexation of Bosnia. Minor problems such as the Tripartite agreement on Abyssinia, Macedonian reform, and the second Hague Conference are passed in review, but the main interest centres in the unceasing antagonism of the two European groups. More interesting than Tittoni are the French and German Ambassadors. We watch the indefatigable Barrère skilfully sowing mistrust between Italy and her allies, interfering in Italian domestic affairs without ever going too far. Monts was almost equally clever, but he played a losing game. Unlike Bülow he realized that the Triplice was dead. Austrian officials, we are assured, usually tried to smooth away friction, but the hostility of Italian opinion made the attempt of the Foreign Minister to keep up appearances very difficult. Nothing but watchful waiting seemed possible. To terminate the treaty would have been dangerous, and consent to drastic revision was unobtainable. The fourth and final volume will deal with the Bosnian crisis.

Two Italian Prime Ministers have taken the world into their confidence with refreshing frankness. Nigra used to say that Italy and Austria must be either allies or enemies, but Giolitti's *Memoirs* suggest that they were both at the same time. The Italian Premier, for instance, subsidized the Italians in the municipal elections of Trieste, in which the Slavs were routed despite the support of the Austrian Government; and when Aehrenthal secured a concession for the Sanjak railway, his ally worked for a line from the Danube to the Adriatic in company with Servia, Russia and France. The dramatic interest begins with Giolitti's return to power in March 1911. "I had for some time reflected on the Libyan question," he writes, "with the firm intention of solving it at the first opportunity. If we had not gone to Tripoli, some other Power would." The task was easiest, he adds, when France and Germany were disputing about Morocco. Only San Giuliano,



his Foreign Minister, was told of his designs ; but Grey was informed on July 25 that Italy would probably be compelled to take action, and he promised not to oppose. Germany and Austria were only let into the secret after Great Britain and France, and their attempts to hold her back decided the Premier to act at once. The complacent picture of himself and his Foreign Minister spending the summer in the country far from Rome, "to show nothing was in the wind," will always remain a *locus classicus* of secret diplomacy. The most striking feature in the relations of Italy to the Powers during the struggle was the cordiality of Russia, who urged her to give the Young Turks a good lesson and to smite the enemy in a vital part. Such action was disapproved by Aehrenthal, and Grey deplored the naval attack which resulted in the closing of the Dardanelles. The Wilhelmstrasse was much less unfriendly. But Marschall and Wangenheim, his successor at Constantinople, were openly Turcophil, and encouraged the Porte to resist as long as possible the surrender of sovereignty by which alone the war could be brought to an end.

Giolitti's opposition to the attack on Austria in 1915 was not due to tenderness towards an ally, for the pages of this cool-headed realist are filled with denunciations of her policy. Merey, the Ambassador in Rome, was so rude and contemptuous that the Premier and San Giuliano were often tempted to throw him out of the room; and the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 caused scarcely fewer sparks to fly between the Consulta and the Ballplatz than the Tripoli campaign. Jagow told the Italian Ambassador that he had to intervene more than once at Vienna to stifle rash resolutions, and Giolitti proudly recalls how he held back his ally from attacks on Montenegro in March 1913 and on Servia a few months later when she was attacked by Bulgaria. When in the latter case Austria pleaded the *casus foederis*, Italy coldly replied that her proposed action was offensive, not defensive. On the outbreak of the world war Salandra consulted the veteran statesman, who advised neutrality—unlike Sonnino, who at first favoured support of the Central Powers. To those who wished to join the Entente Giolitti replied that the struggle would last at least three years ; that Austria would doubtless make considerable sacrifices to preserve Italian neutrality ; that the Hapsburg Empire was in any case doomed to dissolution by racial discord and the stress of war ; and that Italy would thus obtain her share of the inheritance without the shedding of blood. He adds that the

story of his intrigues with Bülow after his return to Rome in May 1915 is a pure invention. He met the German statesman once in the street and paid him a single visit. On both occasions he avoided the topic of Italian policy, "since I would not meddle with things for which the Government was solely responsible." He further explains that he was not informed of the Treaty of London, which had already been signed.

Still more important are the confessions of Salandra. Called to power in March 1914, on the advice of Giolitti, the outgoing Liberal Premier, and Sonnino, the Conservative leader, he occupied a strong position. *La Neutralità Italiana*, his documented narrative of events from the Serajevo murders to the close of the year, reveals his innermost thought. A war with Austria, he declares, was inevitable, for the two peoples were animated by feelings of mutual aversion. "Italy felt herself incomplete. Each one of us carried in his heart a germ of irredentism." Though the Triple Alliance was prematurely renewed at the end of 1912 instead of in the summer of 1914, there had been no increase of intimacy. New causes of friction had been added, and Albania was a source of continual strife. The situation was described in a remarkable despatch from the Italian Ambassador in Berlin dated July 5, 1914. The smallest incident, declared Bollati, might cause grave complications. To keep the *Triplice* in being was like the labour of Sisyphus, and the disappearance of the Italophobe Franz Ferdinand would not mend matters. "I see no means," he concluded, "of an efficacious and lasting remedy." In his old age Garibaldi had urged his countrymen to prepare for the inevitable war with Austria; and Salandra argues that the gravest fault of Giolitti was that he failed to organize the country, morally and materially, for the great ordeal.

At the end of July San Giuliano was at Fiuggi for his health, and Flotow, the German Ambassador, was staying at the same hotel. The Prime Minister was paying his colleague a visit when the text of the Austrian ultimatum was telephoned from Rome. Salandra and the Foreign Minister listened with exclamations of protest and surprise, while even Flotow exclaimed *Vraiment, c'est un peu fort*. They promptly decided that the *casus foederis* did not arise, and indeed Austria had not dared to ask for support. Parliament was not sitting, the politicians were on holiday, and the responsibility for a decision rested on the two statesmen closeted at Fiuggi. There was not a moment of doubt that neutrality must be proclaimed. It was

impossible," explains Salandra, that Italy should help to secure the domination of the Adriatic for the Central Powers. "Public sentiment corresponded with the calm consideration of our vital interests. The subjection of Servia with or without diminution of territory, and her reduction to impotent vassalage, would signify the definite hegemony of Austria, the triumphant invasion of the Balkans by Germany, the end of all possibility of expansion, and the loss, commercially and militarily, of the Adriatic." Italy, he adds, had always been treated by her Allies as an inferior, and if they proved victorious the relationship would become more galling still. Last but not least, the Italian statesmen were convinced that England would intervene, and Italy had long ago informed her partners that she could never expose her coasts to the guns of the British fleet. It was in vain that an aide-de-camp of the Kaiser hurried to Rome and had audiences of the King. Barrère's feverish anxiety was allayed by the comforting assurance of the Premier, *Vous n'avez rien à craindre de nous*. The country was relieved and grateful. Giolitti and the veteran Visconti-Venosta telegraphed approval. The Ambassadors were divided. Tittoni had urged neutrality from Paris on July 27. Avarna in Vienna and Bollati desired to join the Central Powers, while Garroni at Constantinople openly disapproved the decision of his Government. Imperiali, on the other hand, who was fascinated by Grey, desired to join forces with the Entente. A letter from Bülow to his old friend San Giuliano argued that the best policy for Italy was to seize the opportunity of realizing her dreams on the coast of Africa and throughout the Mediterranean. He added that Germans had long memories.

The most important of Salandra's revelations is that the battle of the Marne converted him to intervention on the side of the Entente. "The historical moment had arrived to complete Italian unity, to extend Italy to the boundaries consecrated by nature and tradition." During the following months, as he admits, his Government appeared hesitant and vacillating. A long period of neutrality was needed, during which public opinion and the army could be quietly prepared for the plunge. He depicts the decision for war as no less inescapable than the provisional decision for neutrality. "It is an occasion which may never occur," he wrote to the King on September 30, "for the completion and aggrandisement of the country." San Giuliano, he repeatedly assures us, though commonly regarded as a pillar of the Triplice, entirely agreed with him ;

and Sonnino fully accepted the policy of war in the spring when, on San Giuliano's death in October, he took over the Foreign Office. The Premier explains that his famous phrase *sacro egoismo* was mystical, not cynical in character; but his version of the steps by which he prepared for war is as cold-blooded as Giolitti's narrative of the Tripoli *coup*. "Macchio is a little suspicious," wrote San Giuliano five days before his death; "we must lull him to sleep." The prescription was faithfully carried out, and every attempt on the part of the Entente to accelerate the decisive step was politely declined. Thus the Tsar's offer to release the Italian-speaking prisoners taken from Austria on condition that Italy should look after them during the struggle produced the evasive reply that the question would be examined; and when Grey invited Italy to assist in assuring the neutrality of the Suez Canal, she declined on the ground that such action would involve war with Turkey and possibly with the Central Powers. The same negative attitude was assumed when Wangenheim informally suggested to Garroni the formation of a League of Neutrals with a view to bringing the belligerents into conference; for, as Salandra confesses, he did not wish to end the war before Italy reached her goal.

The volume ends with the close of 1914, when there were mutterings of the coming storm. "Italy has vital interests to defend, just aspirations to sustain," exclaimed Salandra in Parliament on December 3, and the words were greeted with comprehending cheers. On December 9 Avarna put forward in Vienna demands for compensation under article 7 of the Triple Alliance. On December 19 Bülow, who had just arrived in Rome, paid his first visit to the Premier, and found the position worse than he expected. The Trentino, he suggested, might be discussed, but Trieste was impossible. Thus began the negotiations, partly in Vienna and partly in Rome, which screened the preparations for the attack. The Cabinet, records its chief, never discussed the question of war, but all its members felt that it must come. "We never had any illusions as to the result of the discussions." Though most of them were past middle age, "the idealism of the *Risorgimento* lived on in us old men." There is no talk in these realistic pages of right and wrong, no suggestion that Italy was in danger of being attacked or despoiled.

Salandra's second volume, *L'Intervento*, is intensely dramatic. The goal was clear enough. "We were convinced that we could

not miss the opportunity, which might not recur for centuries, of securing the whole national territory, of acquiring a land frontier no longer open to the usual invaders, of raising Italy to the status of a Great Power." Yet the ship required very careful steering, for the army would not be ready till April 1915. There was no danger of an explosion about the Trentino, parts of which Austria might grudgingly surrender; but to ask for Trieste would be to apply the match. It was therefore decided to propose the creation of a Free City, and to proceed to the larger demands when the time was ripe. Bülow's mission, we learn, was not of much importance. An agreement was out of the question, for no state—certainly not a Great Power—could be expected to cede large and valuable portions of its territory.

At the beginning of March a new chapter opened. Hitherto the task had been to obtain evidence that Austria declined to cede the natural frontiers. Now was the time for Italy to secure the highest possible price from the Entente. England, France and Russia had wooed her ever since the outbreak of war, but it was not till March 1915 that she opened formal negotiations. The principal difficulty concerned the eastern coast of the Adriatic, where her claims in Dalmatia conflicted with the ambitions of Servia, an ally of the Entente Powers and the *protégé* of Russia. So critical, however, was the military situation that on April 26 the Treaty of London gave Salandra and Sonnino their price. A few days later the Triple Alliance was denounced. Instead, however, of plunging straight into the fray, the Government was held up by the unexpected announcement that the army was still unready. The delay provided the neutralists with their opportunity; for a moment it seemed as if Salandra might fall and the Treaty of London be torn up. The closing pages describe the feverish days when Giolitti, strengthened by Austria's enlarged concession, could point to a majority in the Chamber, and Salandra believed himself to possess a majority in the country. The King sided with the Premier and refused to accept his resignation. Giolitti fled from Rome and Italy declared war.

The most valuable evidence on the war years is supplied in two volumes by Count Aldrovandi-Marescotti, who became Ambassador at Berlin after the war and is now a Senator. The first, entitled *Guerra Diplomatica: Ricordi e Frammenti di Diario 1914-1919*, has appeared in a French translation as *Guerre Diplomatique 1914-1919*. About half the volume was

published in *Nuova Antologia*, 1933-1935, and a translation of the chapter on the Fiume discussions fills forty pages of René Albrecht-Carrié's *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference*, published by the Columbia University Press in 1938. A member of the Embassy in Vienna when the war began, the author was recalled to Rome in the autumn of 1914 as Chef de Cabinet to Sonnino, for whom he expresses the warmest admiration. He held the post for five years, took part in important inter-allied conferences, and was Secretary of the Italian Delegation at the Peace Conference.

The first chapter deals with the outbreak of the war. A despatch from the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, dated August 5, 1914, contrasts the statements of Jagow with those of the *Weissbuch* issued on the outbreak of war. To Bollati's inquiries about Austrian intentions the Foreign Secretary invariably replied that he had no information. All he knew was that satisfaction would be demanded of Servia, but there would be no complications. When Bollati remarked that Russia would come in, Jagow replied that she would only bluff. The *Weissbuch* on the contrary confessed that the Government fully realized that an Austrian attack might bring in Russia. Yet Italy had not been consulted, and therefore, she argued, the obligations of the alliance lapsed. Avarna, the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, lacked initiative, and the author believes that a more resourceful diplomatist might have extracted fuller information. He did not expect war, since in his opinion Francis Joseph had been too unsuccessful in previous struggles to try again. The Austrian Government, we are told, did not resent Italy's neutrality.

The second chapter describes the making of the Treaty of London, and indicates that Italy's terms, which seemed to Grey a little excessive, and to Sazonoff, the champion of Servian interests, quite impossible, were only a minimum and might be enlarged when the sharing out began. The third chapter describes the inter-Allied conference at St. Petersburg on the eve of the revolution. The diarist's two dominant impressions were the subordinate position assigned to Italy and the weakness of Russia. If she went out of the war, he reflected, Italy would be less able to press her claims against Austria, whose overthrow was not in the Anglo-French programme.

The fourth chapter reveals Italy in the dark hour after Caporetto when at certain moments even Sonnino lost confidence. At the outbreak of war he had advised co-operation with Italy's

allies, but after changing his mind he never looked back. He frowned on the project of a separate peace with Austria, of which he was informed at St. Jean de Maurienne, and he strove to prevent its further discussion by England and France. When in September, 1917, the King visited Poincaré, Sonnino gave the author a memorandum summarizing the situation and denying the Emperor Karl's statement that a peace feeler had recently been made, unknown to the Foreign Minister but authorized by the King and Cadorna. The memorandum records a statement by George V to Sonnino that he never believed Victor Emmanuel was involved. The hero of the Rapallo Conference in these pages is Orlando, the new Premier, who declared that Italy would continue her resistance "even if we have to retreat into my Sicily". The situation was very grave, "even graver than I expected," as Mr. Lloyd George remarked. No one kept his head better than the King, whom the Allied statesmen visited at Peschiera, and who struck out the opening sentence of a draft proclamation: "An immense disaster has torn my heart as an Italian and a King." It is interesting to learn that he, like William II, was not told everything. Sonnino, writes his devoted Chef de Cabinet, was obstinately secretive. "I am thinking in particular of the moment when he took the intrepid decision and the terrible responsibility of concealing even from His Majesty at Peschiera the Austrian peace offer on the basis of the *status quo* before the war."

The later chapters describe the making of the armistice and the peace. Knowing English as well as French, the author took down the actual words at the meetings of the Big Four and other discussions at which he was present. His notes were read to the Italian Delegation immediately after each meeting, but were not modified. Those of Sir Maurice Hankey, on the other hand, which were afterwards used by Stannard Baker, Mermeix, and other writers, were submitted to the Big Four and occasionally modified. We witness the friction between the victors beginning during the discussions of the armistice with Austria, in which Colonel House indicated that, if the conditions announced in the Fourteen Points were rejected, his Government might have to treat directly with the Central Powers. "That means that the United States might make a separate peace", remarked Clemenceau. "It may lead to this", rejoined House. "House is perfectly calm in making this declaration", notes the diarist. "He seems to have no

nerves. Neither his rather low voice nor his tranquil expression changes. He is calm and courteous without any suggestion of coldness."

The most dramatic chapter in the book, entitled *La Semaine de Passion Adriatique*, records the agitated debates on Fiume in great detail. Wilson was "glacial and intransigent" in regard to Italy, and a sort of nervous tic shook him whenever the Treaty of London was mentioned. He it was, however, who secured Lissa for Italy. The disagreement was painful to all concerned. When the Italian statesmen decided to leave the Conference Sir Maurice Hankey, here described as "Lloyd George's incomparable secretary," shook the author's hand and said "Au revoir . . . Aldrovandi." He had apparently wished to say more, but his tone and expression sufficiently revealed his emotion and sympathy. The final chapter, *Peace with Austria*, records the other discussions of the Big Four, the sessions of the five Foreign Ministers, and the meetings of the Commissions, in so far as Italy was concerned. Her claims in Asia Minor aroused almost as much antagonism in the Anglo-American camp as the problem of Fiume. The final scene is the presentation of the Allied terms to the Austrian Delegation at Saint Germain on June 2. "Vous venez tordre le cou à votre ennemi", remarked Foch to Sonnino with a smile when they met in the courtyard of the Château. The Foreign Minister was silent. After the ceremony, Orlando appeared relieved, remarking "Anyhow the Brenner is secured, and as regards other matters nothing is compromised." Again Sonnino was silent.

A second volume, *Nuovi Ricordi e Frammenti di Diario* opens with the author's notes of the last sessions of the Four, covering the period June 3-28, 1919, with special reference to Italian interests. The second chapter describes the negotiations with England and France at St. Jean de Maurienne in April 1917, which the author attended as Sonnino's Chef de Cabinet. The third reveals the negotiations and treaties between Italy and Roumania during the opening months of the war. Since both of them had designs on the territory of Austria, their old ally, concerted action seemed the obvious course; but they did not always keep in step. The first initiative towards a written agreement came from Bucharest, and on September 23, 1914, a secret treaty pledged the signatories to keep in touch and to give a week's notice if either decided to abandon neutrality. This was not enough for Bratiano, who, after the



death of King Carol, pressed for a defensive alliance. At the moment Italy was cool, but at the opening of 1915 her mood changed. On February 6, 1915, a new treaty, valid for four months, pledged the signatories to co-operate in the event of an unprovoked Austrian attack. This time it was Italy's turn to want more, and Sonnino urged Roumania to join in the fray if Italy were to take action at the end of April. Bratiano temporized and asked her to persuade Russia to further concessions. The request was carried out; but the Russians hesitated, and Roumania, scared by fresh German victories, decided to remain neutral for the present. It was Aldrovandi's task to convey this disappointment to Cadorna, the Italian Generalissimo, just before Italy struck her blow. It is interesting to learn that in April 1915, at the eleventh hour, Jagow proposed a secret meeting with Sonnino in Switzerland or the Italian Lakes. Sonnino replied that he could not leave Rome for more than a few hours, that secrecy was impossible, and that Austria was unlikely to make the necessary sacrifice. A chapter on the entry of Italy into the war adds a few details to Salandra's narrative and contains some vivid personal touches. The book concludes with notes on the discussions at Paris during the Peace Conference relating to an American mandate for Armenia.

The diary of Silvio Crespi, a successful industrialist who became Food Controller in the Orlando Ministry, reaches from the autumn of 1917 to the autumn of 1919. Though mainly concerned with the details of his department, the later portions of his bulky volume, *Alla difesa d'Italia in Guerra e a Versailles*, are of high political interest. As the war approached its conclusion the Ministry, like public opinion, found itself deeply divided by the problem of the Hapsburg Empire. One school, eloquently represented by Bissolati, desired to encourage the national minorities to revolt, while the other, led by Sonnino, dreaded the effect of stimulating their appetites. A powerful Yugoslav state would resist Italian claims on the east of the Adriatic, where the population was Slav. The author, like the Premier, sympathized with Trumbitch and other leaders whom he met and liked.

Crespi took part in the peace negotiations as a technical adviser, and when Orlando and Sonnino suddenly left Paris on the Fiume issue he acted as head of the Italian Delegation. The pages on these crowded days form the most arresting part of the diary, for they witnessed a dramatic struggle with

Clemenceau to uphold the claims of his country. The Supreme Council had altered the text of the treaty to the economic disadvantage of Italy and omitted her name among the Great Powers in the Preamble. After failing to move Loucheur and obtaining only partial satisfaction from Pichon, the author boldly stated his case in a plenary meeting of the Conference held to communicate the treaty to the smaller Powers. Clemenceau glared at him, and after the meeting addressed him in words which stung like a whip. A moment later Tardieu found the Italian with contorted features and asked "Qu'est ce qu'il y a, Crespi, qu'est ce vous avez?" "J'attends votre Président." "Pour quoi faire?" "Pour le gifler." Tardieu thought him mad and sent for Pichon, who managed to convert his formidable chief. Presently the Tiger emerged and smilingly remarked: "Enchanté de vous faire plaisir, de faire plaisir à l'Italie". As a business man Crespi deplored the imposition of astronomical reparations on Germany. It would be wiser, he believed, to lend than to demand milliards. The whole settlement seemed to him unwise, for Wilson yielded to the wiles of Lloyd George and the impetuosity of Clemenceau. In several respects the Italian Keynes saw further than his chiefs.

The declaration of neutrality secured Italy a breathing space. It was, however, argued in certain quarters that the Central Powers would never forgive their recalcitrant ally, and that now she was off with the old love it was time to be on with the new. It was in this spirit that Sabini undertook the negotiations described in his volume, *Le Fond d'une Querelle: Documents inédits sur les relations Franco-Italiennes, 1914-1921*. As an ex-member of the Embassy at Paris and a champion of a Franco-Italian partnership he hurried to the French capital on the outbreak of war. "On my initiative and personal responsibility I took the first steps to associate the countries in the war and to arrange an alliance." Reaching Paris on August 6 he visited his old friend Clemenceau, who agreed that Italy must be brought in as soon as she was ready. Clemenceau took him to the Elysée, where Poincaré's blessing was obtained. The plan was not only for a fighting partnership but for a permanent alliance to keep the territorial compensations demanded as the price of her support. The scheme was further discussed with Briand, Bourgeois, Deschanel, Delcassé, Pichon, Millerand, Barthou and other French statesmen, and then with Barrère in Rome. For a time it seemed likely that

the plunge might be quickly taken, but the road was blocked by Tittoni, who cautioned his Government against the impatient envoy. By October Sabini realized that the hands of the clock could not be moved forward, and desisted from his efforts.

Alessandro de Bosdari's reminiscences, *Della Guerre Balcaniche*, *Della grande Guerra* contain the experiences and reflections of a diplomatist of courage and conviction at various European capitals. The story opens in London at the beginning of 1908, with the author acting as Chargé d'Affaires. He formed a low opinion of Grey's capacity and statesmanship. "I was in intimate contact with him for more than three years, and I was more than once surprised at his levity of judgment, at his inconceivable ignorance of the historical and geographical details of the questions he had to treat, and at the facility with which he contradicted himself." He speaks of the perpetual timidity and uncertainty of the Cabinet, and records Paul Cambon's conviction that he could always bend England to his will. He noted that the Anglo-Russian Entente was already assuming the character of an alliance, and quotes Sir Charles Hardinge's remark that an Austrian attack on Servia would involve a great war.

A quiet year at Budapest convinced Bosdari of the weakness both of the Hapsburg Empire and the Triple Alliance. Wekerle, the Premier, openly denounced Austria, and at his first visit volunteered the information that she was secretly building two Dreadnoughts which were obviously aimed against Italy. Kossuth, the Minister of Commerce, was even more vehemently anti-Austrian, while Apponyi made no secret of his dislike of Italy. Transferred in 1910 to Sofia the author was plunged into the Balkan whirlpool. He only saw the King four or five times, but he received a vivid impression of his sinister personality. He despised his Ministers, but he was an adroit flatterer of foreign Powers. He never met the French Minister without telling him that he felt himself French in every fibre of his being, and equally effusive tributes to the Tsar Liberator spiced his conversation with the representative of Russia. Yet Bosdari was informed in December, 1912, by "a person in the innermost circle" that, though the King might at times appear to be anti-Austrian, his final decisions would always be based on a secret agreement with Austria concluded in 1898. The Minister accepted the confidence as the master-key to the King's policy, and held to it through the

coming years when the Entente Powers believed that he could be won by bribes or threats. He heard the King read his Declaration in the Sobranje on the eve of the first Balkan war in an "artfully tremulant voice"; and he carried away with him the impression of a Renaissance Prince of the Macchiavellian type.

The larger part of Bosdari's reminiscences is devoted to Greece, whither he was transferred at the opening of 1913. His belief in Ferdinand's commitment to Vienna served him as a compass; and when Austria, after the first contest of the third Balkan war, informed Greece that she could not allow the destruction of Bulgaria, he knew that it was more than bluff. He understood the attitude of Constantine, which the French and British representatives attributed to German sympathies. While the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street with ever-increasing vehemence championed Venizelos and his policy of intervention, the Consulta realized that the King of the Hellenes was pro-Greek and nothing else. He was convinced that Germany would win, and expressed his surprise to Bosdari that Italy should dare to enter the fray. If Greece had followed the advice of Venizelos, the country would have been overrun by the Central Powers, and her harbours would have passed into German and Austrian hands. Accepting this reasoning, Bosdari argued that Greek neutrality was more useful to the Allies than her belligerence, and he never believed that Greece secretly assisted German submarines.

For the character and statesmanship of Venizelos Bosdari has nothing but hard words. It was useless to negotiate with him, he declares, and when out of office he was determined to prevent the Entente reaching an agreement with anyone but himself. He defends the Greek Government against the charge of treachery in the tragic events of December 1, 1916, since the intention to refuse the delivery of the guns was known to the Allies. He does not believe that the Greek troops fired first: if they did it was only when the invaders endeavoured to occupy public buildings. The Jonnart Mission, culminating in the deposition of the King, was too much for him. France had on several occasions vainly attempted to secure his recall, but after the eviction of Constantine he voluntarily resigned. The Foreign Minister had hitherto instructed his representative to do everything in his power to avoid a rupture with the Greek Government, and had stood aloof from all the harsher measures of coercion; but the breach had now occurred, and

the will of France and Venizelos was the law of the land. Moreover, as Sonnino explained in reply to the author's expostulations, Italy now depended on England and France for the means of carrying on the war.

Every scrap of information on the bloody deed which precipitated the world war is welcome, and *Il Dramma di Serajevo*, by Luciano Magrini, provides some important evidence. During the retreat of the Servian army in 1915 the author, a war correspondent, made the acquaintance of Tankosich, the actual organizer of the murder. The Major frankly acknowledged that he armed the conspirators, and that he waited impatiently for the event. Magrini is convinced that the Serb Government was also aware of the plot, for explicit statements to this effect, he tells us, were made to him during the retreat by Major Georgevich, son of the ex-Premier. According to this informant, who is said to have enjoyed the confidence of Pasitch, the news began to circulate in high quarters some time before its execution. When the Premier learned of it in the first week of June he desired to avert the crime, and, on discovering that the conspirators had crossed the frontier, he instructed his Minister in Vienna to warn Berchtold. Magrini was informed during the retreat by the ex-Military Attaché in Vienna that Jovan Jovanovich, unable to give any precise information and not altogether a *persona grata* with the Austrian Foreign Minister, conveyed the warning to Bilinski in general terms. Scarcely less interesting is the record of a conversation with Count Fredericks at Helsingfors after the Revolution, describing the struggles of the distracted Tsar against the demand for general mobilization in 1914.

It was the duty of Nitti as the successor of Orlando to sign the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles; but he was in no way responsible for its provisions, and the ex-Premier employed part of his enforced leisure in denouncing its authors, its spirit and its results. His first indictment, entitled *Peaceless Europe*, created a mild sensation, not by any revelation of Italian secrets, but by publishing Mr. Lloyd George's statesmanlike Memorandum of March 25, 1919, appealing for a peace settlement "as if we were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the passions of the war", and warning his fellow negotiators against driving Germany into Spartacism and to a Bolshevik alliance.

In Count Sforza's *Makers of Modern Europe* the best portraits are those of his countrymen. Benedict XV, reserved, ironical,

open-minded, receives a fine tribute as a far-seeing statesman. Sonnino alone of prominent Italians desired to join the Central Powers at the outbreak of war. Aehrenthal confessed that the defeat of Austria in 1866 had made an indelible impression on him as a boy of twelve, and he despised his predecessor Goluchowski for his want of backbone. Pasitch, we are told, possessed a peasant mentality, but he assured the author that he knew nothing of the Serajevo plot.

Though the Papacy was incapable of directly influencing the policy of the belligerents, its moral support was desired by both sides. A convenient record of the actions and allocutions of Benedict XV may be found in *Il Vaticano, l'Italia e la Guerra*, by Ernesto Vercesi, a priest who combines impeccable patriotism with a sympathetic understanding of Vatican responsibilities. The Pope, he admits, desired Italy to remain neutral throughout; but the man denounced by Clemenceau as "le Pape boche" is presented as the disinterested servant of the Prince of Peace. That the Papal Note of August 1917—the most important act of his pontificate—fell on deaf ears in no way diminishes the merit of its author, whom the angry Ludendorff charged with attempting to snatch victory from the grasp of the Central Powers. That the relations between the Vatican and the Quirinal remained normal throughout a critical period is attributed by Vercesi to the tact displayed by the authorities on both sides of the Tiber. An earlier phase of Vatican diplomacy is illustrated in the *Mémoires* of Cardinal Ferrata, written in French and published at Rome in 1920. The second and third volumes describe his experiences as Nuntius at Paris 1890–6, where he zealously supported the policy of rallying French Catholics to the Republic inaugurated by Leo XIII. Though ecclesiastical affairs are naturally in the foreground, we catch interesting glimpses of French politics and politicians.

Cadorna's *La Guerra alla Fronte Italiana*, of which there is a French translation, is dedicated to "my comrades in the holy war". The story opens with a sombre picture of Italy before the plunge. The army, he declares, had been neglected during the long peace; baneful anti-social theories had spread; and the Government had thus been compelled to follow a policy of renunciation and humiliation. When Salandra, in April 1914, offered the War Office to General Pirro, the latter declared that six hundred million liras for six years were indispensable. The Premier refused to promise such a large sum, and the

General declined the post. When Cadorna succeeded Pollio as Chief of the Staff on July 27, 1914, he found a lamentable state of affairs. The campaign studies prepared by the experts in the event of war with Austria were exclusively defensive, and plans for an offensive had to be improvised. "Our military machine was unprepared to sustain even a defensive war, and *a fortiori* an offensive."

The country, according to Cadorna, was no better fitted for a life and death struggle than the army. "The necessity of the war was only understood by an intelligent minority. Italy was morally unprepared for such a great enterprise." The Chamber had been elected under the Giolittian dictatorship, and most of its members were opposed to the war. The instability of Governments depending on votes and therefore compelled to tolerate defeatists was a national danger. Against this dark background of civilian timidity and neglect Cadorna's story of his own achievements stands out in bright colours. "I have the satisfaction of having created a living organism, capable of leading Italy to victory, despite the half-heartedness of the official world, impervious to the military spirit, incapable of belief in the heroic virtues of the people in arms, ignorant of the deepest and soundest foundations of the Italian race." For the crushing disaster which terminated his command the General disclaims all responsibility. "In Caporetto we discern the reflection of all the weaknesses and passions which have distracted the Italian nation in its fifty years of life." A later work, *Altre Pagine sulla Grande Guerra*, contains four studies, of which the longest and most important is devoted to the operations in Albania and Macedonia. The first volume of the voluminous General Staff history, *L'Esercito Italiano nella Grande Guerra*, which traces the development of the army from 1861, may be read as a supplement to Cadorna.

Two books on the struggle in the Balkan peninsula mix a good deal of politics with their military narrative. An extremely unflattering picture of General Sarrail, the French Commander-in-Chief, is painted in Villari's *The Macedonian Campaign*, in which his military capacity, his political indiscretions, and his private character are sharply assailed. That the personality and policy of Venizelos were regarded in Italy with feelings very different from those entertained in France and England may be seen in the work of Colonel Caracciolo, *L'Intervento della Grecia nella Guerra mondiale e l'Opera della diplomazia alleata*, with a preface by the Nationalist Senator,

Enrico Corradini. The Military Attaché in Athens shared the deep-rooted distrust of the Dictator entertained by his Chief, Count Bosdari, and indeed by Sonnino himself, who scented the rival rather than the ally. Behind Venizelos, he believes, stood France, who desired the expansion of Greece, not for the *beaux yeux* of the Dictator, but as a make-weight in the Balkans and the Adriatic against the ambitions of Italy.

Leonida Bissolati's *Diario di Guerra* affords tantalizing glimpses of one of the noblest figures in the war. The leader of the moderate Partito Socialista Riformista, which split off the main party in 1912, was the first Italian statesman publicly to advocate intervention on the side of the Entente, and when his advice was followed in 1915 the athletic volunteer of fifty-eight went straight to the trenches. When Salandra fell in 1916 Bissolati became Minister without portfolio in the Boselli Cabinet, and retained his Cabinet rank when in the dark hour of Caporetto Orlando took the helm. Throughout the conflict he kept the army and the Government in touch, equally trusted and admired by the King and his Ministers, Parliament, Cadorna and the soldier in the ranks. He took part in the Rapallo conference and accompanied Orlando to Paris and London. He was the first Minister (in a speech in October 1916) to include the dissolution of the Austrian Empire among the essential aims of the war and the erection of "a living wall" of free peoples. In this spirit of generous nationalism he opposed the annexation by Italy of territory inhabited by other races. The scrappy entries in the diary are supplemented by a few letters and speeches.

## II

Our chief Spanish witness is Count Romanones, the veteran leader of a section of the Liberals, who warmly defended the handiwork of his contemporaries and himself in *Las Responsabilidades Politicas del Antigua Regimen de 1875 á 1923*. The book was inspired by Primo's *coup*, which the Dictator excused on the ground that the men who had governed since the Restoration had failed. The first part describes the foreign policy of half a century from inside knowledge, and is dominated by the problem of Morocco, which was rendered more acute by the loss of Cuba and the Philippines. When, in 1900, Delcassé resolved on a forward policy, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, Leon y Castillo, reported that a solution would be



reached "with us or without us, and in the latter case against us", and urged that Spain should have a finger in the pie. Long and difficult negotiations ensued between Paris and Madrid, and in November, 1902, he and Delcassé reached an agreement. At this moment the Liberal Sagasta was succeeded by the Conservative Silvela, who, though in favour of the treaty, allowed himself to be convinced by his colleagues that it was dangerous to proceed without British approval. This decision is regretted by the author, who scented no danger and regretfully contrasts the recognition by France of Spain's right to Fez in 1902 with her modest share under the treaty of 1904. In discussing the Agadir crisis he recalls the explicit warning that, if France marched to Fez, Spain would act. The caution was neglected, the request of Spain to share in the ensuing Franco-German negotiations was refused, and only after prolonged discussions was a new Franco-Spanish treaty signed in 1912. The sympathies of the Liberal leader, who was Premier for the second time in 1915-16, were with the Entente, and secret meetings were held with Pichon and Jules Cambon at San Sebastian. The strongest of Conservative statesmen, Maura, was on the side of the Central Powers; but when in 1915 the Kaiser asked Spain to join him or at any rate to afford indirect support, offering Gibraltar, Tangier and a free hand in Portugal, Dato, the Conservative Premier, declined, not only because he disbelieved in a German victory, but because the division of Spanish opinion rendered neutrality inevitable. The author's own services are recorded in more detail in *Notas de una Vida*, which carries us to 1912.

*La Reine Marie Christine* adds some intimate touches to the picture. The Introduction by the translator, André Mévil, salutes Romanones as the best friend of France in peace and war, and quotes his protests against Spanish neutrality. Queen Marie emerges as a high-minded, cultivated, sorely tried woman, who tactfully performed her difficult task during the Regency, but lacked the arts of popular appeal. The sister of the Archduke Frederick, Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army in the world war, naturally desired the Hapsburgs to win, and she was indignant when Italy joined their foes. But she had been friendly to France since the American war, and she was almost as hostile to Germany as her daughter-in-law. She described herself as an Austrian of the time before 1866, and sharply criticized the diplomacy of Berlin. That the King's sympathies were with the Western Powers every one was aware,

but he bowed to the national demand for neutrality. In addition to Alfonso and his mother the veteran Liberal leader provides vivid sketches of the chief political actors on the Spanish stage, and singles out Sagasta for special praise. A portion of the same ground is covered in detail by Leon y Castillo, Marquis del Muni, in his autobiography *Mis Tiempos*, the second volume of which describes the negotiations of the Franco-Spanish treaties of 1902 and 1904, the chief events of his long tenure of the Spanish Embassy at Paris.

A German translation of Count Cartagena's unfinished reminiscences of his residence in Russia is entitled *Erinnerungen an meine Botschafterzeit in Russland* 1914. The Spanish nobleman felt quite at home in the aristocratic circles of St. Petersburg. The Tsar is depicted as kindly but shy, the Grand Duke Nicholas as an impressive personality, and the Germanophobe ex-Empress Alexandra as an influence behind the scenes. Sazonoff only knew love and hate. When the Ambassador praised Witte as the ablest Russian statesman of the last half century, the Foreign Minister angrily exclaimed: "He is a pig, capable of every villainy to satisfy his ambition." The impression left on him by Poincaré's visit in July was that he had come to prepare war. In Cartagena's opinion Russia was responsible for the conflict.



FRANCE



## CHAPTER VI

### FRANCE

#### I

AT the close of the war the French Government published three *Livres Jaunes* of the highest importance, *L'Alliance Franco-Russe*, *Les Accords Franco-Italiens*, 1900-1902, and *Les Affaires Balkaniques*, 1912-1914. The first two revealed well kept secrets. The British Government had never been informed of the exact nature of the ties which bound France to Russia, and the Central Powers had never learned the full extent of Italy's commitments to France.

The first documented work on the causes of the conflict was the substantial volume by Bourgeois and Pagès, *Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre*. A rather truculent preface explains the purpose which the authors had in view. "For seven years Germany has refused, in spite of evidence and in spite of defeat, to admit that she concerted with Austria the sanguinary enterprise of 1914, not in self-defence but to accomplish the plan of subjecting Europe and perhaps the world to her laws. . . . The archives of Berlin and Vienna, in which William II and Francis Joseph counted on keeping for a long time the secret of their ambitious designs and their responsibility, have been opened after the downfall of their power. Written in their own hand, they reveal the history of their plot against the peace of the world." In its original form it was written at the request of the Senatorial Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the war, and was printed in the *Journal Officiel* of January 9, 1921; but the permission to study the archives at the Quai d'Orsay, added to the revelations from Central Europe, necessitated re-writing on a larger scale. The longest and most valuable portion describes Franco-German relations from 1871 to 1914, and is illustrated by quotations from the despatches of the French Ambassadors at Berlin.

That France would follow the example of Germany and England by opening her archives was announced in 1928. The Commission, headed by M. Charlèty, Rector of the University of Paris, was grouped under the three heads of historians and

specialists, diplomatists, and Members of the *Institut*. It contained so many men who had helped to make history, such as Jules Cambon and Camille Barrère, Pichon and Paléologue, that apprehensions were expressed that the publication might be too discreet. These suspicions are met in the Introduction, signed by M. Charlèty, which assures us that the selection has been made by historians; that it has been inspired by no interested motives; and that, in accordance with the intention of Parliament and the Government, the enterprise is inspired by a spirit of strict impartiality.

In the choice of starting-point the French followed the German model, for 1871 inaugurated a new era for both countries. This decision involved an enterprise of about the same magnitude as *Die Grosse Politik*, divided into three parts, the first extending to the end of the nineteenth century, the second to the signing of the Morocco and Congo agreements on November 4, 1911, the third to the outbreak of war. The three series were to march abreast. The British precedent was favoured in regard to notes, which are explanatory, not argumentative, but in one important particular the *Documents Diplomatiques Français* struck out a path of their own. Both the German and British material is grouped into chapters dealing with particular issues, so that the reader may follow the development of a problem or a crisis. The French Commission prefers the chronological method adopted many years before in the volumes on the origins of the war of 1870, and soon to be followed by the editors of the Austrian and Russian collections. The difference between the two systems is minimized by a classified list of the documents in each volume relating to the main subjects of interest. By consulting this table the reader can escape from the bewilderment of parallel negotiations. In addition to the treasures of the Quai d'Orsay the archives of the Ministries of War, Marine and the Colonies have been examined.

The first series has only reached the threshold of our period. Seven volumes of the second have appeared, covering the years from January 1901 to the autumn of 1905. Here for the first time is the documentary record of the process by which Delcassé transformed the face of Europe, terminating the feud with Italy, creating the *entente cordiale* with England, securing the co-operation of Spain for French plans in Morocco, and thus strengthening France for the struggle with Germany which he felt sure would come. Though sharply attacked by

such experts as Hanotaux and René Millet, and though Clemenceau charged him with inflicting on France the greatest humiliation she had ever suffered, his achievements tell their own tale. He strengthened the Dual and weakened the Triple Alliance, and no statesman can render greater service to his country than by changing foes into friends.

In the wooing of Italy Delcassé found an ideal agent and partner in Camille Barrère. There is nothing more arresting than the despatches and telegrams from the great Ambassador who went to Rome in 1898 and stayed till the war was won. His task of detaching Italy from her allies was facilitated by her traditional Austrophobia, which was fully shared by the young King, and by the *Flottenpolitik* which antagonized England. But even if we allow for these advantages, Barrère's tenacity and resource are impressive. The secret Morocco-Tripoli pact of 1900 was an excellent start. The changed relations were announced to the world when an Italian squadron visited Toulon in 1901. The King's telegram referred to *La France, amie de l'Italie*, and Barrère reported that the Italian press was admirable. Yet Italy remained a member of the Triple Alliance. He advised that, in congratulating the Italian Ambassador on the Toulon meeting, his chief should say that France expected Italy to harmonize her engagements with her new friendship. "I allude to the clause which obliged her to draw the sword if Germany is attacked by France. In this defensive form such a clause is clearly offensive for us." Here was the second and more difficult item of the programme. Many Italians believed that Italy would not fight against France, and Barrère agreed with them; but in the region of high politics hypotheses are not enough.

The Triple Alliance was about to be renewed, and the Italian Foreign Minister was pressed to insist on its modification. "It must be harmonized with our new relations", declared Barrère. "We are free from any engagement against Italy. It must be the same for France." The demand proved impracticable, for Bülow's suspicions were aroused. As a substitute a neutrality declaration was signed on June 30, 1902, the text of which remained unpublished till 1920; but its existence was revealed to the Chamber by Delcassé in a sentence which echoed round the world. "En aucun cas et en aucune forme l'Italie ne peut devenir ni l'auxiliaire ni l'instrument d'une agression contre notre pays". The Triple Alliance was renewed, but it was now, to quote Barrère, a negative and



discredited pact. Well might Rouvier exclaim at the stormy Cabinet which decreed Delcassé's fall: "L'Allemagne vous reproche d'avoir débauché l'Italie." A year later the King visited Paris and in 1904 President Loubet journeyed to Rome. It was not an extra dance, as Bülow suggested, but a diplomatic revolution. Rome, declared Barrère, had passed out of the German orbit.

Delcassé now turned his attention to Spain. A hypothetical partition of spheres of influence in Morocco was outlined at the end of 1902, but the Spanish Government felt unable to act without England's consent. The road to Madrid passed through London, where Paul Cambon had been waiting for the conclusion of the South African war. The reports of the historic conversation on July 7, 1903, differ in regard to Egypt. According to Lansdowne, he remarked that no one believed that we were likely to retire, but that, as France could give us trouble in matters of detail, this would have to be part of a general settlement. According to Delcassé, Lansdowne mentioned Egypt, but "in view of my extreme reserve he did not touch on the political question." Lansdowne proceeded to put Egypt in the forefront of his programme. "There is the chief point for England," commented Cambon. "If we recognize the Occupation we should have to ask more in Morocco or elsewhere." The Ambassador conducted the ensuing negotiations with consummate skill, pressing hard for the maximum concessions but never risking a breach. His best card was Cromer's craving for a free hand in Egypt. At Cambon's suggestion the French Chargé in Cairo was instructed to declare, as if the warning came from himself, that the Egyptian settlement depended on suitable compensation for the surrender of French rights in Newfoundland. Cromer played up and the British offer was enlarged.

The most precious item in the Delcassé period is the account of the Cabinet meeting on June 6, 1905. The Foreign Minister's version is only available at second hand, but here at last is a full report drawn up the same day by Chaumié, the Minister of Public Instruction. England, declared Delcassé, had suggested common action against Germany. Written notes had been exchanged. He read the latest of them, and argued for the conclusion of an alliance. Germany was menacing, but he believed it was bluff. "If we refuse her offers, take care lest England, who for the moment desires to co-operate with us to destroy the navy and ruin the commerce

of Germany, whose competition she fears, does not shortly turn towards Germany, leaving us isolated, exposed to attack, in danger of losing the fight in Europe and of being despoiled of our colonies." Germany, retorted the Premier, deeply resented her isolation, and she had used the Moroccan affair to make her protest. She was aware of the *pourparlers* with England, and he had been warned by a responsible agent of Bülow that if they signed the formula of co-operation she would attack. Was France ready for war? Certainly not. The German fleet would be vanquished, but France would be invaded. The country would not understand being plunged into such an adventure in consequence of disagreements about Morocco, and to fight in such conditions of inferiority would be an indefensible gamble. When the debate between Rouvier and Delcassé was over each Minister in turn was asked for his opinion. The Foreign Minister, finding no support, resigned. The deciding factor was France's unreadiness for war. Chaumié's report ends with the words: *L'heure a été vraiment tragique.*

The third series, carrying the story from the end of the Agadir crisis to the outbreak of war, is complete in eleven volumes. The first five deal with the year 1912 when Poincaré was Premier and Foreign Minister. Though he lacked diplomatic experience, his self-confidence carried him through. His first task was to deal with the storm in the Mediterranean when in the course of the Tripoli war two French ships were held up. When Barrère wired that a third French ship had been searched for contraband and released, he received a stinging rebuke. "I ask myself how you could accept the suspicions of the Italian Government. . . . You seem entirely to misconceive the state of French opinion." The distinguished Ambassador kept his temper, explaining that his duty was to convey Italian opinion. "Our agreements with Italy owe their value above all to the assent of the people. This popular sanction it is a major national interest to preserve." In the wearisome negotiations with Spain leading up to the treaty of November 27, 1912, Poincaré showed once again that he was willing to run greater risks than his Ambassador in Madrid.

The Haldane Mission in February, 1912, filled England with hope and France with suspicion. Any written formula, however anæmic, seemed dangerous to Poincaré. The British Government resisted temptation, but German pressure, he feared, might be renewed. The Entente was accordingly

underpinned by the Mediterranean Agreement and the Grey-Cambon letters. Poincaré, like other Frenchmen, would have preferred an alliance, but he welcomed the advance. "I have appreciated the high value of these documents", he wrote to Paul Cambon. "The strategic studies on which the General Staffs of the two countries are secretly at work have henceforth the explicit approbation of the British Government. The Government of the Republic is grateful for the mastery you have shown in this delicate negotiation." In forwarding copies of the letters to his colleagues, the Ministers of War and Marine, he added: "The importance of these documents will not escape you." In Grey's eyes the relationship between the two countries had been defined but not changed. The Quai d'Orsay's interpretation was much more jubilant.

The documents during Poincaré's year reveal a surprising amount of friction with Russia, accompanied by personal dislike of Iswolsky and growing distrust of Sazonoff. The discovery in the course of his visit to Russia in August 1912 that the Serbo-Bulgar alliance concluded under Russian auspices months before was in his own words *une convention de guerre* was a shock, and he strove to localize the Balkan conflict to which it led. The charge based on certain passages in Iswolsky's reports that he aimed at war and spurred on his ally can now be tested by the documents themselves. "I am aware", he wrote to his Ambassador in St. Petersburg, "that in 1908 Iswolsky felt able to attribute the checks in his policy to the hesitations of France. I am anxious that reproaches of this kind shall not be addressed to us." Yet he was equally determined not to exceed the obligations of the alliance, and he repudiated the words attributed to him by Iswolsky: *Si la Russie fait la guerre, la France la fera aussi*. There is not a word to indicate that he desired or worked for war, but the Russian Ambassador was correct in sensing an atmospheric change. There is a stiffer tone in the despatches of the late autumn of 1912, when an Austro-Russian conflict about a Serb port seemed within sight.

The volumes on 1913 are unexciting, but interest revives in 1914 when the Liman crisis revealed the loose texture of the Triple Entente. An alliance with England, as Sazonoff well knew, was impossible, but perhaps a naval convention might be made. The opportunity was seized of Grey's presence in Paris during the visit of George V to Paris in April, and a full report by Doumergue, Premier and Foreign Minister, in

volume X is one of the gems of the collection. How abnormal it was, he remarked, that while France had naval arrangements with England and Russia, there was no co-ordination between the three Powers! Could not England do with Russia what she had done with France? The logical consequence of Anglo-French co-operation in the North Sea was Anglo-Russian co-operation in the Baltic. Grey expressed his willingness to inform Russia of the conversations between the French and English General Staffs and to ask her what she proposed. Doumergue approved but wanted more. Could not there be an exchange of letters stating that, if one of the three countries suddenly found itself menaced, or if the general situation made it appear necessary, a conversation *à trois* would immediately take place? That, replied Grey, could be discussed at a later stage. Once again he underestimated the psychological significance of a transaction which meant so much to Paris and St. Petersburg by increasing the hopes of British co-operation in the event of war. It is surprising and disappointing to learn that no documents relating to the conversations of Poincaré and Viviani in St. Petersburg in July 1914 have been found. The concluding volume, covering the period July 24–August 4, confirms the impression that French diplomacy played a secondary part in the decisions which started the avalanche.

## II

On being evicted from office in January, 1912, Caillaux began to compile a massive work, stuffed with confidential documents. The treatise was designed to appear after his death, or at any rate after the lapse of years—the author in the meantime submitting to insults and calumnies, “la tête haute et la bouche close.” The outbreak of war, however, decided him to shorten his apologia, and the small but weighty volume *Agadir* appeared in 1919. With his call to the Premiership on the eve of the *Panther’s* spring, the narrative becomes an invaluable record of the crisis, in which his task was complicated by the inexperience of his Foreign Minister, de Selves. That the Premier was right in assuming control of the later negotiations few readers will doubt. The preservation of peace with honour, when peace hung on a thread, was a small price to pay for the sacrifice of the *amour propre* of the Foreign Office. That he was prepared to fight rather than allow Germany a foothold in Morocco was made clear throughout, and German

resentment at the November treaties was the measure of his success. He received repeated congratulations on his handling of the crisis from Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin. He closes his narrative with the proud words: "It will be the honour of my life to have prevented the outbreak of the Great War in 1911, despite the obstacles which crowded my path." A second edition was enriched by selections from the intimate correspondence of Kiderlen with a Russian Baroness during the Agadir crisis, which, by accident or design, came into the possession of the French authorities. *Mes Prisons*, the very inferior sequel to *Agadir*, describes the persecutions to which the ex-Premier was subjected during the war, and is of interest less for its facts than for its opinions. It is argued for instance that France should have held back Russia from general mobilization in 1914, and have striven for a moderate peace in 1915.

No politician of the Third Republic has told his story so fully and with such literary skill as the eminent lawyer who succeeded Caillaux in the Premiership in January 1912 and Fallières in the Presidency a year later. Poincaré's first apologia, *Origins of the War*, contained six addresses delivered in 1921. The first three offer a bird's-eye view of French policy from 1871 to the eve of the conflict, in which the pages allotted to the year 1912, when he was Premier and Foreign Minister, are the most valuable. The second half of the volume deals with events from the murder of Francis Ferdinand. The picture of the long voyage home from Russia, with wireless messages pouring in and anxiety increasing every hour, lingers in our memory. He was greeted on July 29 at the Gard du Nord by Messimy, Minister of War: "Vous allez voir Paris, Monsieur le Président: c'est splendide."

The lectures were the prelude to a far more ambitious effort. Planned on a generous scale, richly supplied with documents, and written with consummate forensic skill, *Au Service de la France, Neuf Ans de Souvenirs*, ranks high among political apologies. The first volume, *Le Lendemain d'Agadir*, opens with his first Ministry in January 1912. In reply to the charge that he changed the orientation of France and ruled like an autocrat, he rejoins that his policy was absolutely pacific, that he informed the Cabinet of every detail, and that all his colleagues spoke with emotion of their harmonious collaboration. His first task was to carry through the Moroccan settlement inherited from Caillaux, to select Lyautey to inau-

gurate the Protectorate, and to conduct the wearisome negotiations with Spain. His second was to avoid dangerous friction with Italy during the difficult months of the Tripoli war. His main permanent preoccupation, however, was Germany, described by Jules Cambon and Colonel Pellé, the Military Attaché, as pacific, but nervous, liable to sudden change, and disinclined to accept another humiliation like the Moroccan treaty.

To diminish the danger from beyond the Rhine it was necessary to draw closer the ties with England. We knew from the *Livre Noir* that the French Government attempted to limit the Anglo-German rapprochement initiated by the Haldane mission; but Poincaré reveals the astonishing fact that its intervention was prompted by the private initiative of Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador, who saw in the Anglo-German negotiations nothing but a German trap, and urged the Premier to prevent a declaration of neutrality. The protest was followed by the expression of a wish for a formula defining the relations of the two countries—not a treaty but an exchange of declarations. Nicolson approved the suggestion, but no action was taken till the request was renewed, a few months later, after the Mediterranean agreement supplied a new argument for a definite understanding. The Grey-Cambon letters, however, fell short of French desires. "In Lord Lansdowne's time," wrote the Ambassador, "this would have been the beginning: it is the last word of the Liberal Government. The fall of Delcassé perhaps destroyed the chance of a real alliance." Sazonoff's statement that the French Premier told him that England had contracted to support France is denied; and the recall of Crozier, the French Ambassador in Vienna, is justified on the ground that the loans to the Dual Monarchy for which he pleaded would have been spent on armaments.

The rather sinister figure of Iswolsky pervades the later chapters of the first volume and the whole of the second. He had deeply offended official circles in 1911 by warning the Government not to fight, since Russian opinion would grudge military support for Morocco. Despite the Tsar's assurance, "Of course we are loyal to our obligations," Neratoff, who directed foreign affairs during the long illness of Sazonoff, was almost as chilly as Iswolsky. After this alarming experience the Quai d'Orsay could never be sure whether the Ambassador was obeying or evading instructions. Poincaré openly

expresses his dislike and distrust of the man who has often been represented as his *alter ego*, but he adds that he never heard a word from his lips to suggest that he did not sincerely desire peace. Nor, we are told, was he responsible for the campaign against Georges Louis, whose recall was due to Sazonoff alone, and whose policy, as set forth in his own despatches, differed in no respect from that of the Cabinet.

The second volume, entitled *Les Balkans en Feu*, is one long complaint against Russia and her Ambassador. While France stood for the integrity of Turkey and the *status quo* in the Balkans, her ally encouraged the formation of a Balkan League which Sazonoff falsely described as a strictly defensive alliance, but which the horrified French Premier, on seeing the documents during his visit to St. Petersburg in August, at once characterized as "une convention de guerre". The treaty, he added, contained in germ not only a war against Turkey but a war against Austria. The larger part of the volume describes the efforts of the author first to prevent and then to localize the struggle by the collaboration of the Powers. Every step that he took was approved by the Cabinet, Parliament and the press. Never once, he declares, did he go beyond a promise to carry out the obligations of the alliance. He reviews the passages in the *Livre Noir* which had been taken to prove the contrary, and declares that his utterances were misrepresented by Iswolsky. He also denies that during his visit to Russia he consented to restore the 'Three Years' military service.

The third volume, *L'Europe sous les Armes*, which opens with the election to the Presidency and covers the whole of 1913, is of less interest. Poincaré was the ceremonial head of the nation, and he assures us that he never for a moment overstepped the bounds of his authority. Nor was he tempted to do so, since his successors, Briand, Barthou and Doumergue, continued his firm but pacific policy. Like other Presidents he was told everything of importance, but decisions were made by the Ministers alone. It was the Briand Cabinet, for instance, which decided on the revival of the 'Three Years' law, owing not to pressure from Russia but to the menacing increase of the German army. It was the Briand Cabinet again, not the President, which recalled Georges Louis and sent Delcassé to mend the wire at St. Petersburg. The author renews his complaints against Russia, and indeed his apologia is in large measure a defence of France at the expense of her ally. Sazonoff was addicted to acting or threatening action without con-

sulting the Quai d'Orsay. The name of Iswolsky is rarely mentioned without dislike.

The fourth volume, *L'Union Sacrée*, carries us from the opening of 1914 to the outbreak of war. Poincaré was aware of the fierce attacks upon his conduct and statesmanship, not only by foreigners but by his own countrymen, and he puts forth his whole strength to rebut the charge of having helped to start the avalanche. The negative argument for his innocence is that as President of the Republic he was a mere figure-head. He complains bitterly of his "inactive and cloistered magistracy"; of his dungeon, the Elysée, of the daily penance of routine duties. He envied Loubet and Fallières, who had regained their freedom, while he, after so recently controlling the destinies of France, chafed at his impotence to reply to the attacks of Clemenceau and other foes. "All the Ministers recognized that I scrupulously conformed to the constitutional rules." The only exception to his dignified detachment was his endeavour to keep up the standard of national defence; for the sky was full of clouds, and the Liman crisis increased the tension between Russia and the Central Powers.

The journey to Russia in July was arranged on the advice of Doumergue, the Premier, as far back as January 1914, and was merely the traditional visit of every President in turn. The sinister significance of Iswolsky, "toujours prêt à se mettre en avant", is once more dismissed as a legend, and Sazonoff, like his master, is credited with a sincere devotion to peace. The Tsar gave no indication of expecting serious trouble. "The impression that he left on M. Viviani and myself was very reassuring. He was a faithful ally and a sincere lover of peace." The charge that he himself poisoned the mind of his Imperial host is dismissed with frigid contempt. "I can hardly imagine a French politician, who had become President of the Republic for seven years, allowing himself to be blinded by some absurd ambition to the point of urging the absolute sovereign of a foreign country to the most formidable of wars. But I affirm that if, in a fit of madness, I had so far forgotten myself, the Emperor would gently but promptly have put me in my place, and made me understand that his conception of his duties to humanity was not mine."

The news of the ultimatum to Servia reached the President and the Premier on their way home, and on regaining French soil at Dunkirk on July 29 war seemed almost inevitable. At this point he dispels the rumour that, when asked on landing



whether he thought a conflict could be avoided, he replied: "Ce serait grand dommage ; jamais nous ne retrouvions conditions meilleures." The Senator to whom the words were supposed to have been addressed denies that anything of the kind was said, and his statement is confirmed by the Mayor of Dunkirk, who was at the President's side. Returning to Paris, he was again immured in the Elysée, while Viviani, "faithful guardian of my constitutional irresponsibility", and his Cabinet colleagues steered the ship of state. "All that I know," he wrote in his diary on July 31, "I know only through them ; all that I think I can confide to them alone. I must leave to the Ministers entire freedom of action. If not, I should betray the spirit of the Constitution and expose the country to governmental anarchy." His only initiative in those terrible days was the suggestion, approved by the Cabinet, that he should write a personal letter to King George, since the Cambon brothers reported that nothing but the assurance of British intervention would hold Germany back.

Poincaré is convinced that the Central Powers were responsible for the catastrophe, and he never questions the right and the duty of Russia to defend her *protégé* even at the cost of a world war ; but he criticizes her methods at a moment when the spirit of the alliance, to say nothing of ordinary courtesy, demanded the most intimate co-operation. General mobilization, to which Germany made the anticipated reply, was decreed and announced without the knowledge of the French Government, which "regretted this measure and deemed it precipitate." France had definitely advised against any step which might provoke Germany to mobilize. "So we did not expect the ukase, for which nothing prepared us and of which we only learned several hours later." The compromising sentiments attributed by Iswolsky to Messimy and de Margerie in his telegram of July 30, encouraging Russia to push on secret preparations, are denounced as an invention of the Ambassador. "Once again he put his own words into the mouth of other people." If the governing purpose of Poincaré's first four volumes is to vindicate the pacific attitude of his country and himself, their incidental effect is to exhibit Russia in the light of a disloyal ally, whose policy in 1912 and in 1914 helped to precipitate both the lesser and the larger catastrophes.

The fifth volume, *L'Invasion 1914*, carries us through the opening months of the war. It was not always easy to entertain the confidence in victory which the President was expected

to display. The first task appeared to be to strengthen one of the weakest Ministries France had even known. "But if I open the door," objected the distracted Viviani, "far too many candidates will try to enter, and I shall be smothered." Among the would-be pilots Clemenceau stands out in sharp relief. In the earliest days of the conflict the Tiger paid some friendly visits to the Elysée, but the friendly mood soon passed. The defeats in Lorraine, he cried, were due to Castelnau, a "Jesuit" General. The Tiger could never master his tongue, and on August 27 he lost all control of himself. As the frenzied old man poured forth a torrent of incoherent invective, the President watched him with stupefaction, and contented himself at parting with the words, "Vous êtes fou, ce qui s'appelle fou."

Among other clamorous aspirants to high office was Delcassé. "Mon nom a une signification que personne ne peut contester; c'est ma politique qui triomphe aujourd'hui. Tout le monde m'attend au Quai d'Orsay." His ambition was gratified in the reconstructed Viviani Cabinet at the expense of Doumergue, who divides with Léon Bourgeois the eulogies bestowed on the rare class of men who serve cheerfully in the post assigned to them. No incident was more painful than the flight of the Government to Bordeaux, which provoked the charge of cowardice—a taunt all the harder to bear since the President had opposed the decision. Throughout these months of anxiety and misunderstanding he was supported by his deep-welling patriotism. "If doubts assailed me," he writes on the last day of 1914, "I asked France to sustain and comfort me. Day and night I felt her presence. The greater her suffering, the more she appears to me a living being with features that I know. I see her, erect before me, still marked by the wounds of 1870, but calm, proud, resolute; and I hear her say, in a tone admitting of no reply: 'Since I have placed you in this post and you have accepted it, you must set the example. Hold fast till the end.'"

The most striking feature in the sixth volume, *Les Tranchées*, which covers the first half of 1915, is the resentment of France at the ambitions and methods of her ally. Paléologue announced in March that Sazonoff had at last associated himself with the growing national demand for Constantinople. The President was alarmed by this formal declaration, above all on the ground that, once assured of the city, Russia would lose interest in the German war. In conversation with the French Ambassador

the Tsar explained that he could not ask his people for such terrible sacrifices without giving them the reward of which they had dreamed for centuries. "May I inform my Government," rejoined Paléologue, "that in the questions directly concerning France Your Majesty's views are unchanged?" "Certainly. I wish France to emerge from this war as large and strong as possible. I accept in advance all that your Government may desire. Take the left bank of the Rhine, take Mainz, take Coblenz. Go further, if you like." Poincaré was stupefied by this telegram, and at the wish of Delcassé he drafted an informal letter to Paléologue. The possession of Constantinople and its environs would give Russia, not only a privileged position in regard to the succession to the Ottoman Empire, but also the possibility of becoming a great naval Power. The whole European equilibrium would be changed. Such aggrandisement would only be acceptable if France obtained equivalent advantages. The Ambassador should warn the Russian Government not to allow the vision of Constantinople to divert it from the essential object of the war. This was the only occasion during his Presidency, adds Poincaré, that he corresponded with a French diplomatist. He complains of the unhelpful attitude of Sazonoff when the Allies were wooing Italy, and it was a relief that he hardly ever saw Iswolsky. When a Russian General remarked sententiously "La Sainte Russie s'est levée, et elle marche toute entière", the President's comment was not very flattering. "Russia is limping, without shaking off all the parasites which swarm in the folds of her garments."

The seventh volume, *The Siege War*, covering the last five months of 1915, describes how the struggle used up not only the reputation but the physical strength of French statesmen. Delcassé resigned on the ground that he was too exhausted to read the despatches, though differences in regard to Balkan policy played their part. Viviani had lost credit, and the unofficial search for a new Premier began. Friends suggested that Poincaré, retaining his position as head of the state, might return to active politics. That would not be very constitutional, replied the President, but he would gladly exchange the Elysée for the Premiership. When Clemenceau was mentioned he remarked that it would be dangerous to place a man of such impulsiveness and instability at the helm. He would not, however, stand in his way if a Clemenceau Ministry were desired by the Chambers or indicated by events. It was a depressing

autumn. "The year closes without any sign of victory", runs the last entry for 1915; "yet the dawn must come. Victor Hugo was right: On the day that France disappeared, darkness would cover the earth."

The eighth volume, *Verdun*, includes the first nine months of 1916, and is dominated by the heroic defence of the fortress on the Meuse. France, we gather, was better served by her soldiers than by her politicians. Briand, who succeeded Viviani, was described by Bourgeois, the most valued of the author's friends, as a magic orator, but ignorant, lazy and inclined to claim credit for the initiatives of other men. "But what do all these quarrels matter? Paris has been defended, the battle of the Marne has been won, and to-morrow we shall score a victory at Salonica. It is not the time for personal claims. France has to be saved." Poincaré is not a man to love, but his devotion to France inspires respect. He can forgive even "that monster of contradiction", Clemenceau, his many faults when he delivers a noble patriotic speech. Among the *obiter dicta* which enliven the pages of the diary is a truculent utterance of the German Crown Prince to the Prince of Monaco at the time of the Casablanca crisis of 1908. "My father was wrong to compromise. A nation conscious of its strength should never yield."

The ninth volume, entitled *L'Année Trouble*, is unexciting, but the leading figures gain in definition. The successive Premiers, Briand, Ribot and Painlevé, are treated with respect. Briand, we are told, lacked clarity and the power of rapid decision, but no one possessed a more subtle and receptive mind. "Can anyone resist the magic of his eloquence? Is he not, when he chooses, the master of an assembly or a crowd?" Ribot was growing old, but next to Bourgeois nobody so fully enjoyed the confidence of the President. Painlevé was more at home in science than in politics. As early as October 1916 Poincaré wrote in his diary: "Perhaps the hour will soon strike when I shall have to call to power a man who will sacrifice everything to the war and who possesses a will of his own. Even if it were Clemenceau, my worst adversary, I would call him to the helm." A year later the hour struck. "The Tiger arrives. He is fatter. His deafness has increased. His intelligence is undiminished. But his health? His will? I fear both may be impaired, and I am increasingly aware of the perils of the adventure. But this daemonic personality has the patriots on his side, and if I do not summon him his absence

will weaken any other Cabinet." He was courteous enough, and actually called his old enemy *Mon cher ami* several times. "Je ne prendrai jamais aucune décision sans venir causer avec vous." This admirable resolve was soon forgotten, for the Tiger was determined to go his own way, irrespective not only of the Elysée but of his colleagues.

The stalemate of 1917 encouraged attempts to bring the struggle to an end. The approaches of the Emperor Karl through Prince Sixtus were taken more seriously in London than in Paris, where only the German armies seemed to count. The mysterious discussions connected with the name of Baron von der Lancken were equally fruitless. No one seemed to take much interest except Briand, whose credulity annoyed the President. He believed, for instance, that Germany was prepared to restore Alsace-Lorraine. After watching Briand blow these soap-bubbles, Poincaré wrote in his diary: "I ask myself whether he is engaged in intrigue or whether he has lost the sense of realities. . . . What is he after? He left a painful impression on me, a mixture of distrust and disquietude."

The wholesale slaughter on the Chemin des Dames in May 1917 was followed by mutinies, which determined the Government to refuse passports for Stockholm. "If there is an international Socialist congress at Stockholm," asked Poincaré, "and if the French meet the Germans there to discuss conditions of peace, would you be able to hold your army? Would they continue to fight?" "No," replied Pétain in a loud voice. This monosyllable created a profound impression. After that, declared Painlevé, it would be impossible to issue passports, though there were dangers in either case. If the Congress met, the French army would be immobilized; if the Russian invitation were declined, the Russian army would go out of action and seventy-five German divisions would be thrown on the French front. "Yes," rejoined Pétain; "but the danger of seventy-five German divisions coming to attack us is decidedly less grave than the demoralization of our army."

The tenth volume, *Victoire et Armistice*, is dominated by the Tiger with his teeth and claws. The President, if we may judge from his diary, showed unfailing self-control in dealing with a man who was old and ailing, impulsive and domineering, feared by his own colleagues, full of baseless suspicions and ancient resentments, rough of speech and sometimes intolerably rude. Yet he was a born leader, whose will to victory even in the darkest hours of the German offensive of 1918 burned like a

torch. "Le Comité de guerre", he exclaimed, "c'est moi." Every one knew that he was irreplaceable while the fate of France hung in the balance. Pichon, his Foreign Minister, trembled before him. His confidence was given to Mordacq and Mandel alone.

How close the Allies came to defeat, how gloomy was Pétain, how fortifying the self-confidence of Foch at Doullens, how harrowing the bombardment of the capital, how overwhelming the revulsion of feeling when the invaders fell back, may be read once again in this vivid diary. No wonder that on November 5, 1918, Clemenceau received an indescribable ovation in the Chamber. "Pour tout le monde, il est le libérateur du territoire, l'organisateur de la victoire, seul il personifie la France. Foch a disparu ; l'armée a disparu. Quant à moi, bien entendu, je n'existe pas. Les quatre années de guerre pendant lesquelles j'ai présidé l'Etat et que Clemenceau a consacrée à une opposition sans merci contre les gouvernements successifs, sont totalement oubliées." It was hard to bear, but the official visit of the son of Lorraine to Metz, with which the work concludes, provided consolation. "J'ai les yeux brouillés par les larmes ; mon cœur bat à se rompre. . . . A ce moment Clemenceau est près de moi. Poussé par un mouvement irrésistible je lui dis : Et vous aussi, il faut que je vous embrasse. Bien volontiers, répond-il."

A valuable pendant to the *Memoirs* is to be found in Gérin and Poincaré, *Les Responsabilités de la Guerre : 14 Questions, 14 Réponses*. The book opens with a letter dated June 10, 1929, containing questions by a young man who had fought in the war, but sharply challenged the official version of its causes. Most of his contemporaries of the École Normale, he added, similarly denied the complete innocence of the Entente. He reminds the ex-President that he watered down his charges against Germany in his *Souvenirs*, in which he transferred part of the blame to Austria. Poincaré's reply, dated April 1910, agrees that the responsibilities should be studied without prejudice. He expresses surprise that any one should prefer Iswolsky's assertions to declarations by himself and his colleagues. "There is not an ex-Minister who does not know that I never had great confidence in him. Indeed I put them all on their guard. He was neither an adventurer nor a fire-eater. He was obviously very pleased with himself, vain and boastful rather than nobly ambitious. But there was not the slightest appearance of challenge in his words or in his

despatches as now revealed. Never—I declare on my honour—did I say a word which could lead him to expect from me an extension of the Franco-Russian alliance. I promised nothing to Russia beyond the strict execution of the Treaty. I cannot believe that he misunderstood what I said. He was very intelligent and knew French very well. I am therefore forced to suppose either that the text published by the Soviets is inexact, or that it has been badly translated, or that he attributed to me language which he would have liked me to use in order to influence his Government or to blow his own trumpet. I was far from putting France in tow of Russia. It was equally absurd and unjust to pretend or insinuate that at some moment in 1912 we egged on Russia against Austria.”

Passing from 1912, when he was Premier and Foreign Minister, to 1914, when he was merely President of the Republic, “immured in a narrow Constitution, unable to act”, Poincaré quotes Viviani’s statement in 1914: “The man who was responsible is myself.” No support to Russia, he declares, was promised by Viviani, by Bienvenu-Martin, his deputy during the visit to St. Petersburg, or by himself beyond the strict execution of the treaty, and it was always explicitly understood that nothing would be done without the previous authorization of Parliament. “Sazonoff never appealed to my pretended promises of 1912 or of my visit to St. Petersburg in July 1914. I should not think of invoking my constitutional irresponsibility to deny a moral responsibility. I am not such a coward as to shelter myself behind the Cabinet. I say that both it and I did all we could to avoid a war. You will not find a line in my speeches about *Revanche*.” He admits that his judgments on Germany were milder in his Memoirs than in his lectures, as research proved that Austria was the chief culprit, though Germany’s culpability was not removed. “I never thought of extending to a whole people the reprobation incurred by its leaders and its institutions.” Passing to another of the fourteen questions, he replies that the *Livre Jaune* published on the outbreak of war was edited without reference to him; but the Government at that time sincerely believed that Austria’s general mobilization preceded that of Russia. In his little volume *Raymond Poincaré* Hanotaux pays a tribute of affectionate admiration to his lifelong friend.

Viviani’s *As we see it* (the author’s title is *Réponse au Kaiser*) is the slightest of the contributions by the Prime Ministers of Europe. Writing in 1922, the author is still at white heat, and

the chief interest of the book is the revelation of the mentality generated by the horrors of the struggle. In attacking the *Memoirs* of the Kaiser, "who wields the pen even worse than the sword," he has an easy task. His testimony becomes important with his appointment as Premier and Foreign Minister on June 13, 1914. The visit to St. Petersburg was undertaken by the President and the author "with peace in our hearts, not to concert war. Like our predecessors we agreed to maintain the alliance in dignity and peace." Schoen is described as pacific, honourable, courteous and a genuine lover of France, clearly embarrassed by the rôle which he was compelled to play. For himself Viviani claims that he did everything possible to preserve peace, including a warning to Russia to give Germany no pretext for war.

Ribot's *Letters to a Friend*, written in 1920, were published in 1924. "I am not writing a history in these letters," he explains; "I am merely giving some random impressions without claiming to reveal any secrets." He begins on August 26, 1914, when he was appointed Minister of Finance, and deals mainly with French and inter-allied financial difficulties and experiments until he became Premier in March 1917. More interesting to the general reader are his comments on his colleagues. He blames the flight to Bordeaux, which he attributes to the desire of Viviani to avoid a debate on the military situation. A high tribute is paid to Poincaré. "He always showed the greatest *sang-froid* on learning the gravest news. He never let it be suspected that he could have the least doubt as to the final outcome. Whatever may be thought of his policy before and after the war, no one can fail to render homage to the force of character that he displayed during these long years." Delcassé was a disappointment at the Foreign Office, telling his colleagues little, fumbling over Turkey and Bulgaria, and resigning when French troops were sent to Salonika. On the fall of Viviani in October, 1915, Ribot was offered and declined the Premiership. The burden was assumed by Briand, whose unflattering portrait in some respects recalls Mr. Keynes' picture of Mr. Lloyd George in 1919. "He brings despatches to the Cabinet without having formed an opinion, reads them aloud, watches the faces, anticipates the objections which he scents, and adapts his own opinions to those which he sees emerging."

The letters describing the brief Premiership in 1917 with the aid of official documents are the most valuable. We learn



more of the Doumergue negotiations with the Tsar, of which his colleague Lord Milner was kept in ignorance. The French Cabinet was unanimous against granting passports for the Labour conference at Stockholm, despite the wishes of Albert Thomas and Kerensky in St. Petersburg and of Mr. Lloyd George in London. In narrating the negotiations of Prince Sixtus Ribot describes his interview at Folkestone with Mr. Lloyd George, who cried "We are on the road to peace," and suggested that Italy might have Smyrna instead of Trieste—a scheme that was wrecked by Sonnino at St. Jean de Maurienne. The Armand-Revertera negotiations which followed were authorized by Painlevé, the Minister of War, without the knowledge of the Premier, who also sharply condemns Briand's unauthorized contacts with Baron Lancken. On the succession of Painlevé to the Premiership, Ribot remained at the Foreign Office, his official career ending a few months later when Clemenceau, for whom he had no affection, grasped the reins. Ribot's apologia is supplemented by his *Journal et Correspondance Inédite*, 1914-1922, edited by his son, in which the pages on the Sixtus and Lancken negotiations are the most instructive.

Messimy's *Mes Souvenirs* throw welcome light on the Agadir crisis. As Minister of War in the Caillaux Cabinet he pays tribute to the abilities and character of his chief. Though an ardent patriot he realized that Germany had a case. When Cruppi, the Foreign Minister in the short-lived Monis Cabinet in which the author was Minister for the Colonies, assured his colleagues, the press and the diplomatic corps that the expedition to Fez was only a relief column, and that after the capital was relieved it would return to the coast, he could not repress a smile. It was almost without precedent, he remarks, that a colonial expedition should not involve permanent occupation. When Caillaux took the helm on the eve of the *Panther's* spring, he had to contend not only with the wiles of the Wilhelmstrasse but with the officials of the Quai d'Orsay, who, we are told, were anxious to trip him up. Jules Cambon, who fought France's battles at Berlin, complained of "la politique belliqueuse" of his superiors and added that they were playing with fire. In the middle of August 1911, after weeks of fruitless talk, the situation was so serious that Messimy begged the Premier to take over the negotiations, since the Foreign Secretary de Selves was obviously unequal to his task. Other Ministers made a similar request. The skill and courage of

Caillaux were rewarded by the incorporation of Morocco, "the only great French victory of the years before the war." This opinion was shared by Colonel Pellé, the French Military Attaché in Berlin, whose private letters to the author supplement his official despatches already published. The war party outside the army, he reported, was small. The German Government was anxious for a settlement and public opinion was all for peace, he wrote on October 2; but a hitch, or a feeling that an agreement was unattainable, would involve dangerous tension.

During Messimy's tenure of the War Office in 1911 he took part in two transactions which he records with peculiar satisfaction. General Michel, the Commander-in-Chief, was so temperamentally unfitted for a war that when the Agadir crisis brought a conflict within sight he was induced to resign, and Joffre was appointed in his place. A second incident was of at least equal significance. On July 21, 1911, the evening of the Mansion House speech, Sir Henry Wilson arrived in Paris and was presented to the Minister of War. "At last we know where we are", he began. "The Germans are showing their teeth. . . . I am authorized to come and settle the conditions on which we may be summoned to prove that they are not the masters of the world. But I am not a plenipotentiary." Messimy describes his visitor as the man who played the chief part in the working out of the Entente, and he proudly declares that the agreement then reached under his auspices was applied without alteration when the test came.

Three years later, on June 14, 1914, Messimy was re-appointed to the War Office in the Viviani Cabinet. A fortnight before the Serajevo crime no one, he tells us, expected a general war except the President and the Premier, who was also Foreign Minister. When the storm burst Messimy, like other Frenchmen, suffered torments while the British Government was making up its mind. "Will England be with us? We know there is no alliance. But why did they authorize and encourage the War Office and Admiralty contacts with the French if they were to be withdrawn at the moment of peril? We felt that war could have been averted if England had banged her fist on the table and announced she would join against the aggressor. To every Frenchman the neutrality of England would seem, not indeed actual treachery, but the breaking of the gentleman's agreement which the two countries had implicitly made."

Painlevé's apologia, *Comment j'ai nommé Foch et Pétain*, is confined to the military crisis of 1917. The story begins at the end of 1916 with the appointment of Nivelle, the hero of Verdun, to be Commander-in-Chief on the North and North East front. In March 1917 Ribot succeeded Briand, with Painlevé as his Minister of War, on the eve of the offensive on the Chemin des Dames which Nivelle had planned and to which most of his subordinates looked forward with dismay. The clouds are ruthlessly dispelled in these pages. The battle was lost as soon as it began, and the casualties of the "massacre" exceeded the maximum expectation threefold. 33,000 were killed, mostly on the first morning of the attack, and the army was angered at being set an impossible task. In answer to the fable that some deputies witnessed the slaughter and persuaded the Government to stop it, Painlevé asserts that there was no trace of intervention by the Government or the Chamber. When, however, the dimensions of the catastrophe were discovered, he promptly proposed the supersession of Nivelle by Pétain, the Chief of the Staff, whose post should be filled by Foch. Nivelle at first expressed his readiness to resign at any moment; but he changed his mind, and mobilized his friends in the Cabinet, the Chamber and the press. Meanwhile mutinies broke out, and we learn that there were only two dependable divisions between Soissons and Paris. "It was the worst moral crisis of the war." After an agonizing struggle, in which Painlevé forced his colleagues to choose between Nivelle and himself, Pétain was placed in control and the *morale* of the troops was gradually restored. Of 150 mutineers condemned to death 23 were executed. His proposal to Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Milner in August, 1917, that Foch should become Chief of an Inter-Allied Staff was approved by the two British statesmen but by nobody else. The volume concludes with the author's two months' Premiership and the Conference at Rapallo, where the creation of a Supreme War Council pointed to unity of command.

Clemenceau's reply to Foch, entitled *Grandeur and Misery of Victory*, the work of his last days and hours, is a bitter book. "You challenge me. Here I am." Yet the veteran of eighty-eight writes as much in sorrow as in anger. "My good Foch! have you forgotten everything? Himself alone—that is all he can think of!" Yet he owed the Supreme Command to the French Premier. "I first broached the idea to Haig of placing British soldiers under the command of a Frenchman in

January 1918. He jumped up like a jack-in-the-box, and with both hands raised to heaven, exclaimed: 'M. Clemenceau, I have only one chief, and I can have no other: my King'." Haig, he adds, never submitted wholly to the instructions of the French Generalissimo. Foch was superb at Doullens, but he was spoiled by success. He made a very large contribution to the winning of the war, but he was far from infallible. When victory was won he was a thorn in the flesh. For instance he gave an interview to the *Daily Mail* during the negotiations, combating the decisions of the Allies. Both Lloyd George and Wilson protested against Clemenceau's toleration of such insubordination.

The account of the Peace Conference by its President is of great personal interest. He speaks warmly of Colonel House, respectfully of Wilson, Hankey and Pétain. His sharpest arrows are reserved for his countrymen. "An insubordinate soldier at my heels, and a President who would have liked to see me at the bottom of a well!" Poincaré he describes as "the professional lawyer." He stoutly defends his handiwork against the grumblings of the super-patriots. "The keynote of the Treaty of Versailles is the liberation of the peoples, whereas the keynote of Foch and Poincaré was the occupation of territory by force of arms against the will of its inhabitants. An independent Rhineland would have been contrary to the rights of peoples and to a Europe founded on right. It would also have broken up the alliance. Poincaré did not care for the promise of British and American help. When I reported the offer, he did not seem at all moved. He was silent, which was sometimes his way of showing disapproval." Yet Poincaré, like Caillaux, had been willing to cede part of the Congo in 1911. It was not Clemenceau's fault that Wilson was repudiated by his people or that the treaty was mutilated by the reduction of reparations. The old man, with one foot in the grave, found little to give him pleasure or hope. Germany, he declared, was unchanged, still striving for Empire and revenge. England was pro-German, America greedy, France asleep.

The story of the settlement has been authoritatively told from the French point of view in Tardieu's *The Truth about the Treaty*, which is enriched with a preface by Clemenceau. His earlier writings on Morocco, valuable as they are, yield in importance to this semi-official record of the diplomatic war waged by France with her allies after victory. The Premier

kept the President in the background, and even Pichon, the Foreign Minister, was allowed no initiative. His right hand was Tardieu, whose wide knowledge, ready pen and tireless industry lightened the burden and earned the lasting gratitude of his chief. Next to Clemenceau Tardieu was the chief French architect of the Treaty of Versailles.

The whole work breathes resentful astonishment that the British and American Delegations resisted proposals which, in the author's view, could alone preserve the security of France. The thesis that German rule should end at the Rhine, and that the separation of the Left Bank was the only solid guarantee against invasion, is set forth in the memoranda drawn up by Tardieu at the bidding of Clemenceau. The advocacy of *les frontières naturelles* broke before the Anglo-Saxon defences, Mr. Lloyd George taking the lead in opposing the creation of a new Alsace-Lorraine, President Wilson in frustrating the annexation of the Saar. How a compromise was found in a temporary occupation of the Rhineland and a temporary exploitation of the Saar mines; how the German comments on the Treaty scared the British Premier; how "the second and worst crisis" began; how, in the absence of support from President Wilson, "reason resumed her rights and the amendments vanished one after another," will long be read in these brilliant pages. Nor will posterity quickly lose interest in the Big Three who made the treaty—"an astonishing contrast of natures the most opposite one could conceive. Wilson argued like an academician who criticizes a thesis. Lloyd George discussed like a sharp-shooter. Clemenceau's dialectic proceeded by massive affirmations often animated by fascinating emotion. That one duped the other is a legend. From the beginning they discussed with a profound desire to agree." To compatriots who complain that France had always yielded Tardieu replies that "it was the French point of view which generally prevailed."

A curious story, which may be regarded as an appendix to his work on the Peace Conference, is told in Tardieu's documented volume *Le Slesvig et la Paix, Janvier 1919-Janvier 1920*, written in collaboration with the Danish historian F. de Jessen. The defeat of Germany provided an opportunity for the plebiscite in North Slesvig promised after the campaign of 1864; and early in October, 1918, Professor Friis and some other prominent Danes, at the suggestion of their Government, drafted a declaration to the effect that Denmark desired North

Slesvig and nothing else. The armistice was not yet in sight, and the British Government warned Denmark of "the grave danger of placing herself on the side of Germany at this moment." A few days later the Danish Minister in London was informed that the Allies would deeply regret any arrangement negotiated between Denmark and Germany behind their back. Despite these warnings, the Zahle Cabinet despatched Professor Friis to Berlin directly the Armistice was signed, and an agreement was reached without difficulty for a plebiscite in the northern zone. The Peace Conference had to decide whether it should stand. The Danish Government informed the Allies of its wish for a plebiscite in the north and also in part of the centre of the province if the inhabitants of the latter zone desired to vote. The Commission on Danish claims, of which Tardieu was Chairman, was astonished at such moderation. He was filled with resentment as he contemplated the "sabotage of Slesvig's claims by the Germanophil Cabinet", and he supplies his readers with what appear to him to be the explanation. "Before and during the war Germany had fascinated half the world. The Zahle Government furnishes the most complete instance of this fascination. The fear of Germany decided them to be content with a solution which she had accepted in advance." As we listen to Tardieu denouncing the "policy of national abdication," we are back in the fevered atmosphere of 1919, when it seemed axiomatic to seize every opportunity—however little it might be desired by the party principally concerned—of diminishing the territory of the German foe.

*De la Guerre à la Paix*, the scrappy and querulous memoirs of Klotz, Minister of Finance in the Clemenceau Cabinet, adds little to the testimony of Tardieu. He complains bitterly of Mr. Keynes, "le Germanophile", who led Austen Chamberlain by the nose and infected other members of the British Delegation. "Mr. Hughes was one of our few friends, and he alone stood up to Lloyd George." His judgment of the settlement is far more severe than that of Tardieu. "The peace has been sabotaged. The German Government recovered in dribblets what it surrendered in bulk." Léon Bourgeois' volume *Le Traité de Paix de Versailles* contains the report presented to the Senate by the Committee of Foreign Affairs on October 3, 1919, and the Chairman's speech in the Senate on October 9. No fresh information is embodied in this rather colourless volume, which accepts the treaty as "a peace of

vigilance", needing to be supplemented by alliances and armaments.

### III

No country commanded the services of more brilliant representatives than France, and three of them, the Cambon brothers and Camille Barrère, are in the first flight. An intimate tribute to the eldest is paid in *Paul Cambon : Ambassadeur de France par un Diplomate*. Arriving at the London Embassy at the close of 1898 he found the Fashoda crisis in full swing. The chilly atmosphere prompted him to exclaim : " Je ne demande qu'une chose : c'est de ne pas être un nouveau Benedetti." A new chapter opened on January 11, 1899, when he officially announced the evacuation of Fashoda, reminded Salisbury of the promise to his predecessor to discuss zones in the Bahr-el-Ghazal province, and suggested a commercial outlet in the valley of the Nile. What he described as a personal idea had in fact received the approbation of his chief at Paris a few days before. " He constantly adopted this procedure", writes his son, " first with Salisbury, then with Lansdowne. His interlocutors willingly entered into the game, which ensured for the negotiations complete flexibility. Keeping in close contact with Delcassé, not only by his official correspondence, but by private letters and visits to Paris almost every week, he presented his proposals to the Foreign Office as his personal ideas which did not engage his Government. He never sacrificed one iota of his programme to hasten a solution." His balance and patience were particularly valuable since they counteracted the occasional impulsiveness of his chief.

Paul Cambon's share in the Anglo-French treaty of April 8, 1904, was known to all the world, but his biographer reveals his services as a peacemaker during the Dogger Bank crisis. Benckendorff, we are told, was rather lacking in personality, and his Government failed to realize the necessity of rapid decisions. The situation was saved by the French, Delcassé goading Lamsdorff to action, Cambon building bridges between Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador. Still more exciting was the first Morocco crisis, in which his sympathies were with Delcassé, though he begged his chief to bear in mind the hesitations of Rouvier, the Premier. The fall of Delcassé provoked Barrère to exclaim : " Désormais la guerre est inévitable ; il y a des taches qui ne se lavent qu'avec du sang." The

narrative of the outbreak of war in 1914 describes the agony of the man who had helped to create the Entente Cordiale. So desperate was the situation on August 1 that he felt it necessary to mobilize the Conservative Party. He described Sunday, August 2, as the gravest experience of his life, and the hesitations of the Government filled him with wrath. "Que faites-vous, M. Cambon?" asked Wickham Steed on a visit to Albert Gate. "J'attends de savoir si le mot honneur doit être rayé du vocabulaire anglais." A final struggle took place on August 4 when he asked Grey what would follow England's declaration of war. The blockade of the German ports, was the reply; the despatch of the troops was not contemplated. Cambon protested warmly. With a pencil and map he showed that the landing of an army was envisaged by the agreements of the General Staffs and that any delay would upset the plan.

The careers of the brothers Cambon, a devoted pair, were curiously parallel. Both took an active part in the war of 1870, both had administrative experience in France, both were Governors of African territory, Paul in Tunis and Jules in Algeria, both entered diplomacy in middle life and rose to the highest posts. The attractive picture drawn in *The Life of Jules Cambon* by his niece, Mme. Tabouis, gains in interest by many intimate touches. The years at Washington were memorable for the Spanish-American War, and the years at Madrid witnessed the Franco-Spanish settlement of 1904. From Spain, then a quiet backwater, to Germany was indeed a change, and as early as 1907 he instinctively foretold trouble. "I hope that my departure from Berlin may be as fine as this, but I doubt it," he exclaimed as the train drew out of the Spanish capital.

The next seven years were the most memorable in his life. He never trusted Bülow, finding under a mask of dilettantism a Prussian—very Prussian and not very scrupulous. The Crown Prince was frankly bellicose. Bethmann he respected, but he realized that he was never master in his own house. Kiderlen was not an agreeable person, but Cambon learned to respect his ability and, after a bad beginning in the Agadir *coup*, his relative moderation. "It has never been sufficiently realized," he wrote later, "how greatly the peace of the world was in danger during the second fortnight of August 1911. . . . At bottom, the only thing of which I am proud is that I avoided war in 1911." His services to peace were recognized by Kiderlen, who remarked that "if the negotiators had been



anybody but Jules and I there would have been war." Hot-heads in both countries were furious at the Morocco-Congo treaties of November 4, 1911, and the fiery Déroulède refused to shake hands with the Ambassador. When reproached by a friend for not playing a stronger hand, Cambon replied that he had never been a gambler.

As the sky darkened again in 1913 during the later phases of the Balkan war, and as talk of war became general in both countries, the Ambassador lost the gaiety and sprightly wit which had made him a welcome figure in the salons of Berlin. The conversations between the King of the Belgians and his hosts on his memorable visit to Berlin in November 1913 left no doubt that peace was hanging by a thread. While Paul retained his London post throughout the war, Jules returned to Paris. In the autumn of 1914 he was sent to Rome on a temporary mission to plead for France. The post of Secretary-General at the Quai d'Orsay was created for him in the autumn of 1915, and henceforth his advice counted for more than that of any other official. When he congratulated Joffre after the victory of the Marne, the Commander-in-Chief replied: "Do not congratulate me. It was von Kluck who lost the battle, not I who won it." When Clemenceau was called to the helm in 1917 at the darkest hour, Cambon learned to know both his merits and his faults. He regretted the Premier's studied humiliation of the President, but the greatness of the old man was beyond dispute. "When I see the courage and effort with which he fights from day to day against the worst difficulties and the lowest intrigues in order to rescue France, I cannot help loving him." As a member of the French delegation he took an active part in the making of the peace. The chapter entitled "Thy Peace Treaty" describes the first contact with the German delegates at Versailles and the historic scene when Clemenceau and Brockdorff-Rantzau met face to face. He knew that the settlement was unduly severe, and, despite his admiration for Foch, he described as wild the demand that German sovereignty should end at the Rhine.

In his ripe old age Jules Cambon published his reflections in his little book *Le Diplomate*. During the last years of peace, he declares, no country's diplomacy was superior to that of France. "I cannot mention all our Ambassadors, but I may be allowed to recall the man who, after organizing the Tunis Protectorate, marked his sojourn at Constantinople by defending the massacred Christians against the savagery of the Red Sultan.

Transferred to London he won the friendship of the sovereign, the confidence of the Government, the respect of the British nation. His loyalty dispersed all the misunderstandings between our country and England. The wisdom of his counsels in no way diminished their force. The distinction of his mind, not less than the discretion and the moderation of his language, gained him an authority recognized by all his colleagues, who gladly recognized his position as the *doyen* of European Ambassadors." This resounding tribute to his brother is followed by a eulogy of Barrère. "And what shall I say of that other man, who seemed his living contrast although he was his closest friend? . . . Placed in the most delicate of all posts, among a proud and sensitive people, he gradually, despite a thousand obstacles, unloosed the ties uniting Rome and Berlin, and transformed a possible adversary into a friend, an ally, a brother in arms." The chief quality required in an Ambassador is judgment, but patience is not less essential. During the long negotiations with Kiderlen in 1911 public opinion became enervated. "I urged him to conclude. Under a brusque exterior he had plenty of *finesse*, and he replied: Let them talk. You desire agreement, and so do I. But we must wear down the *amour-propre* on both sides. What was impossible yesterday, what would be difficult to-day, will be accepted to-morrow with relief." Among other *obiter dicta* we note an interesting verdict. "It is infinitely probable that if, in 1914, the Conservatives had been in power, the British Government would have announced its resolution to fight at an earlier stage. That would perhaps have been of importance for the preservation of peace. But the nation would not have been so unanimous in its resolution as it was when the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany exasperated the Puritan conscience of the whole British people."

Some interesting extracts from Jules Cambon's diary relating to the Peace Conference, at which he was one of the five French delegates, were published in *Revue de Paris*, November 1937. When Lord Hardinge asked his opinion on the extradition of the Kaiser he replied that there was no need to make a martyr of him, and Hardinge agreed. Vandervelde, the Socialist leader and one of the Belgian delegates, desired that Germany as well as France should have a demilitarized zone. Cambon disapproved the termination of Belgian neutrality on the ground that it had benefited France as well. It had rendered her excellent service—in 1870, because it was respected, in

1914 because its breach brought England into the war. During the ceremony of the signing of the treaty of Versailles the sun broke through the clouds and stirred the patriotic emotions of the veteran diplomatist. "O sun, ally of the victors, sun of Austerlitz, sun of the Marne, keep faith with us, warm our hearts for ever and the ancient soil of France!" Cambon left no Memoirs, but he sometimes contributed to the reviews. A particularly interesting article, *Bülow and the War* (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1932), suggested by the Memoirs of the ex-Chancellor, described him as an irresistible person but an untrustworthy statesman. His support of Austria in the Bosnian crisis doubtless encouraged her to action in 1914, and Bülow would probably have supported her again had he remained in power, despite his sharp criticisms of Bethmann.

Camille Barrère was an old man when he began to reveal some of his secrets in the *Revue des deux Mondes*. *Le Prélude de l'Offensive Allemande de 1905* (February 1, 1932) describes the Kaiser's attempt to spike the French guns by arriving at Naples in his yacht on the eve of President Loubet's state visit to Rome in April 1904. When the Ambassador expressed his apprehensions, Tittoni replied that if the King went to meet him there would be no toasts. Imagine his surprise when he read in the papers an exchange celebrating the virtues of the Triple Alliance. To his grave remonstrances Tittoni could only reply that the Kaiser had insisted on toasts with such vivacity that it was impossible to refuse. Happily the only result was to intensify the enthusiasm of the welcome to the French President. In Barrère's opinion this incident determined Bülow to launch a diplomatic offensive against the policy of Delcassé as soon as opportunity offered. The chance came in 1905 with the defeat of Russia, though at this stage there was no thought of attack. "There can be no question of us going to war about Morocco", remarked Monts, the German Ambassador in Rome, to another diplomatist. "Since England would certainly take part, Germany would lose her fleet and her colonies; but in 1914 we shall be ready." This confirmed a conversation in the summer of 1904 between Tirpitz and Luzzatti in which the Admiral admitted the weakening of the Triple Alliance, but stressed the importance of avoiding trouble at any rate till 1912, when the German fleet would be numerically superior, not to the British navy as a whole, but to the Channel fleet and its reserves. From these utterances Barrère concluded that Germany would not fight

about Morocco in 1905 and therefore that Delcassé's policy was free from risk.

In the *Revue des deux Mondes*, August 1, 1932, Barrère describes a dramatic meeting at the Elysée on May 15, 1905, at which President Loubet, Rouvier, Delcassé, Paul Cambon and himself were present. The Ambassadors had been summoned from London and Rome to discuss the invitation to a Conference on Morocco, which the Foreign Minister desired to reject. Delcassé's conviction that Germany was bluffing was shared by his two most brilliant lieutenants. He explained that he had received important information as to the intentions of the British Government, and Cambon filled in the outlines, the impression being given that an alliance was within reach. Rouvier, on the other hand, was convinced that the Germans were not bluffing, and he believed France to be completely unprepared for war. When Cambon had finished, he said to him: "Je vous en prie instamment, ne continuez pas cette négociation. Si les Allemands la connaissaient, ils nous déclaraient la guerre." On returning to the Quai d'Orsay Barrère angrily remarked to Paléologue that Rouvier's cowardice would cost France dear. He never ceased to stand up for his old chief. "The noble aim of his policy was the independence of France, the legitimate liberty of a great people. He conceived and carried out the plan of freeing his country from the subjection to Germany which had weighed on her for half a century."

The story is continued in *Le Duel d'Algésiras* (January 1, 1933). Instead of conciliating Berlin by the sacrifice of Delcassé, as he had hoped, Rouvier found that France was being treated like a defeated Power. He sought aid from his chief Ambassadors, but the divergence of opinion was too great to make the meeting useful. Though the Premier said little, the constant refrain was: "La paix, la paix, surtout la paix." The impression, complains Barrère, was deplorable. At this critical time the *Entente Cordiale* was saved by the skill and prestige of Paul Cambon. He was seconded by Barrère, who urged the necessity of sending one of Italy's most experienced representatives to Algeciras. Tittoni agreed, adding that his Ambassador at Madrid was to carry the flag. Barrère was horrified, for Silvestrelli was known for his German sympathies. Tittoni explained that his instructions would be so precise that he could only obey. Barrère remained dissatisfied, knowing better than most that instructions could be

carried out in different ways. At this moment a ministerial crisis brought San Giuliano to the Consulta, and on the day of his appointment the French Ambassador suggested the name of Visconti-Venosta, who had co-operated in the making of the secret pact of 1900. "Vous avez cent fois raison !" cried San Giuliano ; " mais acceptera-t-il ? " Barrère went straight to the house of the illustrious octogenarian, whom he found in his dressing-gown, and who professed his willingness to go if he was given an absolutely free hand. His terms were accepted, and he came out boldly on the French side. Thus the Conference was a resounding success for France, and Delcassé's policy survived his fall. Barrère had a right to be proud of his work.

In the *Revue des deux Mondes*, April 15, 1913, Barrère lifts the veil on the conferences of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne and Rapallo. Early in April 1917 Ribot informed him that the French and British Governments urgently desired to confer with the Italian Government, though the subject of the discussion was not mentioned. Sonnino was suspicious of the invitation, and the Ambassador hurried to Paris to discover its purpose. When Ribot showed him a letter from the Emperor Karl with a suggestion for peace Barrère was not greatly impressed. Berlin, he declared, must have known of the plan, Italy was completely ignored, and Sonnino would certainly decline to talk. On hearing these objections Ribot would have liked to cancel the meeting, but it was too late. The Italian Foreign Minister dismissed the Austrian approach as a snare to sow disunion among the Allies. When the discussion turned to the partition of Asia Minor, and Sonnino unblushingly claimed the Western portion, including Smyrna and parts of Cilicia in the south-east, the atmosphere of the meeting, which Barrère attended, became tense. Ribot and Mr. Lloyd George objected, but, in the words of the Ambassador, Sonnino won all along the line. It was a hollow victory, for Russia's consent was needed to make it valid ; and since the Bolshevik revolution prevented such acceptance, the British Government declared the treaty null and void.

A few months later, after the rout at Caporetto, the Allied statesmen met at Rapallo, where Barrère represented the French Government. Foch radiated confidence and persuaded the Italians that their defeat, though serious, was not a catastrophe. He was ready to supply the substantial help they requested ; and though Sir William Robertson argued that large rein-

forcements were unnecessary in view of Italy's three other armies, Mr. Lloyd George finally rallied to the Italian side. As Barrère pointed out, it was not merely a case of helping an ally in time of need ; it was also a question of the security of France. Without adequate help a second Caporetto might follow the first, Italy might be compelled to make peace, and the final victory of the Allies would be in doubt. If they left Rapallo without agreeing to the necessary reinforcements from the Anglo-French front, the effect in Italy would be catastrophic. When the principle of effective aid was adopted, a sharp discussion arose on the number of divisions to be sent. The Italians asked for fifteen, and the figure was ultimately fixed at twelve. That Italy recovered herself before they arrived was largely due to the knowledge that they were on the way.

Maurice Bompard's *Mon Ambassade en Russie* 1903-1908 depicts Witte as a sort of Russian Colbert. The larger part of the book indeed is dominated by "the greatest figure in Russian politics, the only statesman except Stolypin I met." The Ambassador, however, was well aware of his faults, the worst of them being that he had no programme. No one could tell whither he wished to go. He did not always know himself. The Tsar was loyal enough to the French alliance. "C'est la base de ma politique extérieure, le fondement sur lequel elle repose tout entière", he remarked. Yet the internal regime remained an insurmountable obstacle, and in 1908 Bompard was recalled at the wish of the Russian Government on the charge that he had been seen in a restaurant with Miliukoff. It was in vain that he assured Iswolsky that he had never met or even seen the leader of the Cadets. "Nicholas was suspicion personified, and he mistrusted all who came near him, including the Ministers of his own choice. Yet by a strange paradox he felt blind confidence in the most unreliable of Russian institutions, the political police, which he regarded as the chief support of his Government."

Bompard's advice was sought by Rouvier in the first Moroccan crisis, when Delcassé opposed a Conference. If the Entente with England was solid, replied the Ambassador, Germany's demands should be resisted. In yielding to pressure France would weaken the Entente and encourage her neighbour to further demands. When Bompard had finished Rouvier exploded. "That is what the diplomats are like. Yesterday Paul Cambon and Barrère were here and spoke in the same terms. You are all alike. You live far away in the unwhole-

some atmosphere of the Courts, and you do not know that of your own country. What would happen if Germany declared war? I will tell you. There would be a general rising, not against Germany but against the Government. Mobilization orders would be disobeyed, the soldiers would refuse to march to the frontier, rebellion would break out in all the big cities, and they would proclaim the commune. The whole structure would collapse." On the following day Bompard visited Delcassé, who denounced the Premier, pointing to documents which revealed his secret dealings with the German Embassy. A few days later when he visited the Quai d'Orsay to condole with the fallen Minister he found him busy spreading out the material he had shown to Bompard. "I desire that the first thing that meets his eye shall be these documents which prove his treason. He will see that I am aware of every detail of his criminal conduct."

Bompard only learned the terms of the Björkö pact many years later, but he knew that something was in the wind. Having vainly sounded the Russian Foreign Office and diplomatic circles he visited Witte, the newly appointed head of the Government on December 1, 1905, informed him of the rumours current in France, and begged that the mystery should be cleared up. Witte's reply was on the whole reassuring though lacking in detail. "If France knew what I have done during the last month, she would find it difficult to express her gratitude. During my absence dangerous intrigues took place, not directed against France but threatening the tranquillity of Europe. All I can tell you is that nothing so important has happened for at least fifteen years. Count Lamsdorff showed me the extreme danger on my return, and together we strove to discover the whole truth and avert the danger. We only succeeded with difficulty. Now it is all over." Thus ended what the Ambassador describes as a nightmare which lasted four months.

Next to the preservation of the alliance Bompard's chief task was to foster the Anglo-Russian rapprochement. A talk with Nicolson on his arrival as British Ambassador in May, 1906, convinced him that the negotiations were in good hands. Iswolsky's fidelity to the Franco-Russian alliance was never in doubt. Though he feared Germany above everything, he nevertheless worked hard for a rapprochement with England. "No one else, I am convinced, was capable of surmounting all obstacles at home and abroad. I never joined the ranks of

his detractors, for I regarded him as indispensable to the maintenance of our alliance." The Ambassador welcomed the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 with the greatest joy. "I had looked forward to it for over four years, believing it to be a condition of the preservation of the Franco-Russian alliance for which I was responsible at St. Petersburg." The Tsar was both an asset and a liability. "From him came the gravest dangers, but I never appealed in vain to his fidelity to the alliance. He sometimes struck blows, one of which was almost mortal; but he did so unconsciously, for he always considered himself its accredited guardian."

Bompard re-entered the witness-box with two articles (*Revue de Paris*, July 1 and 15, 1921) entitled *L'Entrée en Guerre de la Turquie*. France, he reminds us, had lost influence in Turkey since 1870, and on his appointment to the Constantinople Embassy he strove to revive it. His labours were in vain, for on July 22, 1914, Enver offered the German Ambassador an alliance. On the day of its signature the Grand Vizier, a complete nullity, declared that Turkey would remain neutral, to which the Ambassador replied that the declaration was useless unless the German Military Mission were sent home. Said Halim was so vague and embarrassed that Bompard felt sure he was deceiving him. All that remained was to try to defer the clash. Enver wished to fight at once. He was prevented by Talaat, but mobilization was quietly begun. The enthusiasm which welcomed the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* was matched by the fury at England's retention of two Turkish battleships at that moment in her keeping. This decision converted Djavid from neutrality, though, like Enver and Talaat, he continued to promise it. Bompard was never deceived, for the sympathies and ambitions of Turkey were unconcealed. "Egypt is for me", remarked Djavid, "what Alsace-Lorraine is for you", and preparations for the invasion began at once. Liman, the head of the German military Mission, visited Enver daily at the War Office, and the two soldiers pored over the war maps. On the eve of the battle of the Marne Bompard entered the Minister's room and heard the laughter of the German officers, who stiffened at his approach. When Talaat was caught in a flagrant lie he blandly observed: "C'est pour la patrie."

No French diplomatist of the Third Republic writes quite so well as Paléologue. Two of his works, it is safe to predict, will be read for generations. Of the many books describing



the decline and fall of the Russian Empire there is none to compare with *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*, the translation of which bears the title *An Ambassador's Memoirs*. In addition to recording the usual contacts and conversations, he enables us by subtle touches to sense the moral instability which rendered the ally a broken reed. Throughout these three fascinating volumes of diary the Tsar appears as the kindest of men, whose will to victory never wavered. The Empress, we are assured, was equally hostile to Germany, though she was the evil genius of her husband. Rasputin inspired him with physical as well as moral disgust. When Sazonoff, of whom the author always speaks with affectionate admiration, was dismissed in 1916, he sadly observes: "The Emperor reigns, but the Empress governs—under the inspiration of Rasputin." The melancholy story closes with the author's return to France after the revolution. In reading Paléologue and other diarists who quote conversations of considerable length, we must bear in mind the fallibility of human memory and the photographer's temptation to touch up his work.

Many years later Paléologue published selections from his diary during his years at the Quai d'Orsay. *The Turning Point: Three Critical Years, 1904-1906* paints a picture of Delcassé, the hero of the story, which throbs with life. The curtain rises on January 1, 1904.

*Paléologue*: What may I wish you for the New Year?

*Delcassé*: First that Russia and Japan may not come to blows. Then that I may succeed in my agreements with England, Italy and Spain.

*Paléologue*: You do not mention Morocco.

*Delcassé*: There is no need. If Russia keeps her hands free in Europe, and if I make my pacts with England, Italy and Spain, you will see Morocco fall into our garden like ripe fruit.

Delcassé, unlike Paléologue, was surprised by the Japanese attack, but the progress of the negotiations in London consoled him. "We are liquidating all our past quarrels", he remarked on February 1. "But I shall not stop there. It should lead to a political alliance with England. What fair horizons would then open to us! If we could lean both on Russia and England, how strong we should be in dealing with Germany!" He inherited the idea of an English alliance, he added, from Gambetta, and he had dreamed of it even during the Fashoda crisis.

Paléologue confirms the accuracy of this statement by a quotation from his diary on December 29, 1898. The evacuation of Fashoda, declared the Foreign Minister, would soon be merely an unpleasant memory. For Russia as for France England was a rival but not an enemy, above all not the enemy. "Ah! my dear Paléologue, if Russia, England and France could ally against Germany!" Italy, too, he believed, could be won. President Loubet, we are told, was strongly opposed to the plan of an official visit to Rome, fearing a breach with the Vatican, but he finally yielded to the argument that it was the price of an alliance. Delcassé never doubted that William II, with Holstein behind him, would sooner or later declare war against France, and his whole aim was to win trusty comrades in advance. There was no time to be lost, for a German traitor, described as *Le Vengeur*, sold to the French military authorities the latest plan of campaign. (The story of this mysterious episode is told in a small volume by Paléologue, entitled *Un Prelude à l'invasion de la Belgique. Le Plan Schlieffen.*)

The most dramatic chapters describe the first Morocco crisis, the struggle between Rouvier and Delcassé, and the fall of the Foreign Minister. Barrère, who was summoned from Rome to give advice, sided with his chief and asserted that the Kaiser was bluffing. "The Germans, stupid though they are, are not quite so stupid as to quarrel with France about a matter which concerns them so little as Morocco." Paléologue admitted that the arrogance of William II might well be bluff, but one could not be sure. Moreover Delcassé had often complained that his colleagues had neglected the army and navy. He reproduces a "lettre personnelle" of the highest importance from Paul Cambon to Delcassé, dated June 1, 1905, in which the Ambassador warns his chief not to go too fast. "I have not yet spoken to Lord Lansdowne about his letter relative to a general understanding between our two Governments. A conversation of this kind cannot be entered on without envisaging all the consequences and without the assent of M. Rouvier. You remember his last words as we left the Elysée: *Surtout ne vous concertez pas!* Unless he has completely changed his opinion, it seems to me difficult for you to respond to overtures which will lead us to an alliance. What should we reply to Lord Lansdowne if he proposed, in view of grave eventualities, to bring together the chiefs of staff on land and sea? We should expose ourselves to a suggestion of this kind if we lent ourselves too easily to a general conversa-

tion. You would certainly not be followed by your Cabinet colleagues nor by public opinion, and you would be accused of preparing for war. So I think it prudent to respond in terms cordial enough not to discourage the good will of Lord Lansdowne and vague enough to avert proposals for immediate contact."

Delcassé returned to the Quai d'Orsay from the fateful Cabinet of June 6, 1905, with tears in his eyes. "Mais nulle plaint, nulle récrimination, nulle invective, nulle parole amère ou blessante : une grave et noble tristesse. . . . Ce n'est pas dans son orgueil ou son ambition qu'il souffre : c'est dans son patriotisme, qui est toute sa religion." He proceeded to describe the meeting. He had declared Germany to be bluffing, which Rouvier sharply denied. "Sommes nous en état de soutenir la guerre contre l'Allemagne ? Non, non ! Même avec la co-opération de la flotte anglaise, nous irions à un désastre pire qu'en 1870." Delcassé found himself alone and resigned. His only consolation was that Rouvier would quickly revise his opinion of German policy. Paléologue confided to his diary on November 23, 1904, the main impressions derived from six and a half years of intimate collaboration with the greatest Foreign Minister of the Third Republic. His dominating characteristic was will. He had done great things, though he was not a great spirit. He lived for politics alone. No one was less of a *doctrinaire*. He was a great negotiator, a master of manoeuvre, resourceful, an immense worker, always on his guard. His heroes were Louis XIV and Joan of Arc. "Ce sont mes divinités nationales ; sans elles il n'y aurait plus de France."

We meet Delcassé again in *Sept Ans à l'Elysée*, 1899-1906, by Combarieu, the secretary and admiring friend of Loubet. The Foreign Minister was a lonely man, living for his work, avoiding the lobbies and despising most of his colleagues ; but he and the President, both of them from the south of France, were bound to each other in confidence, affection and similarity of view. "For thirty years", remarked Loubet in 1901, "we have lived in the thought of the *Revanche*. It is impossible to achieve by force and direct attack, but it is none the less at the bottom of the soul of France." The best preparation was to turn rivals into friends. The secretary accompanied the President on his memorable visits to London in 1903 and to Rome in 1904. In the early phases of the Tangier crisis, we are told, Delcassé was preoccupied but not alarmed, sincerely

believing that Germany would not break the peace. Rouvier's anxieties, on the other hand, increased from day to day, and on June 5, 1905, he arrived at the Elysée in great excitement. The Kaiser, he declared, might attack at any moment, and Delcassé would have to go. Barrère, who was summoned from Rome for consultation, shared the Foreign Minister's conviction that Berlin was bluffing, and advised an unbending attitude on the ridiculous ground that King Edward personally directed British policy.

Paléologue's successor, Joseph Noulens, arrived in St. Petersburg just in time to witness the first Bolshevik revolt of July 17, 1917, but its suppression afforded him no lasting satisfaction. The two volumes of *Mon Ambassade en Russie Soviétique* 1917-1919 might have been called the Trials of an Ambassador, for they contain a shrill indictment of the individuals and parties who ruled after the fall of the Tsar. Kerensky, he tells us, had an excessive confidence in gestures and words combined with a marked incapacity for action. He lacked the courage to punish the authors of the July insurrection or to disturb the open preparations for a second attempt. The triumph of the Bolsheviks, he wrote home, was a return to barbarism. The best pages in a rather disappointing book describe the Ambassador's first interviews with Lenin and Trotsky—the former combining a magnificent forehead with the nose, mouth and chin of a savage, the latter strong, clever and cruel, the perfect type of an oriental despot. Apart from their unprepossessing appearance and their ruthless methods, he could never forgive them for their desertion of France. When the Germans were approaching the capital in February 1918, the Ambassador fled to Finland, thankful to leave a country which he never seriously tried to understand. There are some vivid snapshots of his colleagues, among them Francis, the American Ambassador, the doyen of the *corps diplomatique*, a rough diamond, perpetually chewing gum and discharging his saliva with unerring aim into a spittoon eight feet away.

The name of Georges Louis, Political Director of the Quai d'Orsay and later Ambassador to Russia, was better known after his death than during his life. His champions opened the attack with a little volume entitled *Poincaré a-t-il voulu la guerre?* in which Gouttenoire de Toury argued that he was recalled because he attempted to counterwork the bellicose policy of Russian and French Imperialists. This grave indictment was pressed home in the volume entitled *Georges Louis*,

by the veteran journalist, Ernest Judet, with the aid of the diplomatist's papers ; and eulogy of " le plus droit et le plus adroit de nos Ambassadeurs " is combined with denunciations of his enemies at Paris and St. Petersburg. " He was sacrificed to a desperado eager to set Europe aflame in consolation for his mistakes, and to a Minister on his knees before the insatiable demands of Pan Slavism." The conspiracy to bring about his recall was with difficulty frustrated in 1912 by Ribot, Bourgeois and other friends, but early in 1913 he was replaced by the fire-eater Delcassé. The prime mover, in the opinion of the Ambassador and his biographer, was Iswolsky, while Sazonoff and Poincaré danced to his tune ; for Iswolsky thirsted for the Straits, and Poincaré encouraged his ally to adventures in the Near East. Georges Louis, on the other hand, believed that the Franco-Russian alliance should be used only for common interests, and that the one partner had no more right to invoke it for Constantinople than the other for Alsace-Lorraine. The ex-Ambassador, we are told, died a broken-hearted man, while maintaining a patriotic silence to the end.

" He was a modest man ", writes his Austrian colleague Szilassy, " and this damaged him in the eyes of Court society ; but few knew Russia so well as he." Whatever may be thought of his efficiency as the representative of France, there can be no doubt as to the interest of his conversations with the chief actors in Paris and St. Petersburg. *Les Carnets de Georges Louis*, published in 1926, cover the period from 1908, when he was Political Director of the Foreign Office, till his death in 1917. Though his recall ended his official career, he continued to receive and record the confidences of highly placed friends. Among his countrymen who throng the crowded stage are Poincaré, Clemenceau, Ribot, Bourgeois, Delcassé, Deschanel, Pichon, Paléologue, and Jules Cambon. In Russia we listen to the Grand Duke Nicholas, Iswolsky, Sazonoff, Kokovtsoff, Suchomlinoff, Witte and the Countess Kleinmichel. Among other foreign celebrities we are introduced to Bertie, Nicolson, Buchanan, Tittoni, Radolin and Pourtalès. The volumes leave an acid impression of ambitions and intrigues, backbiting and hatreds. Poincaré is charged with encouraging Russian chauvinism. Iswolsky, who greeted the catastrophe with the words " C'est ma guerre ", is painted in equally sombre hues. Kokovtsoff, as usual, emerges as an honourable and peaceful man. The embitterment of the diplomatist after his recall darkens his pages, and renders the later part of the diary less

valuable than the earlier. More than one of his victims has denied the accuracy of his reports.

A good deal of information is to be found in a series of articles entitled *L'Autriche et l'avant-guerre* contributed to *La Revue de France* (April, May, June 1921) by Philippe Crozier, who was appointed to Vienna in 1907. Iswolsky, we learn, was delighted with Aehrenthal's appointment, and observed to the author "C'est tout à fait un ami." He soon discovered his mistake; but Crozier writes as a friend of Aehrenthal, whose efforts to escape from German tutelage he warmly encouraged. What Barrère had accomplished with the Consulta, he endeavoured to achieve with the Ballplatz. Nor did the task appear by any means hopeless, for Aehrenthal could only regain freedom of action within the Triple Alliance by cultivating London and Paris. Austria's goodwill was displayed in 1908 when she mediated in the Casablanca crisis, and Agadir found her benevolently neutral. A similar policy of rapprochement was pursued by Cartwright, who succeeded Goschen at the end of 1908, and was free from his predecessor's dislike of the Foreign Minister. So independent did Aehrenthal seem to have become that in 1911 the French Ambassador advised his Government to allow an Austrian loan in return for an assurance of goodwill in Morocco. The narrative closes with the rejection of his advice on the ground that a loan to Austria was a loan to Germany.

Snapshots of Vienna on the eve of war are presented by Alfred Dumaine in *La Dernière Ambassade de France en Autriche*. Appointed in 1912, after Crozier's recall, the Ambassador had two years to observe the stage on which the Emperor, the Heir Apparent and the new Foreign Minister played their parts. Francis Joseph, he tells us, was in full possession of his bodily and mental powers, and took no pains to conceal his dislike of his nephew, whose anticipated accession inspired general dread. Berchtold was an aristocrat of perfect manners, without any vocation for politics. Ignorant, bored by his work, and incapable of decision, he was a tool in the hands of stronger men, among them Forgach, the arch-enemy of the Serbs. The villain of the piece, in the eyes of the French Ambassador, was Tschirschky, of whose overbearing manners he writes with detestation.

No French diplomatist has left a more fascinating record of his activity than Saint-René Taillandier's *Les Origines du Maroc Français : Récit d'une Mission* (1901-6). For France, he

explains, the Morocco question dates from the conquest of Algeria, on which its neighbour weighed with suffocating force. "This living paradox at the gate of Europe could not last long. I brought with me a dominating idea: France intended to earmark Morocco for herself. I had to exclude all foreign enterprise which might have limited her authority. I had also, by winning the confidence of the Sultan and the Makhzen, to prepare the way for our own initiatives for the moment when our agreements with the Powers would give us a free hand." He had a difficult task, for the young Sultan was dominated by Kaid Maclean and suspected French designs. At the beginning of his mission England was the chief rival, but after King Edward's visit to Paris the tide began to turn. A few months later, in September 1903, Nicolson, the British Minister, volunteered a statement which, in the author's phrase, ended the rivalry. "Every one requires these people to reform, and it is evident that they will not reform themselves. It is not our business to help them, but it might well be yours." Peaceful penetration was the obvious method, and assistance meant control. Taillandier rejoiced at the treaty with England, but was horrified by the secret treaty with Spain, fearing that it would leak out and deploring the hypothetical partition of spheres of influence. His apprehensions were realized, for the Sultan, now that the hope of English support was gone, turned to Berlin.

The most valuable chapters describe his mission to Fez in January 1905, which lasted nine months, and his conversations with the Sultan and his Ministers. It was uphill work, for Abdul Aziz preferred his independence to reform under foreign control. Moreover, Delcassé, for whom he professes gratitude and affection, was becoming alarmed by hints of German hostility and instructed the envoy to avoid a break. Taillandier denies the German assertion that he invoked a European mandate; but, whatever he may have said, his path was blocked by the Tangier demonstration which stiffened the Sultan's back. Tattenbach hurried to Fez, and the two envoys engaged in a diplomatic duel in which the German won. Taillandier, like his chief, was opposed to a Conference, and was horrified when it was accepted. The two men worked with equal zeal for French predominance in Morocco, but neither fully realized the difficulties of the other. Taillandier was too far away to understand how real was the German menace and how unprepared was France; and Delcassé, in the

author's words, expected more from persuasion than persuasion, unsupported by threats, could obtain.

The *Memoires* of Auguste Gérard, with an affectionate Introduction by Hanotaux, form a pleasant record of the career of a diplomatist who was also a scholar ; but as his chief posts were Peking and Tokio his testimony adds little to our knowledge of European politics. Beginning as a *protégé* of Gambetta and as *Lecteur* to the Empress Augusta, he passed from capital to capital in three continents. His longest sojourn in Europe was at Brussels from 1889 to 1906, and we find in these chapters a vivid account of the Court, the parties and the problems of Belgium. The friend and admirer of Hanotaux was coldly treated by Delcassé, of whom he draws an unflattering portrait. Happening to be in Paris at the time of his fall, he was present at the Quai d'Orsay on the evening of King Alfonso's departure. The Minister and his family stood almost alone, while Rouvier and his other colleagues were the centre of large groups. It was obvious that he was isolated and vanquished, and on the following morning he resigned. Gérard was again in Paris at the moment of the Agadir crisis, during an interval of service in Japan. During the anxious days following the arrival of the *Panther* he was in close contact with de Selves, and believes himself to have been of some service to the Quai d'Orsay. The rapid recovery of national self-confidence filled him with satisfaction. The summer of 1911 appears to him in retrospect as the first general mobilization of French patriotism, accompanied by "a clear demonstration of close and absolute solidarity by our Russian and English allies."

The *Souvenirs de Belgique* of Klobukowski, the French Minister at Brussels, though undistinguished, are of some interest for the last years of peace. Arriving in 1911, he found Belgium alarmed by the attempt of Germany to secure a reversionary interest in her vast colony—an attempt which the Franco-German settlement of November 4 appeared rather to encourage than to repress. The Government, indeed, was of opinion that the status quo had been profoundly modified, since the question of the Congo might one day be reopened. Belgium felt painfully conscious of her isolation and of the precarious nature of her guarantees. The growing economic influence of Germany, the journalistic propaganda, and the concentration of troops on the frontier, increased the *malaise* which King Albert determined to counterwork by raising the effectives from 42,000 to 200,000. "If the atmospheric



tension increases," reported Klobukowski in June 1913, "there is a very definite feeling that Germany will take the offensive like a storm suddenly unloosed."

The core of the volume consists of extracts from Klobukowski's diary from July to November 1914. The Belgian Government, he assures us, believed up to the last moment that Berlin would modify a plan which must bring Great Britain into the fray. He adds the interesting information that on the morrow of the German ultimatum the Dutch Government declared that it would have no objection to the sending of a fleet up the Scheldt by Great Britain as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality—an offer which was withdrawn when Great Britain became a belligerent. The subsequent British attempt to save Antwerp aroused no gratitude. The evacuation, declares the French Minister, was unwisely postponed out of deference to the British Government. The hero of the book is King Albert, who in the conversations with the French Minister appears as wise as he was brave. When the latter foolishly argued that Germany must be broken up and Prussia reduced to a miniature state like the Electorate of Brandenburg, the King replied: "Even after defeat the Germans will still be very strong." After the transfer of the Belgian Government to Havre the extracts from the diplomatist's diary come to an end, and the flow of narrative up to his departure in 1918 dwindles to a trickle. The only incident of diplomatic interest on which light is thrown is the account derived from the Premier, de Broqueville, of the German approach through von der Lancken in 1917, in which the author saw nothing but a snare.

The authorship of a series of three well-informed articles in the *Revue des deux Mondes* was revealed when they appeared in book form as *Les trois Ambassades à la veille de la Guerre*, by François Charles-Roux. An interesting Preface by Jacques Seydoux contains warm eulogies of the Cambon brothers and Barrère. Never in French history, he exclaims, was there such an ambassadorial triumvirate. He recalls a conversation with Mühlberg, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, during his service at the French Embassy at Berlin. "He pointed out the dangers of our accord with England. On the table was a large volume called *Alsace-Lorraine*, with a picture of Strasbourg Cathedral on the cover. As Mühlberg marshalled all the advantages of a defensive entente against British ambitions, I could not help placing my hand on the engraving. He saw—

and was silent." The first of the three articles, entitled *Veillée d'armes à Londres, June 22–August 4, 1914*, is based on the author's personal experiences as Second Secretary. Apart from the picture of Paul Cambon, whose courage, dignity and skill left an abiding impression on his mind, the main interest lies in the record of the British visitors who brought tidings and encouragement to Albert Gate. "The first Englishman to put his hand in ours" was George Lloyd, now Lord Lloyd, who described his efforts to mobilize the leaders of the Unionist party. He was followed by Mr. Amery and Mr. Maxse, Lord Charles Beresford and Mr. Wickham Steed.

The second article, *L'Italie et l'Agonie de la Paix en 1914*, is a pæan to Barrère, to whom the volume is dedicated, and whose despatches and information have been at the author's disposal. The Ambassador, we are told, conceived his aim of drawing Italy into the orbit of the Western Powers while still at Berne, as Paul Cambon had resolved to woo England before he left Constantinople. Barrère employed "all the resources of diplomatic therapeutics" in healing the sores. Money played a very minor part, for the secret service fund would not have kept a single-sheet journal for a month. He cultivated leading men in all parties and all circles, and was warmly attached to Victor Emmanuel. His task was facilitated by the King's hearty dislike of the Kaiser. Months before the war San Giuliano told him that if France were attacked Italy would be neutral, as indeed she was pledged by the secret agreement of 1902; yet when the storm broke Barrère was filled with anxiety. He was in a lonely position, for the Russian Ambassador was a nonentity and Sir Rennell Rodd was unable to commit his Government. His prestige, nevertheless, surpassed that of all other members of the diplomatic world, and it was music to his ears when a Minister, on leaving the Council which decided to remain neutral, observed, "The *Triplique* is the first casualty of this war." The third article, *Fin d'Ambassade à Berlin, 1912–1914*, contains a warm eulogy of Jules Cambon.

In *L'Entente, la Grèce et la Bulgarie*, Gabriel Deville, French Minister at Athens since 1909, sketches the *début* of Venizelos and the first year of the war, at the end of which he was recalled by the Bulgarophiles at Paris, who were attempting to attach Bulgaria instead of making sure of Greek support. Recouly's little book, *M. Jonnart en Grèce et l'Abdication de Constantin*, is virtually an official record of the mission of the High Commissioner despatched by France in 1917.

Only Germany could boast of a Holstein, but France possessed a civil servant whose rôle was not less important than that of Eyre Crowe. *Philippe Berthelot*, by his life-long friend Auguste Bréal, is an affectionate tribute to "l'homme du Quai d'Orsay." A son of the famous chemist who was for a short time Foreign Minister, the young official began to exert influence when Rouvier made him his secretary in 1905. He convinced the Premier, who took over the Foreign Office on the fall of Delcassé, that he too must say "No" to Germany, if not in the same rough way. "Since you have taken this business in hand", observed his chief, "you must see it through." Berthelot accordingly drafted all the despatches relating to the Algeciras Conference. At one moment, when Révoil was on the point of yielding, energetic instructions were sent to the French plenipotentiary and the situation was saved. In 1914 he was in close touch with Paul Cambon, sharing his conviction that German policy, if not French appeals, would bring England in. Throughout the war he was a tower of strength owing to his calm confidence in victory. It was his duty to keep Joffre in touch with the diplomatic situation, and in the later stages of the struggle he acted as *liaison* between the Government and the Generals, enjoying as he did the confidence of both. His hope of becoming Secretary to the Peace Conference was disappointed, for Clemenceau had a candidate of his own; but he exerted a good deal of influence behind the scenes and strove to moderate the extremist demands of France. While loyal to all his chiefs, he stood nearest in sentiment and affection to Briand.

#### IV

The first of the massive quartos of the official history of the war, compiled by the Historical Section of the General Staff, *Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre*, opens with a patriotic flourish. "The time has not yet come to write the history of the great war. . . . But it is fitting that the world should know at the earliest moment how France once again, by the genius and sacrifice of her children, saved civilization in time of peril." The first chapter summarizes the plans of campaign preceding Plan 17, and correlates successive modifications with the changes on the European chessboard. As early as 1878, we are told, the General Staff expected that in the event of war Germany would attack Belgium and Luxemburg.

In March 1906, at the height of the first Morocco crisis, the violation of Belgium was regarded as increasingly probable. In February 1911 General Michel, Vice-President of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, suggested a new distribution of the reserves, on the ground that the Germans would probably march through Belgium; but his advice was not accepted. Plan 17 forms the theme of the second chapter, which opens with an *exposé* of the relations of the Powers. Owing to the renaissance of the Balkan states Germany could not be so sure of effective Austrian support as hitherto. Italy would almost certainly remain on the defensive and hold herself ready to intervene after the first events on the side which seemed most likely to satisfy her territorial appetite. England had not promised co-operation, but France could count on the British fleet. On land an understanding between the two General Staffs envisaged the employment on the extreme French left of an army of one cavalry division, six infantry divisions, and four mounted brigades, a total of 120,000 men. This assistance, however, was uncertain. "We shall therefore act prudently in not taking the British forces into account in our plans of operations." Plan 17 was submitted to the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre on April 18, 1913, and unanimously approved.

Several French soldiers have gone into the witness-box. Huguet's *Britain and the War* is dedicated to the memory of Sir Henry Wilson, "l'initiateur et le préparateur de l'intervention militaire Anglaise en 1914." Part I, entitled *L'avant-guerre*, recalls the situation when the author was appointed Military Attaché in London at the end of 1904. The British army, he declares, was at that time considered by the French War Office as somewhat archaic. The improvements, however, introduced in 1905 led him to believe that its help would be precious in the next round of the Franco-German conflict; and Paul Cambon informed him of his apprehensions in regard to Germany's attitude in Morocco. Accordingly in the course of the autumn he began the detailed study of the effectives which Great Britain could provide. His estimate was 150,000, whose transport could not be completed before the thirtieth day. He then learned from General Grierson, Director of Military Operations, that the British Staff was studying the same question. His estimate of numbers was correct, but mobilization and transport would be much quicker than he had calculated. The Ambassador, who had placed the maximum at 30,000, was delighted not only by the figures but by the fact that the War

Office was studying the eventuality of co-operation. Having obtained permission from Rouvier to open official *pourparlers* with the British Government, Cambon secured that the studies independently begun should be secretly continued by General Grierson and Colonel Huguet, though the discussions were not to bind the British Government. "We were a little surprised by the readiness of the response. Assuredly Campbell-Bannerman, Grey and Haldane were too clever not to realize that the studies now to be pursued would—whatever the qualifications—constitute a sort of moral engagement, and later, in fact, this consideration played its part in the decision of 1914. They knew, too, that France was a little disquieted by the accession to power of a party reputed to be pacifist in the extreme, and they doubtless did not wish to decline the first request by the French Embassy."

For some time the studies advanced slowly, as the British army was being overhauled. Moreover, in July 1906, General Grierson was succeeded by an officer whom Huguet describes as little inclined to assume responsibility, and who, he declared, during his four years as D.M.O., never spoke to him of the tasks which should have been performed in common. Discussions, however, were carried on by subordinates. The British General Staff wished to land at Antwerp, since the idea of the despatch of the army was bound up with the defence of Belgium. Long discussions were needed to convert it to the plan of landing in France, and the Admiralty rendered assistance by undertaking to guard the Channel. Considerable progress was made by the end of 1908, but even then the French thought that it was merely a paper arrangement. This fear prevailed till 1910, when Sir Henry Wilson was appointed D.M.O. and every detail was gradually worked out. It is hardly surprising to read the opinion of the French Military Attaché that, for the officers engaged in these discussions, the moral obligation to intervene became impossible to ignore.

The most valuable portion of the *Memoirs of Marshal Joffre* for our purposes concerns the anxieties and preparations of the last years of peace. Early in August 1911, at the height of the Agadir crisis Caillaux sounded the new Chief of the General Staff. "Napoleon is said never to have fought unless he thought he had at least 70 per cent. chance of victory. Have we that now?" "No," replied Joffre. "Then we will negotiate", rejoined the Premier. Belgium remained an uncertain factor. Michel, his predecessor, had drawn up a plan of de-

fence in January 1911 on the hypothesis that Germany would violate her neutrality, and had therefore proposed to mass his forces on the extreme left, with the English at Soissons. This scheme, in the opinion of Joffre, exposed the French centre and right to excessive risk. There was plenty of talk about an attack on Belgium, but perhaps it was only a manœuvre. He was aware that the Schlieffen plan involved an attack on France before Russia, but he did not know that a staggering blow at Belgium was the core of the scheme. General Dubail was sent to Russia to hasten the procedure of mobilization, and an agreement signed on August 31, 1911, committed both partners to a vigorous offensive. "It is at the very heart of Germany that we must strike", remarked the Tsar; "the objective of both of us should be Berlin."

Joffre's influence increased when Poincaré was called to the helm in January 1912, and the dynamic Millerand was appointed to the War Office. The situation was reviewed in a conference on February 21, attended by the Premier, the Ministers of War and Marine, Paléologue, the Directeur des Affaires Politiques at the Quai d'Orsay, the Chief of the Naval Staff and the author. Delcassé explained the arrangement with the British Admiralty, by which operations in the North Sea, the Channel and the Atlantic were reserved for the British fleet, those in the Mediterranean for the French. Joffre then described the conversations about the co-operation of the British army. "If we could attack through Belgium", he added, "assuming we could agree with her in advance, we should have a better chance of victory." France should enter before Germany violated her neutrality as she probably would, and the British Government should be told that this was the best solution. Millerand and Delcassé agreed, but Poincaré declared that such a step would risk ranging Europe and the Belgians themselves against France, as it would be difficult to reach an understanding beforehand. Belgium must not be entered unless there was a positive menace of a German invasion. In the following November Sir Henry Wilson, with Grey's approval, warned France not to be the first to cross the Belgian frontier, as the Belgian army would join the German and England would be called on to defend Belgian neutrality.

The chapter on the outbreak of war reveals the desire of the French Government not to precipitate events, all the more since the President and Premier were in Russia when the crisis arose. It was in vain that Joffre pressed for certain measures

of precaution. His anxieties were increased by uncertainty about the attitude of Belgium, where, he declares, the powerful Catholic party was Germanophil. "It will be the eternal honour of the King to have interpreted the aspirations of his people in ranging himself on our side. But it is none the less true that on July 29 we knew nothing of Belgium's intentions." The attitude of England was equally uncertain. Joffre regretfully contrasts the universal confidence he enjoyed in the opening stages of the war with the hostile criticism of the second and third years. He fought against what he regarded as the excesses of Parliamentary control, and speaks with pained surprise of his dismissal at the end of 1916.

*The Memoirs of Marshal Foch* are less personal and far less complete. As a preliminary he directed his staff officers to collect the necessary documents and to prepare an objective narrative of the events in which he had taken part. This was used as a framework for his comments. Foreword and Preface, on the other hand, are entirely his own. The former, which contains a brief autobiography, pays tribute to his teachers and colleagues, among whom Sir Henry Wilson is singled out for high praise. An invitation to the Russian manœuvres in 1910 opened his eyes to the weakness of France's ally, and he realized the possibility that in the stress of a great conflict she might crash to earth. The Tsar was loyal enough but anxious about the future. "I left Russia feeling it was wise to base our calculations on the things we could be sure of rather than on the intentions he affirmed." The Preface is a fierce indictment of the foe. By 1914, he declares, Germany had become completely Prussianized, and every German believed that might was right. France, on the other hand, did everything possible to avert the war.

The Memoirs, which consist of two parts, are almost purely military. The first describes the battles of 1914, the second those of 1918 and the making of the armistice, the latter contains a fierce indictment of the Treaty of Versailles. These chapters were submitted to and approved by the Marshal, who made a few additions. According to Foch his appointment to the Supreme Command was mainly due to Haig, whereas Clemenceau could only remark: "You have got what you wanted." Acute disagreement between the two men arose when the Premier, exasperated by the tardiness of American help, desired to urge President Wilson to order Pershing to bestir himself or to remove him from his post. In answer to

the criticism that he should have continued the war to the bitter end, Foch replied that the Armistice enabled the victors to impose any terms they liked, since Germany was rendered powerless. The fault lay with the politicians, who sacrificed the security of France by allowing the foe to retain territory on the left bank of the Rhine. When he protested that the Rhine must be the new frontier, he was snubbed by Clemenceau and told to mind his own business. Poincaré and Jules Cambon, we are told, shared his opinion, but were equally powerless to prevent the hateful settlement.

*Les Carnets de Gallieni*, the diary of the saviour of Paris, reveals one of the most impressive figures of the war. Tortured by the prostate gland which was to kill him, fretting at the futilities of the politicians, and profoundly dissatisfied with the Commander-in-Chief, it is not surprising that his pages bristle with complaints. The most valuable chapter, after that on the victory of the Marne, describes his brief tenure of the War Office during the winter of 1915-16. The appointment raised high hopes, for his stature was incontestable. He accepted the succession to Millerand on condition that he should have a free hand ; but the Chambers had no intention of loosening their grip, and Joffre fought hard for his prerogatives. With the exception of Clemenceau and Doumer no leading statesman finds much favour in his eyes. "They have not the least idea of psychology. Poincaré and Millerand never give you a friendly word. Nothing to produce confidence or devotion. They are always preoccupied with their popularity, Parliament, their quarrels, etc. No character, no decision, no knowledge of men, nothing. Little men !" (October 7). Like Kitchener in Whitehall, he was exasperated by the flood of talk. "Council of Ministers, Ce Briand, quel palabreur !" (November 6). "Council of Ministers, always these idle discussions, which bring out everybody's character. Poincaré, argumentative, unfriendly, distrustful, wishing to have a finger in the pie, but without responsibility, wishing to preside and keep his name always in the papers. Briand, amiable, but undecided, lazy, not ruling his Cabinet, a mediocre Premier in time of war ; Painlevé, Clémentel, Doumergue, politicians in the full sense of the term, obeying their party orders ; Ribot, good, but solemn, too formal, a Parliament man ! Viviani, cold, without nerves, thick-skinned, also a Parliament man ; Combes says little except to attack Joffre ; Freycinet, dogmatic, forgetting his rôle in 1870, imagining that



a plan is everything and not troubling about its execution ; Bourgeois, always raising objections but declining responsibilities." (February 5, 1916). Paris was bad enough, and Chantilly (the headquarters of Joffre) was no better. "Chantilly est aveugle, malhonnête et politicien." (March 17). After five months of friction and disappointment Gallieni was glad to resign, and a few weeks later he was dead. Though he never learned the habit of team-work and was cruelly unjust to civilians as patriotic as himself, there is a certain tragic grandeur about the old soldier who gave to his country the last ounce of his ebbing strength.

General Mordacq, Chef de Cabinet and the inseparable companion of Clemenceau, tells a dramatic tale in *Le Commandement Unique*, *Revue des deux Mondes*, April 1929. At a Conference at Compiègne on March 25 the Premier informed Milner that unity of command was a matter of life and death. Milner asked for a further conference on the morrow, at which Haig and Wilson could be present, and Clemenceau confided to the author that he had good hopes. On March 26 Mordacq accompanied his chief, who was in excellent spirits, to Doullens. Foch, "superbe de conviction et de confiance," remarked to Clemenceau : "My plan is simple enough—it is to fight. I shall finish by beating the Boche. He is neither cleverer nor stronger than we." The Premier's face lit up with joy—he had found a man of action. Milner, Haig and Wilson arrived an hour later, and Milner secured Haig's consent to the promotion of Foch before the conference began. At Clemenceau's wish Milner proposed that Foch should "co-ordinate the action" of the armies, and the plan was accepted. Haig, whose features had been drawn and tired, was transformed, and every face was radiant. The dream of the French had at last been realized, the British opposition overcome. "There was an immense faith in victory in us all."

Doullens was the beginning, not the end. Mordacq proceeds to describe subsequent meetings at Clermont, where Pershing came to place himself and his troops at the disposition of Foch, and at Beauvais, whither he transferred his headquarters. The Generalissimo was so gloriously confident that Clemenceau hugged him in a long embrace. Mr. Churchill, who came to discuss munitions, asked Mordacq whether he shared Foch's confidence. "Absolutely", was the reply, "but on condition that his powers are extended." On their way back to Paris the Premier remarked : "I hope you are

satisfied—things are not going badly.” “Not at all satisfied”, rejoined Mordacq. “We saw to-day that Haig was embarrassed when Foch insisted on the employment of the third and fourth British army. It is clear that the English do not consider co-ordination the same as supreme command. It must come.” Clemenceau doubted whether the British were ready for a further sacrifice of pride. Mordacq replied that a Commander-in-Chief was indispensable, though he might bear another name. “Find a formula,” replied the Premier. Mordacq suggested “strategic direction,” which was accepted by the British at a Conference at Beauvais on April 3. The dominant impression left by this vivid narrative is the resilience of Clemenceau, with a will of steel and the spirits of a schoolboy delighting in the “agreeable surprise” of falling shells.

*La Vérité sur l'Armistice* continues the hymn of praise. “Unity of political direction was only reached when Clemenceau came to power. Before that time there were only palavers between the heads of Governments, none of whom possessed a personal ascendancy sufficient to dominate their colleagues. That was one of the reasons why the war lasted so long. In like manner the unity of military command in the person of Foch was Clemenceau’s work.” Only two men, declares Mordacq, opposed the ending of the war, General Bliss and himself. At Paris there was great anxiety as to whether the Germans would accept the conditions of the armistice, which Haig and Lloyd George thought too hard. When the news arrived that they were accepted in principle, “Clemenceau looked at me long and fixedly. His eyes filled with tears, and putting his head in his hands, he wept silently. Never before had I seen him give way to such emotion. He quickly recovered himself and exclaimed ‘It is absurd : I cannot control my nerves. But all at once I saw 1870, the defeat, the shame, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and now it is all wiped away. Is it not a dream?’” He had an excellent heart, adds Mordacq, and at bottom, for those who knew him well, he was a man of feeling. When the news arrived on November 11 that the armistice had been signed and the author hurried to his chief at 6 a.m., he found him already up. “He took me in his arms and pressed me long. Both of us were unable to speak. The next visit was to Poincaré, who holds my hands long, looks at me without speaking, like a man in a dream, or rather who awakes from a long nightmare.” There follows a detailed account of the negotiations from the arrival of the Germans on

November 8 by an unnamed eye-witness, given to Mordacq a few days later and described by him as of primary importance.

The closing chapters illustrate the sharp differences of opinion among the victors as to the terms they should propose. Joffre, whom Mordacq visited on October 16, was a moderate. "The Germans are beaten, but they remain a great people. If we wish them to accept their fate and not dream of revenge, we must demand the essentials but nothing more, above all nothing to humiliate them. That would also be unworthy of the victors." The Allied conferences on the conditions of an armistice began with a stormy session on October 29, which Clemenceau described for the author the same evening. Lloyd George pressed for moderate terms, since the Germans were still strong and England was tired. Colonel House was rather less decided. "Whatever happens", remarked the Tiger, "I will not allow victory to be sabotaged."

We can reconstruct the latter phases of the war and the making of the peace in Mordacq's four volumes, *Le Ministère Clemenceau*. In inviting him to be his Chef de Cabinet, the Premier made a good choice. "I was perhaps the only General who would avoid collisions between Clemenceau, Foch and Pétain, as I felt affection for all three." He finished his work in 1923 and showed it to his old chief. "Very good", was the comment, "a very exact picture of the Ministry, and precious documents." It would, however, provoke controversy and lead him to break silence. The book was therefore held back till his reply to Foch had appeared. The first volume opens with informing chapters on the situation in November 1917, the reorganization of the War Office, and the reorganization of the Administration. The report of Clemenceau's talk on November 2, 1917, when he had received news of his appointment, brings us very near the indomitable old man of seventy-six. The second volume describes the last German offensives and the victory of the Allies. Mordacq draws a sharp distinction between the heroic soldiers at the front and the self-seeking politicians at the rear. "While M. Clemenceau thought of nothing but of overthrowing the Germans, his enemies thought of nothing but of overthrowing him." It was a comfort to escape almost every day from the intrigues of the capital to the commanders in the field and the *poilus* in the trenches. The co-operation of the Premier, Foch and Pétain was complete, while Haig is described as a sincere and devoted friend of France. The Tiger could be charming when he wished, and

King Albert, who had heard much of his rough tongue, was delighted by his simple and paternal approach.

The third volume, the most valuable of the series, carries us from the armistice to the signing of the treaty of Versailles. "We have won the war, and it was not an easy task", observed the Premier; "now we must win the peace, and it will perhaps be more difficult." It is a story of ceaseless struggle, complicated by bodily sufferings bravely borne. The greatest disappointment was the estrangement from Foch, who attempted to play a political *rôle*, and Poincaré was suspected of co-operating with him. At any rate he was no friend, and the Elysée was regarded as a nest of intrigue. Pétain, on the other hand, is never mentioned without admiration or affection. First impressions of Wilson were favourable enough. "I think we shall get on", remarked Clemenceau after the first long conversation. He was a man of principle, though he did not perhaps sufficiently realize the abyss between theory and fact. But he was very courteous and even conciliatory, only asking to be instructed about the Europe which he seemed to know so little. On closer acquaintance the verdict became less favourable. On January 23, 1919, he complained that the American statesman was less conciliatory than he had believed. He wished to reconstruct Europe entirely on the basis of his famous principles, not on realities. Under these circumstances it was necessary to confront him with the solidarity of the rest of the Allies.

This proved beyond the power of the President of the Conference, for the British Delegation usually supported Wilson. "There is a veritable aberration on the part of our friends", he complained in February, "as if these four years of war had not sufficed to reveal the psychology of the Germans". The only thing they understood was force. The worst offender in the British team was Mr. Keynes. In another field Colonel Lawrence is singled out for blame as the evil genius who turned Feisul against the French. No one made such an impression of intellectual ability as Venizelos. "Ce diable d'homme est vraiment fort habile. Ulysse n'était qu'un petit garçon à coté de lui." Colonel House is painted in the warm colours of personal affection as the unwavering friend of France, and Lansing, we are assured, was much more Francophil than his chief. It is curious to find that Clemenceau regarded King Alfonso as pro-German. The author regrets that the signing of the treaty prevented the march to Berlin on which he had set

his heart, and which, in his belief, would have prevented most of the subsequent difficulties by giving the Germans a much needed lesson. The fourth volume, which closes with Clemenceau's resignation in January 1920, briefly describes the making of the treaties with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. The concluding chapter of Mordacq's long and important work argues that his beloved chief, a veritable superman, made as good a settlement as the "ferocious appetites" and the disunion of the Allies allowed.

No books on the French Higher Command have been so widely read as the brilliant volumes in which Jean de Pierrefeu has depicted—or, as some would say, unmasked—his chiefs. His task of drawing up the daily bulletin for publication enabled him to know everything that went on in the Grand Hôtel Condé at Chantilly, where, though "a soldier for the moment," he remained "a civilian at heart". The hero of *French Headquarters* is Pétain—in the author's view the man who won the war. The companion volume, *Plutarch Lied*, supplements the record with witty persiflage. Lightly dismissing the charge of "sacrilege" in breaking down the conspiracy of silence about the "heroes", he claims that for the critical spirit there are no closed doors. Joffre emerges as a very ordinary human being, disinclined to mental exertion and surrounded by a camarilla. Foch is transformed from the cool planner of victory into an excitable Gascon, obsessed by the word *Attack*. After the fireworks of Pierrefeu, Mermeix's *Fragments d'Histoire* 1914-1919 are rather dull reading; but they contain a mass of documents on the relations of the Government and the Higher Command. The fifth volume summarizes *Les Négotiations Secrètes*, while the seventh, *Au Sein des Commissions*, describes the work of the Army, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and other Committees of the Legislature.

Colonel Buguet's brilliant *Rue St. Dominique et G.Q.G.*, published in 1937, has the advantage of being written when all the leading figures have passed away. Possessing inside knowledge both of the War Office (popularly known as Rue St. Dominique) and the commanders in the field, he traces the uneasy relations between the two and presents us with a series of living portraits. Of the four Commanders-in-Chief Joffre receives praise for his unruffled calm, Pétain for his broad humanity, Foch for his strength of will. Only Nivelle, insisting on a gigantic offensive despite the opposition of Pétain and his other Generals, proved unworthy of his post. Of the Ministers

of War four were civilians, three soldiers ; but harmonious co-operation between Paris and the front proved unattainable except under Joffre and Millerand at the beginning and under Clemenceau and Foch at the end. The hopes entertained of Gallieni and Lyautey were quickly dispelled, for the hero of the Marne was a dying man, while the proud ruler of Morocco fretted like an eagle in a cage. The sub-title of the book is *Les trois Dictatures de la Guerre*. The first was that of Joffre with the laurels of the Marne on his brow, the second that of Parliament during the Painlevé period, the third that of Clemenceau and the Government. The moral drawn in the closing chapter is that neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Minister of War should be supreme but the Government, captained if possible by a superman. "We always reach the same conclusion—everything depends on the men. The tool is only what the worker makes of it." France was saved by Joffre, Pétain, Foch and Clemenceau. "Choose your best men, civil and military, and you will win. For it is not a regime, a system, a theory, a law which brings victory, but only a chief who knows how to lead a people because he is its heart, its brain, its soul."

Admiral de Faramond's *Souvenirs d'un Attaché Naval en Allemagne et en Autriche* 1910-1914, with a preface by Jules Cambon, contain a remarkable after-dinner conversation between his wife and Tirpitz in January 1914. Without preamble and speaking with unusual excitement, the Grand Admiral urged France to make friends with Germany. "Why do you continue to sulk? I know there are terrible memories to live down. But the harm we did you in 1871 is small in comparison with the defeats and humiliations you inflicted on us for a hundred and fifty years. Why cannot France and Germany consider themselves quits? You say: Alsace-Lorraine! Yes, that is the whole problem. If France would abandon the policy of sentiment, the rapprochement would be easy. We would make large concessions. If instead of trusting to the friendship of England, which cannot be sincere, France consented to forget the past and shake hands, the peace of the world would be assured and a magnificent future would open for our two countries. England is the most selfish of nations. She only thinks of her own interests and never keeps her engagements to her allies and friends. At the critical moment she will leave you in the lurch. Her boundless ambition will lead you into a catastrophe from which she will try to suck

advantage. Our army was never so ready as to-day. Le grand danger c'est l'Angleterre, qui vous poussera à nous attaquer, dans l'espoir de manger la châtaigne."

An almost equally remarkable conversation took place between the author and the Kaiser on board the *Hohenzollern* on June 26, 1911, on the eve of Agadir. Taking the latest Ministerial crisis in Paris as his text the latter expressed his wish that the next Foreign Minister should be a man who understood the Morocco question, "so that we might settle it once for all. The present situation cannot continue. I should like to be able to negotiate with a statesman possessing sufficient authority in France and credit with the Chambers to carry through an agreement with us." Whom had His Majesty in mind? inquired the Naval Attaché. "Delcassé" was the unexpected reply. "I know we had some difficulties with him in the past. But I wish to forget all that and only see in him a specialist in Moroccan and Colonial questions." After the conversation the Chancellor came up and remarked that his master's view was shared by himself and the Foreign Minister. At a later date Kiderlen confessed to Jules Cambon that he had put the idea into the Kaiser's head. President Fallières regarded the Kaiser's intervention as a trap. "He is a rascal. If I had called Delcassé to the Quai d'Orsay, the whole German press would have shouted Provocation, and that is doubtless what he wished."

Colonel Lamouche's *Quinze Ans d'Histoire Balkanique* (1904-18) records his impressions as a member of the International Mission for the reorganization of the Turkish Gendarmerie in accordance with the Mürzsteg agreement of 1903. Balkan specialists always have their favourites, and the author's choice is Bulgaria, who, as he points out, has had few champions in France. He admires General Degiorgis, the first head of the reformed Gendarmerie, of whose staff he was a member. It was impossible, however, to overcome the passive resistance of the Turks, led by Hilmi Pasha, whose courtesy made pressure difficult to apply. "I am convinced that, with a population wearied by years of confusion and terror, a fair policy on the part of the Ottoman authorities, aided by the support of the Powers, would have secured the pacification of the country. It seemed, on the contrary, that they preferred to keep up the agitation in exciting the different Christian elements against one another." With the coming of the Young Turks the Commission was transferred from Salonica to Con-

stantinople, and its members entered the Turkish service. Lamouche blames King Ferdinand and General Savoff for the attack on the Servian troops in June 1913 ; but he argues that a large part of the responsibility rests on the Powers whose duty it was, after impartial inquiry, to delimit the territories ceded by Turkey.

General Sarraïl's querulous apologia *Mon Commandement en Orient*, 1916-1918, presents a bewildering picture of jealousies and intrigues which rendered the large inter-allied forces on the Bulgarian front comparatively ineffective. In *Mes Souvenirs de Guerre*, 1914-1916, Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Commander of the French squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean, describes the crisis which led to the landing of French troops in Peiraeus in December 1916, the collision with the Greek forces, the deposition of King Constantine, and the recall of the author for his handling of the situation.

## V

Useful testimony is supplied by a few writers who occupy an independent position. Albert Pingaud's *Histoire diplomatique de la France pendant la Grande Guerre* gives more than its title suggests, for French diplomacy during the war includes the activities of the other Entente Powers. He supplements the published material from the archives of the Quai d'Orsay, of which he was at one time Director. For instance Klobukowski reports on his talks with King Albert, Jules Cambon describes his visit to King George and Queen Mary on his journey home from Berlin, and Count Hoyos explained the Austrian ultimatum in the pregnant sentence : " We had to show some sign of life."

The main theme of the first volume is the wooing of Italy and the Balkan states, who turned the need of the belligerents to their own account. As a professional diplomatist the author feels himself entitled to pronounce on the skill of the performers, and he is not easy to satisfy. Sazonoff is charged with restless and often misdirected activity, Grey with a *penchant* for half-measures and lack of initiative. The most elaborate portrait is that of Delcassé, whose great qualities and failings are frankly recognized. Bratiano played his hand with considerable skill. " Il se montrait de fer pour proclamer le principe de l'intervention, mais il se montrait de glace dès qu'il s'agissait d'en fixer l'échéance ". The greed of Roumania



horrified the Allies, and Bulgaria likewise held out for the highest offer. King Ferdinand cannot be acquitted of duplicity, but he was very unskilfully handled. Russia in particular felt the indignity of propitiating the little Balkan states so keenly that her offers often came too late. Italy demanded a high price for her assistance, but it was promptly paid. France, declares Pingaud, felt the value of time more than her allies. The second volume embraces the intervention of Portugal, Greece and the United States. The concluding chapter pays homage to the French statesmen and diplomatists who bore the burden and heat of the day. The choicest bouquet is presented to Paul Cambon, to whom all the important telegrams were forwarded daily by the Quai d'Orsay in the hope that his long experience and cool judgment might suggest a course of action not only in his own field but for the policy of the Allies as a whole.

The *Souvenirs* of Charles Benoist, an independent politician and a considerable scholar, cover half a century of French Parliamentary life (1883-1933) in three entertaining volumes. He is at his best in the portraits of distinguished statesmen whose rise and fall he witnessed at the Palais Bourbon. In 1902 Jaurès pointed out a new member of the name of Aristide Briand, and advised the author to keep his eye on a coming man. "Does he know anything?" asked the learned Benoist. "He? His ignorance is encyclopaedic." When he heard the great orator for the first time the mystery was explained. Nature had lavished her gifts on him, but he would have been a much greater man if he had ever learned to work. A dramatic passage in the third and most important volume describes the fall of Delcassé, whose weaknesses are forgiven in gratitude for his burning patriotism. Yet, though Rouvier's rôle was humiliating enough, he had no alternative, for France was notoriously unready to fight.

The greatest Frenchman since Gambetta has found an accomplished biographer in Georges Suarez, whose *Clemenceau* is as exciting as a detective novel. The author only knew the Tiger as an old man, but he collected information from the intimates of earlier years. This is no mere work of a hero-worshipper, for the first volume and half the second depict a man of ungovernable temper, a human volcano, who insulted many honourable citizens, fought many duels, destroyed many Cabinets, wrote with a pen dipped in gall, and possessed far more enemies than friends. Not till he was called to power in

1917 was he purified in the flame of patriotism, and the indomitable old warrior became the symbol of victory and the voice of France. It is a serious weakness of the book that long conversations are reconstructed where no written record is preserved, but we may be grateful for vivid portraits of the leading figures on the French stage over a period of sixty years. A few *obiter dicta* are found in *Clemenceau* by Jean Martet, his admiring secretary during and after the war. Since he only began to record their talks in 1927, we are dealing with the memories of a very old man. There is a vivid little picture of the anxieties of the Casablanca crisis of 1908, when he was Premier. "We just missed going to war. I had not slept for two nights. I asked Picquart, Minister of War: Can we risk it? He asked for two days, and then replied: We can. So I refused the demands, but proposed the Hague Court, which was accepted." Poincaré finds no favour, but Foch had his merits. "He played me shabby little tricks, but he was the man we needed. I did not like him, but I should choose him again. Because of Doullens I can forgive him everything." In the Treaty of Versailles "I got all that one could reasonably expect".

After completing his biography of Clemenceau Suarez turned to a scarcely less dramatic subject. Unlike Poincaré, who preferred to fight his own battles, Briand left his journal and papers to a nephew, who placed them at the disposal of an experienced publicist. The two large volumes which bring the story down to the outbreak of war are a vivid and detailed history of French politics from the hero's election to the Chamber at the age of forty in 1902. He is lovingly presented throughout as a great peacemaker, the prophet of appeasement at home and abroad. The closing chapters of the second volume, which deal with the last three years of peace, fiercely denounce the methods and policy of Caillaux during the Agadir crisis. Briand hoped to be recalled to power after the signing of the Morocco-Congo treaties; but when Poincaré was chosen he joined him in restoring confidence to France and helped him to the Presidency a year later, incurring thereby the enmity of Clemenceau.

The third volume, entitled *The Pilot in the Storm*, covering the first half of the war, is much more important, and the diary which Briand now began to keep is fully utilized. The Minister of Justice in Viviani's reconstructed Cabinet emerges as the real head of the Government. Unlike Clemenceau, who repeatedly refused office on the ground that he must be all or

nothing, Briand was an excellent colleague, immune from the fierce animosities which disgraced so many of the leading actors. Sharing Mr. Lloyd George's disbelief in a decision in the west, he sought victory in the east. Servia, he argued, should be rescued and Austria attacked in flank from a base at Salonica, while the aid of Greece should be secured for the Dardanelles expedition. Unlike Delcassé, whose right hand had lost its cunning, he saw through Ferdinand before he doffed the mask.

When the belligerence of Bulgaria upset the Viviani Cabinet, Briand took the Premiership and the Foreign Office. He was not easily swayed, declares his admiring biographer, and his relations with Berthelot at the Quai d'Orsay were less intimate and trustful than were generally thought. Joffre, with his exasperating optimism, was losing grip, and it was the Premier, not the Generalissimo, who grappled with the menace of Verdun. Another soldier, Sarrail, Commander-in-Chief on the Salonica front, was a liability, not an asset, and the quarrelsome intriguer was only kept at his post because he had influential friends in Parliament. On the home front Caillaux casts his shadow over the scene. At the opening of the war the discredited ex-Premier visited Briand in a state of deep depression. "Je suis un homme fini. On me tient à l'écart de tout. On m'évite sur mon passage. Je suis venu à vous, malgré mes dissentiments, parce que je vous sais généreux." Briand gave him excellent advice. "Faites-vous oublier." If he served in some modest capacity his past would be forgotten and he would recover his position. Caillaux, however, was never content to play second fiddle, and it was during Briand's premiership that stories of his imprudence and of the treachery of his shady entourage began to leak out. Briand was the least vindictive of men, but he was determined to win the war. The dramatic chapter entitled *La Vague Pacifiste* shows that he sowed where Clemenceau was soon to reap. The biographer has no love for Poincaré, who wrote affectionate letters to the Premier while criticizing him in his diary and inviting rivals to the Elysée. A fourth volume will conclude the story of the war years.

## BELGIUM AND HOLLAND



## CHAPTER VII

### BELGIUM AND HOLLAND

#### I

THE Belgian Grey Book, supplemented by a few documents illustrating Anglo-Belgian relations before the war, is included in the *Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, published by the Stationery Office in 1915. The most important of the supplementary items, relating to conversations between Belgian and British soldiers in 1906 and 1912, had been discovered by the Germans on entering Brussels in 1914 and had appeared in the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. A selection from the despatches of the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin was printed by the German Government in 1915 with the title *Belgische Aktenstücke*, 1905-1914, the editor choosing items which indicated the pacific character of German policy and the chauvinism of the Entente. This was supplemented after the war by four volumes of diplomatic circular letters issued by the Foreign Office at Brussels to its representatives abroad and summarizing the information received from various capitals. The work, entitled *Zur Europäischen Politik*, 1897-1914, published in 1919, was undertaken by Schwertfeger as chief editor by order of the German Government. The Introductions are controversial; but the historian is grateful for the reports and impressions from all parts of Europe from 1897, when the practice of compiling the circulars began, to 1914. A fifth volume illustrates the making of the Franco-Russian Alliance. The sharp criticism of the Triple Entente, in which some of the Ministers, particularly Baron Greindl in Berlin, indulge, was acclaimed in the Central Empires as proof of the evil designs of their enemies; but it may equally well serve to dispel the belief that Belgium was tied to her future protectors. A new edition, containing the French original and a German translation, appeared in 1925.

The most heroic and attractive figure in the world war has been portrayed by General Galet, his Military Adviser and intimate friend, in *Albert King of the Belgians in the Great War*.

The book, aided and approved by the King, revealed the part he played in military preparations and in the opening phases of the struggle. When he ascended the throne in 1909 he was already convinced that the dreaded European conflagration would break out during his reign. Despite the warnings of Leopold II Belgium was unprepared, and the young ruler devoted himself to military reform. The first task was to create a General Staff, the second to work out schemes for national defence. His visit to Potsdam in November 1913, when the Kaiser and Moltke spoke ominously of a victorious conflict with France in the near future, confirmed his conviction that the hour was at hand. On July 27, 1914, the Dutch Government proposed joint resistance in the event of German aggression against both countries, but on August 3 it was assured by the German Government that Dutch territory would be respected. If General Galet is to be believed never was a modern state less prepared for war. The country was prosperous and trusted blindly to its guarantees. When the King inspected his Divisions on August 5 and 6, he was horrified by the lack of organization. "Marvellous enthusiasm on all sides, but what an army!" A large part of Belgium, in the author's opinion, might have been saved from invasion. "Alas, our guarantors did not consider this their business. They failed in their duty." The narrative ends with the defence of Antwerp and the operations on the Yser, after which the story of Belgian efforts merges in the strategy of the Allies.

A similar picture of resolution and dignity is painted in *Albert of Belgium*, by Emile Cammaerts, poet, publicist, historian. The author received information from high military and civilian officials who had been in close touch with his hero. Albert's apprehensions were increased by a warning from the King of Roumania, in December 1912, as to the increasing danger of a German attack. Questioned by the Belgian Minister at Bucharest, Carol declared: "Frankly I answer that no account will be taken of your neutrality. . . . The miracle of 1870 will not be repeated." To King Albert the ultimatum was no surprise, and he opened the meeting of Ministers with the words "No, whatever the consequences." Such courage had not been expected by the French Minister, who greeted the news of the German challenge with the query: "Well, you are giving way?" Professor Cammaerts paints an arresting picture of his beloved sovereign at the crisis of his fate. "Those who saw La Panne during the years of waiting will

never forget the tall and austere figure standing on the last strip of Belgian shore, confronted with stormy clouds and foaming sea, watching with calm courage during that long vigil, with all the regal splendour stripped from his Court and almost all his land torn from his grasp, alone among the blind elements and the blinder injustice of men, with no comfort but his Queen, brought as low as any sovereign can be brought by the forces of destiny, and as high as any man can be raised by the conviction of his right and the faith in his cause."

The most important of Belgian witnesses is Baron Beyens. Appointed to Berlin in 1912, as he records in *Germany before the War*, the Minister found himself in an oppressive atmosphere. "We walked on sinking soil as if on the edge of an active volcano." The most valuable parts are the studies of the Kaiser and his political advisers, of the currents of public opinion, and of "la semaine tragique". It will be long before the world forgets his last experiences in Berlin, the sudden and terrible awakening from the "false tranquillity" of the first three weeks of July. When on August 1 he read to the Under-Secretary Zimmermann a despatch stating that Belgium had scrupulously fulfilled her duties as a neutral, and in view of Germany's reiterated assertions of friendship counted on her territory remaining inviolate, "the embarrassed smile" told its own tale. Though writing during the first months of the war, and sharing to the full the righteous indignation of his countrymen, Beyens is not blinded by passion. Germany, he testifies, was divided into a pacific majority and a bellicose minority.

Several years later Beyens traversed the same ground in greater detail in his two volume work *Deux Ans à Berlin*. He arrived with an open mind, and he was certainly no Germanophile. A long sojourn at Bucharest had won him the friendship of Kiderlen, and Zimmermann was invariably courteous. His hero among the diplomatic corps is Jules Cambon. The political atmosphere was described to the newcomer in different tones. Goschen was a pessimist, while his Dutch colleague regarded the situation without a tremor. He reached Berlin during a momentary lull, for the Morocco crisis was over and the Balkan war was still to come. Zimmermann remained unruffled when France and Russia concluded a Naval Convention, remarking that the Russian fleet existed only on paper; nor did the situation in Turkey cause him the alarm which it inspired in the French Ambassador. When Montenegro gave



the signal for hostilities, Beyens found the Turkish Ambassador beaming with satisfaction. His expectation of victory was shared by Kiderlen, who was stupefied by the triumph of "an army of peasants" at Kirk Kilisse. The Foreign Minister, however, believed that the Turks would recover, and "being a very bad Christian", as he remarked with a smile, he ardently hoped they would win. The first diplomatic effect of the war was to bring Berlin and Paris into closer relations, since both countries desired to localize the conflict. "There is no doubt", reported Beyens on November 30, 1912, "that the Emperor, the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister are passionately pacific." Kiderlen's sudden death at the end of the year seemed to his friend a disaster. "I have heard him criticize the adventurous policy of Aehrenthal so sharply that I incline to think he would not have allowed Germany to be taken in tow by her ally." His regret was shared by Jules Cambon. His successor, "le petit Jagow," as Kiderlen called him, finds no favour. "I felt a wall of ice between us"; and there was no serious political talk with him till July 1914.

In the opinion of Beyens the German Military Law of 1913 marks "the beginning of the drama." While the first Balkan war witnessed a *détente* between Paris and Berlin, the new effort created a fresh tension which never slackened. Poincaré was assumed to be almost as powerful as the President of the United States, and the appointment of Delcassé to St. Petersburg increased the suspicions of Germany. Jules Cambon began to expect the worst, though he made no forecast as to when the storm would break, and Beyens came to share his apprehensions. He noted the revival of hostility to France and the angry surprise aroused by the Three Years law. The Lunéville and Nancy incidents, though trifles in themselves, aroused neurotic excitement, and the German press breathed menace and contempt. When the Kaiser celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession the Minister reported that, though he had no wish for war, he could not be regarded as a firm pillar of peace.

While Beyens describes the lighting of the fuse in Berlin, Albert de Bassompierre records the explosion at Brussels. The poignant brochure entitled *The Night of August 2-3, 1914, at the Belgian Foreign Office* enables us to visualize the emotions of the Foreign Minister Davignon and the officials of the Foreign Office who received the ultimatum. There was not, he assures us, a moment's hesitation as to the reply. The

Council sat from nine in the evening till nearly four in the morning with King Albert in the chair, with an interval for the drafting of the response. "Le Gouvernement belge, en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiées, sacrifierait l'honneur de la nation en même temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs envers l'Europe." When the author read these ringing words to a member of the British Legation who had come for a copy, he was almost overmastered by emotion; and the Englishman, seizing both his hands, exclaimed "Bravo les Belges!" Briefer but no less haunting narratives of these terrible days may be found in the interview with Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy, Political Director of the Foreign Office, in Recouly's *Les Heures tragiques d'avant Guerre*, and in the brochure of Comte Louis de Lichtervelde, *Le 4 Aout 1914 au Parlement Belge*.

The story of the struggle itself has been told in the sumptuous and richly illustrated *La Belgique et la Guerre*, of which the fourth and last volume, with a preface by Baron Beyens, is devoted to diplomacy. Though the author, Alfred de Ridder, was Director-General at the Foreign Office, we learn but little from his pages. It is interesting, however, to read that King Albert informed the German Military Attaché of the conversations between General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. *Cardinal Mercier's Own Story* contains his voluminous correspondence with the German authorities.

The Carnegie series on the social and economic history of the war rarely strays into the strictly political sphere, but Pirenne's *La Belgique et la Guerre Mondiale* is necessarily more political than most of its fellows. The distinguished historian, himself a victim of the German occupation, illustrates the character of the occupation, sketches the reaction of national feeling, and traces the stages through which the policy of the invaders passed. He dismisses the *francs-tireurs* as a baseless legend. At first the German Government had merely a temporary occupation in view; but plans of annexation soon cropped up, and finally schemes of administrative partition arose. The volume is an indictment not only of the enemy but of the Activists described by Cardinal Mercier as a handful of traitors without a mandate. General Bissing vainly struggled against ruthless exploitation of the country, but his successor Falkenhausen was a mere agent of the General Staff. We hear much of the Council of Flanders and the transformation of the author's own University of Ghent into a Flemish centre. The Activists, he declares, were used and despised by the

invaders. The moral of the story is that, despite differences of race and tongue, Belgium is one and indivisible.

## II

A few crumbs of information regarding the sentiments of the Powers during the South African War are provided by Dr. Leyds in his book *Eenige Correspondentie uit 1899*, published at the Hague in 1919, which describes his activities as the spokesman of the Transvaal Republic in Europe. He had been State Secretary since 1889, and as such his Government sent him in 1897 to visit the European countries with whom it had relations and to report on opinions and policy. In the following year he returned to Europe as Minister of the Republic. He came for a third time in April 1899. His book was planned as a documented denial of the charge that he had encouraged the Boers to intransigence with expectations of aid. "Germany is a friend", he telegraphed from Berlin on May 29, 1899, "but she cannot assist in a war as England is mistress of the sea." He hoped that the Transvaal Government would make all concessions compatible with independence. There are over two hundred documents, ranging from March 1899 to the declaration of war on October 9, but none contains any promise of help. Russia manifested most sympathy. "The Russian Minister", telegraphed Leyds from Brussels on October 4 "says that the Emperor takes our cause much to heart. He desires to be kept continually informed. I have some hope that he is looking for an opportunity to prepare difficulties for England."

A larger collection of material in three volumes, published in 1930 at the Hague as *Tweede Verzameling (Correspondentie 1899-1900)*, continues the story from the beginning of the South African war to April 1900, when a Boer deputation arrived in Europe to look round. The correspondence and conversations with the Russian representatives in Brussels, Paris and Berlin are particularly interesting. "The Tsar", wrote the former on January 31, 1900, "takes the liveliest interest in all that goes on in South Africa. He has listened with sympathy to what you have told, and he has encouraged me to ask you to keep me informed of the news that reaches you. The Foreign Minister also desires that I should continue in close touch with you." A month later, on February 28, Giers wrote again. "Everybody is affected by the surrender

of Cronje. May the misfortune have no effect on the final issue ! I will tell you when the propitious moment comes for your arrival in Russia." If a Continental coalition had been formed, it is clear from the evidence of Dr. Leyds that Russia would have been its spear head.

The difficulties and anxieties of Holland in a greater struggle are authoritatively described in Japikse's substantial volume *Holland im Weltkriege*, which draws freely on the Parliamentary debates and the press. Neutrality, he assures us, was always loyally observed. Even before the war Belgian and Entente feelers towards closer relations received no response. When the ultimatum to Belgium became known it was feared that Holland's turn would come next, and the reputation of Germany never recovered from the outrage. The submarine warfare was almost equally deplored. Dutch opinion, however, wished for a stalemate, fearing the omnipotence either of Germany or of England. The Government took no share in fostering the efforts to bring the struggle to an end. The story concludes with the unwelcome news of the arrival of the Kaiser and the dignified refusal to surrender him for trial.



GREAT BRITAIN



## CHAPTER VIII

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### I

SHORTLY after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 Sir Edward Cook was authorized to reveal British efforts to end the Anglo-German naval competition. *How Britain strove for Peace*, a brochure based on official materials, claimed to prove "first that England persistently strove to abate the pressure of armaments, and that each and every attempt was negatived by Germany; further that the conditions on which Germany was prepared to come to terms with England were that she should turn her back on her friendships with France and Russia, and agree to regard her treaty obligations to Belgium as a mere scrap of paper." The most novel part described the negotiations initiated by Bethmann on his appointment in 1909, which contemplated retardation of the German programme in return for British neutrality if Germany were attacked. The condition was declined on the ground that she could easily arrange for the formal inception of hostilities to rest with Austria, and that in such case Great Britain would be debarred from assisting France or defending Belgium. When the discussions were resumed in the summer of 1910 the offer of retardation was withdrawn, and a proposal that there should be no increase in the German programme was vetoed by the Kaiser. The parallel search for a formula of conditional neutrality was renewed, and the negotiations, after a further interruption owing to the Agadir crisis, ended in 1912, when agreement was found to be impossible. A fuller account of the later discussions, arising out of Haldane's mission to Berlin, was supplied in a Memorandum issued by the Foreign Office on September 1, 1915.

A similarly authoritative record of the long-drawn Bagdad railway negotiations was supplied in an anonymous article in the *Quarterly Review* in October 1917. The author, Mr. Alwyn Parker, had played an active part in the discussions which after many years had reached a conclusion satisfactory to both sides on the eve of hostilities. The agreements of Great



Britain with Turkey and Germany were contingent on the conclusion of the conversations between Germany and Turkey, which were not completed when the war broke out. The text of the Anglo-German Convention of June 15, 1914, was supplied by Dr. von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, to Professor Earle, of Columbia University, who published it with elucidations in the *Political Science Quarterly* in March 1923, and summarized the whole story in *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*.

On the termination of hostilities an elaborate study of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, entitled *The Outbreak of the War: A Narrative based mainly on British Official Documents*, was published by the Stationery Office. The author, Professor Oman, had been permitted to consult the documents. His narrative was enriched by information supplied by many of the actors, and was "submitted for comment and correction to several of the persons most concerned in its accuracy." The object of his substantial volume, which may fairly be described as semi-official, was "to set forth the manner in which the development of the situation presented itself from day to day to the eyes of those responsible for the policy of Great Britain." It supplemented Headlam-Morley's well-known volume *The Twelve Days*, and remained the standard presentation of the British case till the opening of the archives rendered possible a fuller analysis.

The resolve to reveal the secrets of the Foreign Office for the years leading up to the outbreak of the world war was taken by Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in the summer of 1924, confirmed by his successor in the latter office, Austen Chamberlain, and announced in the form of an exchange of letters with Dr. Seton-Watson. Historians, complained the Professor, had no authentic first-hand material on the British side, and were in consequence gravely handicapped when they came to deal with the charges against British policy. "As regards the publication of the official documents bearing on the general European situation out of which the war arose," replied the Foreign Secretary on November 28, 1924, "a collection of these documents will be edited for the Foreign Office by Mr. G. P. Gooch and Mr. H. W. V. Temperley, who will, I hope, be in a position to begin serious work at a very early date. The reputation of the editors offers the best guarantee of the historical accuracy and impartiality of their work." 1898 was chosen for the starting-

point, since in that year certain British statesmen began to doubt the sufficiency of "splendid isolation" and to look round for friends.

Before the decision to open the British archives was announced, Headlam-Morley, the first and last Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office, had begun to collect the documents from the murder of the Archduke to the declaration of war on Germany. The editors requested him to complete his selection and to issue it as the concluding volume of their enterprise. The British equivalent of the "Kautsky documents," published at the end of 1926, enabled the world to assess the value of the white-book issued two days after the declaration of war against Germany, and to visualize the atmosphere of the Foreign Office by printing minutes by the officials. Perhaps the most arresting item is the memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe on July 31, when it seemed as if the distracted Cabinet might decide on neutrality. "The whole policy of the Entente can have no meaning if it does not signify that in a just quarrel England would stand by her friends. I feel confident that our duty and our interest will be seen to lie in standing by France in her hour of need. France has not sought the quarrel. It has been forced upon her." The most interesting feature of Headlam-Morley's Introduction is the revelation that early in July, 1914, Sazonoff proposed a mutual guarantee of the Asiatic possessions of Russia and Great Britain, to be expanded if necessary by the inclusion of Japan. Grey replied on July 20 that he was attracted by the idea of a triple guarantee, and that he would consult the Prime Minister and the Cabinet "as soon as the Parliamentary and Irish situation gives them time".

The first two volumes of *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, end with the Anglo-French Treaty of April 8, 1904. The earliest novelty is Salisbury's proposal to Russia for a delimitation of spheres of influence in China and Turkey, a promising overture terminated by the seizure of Port Arthur. The negotiations of 1898 relating to the Portuguese Colonies, hitherto known only from the German side, are followed by the so-called Treaty of Windsor, which turns out to have been the offspring of Kruger's ultimatum. The second volume contains three contributions to historical knowledge of first-rate importance. The chapter on the negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance in 1901 gives the British version of the story outlined in *Die Grosse Politik*, ascribes the initiative

to Eckardstein, and illustrates Salisbury's antagonism to continental entanglements. The chapter on the alliance with Japan, already described from the Japanese side in the *Hayashi Memoirs*, illustrates our first departure from the tradition of "splendid isolation". The long chapter on the reconciliation with France records a transaction which was to have still more far-reaching results, and reveals the active share of Lord Cromer in the Egypt-Morocco deal.

The third volume, entitled *The Testing of the Entente*, 1904-6, describes the first Morocco crisis, which began with the Kaiser's visit to Tangier and ended at Algeciras. We learn that in April, 1905, Lansdowne, fearing that Germany might ask for a port on the Moorish coast, informed Delcassé that we should be prepared to join the French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal. The anticipated demand was never made, but the situation continued to arouse anxiety. On May 17 he observed to Paul Cambon that the moral of recent incidents seemed to be "that our two Governments should continue to keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the course of events find themselves confronted." The substance of this conversation was repeated in a letter to the French Ambassador dated May 25. There is no trace in the Foreign Office of an offer of alliance or of armed support. Curiously enough there is no record of the warning which Lansdowne conveyed to Metternich in an interview on June 28, 1905, in which, after a categorical denial that an alliance had been offered to France, he added, according to the German Ambassador, that if Germany light-heartedly provoked a war with France it was impossible to say how far public opinion would compel the Government to intervene.

Of no less interest is the chapter on the military conversations with France and Belgium authorized by the new Liberal Government at the opening of 1906. A good deal of information about the former had been revealed in the biography of Campbell-Bannerman, the apologies of Grey and Haldane, and the diary of Colonel Repington; but the correspondence of Colonel Barnardiston with General Grierson describing the Anglo-Belgian conversations is new, and gives the British side of the story which startled the world when the Germans published General Ducarne's report in the autumn of 1914. The inquiries to be addressed by our Military Attaché at Brussels

to the Belgian military authorities were to concern "the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium in the defence of her neutrality". Neither side has any reason to be ashamed of such precautionary discussions. A third item of importance is Crowe's massive Memorandum on "The Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," dated January 1, 1907, which severely criticizes the recent policy of Germany. A somewhat more indulgent view of the Wilhelmstrasse is presented in the observations of the veteran Lord Sanderson on this indictment.

The fourth volume, entitled *The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement*, 1903-7, describes the transformation of a dangerous rivalry into the beginnings of a diplomatic partnership. In the autumn of 1903 the Russian Ambassador in London was instructed to discuss the points of friction between the two Powers in Asia, namely China, where Russia had a special interest, and Persia, in which both were concerned. Since Benckendorff had no instructions to offer a detailed scheme, Lansdowne outlined an arrangement. Russia would be expected to recognize Afghanistan as entirely within the British sphere of influence, and to undertake not to send agents to Tibet. Great Britain would recognize the preponderance of Russia in North Persia, while the province of Seistan must be recognized as entirely under British influence. These conversations were interrupted for two years by the Russo-Japanese war, but were reopened in the autumn of 1905, when the Treaty of Portsmouth and the repudiation of the Björko Pact by the Russian Government removed the last obstacle. Detailed negotiations began in the spring of 1906, when Iswolsky succeeded Lamsdorff, and Nicolson, whom King Edward regarded as the best diplomatic horse in the British stable, was transferred to St. Petersburg with the draft of a Tibetan agreement in his pocket. Curzon's celebrated despatch, dated September 21, 1899, which opens the chapter on Persia, breathes the same suspicion of Russia as Crowe's Memorandum on Germany, but in 1906 both Great Britain and Russia were anxious to forget. No more striking evidence of a *détente* could be found than the conditional withdrawal of our veto on the passage of Russian warships through the Straits. The change of front was indicated in a memorandum by Sir Charles Hardinge, the successor of Sanderson as Permanent Under-Secretary, dated November 16, 1906, and

announced by Grey on March 19, 1907. This concession, however, which made Iswolsky beam with pleasure, found no place in the Anglo-Russian Convention, which only dealt with the Middle East, just as Iswolsky declined to include a recognition of our special interests in the Persian Gulf. Compared with the difficulty of reaching an agreement with Russia, the renewal and extension of our alliance with Japan in 1905, described for the first time in these pages, was plain sailing.

The fifth volume, entitled *The Near East*, 1903-9, after a series of chapters on Turkish misrule and the consequential intervention of the Powers in Macedonia, continues the story of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Hardinge's elaborate report on King Edward's visit to Reval in June, 1907, is of particular interest in view of the rumours to which the reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia gave birth. We pass to the Young Turk revolution and to the annexation of Bosnia for which it provided an excuse. The most interesting incidents in the drama are Iswolsky's visit to London in October 1908, a few days after Aehrenthal's bomb had exploded in Paris, and the spectacular intervention of Germany in the following spring. In the former case Grey informed Iswolsky in an official Memorandum that the British Government regarded the opening of the Straits as fair and reasonable, but that the proposal to give Russia and the riverain Powers exclusive rights was impracticable and that no pressure must be put on Turkey. Such a guarded acceptance was worthless for a Minister eager to present his countrymen with something which might balance the aggrandisement of Austria.

Henceforth Iswolsky fought a losing battle against his hated adversary, and the *coup de grâce* was administered on March 22, 1909. The communication from Berlin was described by the Minister as a "diplomatic ultimatum", and the Ambassador found him "in great alarm" and "rudely shaken". Aehrenthal, he explained, was brow-beating Russia through Germany, and he had succeeded. Nicolson's indignation at this surrender was divided between its authors and its victim, who capitulated without consulting his friends and allies. "Our entente, I much fear", he wrote to his chief, "will languish and possibly die." When Metternich inquired whether the British Government would yield the same unconditional assent to the annexation, Grey replied that he could give no such assurance until the Servian question was settled in a pacific and satisfactory manner. Though Metternich rejoined that this was "a very

grave decision which imperilled peace", the Foreign Secretary refused to be hustled, and carried through the agreed formula of Servia's submission for which he had been working before the German *démarche* brought the crisis to a head.

With the sixth volume, entitled *Anglo-German Tension 1907-12*, we return to the West. The liquidation of the first Morocco crisis at the Conference of Algeciras was followed by a *détente*, the most striking feature of which was the visit of William II to Windsor in November 1907. It was a false dawn, for 1908 witnessed a rapid deterioration, the stages in which are marked by the Kaiser's letter to Lord Tweedmouth, the abortive naval discussions at Cronberg between Hardinge and the Kaiser, the Casablanca crisis, and the *Daily Telegraph* interview. 1909 opened more hopefully with King Edward's visit to Berlin, but the naval exchanges in the spring revealed the depth of British apprehensions. A chapter of particular interest records the gallant attempt of the new Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg to rebuild the bridges. The discussion of naval limitation and a neutral formula broadened out into a survey of other issues, in particular the Bagdad railway. The negotiations were rudely interrupted by the Agadir crisis. The volume closes with a detailed account of the Haldane mission to Berlin in February 1912, and of the fruitless discussions in London which followed. An appendix contains Grey's comprehensive speech on the international situation delivered before the Committee of Imperial Defence on May 20, 1911, of which only fragments had appeared in print.

The seventh volume is devoted to the Agadir crisis, which, though merely an episode in the story of Anglo-German tension, was too large an item to fit into the framework of volume VI. We witness the exciting drama of the Casablanca deserters, the brief Franco-German *détente* of 1909, the growing anarchy of Morocco, the French expedition to Fez, the Spanish occupation of the zone allotted her under the secret Franco-Spanish treaty of 1904, the arrival of the *Panther* in the closed port of Agadir, the Mansion House speech of July 21, the dragging negotiations which culminated in the Morocco-Congo agreements of November 4, 1911. The readiness of England to help her friend in case of need contrasts with the lukewarm support of the Russian ally. The most piquant revelation is the successful attempt of Kiderlen-Waechter, the German Foreign Minister, to avoid a meeting of the British and German squadron at Molde during the critical days of

July, on the ground that indiscreet utterances by the Kaiser might complicate the situation. The volume closes with the Ministerial declarations and Parliamentary Debates in London, Paris and Berlin when the crisis was over. A weighty Memorandum by Crowe, dated January 12, 1912, emphasizes the utility of the Triple Entente for the balance of power.

Volume VIII, entitled *Arbitration, Neutrality and Security*, flashes light into several dark corners. The second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, despite its disappointing result, claims the longest chapter. Its sequel, the London Naval Conference, summoned to draw up rules of International Law for the use of an International Prize Court, deals with a subject completely ignored in *Die Grosse Politik*. Its offspring, the Declaration of London, is defended against its critics in an elaborate memorandum by Crowe. A chapter on Belgian neutrality, enriched by Foreign Office Memoranda of various dates, is supplemented by a lengthy appendix on the Dutch intention of fortifying Flushing, a project believed in some quarters to be due to German influence and to threaten the safety of Belgium in the event of war. The greatest surprise is the story of discussions between officers of Switzerland and the Central Powers in regard to Swiss neutrality. Among other topics are the bloodless separation of Norway and Sweden in 1905, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in a modified form in 1911, and the disappointing arbitration discussions with the United States.

Volume IX, part 1, resumes the story of Eastern Europe at the close of the Bosnian crisis, and carries us to the outbreak of the Balkan war in October 1912. The longest chapter is devoted to the Tripoli conflict, which encouraged the Balkan states to combine against Turkey and revived Russian ambitions in the Straits. The making of the Balkan League in the winter of 1911-12 is described by the British Minister at Sofia in a series of communications of exceptional importance. Of the many visits of highly-placed individuals two are of particular interest. The first is that of Nicholas II to King Edward at Cowes in August 1909, when Persia and the Near East were exhaustively discussed by Grey and Iswolsky. The second is the journey of Sazonoff to Balmoral in September 1912. Though the first Balkan war was about to break out, the conversations, judging by the British reports, were almost entirely confined to Persia and other Asiatic questions. "I had very friendly talks with Sazonoff and appreciated his

friendliness", wrote Grey to Buchanan; "but I think that he is in a state of weak health, and therefore of low vitality, which makes it difficult for him to come to close grips with questions." Grey feared that he might press us to take a strong anti-Turkish line, whereas he urged pressure on the Balkan states to keep the peace. Sounded by Sazonoff as to our attitude in the event of a European war, Grey explained that it would depend upon how it came about. There would be no support for aggression. If, however, Germany tried to crush France, he thought we should intervene.

Volume IX, part 2, describes the three Balkan wars. The primary cause of the outbreak of hostilities, declared Nicolson, was the secret alliance which Russia had encouraged the Balkan states to conclude. Grey's efforts to localize the struggle were unceasing, and the reports of the informal *réunions* of the Ambassadors of the Great European Powers in London suggest the difficulties of his task. The volume ends with the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on August 10, 1913, in which Bulgaria paid the penalty of her ill-judged attack on Serbia and Greece.

Volume X, part 1, entitled *The Near and Middle East on the eve of War*, continues the discussion of the problems left unsettled when the Balkan conflict was over and the *réunions* of the Ambassadors ceased, namely the fixing of the southern boundaries of Albania, the launching of the little state under Prince Wilhelm of Wied, and the ownership of the Aegean islands. More exciting is the story of the crisis provoked by Liman's appointment to the command of the First Turkish Army Corps at Constantinople, which Grey refused to take as tragically as Sazonoff. The chief novelty is the story of the last attempt by the Powers to introduce reforms in the Armenian provinces. The chapter on the Potsdam meeting of Nicholas II and Wilhelm II in November 1910 reveals the suspicion aroused in London and Paris by the Russo-German rapprochement, when Sazonoff withdrew Russia's opposition to the Bagdad railway without showing much consideration for his partners in the Triple Entente. The friction between England and Russia increased when the activities of Shuster, the American expert invited by Persia to reform her finances, led to Russian reprisals which Grey found it difficult to defend. The documents prove that Grey shared the sentiments of his Liberal critics to a greater extent than his public utterances seemed to indicate.



Volume X, part 2, entitled *The Last Years of Peace*, is mainly concerned with the prolonged Anglo-German negotiations on the Bagdad railway and spheres of influence in the Portuguese Colonies. Of greater general interest are the discussions which led to the redistribution of British and French forces in the Mediterranean and the Channel, and to the definition of our political relations in the Grey-Cambon letters of November 1912. The most memorable document in the volume is the letter of King George to Grey reproduced in facsimile, dated December 8, 1912. Prince Henry of Prussia paid him a visit at Sandringham and asked him point blank whether, in the event of Germany and Austria going to war with Russia and France, England would come to the assistance of the two latter Powers. "I answered undoubtedly yes, under certain circumstances. He professed surprise and regret, but did not ask what the circumstances were. He said he would tell the Emperor what I had told him. Of course Germany must know that we could not allow either of our friends to be crippled." Grey approved the King's impromptu utterance, though he added that the Government was not committed and public opinion was very averse to a war arising out of a quarrel about Servia. "But if Austria attacked Servia aggressively and Germany attacked Russia if she came to the assistance of Servia and France were then involved, it might become necessary for England to fight, as the German Chancellor said that Germany would fight for the defence of her position in Europe and for the protection of her own future and security." Neither the King nor the Foreign Secretary mentioned the balance of power, but that is what they meant.

The historical value of the work rests on the fact that the editors, who were aided throughout by Professor Lillian Penson, had a free hand in the selection of material. In the preface to volume III they announced that they would resign if an attempt were made to insist on the omission of any essential document. This declaration was repeated in subsequent volumes, and students may rest assured that nothing of importance has been omitted, either from the strictly official papers or from the private correspondence presented to the Foreign Office by Grey and Nicolson, later Lord Carnock. So far as British statesmanship is concerned there was indeed nothing to conceal. With the conquest of the Sudan and the annexation of the Boer Republics the British Empire became a satiated state. Thus the story is one less of British initiatives

than of reactions to the approaches and activities of other Powers. There is no recognizable difference between the attitude of the Unionist Lansdowne and the Liberal Grey, for both of them had been converted to Continentalism. The decisive event of the whole period, so far as Great Britain was concerned, was the reconciliation with France in 1904.

## II

While Queen Victoria's part in foreign affairs is recorded in the vast collection of her letters, the story of her son, who was never a letter writer, must be sought elsewhere. The first volume of Sir Sidney Lee's official biography of Edward VII reveals him as an eager observer of the changing scenes of the play rather than a far seeing statesman with definite principles. His dislike of William II is unmistakable, but the crude Germanophobia of his biographer distorts the picture at the end of the century. The most sensational pages describe "the Kaiser's plot" in the opening weeks of 1900. "His nefarious plan was secretly to persuade Russia to initiate a coalition of the Powers which should take advantage of England's difficulties in South Africa by making war upon her during her time of stress." This statement he bases on a report by the Russian Ambassador in Berlin of a conversation with the Kaiser on New Year's day, when the latter eulogized some recent experiments in mobilization on the Afghan frontier. "The Emperor saw in it confirmation of his cherished opinion that Russia alone could paralyse the power of England and deal it, if need be, a mortal blow. This subject led him to declare with ardour that if ever our august master should be moved to order his armies against India, he would mount guard over our frontiers." The plot, comments the biographer, missed fire, owing to the disinclination of Russia and France to move. His jealous dislike of England was notorious, but his impromptu outburst to Count Osten-Sacken is an inadequate foundation for the superstructure which Sidney Lee desires to erect.

That Edward VII acted in agreement with his constitutional advisers, passing on to them any information that he received and seeking their counsel when weighty decisions were required, is proved in the second volume of the official biography, commenced by Sidney Lee and completed on the lines which he had laid down. He shared the growing conviction at the opening of the century that the days of isolation were

over, and he welcomed the alliance with Japan. The tour of 1903, culminating in the conquest of Paris, was decided on his own initiative. French statesmen, when, like Clemenceau and Delcassé, they happened to be Anglophils, were peculiarly congenial, and Francis Joseph commanded his affectionate reverence till the Bosnian *coup*. Though an easy-going man of the world, there were certain things which he had no mind to condone. It was by his wish that diplomatic relations with Servia were broken off after the murder of Alexander and Draga, and he frowned on King Leopold of Belgium.

The frequent meetings with William II, though they usually passed off better than was anticipated, never provided unalloyed satisfaction, since the King could not know what surprise the impulsive ruler had up his sleeve. "The Tangier incident", he wrote to Lansdowne, "was the most mischievous and un-called-for event which the German Emperor has ever been engaged in since he came to the throne. He is no more nor less than a political *enfant terrible*, and one can have no faith in any of his assurances. These annual cruises are deeply to be deplored, and mischief is their only object." The only major political issue on which they agreed was the limitation of armaments, which they regarded as moonshine. The Morocco crisis convinced the King, as it convinced his Ministers, that the long-standing quarrel with Russia must be healed as quickly as possible, and he threw himself into the Reval visit with zest. The official journey to Berlin in 1909 was outwardly a success; but a few weeks earlier he had written to Lord Knollys: "I know the German Emperor hates me." It was in this year, after the dramatic termination of the Bosnian crisis, that the possibility of a European war for the first time crossed his mind. The portrait painted in this volume is not that of a Macchiavellian schemer but a kindly English gentleman, anxious that all nations should enjoy the blessings of prosperity and peace.

Next to the sovereigns come the Prime Ministers. The fourth volume of the life of Salisbury by Lady Gwendoline Cecil displays the Conservative chief at the height of his power, the leading figure on the European stage after the fall of Bismarck. A note on his attitude to Belgium in 1887, when Boulanger seemed likely to plunge the Continent into war, throws light on an obscure chapter of British policy. There is no evidence, we are told, that he was consulted before the famous article by "Diplomaticus" appeared in the *Standard*;

but he probably discussed the subject with Alfred Austin, and was glad that it should be ventilated in the press. He lay low, neither confirming nor repudiating the guarantee to Belgium; but in his daughter's view his silence tacitly admitted that we might not be able to honour it. Much fuller is the account of the bloodless partition of Africa which forms the most memorable achievement of his second Ministry.

The biography of Rosebery by his son-in-law Lord Crewe adds little to our knowledge of foreign affairs, for his official experience was brief. That he stood for continuity when he succeeded Salisbury at the Foreign Office in 1892 was not surprising, for there was nothing specifically Gladstonian about him. The most exciting incident was the Siam crisis in 1893. When news arrived that a British ship off Bangkok had been ordered away by the French, he wired instructions to remain. It seemed as if the guns might go off, and for a few hours peace hung by a thread. The Siamese Government accepted the French demands, and the crisis passed as quickly as it arose, but the experience left bitter memories. "The behaviour of France to Siam", wrote the indignant Rosebery to the Queen, "has, it appears, been base, cruel and treacherous. Perhaps nothing so cynically vile is on record. . . . The French must bear the burden of their own misdeeds, and Lord Rosebery does not doubt that, as there is a God in heaven, these will find them out." A year later the Anglo-Congolese treaty was signed but speedily dropped owing to French and German protests. This time it was Germany who incurred the wrath of the Foreign Secretary. "She is alienating this country", he complained to the Queen, "and instead of making friendly remonstrances and proposals for reconsideration she takes a tone which she might properly use in addressing Monaco." Moreover she was encouraging France to bully Belgium. "It is never wise to fan a French flame, and Belgium might easily become the cause as well as the scene of a European conflagration." He criticized the treaty of 1904, not from hostility to France but in fear of the complications to which her ambitions in Morocco might lead.

Richer material is to be found in Mrs. Dugdale's affectionate life of her uncle Lord Balfour. As Leader of the House from 1895 till he succeeded Salisbury in 1902 he stood closer to his uncle than anyone else, acting as deputy Foreign Minister when his ageing chief went abroad for his health. He was in control during the spring and summer of 1898, a year of

crowding events beginning with the Russian occupation of Port Arthur. It was not worth a war, he reported to the Queen, and the leasing of Wei-hai-wai would maintain the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili. An exchange of letters with Salisbury describes the informal Hatzfeldt-Chamberlain discussions of an alliance in a critical vein. Balfour described "Joe" as "very impulsive". "The one object of the German Emperor since he has been on the throne," wrote Salisbury, "has been to get us into a war with France. I never can make up my mind whether this is part of Chamberlain's object or not. . . . France certainly acts as if she meant to drive us into a German alliance, which I look to with some dismay, for Germany will blackmail us heavily." A third problem arose on the eve of the Spanish-American war when Balfour watered down an injudicious joint offer of mediation to the United States. A fourth task was to conclude a secret agreement with Germany concerning spheres of influence in Portugal's colonies, suggested by the crisis in her finances. On his visit to England in November 1899 William II spoke of it with satisfaction, remarking that it settled the relations of the two countries in South Africa for all time.

The main events of Balfour's Premiership were the Russo-Japanese war and the reconciliation with France. A frank letter to King Edward explains why he made no great effort to hold back our ally. A war between Japan and Russia, he argued, in which England was not actively concerned, and in which Japan did not suffer serious defeat, would not be an unmixed curse; for Russia would be much easier to deal with, both in Asia and Europe. Though he was consulted by Lansdowne at every step of the Anglo-French negotiations, his biography throws little light on the story. The agreement was not envisaged as a prelude to a military understanding. "It came upon me as a shock of surprise, I am far from saying of disapproval," wrote Balfour in 1912, "when I found how rapidly after I left office the Entente had, under the German menace, developed into something resembling a defensive alliance." Indeed, in a Memorandum written by request in June 1912, he urged such a stiffening of the Entente as more likely to diminish than to increase international tension. The difficulty of defining the aggressor could be met by requiring the partner who called for assistance to express his readiness for arbitration.

The second volume describes Balfour's work at the Foreign

Office in the Lloyd George coalition. The most memorable incident was his mission to the United States in 1917. He was not greatly interested in peace talk and peace feelers on the ground that no one knew how the struggle would end. He was aware of Lansdowne's desire for a restatement of war aims, and authorized him to show the draft of his celebrated letter to Lord Hardinge, who had returned to his old post as Permanent Under-Secretary. Hardinge declared that it was statesmanlike and would do good; but Balfour, who was leaving for Paris, gave no instructions and regretted its publication. On the eve of the Peace Conference he remarked that it was not so much the war as the peace that he had always dreaded: it was going to be a rough and tumble affair. Realizing the need for haste, he welcomed the creation of the Council of Four, which he attended on special occasions. On the whole he approved the treaty, though he would have given Germany a land bridge across the Polish Corridor. His share in the Austrian settlement was more direct, for after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles and the return of the Prime Minister to England, he became head of the British Delegation. Throughout the three anxious years of their collaboration he had worked unselfishly and harmoniously with his chief. "I don't say Lloyd George didn't often do things he had better not have done," he remarked after the fall of the Government in 1922. "But you can't expect the P.M. not to interfere with Foreign Office business. . . . The Foreign Office cannot be in a water-tight compartment."

A vivid portrait of Balfour during his mission to America in 1917 and the Peace Congress is drawn in Sir Ian Malcolm's little volume *Lord Balfour*. "My nerves are never frayed", he remarked to his devoted Private Secretary, who presents a personality of irresistible charm. He combats the legend that the British Foreign Secretary was idle, though the difference between the elegant aristocrat and the temperamental Prime Minister was immense. England knew him as Prince Arthur, and to his Secretary he was the last of the Athenians. Clemenceau hailed him as the Richelieu of the Congress. Balfour began to dictate his reminiscences when his strength was ebbing, and the slender volume, *Chapters of Autobiography*, only contains one chapter on his later life. The sketch of his mission to America in 1917 is notable for its tribute to Colonel House. "History will assign him a unique position—always resourceful, always with unruffled temper. I had had in

London many opportunities to know and admire his great qualities."

The life of Campbell-Bannerman, by J. A. Spender, contains an important chapter in the second volume on the development of the French entente. It was believed by Lord Loreburn and others that Grey and his Liberal Imperialist friends in the new Ministry had kept their commitments to France a secret not only from the Cabinet but from the Prime Minister himself. It was an unfounded suspicion, for Campbell-Bannerman was consulted at every step in the exchanges of January 1906, including the authorization of non-committal military conversations. "I do not like the stress laid upon joint preparations", he wrote to Ripon on February 2. "It comes very close to an honourable undertaking: and it will be known on both sides of the Rhine. But let us hope for the best." Though he was not an expert in foreign affairs, he sensed the significance of the military conversations more clearly than his Foreign Secretary. That the whole transaction was not reported to the Cabinet directly after the elections was a grave error of judgment, the responsibility for which must be divided between Campbell-Bannerman and Grey.

The tightening of the bonds with France was unknown to the public, but the Prime Minister's speech to the Inter-Parliamentary Union on July 23, 1906, echoed round the world. The news of the dissolution of the first Duma only reached London a few hours before the meeting, and he promptly wrote out an addition—reproduced in these pages in facsimile—containing the historic words: *La Douma est morte, vive la Douma!* which, in the words of his secretary, Arthur Ponsonby, turned a catastrophe into a battle-cry of hope. Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, resented the rebuke, but the approval of Paul Cambon—"I do not know a better judge"—was a consolation. A second personal intervention in foreign affairs was the publication of an article in the *Nation*, on March 2, 1907, reproduced in these pages, on the forthcoming Hague Conference and the limitation of armaments, the text of which was discussed with Grey before it appeared.

Lord Oxford and Asquith's *The Genesis of the War* is admirable in tone and temper. His criticisms of the Kaiser and other actors in the drama are expressed in moderate language, and he prefers sarcasm to denunciation. The reiterated efforts of Campbell-Bannerman and his successor to secure a reduction

or arrest of naval armaments are authoritatively described, and in the absence of effective response we had to prepare against possible danger. That these preparations were efficiently carried out no one can doubt who reads this narrative. To the disciples of Lord Roberts the author replies that the adoption of compulsory service was not only politically impossible, but would have precipitated a German attack during the confusion of the transitional period if Germany, as this school of thought usually argued, was already determined to strike. While he may be congratulated on his vindication of the pacific aims of British policy and of his stewardship of the national defences, his excursions into the labyrinth of Continental diplomacy are less successful, and his judgments sometimes suffer from oversimplification.

Asquith could write very well when he chose, but none of the three books which together form his apologia is altogether worthy of his fame. The second, *Fifty Years of Parliament*, deals entirely with home affairs. The third, *Memories and Reflections*, 1852-1927, on which he was at work when he died, suggests that he was beginning to lose grip; but the extracts from his diary (in the first chapter of the second volume) during the days of decision in July 1914 must always be consulted by students of British diplomacy. The first reference to coming events is Grey's account of the situation on July 24. "Austria has sent a bullying and humiliating ultimatum to Servia who cannot possibly comply with it. This means almost inevitably that Russia will come on the scene in defence of Servia, and if so it is difficult for Germany and France to refrain from lending a hand. So that we are within measurable distance of a real Armageddon."

On July 29 he noted that Great Britain, though the only Power who had made a constructive suggestion for peace, was blamed both by Russia and Germany for causing the outbreak of war. On the following day he records that the City, which was in a terrible state of depression and paralysis, was strongly opposed to intervention. On July 31, after describing an indecisive discussion in the Cabinet, he comments "Of course everybody longs to stand aside." When the news of Russia's general mobilization arrived the Prime Minister, aided by Sir William Tyrrell and others, drafted a direct appeal from the King to the Tsar, which he took to Buckingham Palace about 1.30 a.m. The King was hauled out of bed to hear the message. On August 1, we learn, Mr. Lloyd George was for peace, Mr.



Churchill very bellicose and demanding immediate mobilization, while the Prime Minister himself was still not quite without hope.

Sunday, August 2, was scarcely less the day of decision than Tuesday, August 4. When Lichnowsky appeared at breakfast time Asquith told him that he had no desire to intervene. It rested largely with Germany to make intervention impossible by abstaining from the invasion of Belgium and from sending her fleet to attack the unprotected north coast of France. A brief description follows of the morning Cabinet, which agreed to tell Cambon that our ships would not allow the German fleet to make the Channel a base for hostile operations. Mr. Burns resigned but was persuaded to stay at any rate till the evening Cabinet. "There is a strong party against any kind of intervention in any event. Grey, of course, will never consent to this, and I shall not separate myself from him. Crewe, McKenna and Samuel are a moderating intermediate body. . . . Happily I am quite clear in my mind as to what is right and wrong." We had no obligation to help France or Russia, and the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force at that moment was out of the question. On the other hand we must not forget the ties created by our intimate friendship with France, and it was against British interests that she should be wiped out as a Great Power. We could not allow Germany to use the Channel as a hostile base, and we had obligations to Belgium. The news that the Germans had entered Belgium "simplified matters," and the ultimatum to Berlin was dispatched on the next day.

Next to the pages devoted to the outbreak of war the most valuable portion of the book is the chapter entitled "The Break-up of the First Coalition," contributed by Lord Crewe and dated December 20, 1916. Lansdowne had drawn up a Memorandum, dated November 13, and we are told that the *causa causans* of the final break-up may possibly be traced to this "striking paper," the apprehensions of which were to some extent echoed in Lord Robert Cecil's Memorandum of November 27. Lansdowne regretted Mr. Lloyd George's "knockout interview" of September 4, adding: "To many of us it seems as if the prospect of a knock-out was, to say the least of it, remote," and concluding with the suggestion of careful stocktaking, domestic and international.

The official biography of Asquith by his friend Alfred Spender and his son Cyril is admirable both as a portrait and

a record. Since he left foreign affairs to Grey, in whom he felt complete confidence, little illumination in this field is derived from these volumes till we reach the world war. An interesting letter from Balfour, Leader of the Opposition, to Lansdowne, dated November 6, 1908, suggests the anxieties of the Bosnian crisis. "Asquith asked me to speak with him last night after the House rose. He was evidently extremely perturbed about the European situation, which in his view was the gravest of which we have had any experience since 1870." The German summons to Russia in March 1909 to drop her opposition to the annexation made a profound impression on Asquith and Grey. A useful chapter, entitled "On the verge of War," supplements the Prime Minister's diary by his reports to the King on Cabinet meetings held during the last week of peace. It is not a complete story, for he was in continuous contact with Buckingham Palace. His tongue never ran away with him, and his records of these distracting days are calm and almost dry. Mrs. Asquith's *Autobiography* helps us to visualize her husband, and there is solid matter behind the froth.

Mr. Lloyd George's *War Memoirs* and Grey's *Twenty-Five Years* are the most important individual contributions from the British side to the literature of the world war, yet no books could differ more widely in character and appeal. While the Foreign Minister tells his story with modesty and reserve, the Prime Minister fights his battles over again, returning blow for blow. The vivacity and resilience, the breathless alternation of crises and triumphs, recall the atmosphere of *Les Trois Mousquetaires*. It is an astonishing performance for a man who took up his pen at an age when most professional writers lay it down. Few readers of the six stout volumes find them too long, for we stand throughout at the heart of great events. "I was the only official figure who went right through it, from the declaration of war to the signing of peace." He admits no errors of judgment except that he occasionally gave his confidence to the wrong man. Some readers may complain that it is a little too good to be true, but no candid student will challenge the author's title to be accounted one of the principal architects of victory.

The opening chapter of the first volume, entitled "The Brewing of the Storm," describes the early contacts with foreign affairs after his appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1908. His discussions with Metternich in

London and Bethmann Hollweg (not yet Chancellor) in Berlin suggested the difficulty of reaching an agreement with a country convinced that an "iron ring" was being forged around its borders and resentful of any plan of naval limitation. So impressed was he with the growing danger that in the Constitutional Conference following the death of Edward VII he vainly pleaded for a party truce and an agreed programme including compulsory service on the Swiss model. His growing anxieties were repeated in the Mansion House speech of 1911. Though he showed it to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, the initiative and the wording were his own. "The effect of the speech was unquestionably to clear the air and avert any danger of Europe drifting unawares into war. . . . If an equally clear statement of our attitude had been made in July three years later, it is conceivable that once again the peril of a recklessly incurred war might have been averted."

Mr. Lloyd George complains that, despite the increasing gravity of the European situation, the Cabinet was not properly informed. Ministers were never treated to such a review as Grey delivered to the Dominion Premiers in 1911. "There was in the Cabinet an air of 'hush, hush' about every allusion to our relations with France, Russia and Germany. Direct questions were always answered with civility, but were not encouraged." He learned nothing about our military commitments till the Agadir crisis, and the Cabinet as a whole only learned of them in the following year. "When in 1912 (six years after they had been entered into) Sir Edward Grey communicated these negotiations and arrangements to the Cabinet the majority of its members were aghast. Hostility barely represents the strength of the sentiment which the revelations aroused: it was more akin to consternation. Sir Edward Grey allayed the apprehensions of his colleagues to some extent by emphatic assurances that these military arrangements left us quite free, in the event of war, to decide whether we should or should not participate in the conflict."

The account of the outbreak of the war is unflattering to the men at the top. "They were all handy men in a well-behaved sea, but helpless in a typhoon. . . . If I were on a jury trying any of the men who were in control of affairs at that date, I should bring against most of them a verdict of manslaughter rather than of murder." He blames Grey for not playing the card of our treaty pledges to Belgium early enough to in-

fluence Germany before she took the final plunge; and he devotes a special chapter to the man who, in his opinion, lacked resolution and resource. The soldiers, including Joffre, French and Kitchener, seemed to him no better. The volume closes with a chapter on the Serbian Tragedy, which denounces both the Foreign Minister and the soldiers. "The way he had been betrayed by the Military to give in the House of Commons pledges to Serbia they had no hope of redeeming did not seem to diminish his childish faith in their advice."

The second volume, which brings us to the fall of the first Coalition in December 1916, completes the story of the author's work at the Ministry of Munitions and begins the discussions of war aims. When it became clear that the struggle would last far longer than had been anticipated, the possibility of bringing it to an end by negotiation began to be canvassed. Lansdowne's Memorandum to his Cabinet colleagues in November 1916, based on the assumption that a knock-out blow was exceedingly improbable, made a deep impression, and expert opinions were invited. Robertson and Haig repudiated the notion of a stalemate. Grey argued that it would be premature to make peace so long as the military and naval authorities thought that the position was likely to improve. Balfour submitted the outlines of a settlement based on the assumption that the Allies would be able to dictate terms. Henderson and Lord Robert Cecil argued strongly that a premature peace would be merely a truce. After considering the opinions expressed Asquith decided that the time for peace feelers had not arrived, and no member of the Cabinet indicated dissent. The author describes this episode at length in order to rebut the charge that he alone stood for a fight to a finish.

Next to the discussion of war aims the most arresting items in this volume are the character studies. An analysis of Kitchener leaves the mystery unsolved. Was he a great man or a great disappointment or both? At any rate he had flashes of greatness. Robertson's mind was sound but commonplace, and he distrusted all foreigners, the French in particular. They called him General non-non. Briand once complained that he said "Non" before he knew the proposal. Asquith lacked drive and initiative. In the words of Lord Morley he ought to have been a judge. While Asquith possessed unrivalled clarity but lacked ideas, Haldane was a man of ideas which he could not explain succinctly but which he was able

to carry out. "This garrulous lawyer was a man of action", by common consent the best War Minister since Cardwell. Balfour was incomparable in presenting arguments, but he lacked the power to decide. "C'est fini?" asked Clemenceau after listening to a string of reasons on both sides. "Oui, monsieur," replied Balfour. Then Clemenceau snapped out in English: "But are you for or against?" Balfour seemed unprepared for an answer. Ultimately he reported against. Bonar Law, a lonely figure, was by temperament a pessimist, possessing quiet courage but no urge to action. Carson was unrivalled as an exposé of humbug and pretension, but he was always "agin" the Government.

With the third volume, in which we enter on the Premiership, the narrative flows in a broadening stream. It was no pleasure, we are assured, to criticize distinguished public servants, some of them no longer able to reply. But as they had directly or indirectly given their version and had not spared him, the author felt justified in correcting wrong impressions. "Lessons cannot be learnt unless they are truthfully taught. I regret more than words can express the necessity for telling the bare facts of our bloodstained stagger to victory." Censure inevitably attracts more attention than praise, and though there are plenty of bouquets in these pages, it is the stinging attacks which linger in the memory. A few are so bitter that they damage the author more than the victim.

The first political task of the new Ministry was to discuss a joint reply to the German Peace Note of December 1916 and President Wilson's simultaneous request for a statement of aims. The former was denounced as a sham, lacking precision, and less an offer of peace than a war manœuvre. The latter produced the first detailed statement of the terms the Allies hoped to enforce, which closely anticipated the treaty of Versailles. A second urgent task was to stimulate Russia to fresh efforts by an Inter-Allied Mission, which came too late. Milner, the head of the British Delegation, found the Russians "thoroughly disgruntled", though he did not anticipate a speedy revolution. When the blow fell the British Cabinet, at the request of the Provisional Government, invited the Tsar to take sanctuary in England, but the growing pressure from the left in Russia prevented his departure. For the tragedy of Ekaterinburg, declares Mr. Lloyd George, this country cannot be in any way held responsible. The volume closes with the

entry of the United States into the war, followed by the Balfour, Northcliffe and Reading Missions.

The fourth volume, which is notable for the chapters on Passchendaele, "one of the greatest disasters of the war", touches diplomacy at four points. The first relates to the despatch of Arthur Henderson to St. Petersburg, on the ground that Sir George Buchanan was *persona ingrata* with the new regime, and to the related problem of the Stockholm Conference. Henderson, we are told, returned from Russia with more than a touch of the revolutionary malaria. "His temperature was high and his mood refractory." His resignation from the War Cabinet was regrettable but inevitable. The second diplomatic incident was the Austrian peace move. It was difficult to combine the secrecy demanded by the Emperor Karl with loyalty to the Italians, for whom there were no concessions. The author describes his meetings with Prince Sixte, the Emperor's emissary, in Paris and London, and the frustration by France of a promising plan. Ribot, we are told, was led by the Cambon brothers.

The third diplomatic item was the Vatican peace note of August 1917, to which the British Government politely replied that their war aims had been explained to President Wilson, and that they must defer a detailed reply until the German reaction was known. Wilson, though the most pacifist of rulers, was equally opposed to compromise, on the same ground that a patched up peace would strengthen the power of military autocracy and provide a breathing-space for a further struggle. No real peace was possible till the military strength of Germany was broken. The German reply to the Pope, when it came, appeared to justify the intransigence of the Allies, for it contained no reference to Belgium. The fourth diplomatic item is the least known. Kühlmann, the new Foreign Secretary, saw further than the Generals, and tried to get into touch with the Western Powers through Spain. The British Government replied that they were willing to receive any communication relating to peace and to discuss it with their allies. But at this moment he announced in the Reichstag that there could never be concessions with regard to Alsace-Lorraine.

While the kernel of the fifth volume is the story of the German offensive of March 1918, the diplomatic soundings which began at the end of 1916 never wholly ceased. The sufferings and war-weariness of Austria were revealed afresh

when the news arrived in December 1917 that Czernin, the Foreign Minister, was willing to send Mensdorff, the highly respected Ambassador in London before the war, to Switzerland to discuss peace terms. General Smuts was accordingly despatched to Geneva, with instructions to review the possibility of a separate peace but not to envisage a general settlement. His masterly report, here printed in full, is one of the gems of the work. British goodwill for Austria, he began, had not been extinguished by the war, for it was realized that she was being used by Germany. This subordination should cease. If she broke with Germany she would receive not only the sympathy but the active support of the Entente, particularly of the British Empire. Mensdorff welcomed the assurance, all the more since the Allied reply to Wilson foreshadowed the break-up of the Austrian Empire. "I assured him that that note never had such an intention, and that its object and still more our object now was to assist Austria to give the greatest freedom and autonomy to her subject nationalities." If she became a League of Free Nations, she would have an even greater mission than in the past. Austrian statesmen, replied Mensdorff, were determined to make a new start after the war, but while it lasted they could not desert their ally. It was their fervent desire to be the means of ending the war, and he pleaded for moderate terms. Germany, he believed, would not be unreasonable. Neither side had won or was likely to win a complete victory. The main interest of this remarkable meeting is the statement that as late as the fourth winter the Allies were not contemplating dismemberment.

A fortnight later, on January 5, 1918, the Prime Minister's considered declaration of peace terms declared that "the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims." As a result of this speech our Minister at Berne was informed that Czernin wished to meet the Prime Minister in Switzerland. The latter was strongly in favour of keeping the discussions alive. If they came to anything, we should have one foe less to fight. If they did not, it would make Austria less inclined to antagonize the Western Powers by sending troops to France. Since the Prime Minister could not get away it was resolved to send a member of the War Cabinet. After long delay, which strengthened the suspicions of the Foreign Office as to Czernin's sincerity, Smuts returned to Switzerland early in March 1918. Skrynsky, the Austrian emissary, was friendly

enough, but the approach of the German offensive in the west had made Czernin less anxious for peace. When the storm burst on March 18, the time for such exchanges was past.

The sixth volume describes the defeat and surrender of our foes in the summer and autumn of 1918. As late as October 19 Haig told the Cabinet that the Germans could still put up a good fight, and the end came with startling suddenness. Mr. Lloyd George had always stood for a fight to a finish, but even in the moment of victory he realized some of its disadvantages. "Beyond question it was a disaster that we had to lay Germany prostrate before we could reach a peace settlement." That the struggle lasted so long and cost so many lives was due in large measure to the mistake, made by both sides, of battering against impregnable lines in the west instead of attacking at the weakest point. Far from admitting the charge that a civilian Prime Minister interfered too much in technical matters, he believes that the statesmen were too cautious in exerting their authority. Passchendaele was only the most glaring example of military miscalculation.

A special chapter entitled "Lord Haig's Diaries and After" replies to the revelations and arguments in Mr. Duff Cooper's official biography. Their personal relations were pleasant enough. "But I never concealed from myself or my colleagues that I thought Sir Douglas Haig intellectually and temperamentally unequal to the command of an army fighting battles on fields invisible to any commander. . . . He was highly trained, conscientious, tenacious, but he possessed neither magnetism nor imagination. The problem set before a commander of two million men on a hundred-mile front battle was one which needed capacity of a very high order. No British General was ever given so gigantic an undertaking. It was far beyond his mental equipment." We needed a man of genius like Foch to pull us through. The author looks back with horror on the scene in which he played a leading part. "Chance is the supreme judge in war, not right. There are other judges on the bench, but chance presides." We were saved by the blunders of German statesmen and soldiers, which were even greater than our own.

Mr. Lloyd George's supplementary volumes, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* supply the first detailed account of the activities of the British Delegation. Since the official French and American versions were given by Tardieu and Stannard Baker, both highly critical of our policy, the need for an



authoritative statement from the British side was urgently felt. Sir James Headlam-Morley had hoped to edit some of the documents, but a better solution has been found. In addition to the memoranda and reports of meetings which fill hundreds of pages, the Prime Minister can speak with unique authority on the aims of his Government and the discussions of the Big Four. It is, of course, the work of a witness, not a judge, but the reader is supplied with abundant materials to form his own opinion. The author has no apologies to offer for his handiwork. The treaties, he argues, conformed to the principles proclaimed at the beginning of the struggle: victory merely gave us the opportunity of applying them. He appears throughout as the apostle of moderation, whose statesmanlike maxims were laid down in the Fontainebleau memorandum of March 25, 1919. That some of our allies were less far-sighted, and that in consequence the edifice contained some rickety portions, was not our fault. The disasters of post-war Europe were due to other causes. "Between the retreat of America and the treacheries of Europe the Treaties of Peace were never given a fair trial."

The robust personality of the Tiger pervades the whole drama, and is presented in an attractive light. Behind his truculence, we are told, there was a core of moderation and good sense. Poincaré, on the other hand, is denounced as a fussy little man, with a sterile mind, blinded by implacable hatred of Germany. "His dead hand lies heavy on Europe to-day." The portrait of Wilson is carefully drawn. "He was the most extraordinary compound I have ever encountered of the noble visionary, the implacable and unscrupulous partisan, the exalted idealist and the man of rather petty personal rancours. . . . He was genuinely humane, but he completely lacked the human touch. The hand was too frigid. It gave you the impression that Wilson's philanthropy was purely intellectual, whereas Lincoln's came straight from the heart." Orlando is depicted as an amiable Liberal, Sonnino as a dour nationalist of limited vision.

The sketches of the members of the British Delegation are friendly enough. Balfour's analytical powers are never mentioned without respect. Milner is described as much the best all round brain contributed by the Conservative party to the Coalition, though the strain of the war had begun to tell on him. Among the Dominion statesmen Botha receives the highest marks. "He was truly a great man. He was a great

warrior, an even greater counsellor and conciliator. Throughout the Paris deliberations he stood for a settlement that would leave no roots of bitterness behind." Smuts was not built in quite such a large mould, but he possessed an exceptional intellect, perfectly trained. The only die-hard was Hughes, whose intransigence brought him close to the French standpoint. If Northcliffe's audacious demand to be one of the British representatives had been granted, a historic quarrel would have been avoided or postponed. He had performed some useful services during the war, but by 1919 his head was turned by power and he had become impossible.

The opening chapters of the first volume, which deals with the German settlement, survey the preparations for the Conference. The proposal to try the Kaiser came from Curzon after a conversation with Clemenceau, and was welcomed by the Imperial War Cabinet without a dissentient voice. The same unanimity prevailed in regard to the German colonies. There was no real desire to add any territory to the Empire, we are told. Why then were they annexed? Because unfortunately America declined a mandate; because the Dominions were not prepared to give up territories they had conquered; and because it was believed that Germany would use any territory restored to her for purposes of war.

Far more controversial was the problem of the Rhineland, which France approached from the strategic angle. To end the deadlock the author, with Wilson's consent, proposed a joint military guarantee against German aggression, and accepted the plan of a demilitarized zone on the right bank. It is satisfactory to learn that the King of the Belgians, "that wise monarch", gave no support to the indefensible French demand for the separation of millions of Germans from the Fatherland. On the question of intervention in Russia there was disagreement within the British Delegation, Curzon and Churchill urging action against the Bolsheviks. "If we are committed to a war against a Continent like Russia", replied the Prime Minister, "it is the direct road to bankruptcy and Bolshevism in these islands." In regard to reparations he had to fight not only against fantastic French demands but against some of his own experts. The chapter on the creation of the League emphasizes the fact that, of all the belligerents, only the British and French Governments had prepared practical schemes. That Wilson was its author is a legend. The Phillimore and Bourgeois schemes were available to him

months before the war ended ; but when the author met him in London in December 1918 and asked to see any scheme prepared by or for him, the President replied that he had worked out no detailed proposals.

The chapter on the presentation of the treaty to the German Delegation describes the discussion of the German reply to the draft treaty by nine members of the British Government and the leaders of the Dominions. "There was a complete absence of bitterness and vindictiveness. . . . It might have been a meeting of the official representatives of a benevolent neutral called upon to adjudicate upon the points in dispute between the parties. The calmness of temper was all the more remarkable since they were all convinced that the conflict had been deliberately provoked. Even if a truer view of the origins of the war had been entertained, it would have been impossible to convert the French, whose hatred for the Germans is repeatedly described as something inconceivable.

The second volume describes the settlement with Germany's allies. The Austro-Hungarian Empire broke into fragments before the victors assembled at Paris, but the distribution of its territories proved a controversial task. Next in importance and intensity to France's struggle for control of the Rhineland was Italy's demand for Fiume. The long chapter entitled "The Italian Claims" describes the fierce duel between the President and the Italians, whose principal argument was that there would be a revolution if they returned with empty hands. What the author describes as Italy's blinkered greed found no support from the British Delegation, which was prepared to carry out the promises of the Treaty of London but refused new rewards.

The section on Czechoslovakia is notable for its sharp criticism of Benes. "Of the many misfortunes that befell Austria in the day of her great calamity one of the worst was that Czechoslovakia was represented at the Peace Conference not by her wise leader, President Masaryk, but by an impulsive, clever but much less sagacious and more short-sighted politician, who did not foresee that the more he grasped the less could he retain." The section on Poland reveals the Prime Minister resisting not only extravagant Polish claims but their French, American and British backers. In this field Wilson rendered no help, for his experts are described as fanatical pro-Poles. The settlement with Turkey is narrated at greater length than any other item, and indeed it fills half the volume.

The most interesting pages concern the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Balfour Declaration, and the refusal of the United States to shoulder the burden of Armenia. A concluding chapter compares the declared aims of the victors with the actual terms of the treaties, and finds no grave discrepancy. In what respect, asks the author, did any of them contravene the principles of equity and wise statesmanship? Had their stipulations been faithfully fulfilled, the dark military and economic menace hanging over Europe in 1938 would have been averted. Such crudities and injustices as had inevitably crept into a settlement patched up in a hurry on so vast a scale could have been removed under the revisionary provisions. Unhappily the treaties were operated by rougher hands and lesser brains. Clemenceau was followed by Poincaré. Wilson was repudiated by his countrymen. France was left in command, and she proceeded to trample on her prostrate foe.

### III

Pending the publication of the final volume of the life of Salisbury, we must be content with the testimony of his colleagues. The most important witness is the Colonial Secretary, whose exchanges with German diplomatists on the possibility of an alliance are recorded in the third volume of Garvin's dynamic biography. The initiative came from the German side. "I said that, so far as I knew", reported Chamberlain to Salisbury after his first conversation with Hatzfeldt on March 29, 1898, "there was no question between the two Governments which affected any important interest, and they were all absolutely trivial in comparison with the great issues involving our relations with other nations. It seemed to me that on these greater issues the interests of Germany were really identical with our own." He proceeded to sketch a defensive agreement for a term of years, based on an understanding as to policy in China and elsewhere. Never before had a British Minister, even unofficially, dangled an alliance before the German Empire.

The response was chilly. Bülow and his advisers believed that an alliance with England involved a break with Russia, and they feared that a change of party at Westminster might alter the course. Chamberlain reiterated his arguments in further conversations, but without avail. In forwarding his notes of the conversations to Salisbury he expressed his

conviction that England was powerless to resist the ultimate control of China by Russia, and that our isolation was a grave disadvantage in negotiating with France. The country, he believed, would favour a treaty with Germany. "I quite agree with you", replied the Prime Minister, "that under the circumstances a closer relation with Germany would be very desirable; but can we get it?" He did not believe it, and he could not share Chamberlain's view of its urgency. "We know that we shall maintain against all comers that which we possess," he declared in a memorable speech on May 4, 1898, "and we know, in spite of the jargon about isolation, that we are amply competent to do so." Chamberlain did not abandon his project of Anglo-German partnership till 1901, when the first and last official discussion ended in failure.

Lord George Hamilton's *Reminiscences and Reflections*, 1886-1906, illustrate the early years of the reign of William II. His first visit to England after his accession left a favourable impression on the author, at that time First Lord of the Admiralty, but by 1891 he had deteriorated. It was "pose, pose, pose". Salisbury, we are told, looked on him as our most dangerous enemy in Europe, and remarked that he never met a man with such a double tongue. The author's dislike increased at every subsequent visit. The cession of Heligoland in 1890 is stoutly defended on the ground that it would have had to surrender at the outbreak of war. "If it was wrong, I must bear the main responsibility."

The most interesting item to the student of diplomacy in the biography of Hicks Beach by his daughter is his character study of Salisbury printed as an Appendix to the second volume. In the latter years of his Premiership, we are told, he was obviously weary and ill, and shrank from any new departure. "I do not think the first Japanese treaty would have been negotiated if he had then been Foreign Secretary." His love of peace and clear sense of proportion kept us out of many quarrels. "There was, however, one occasion on which he was more warlike than his Cabinet and raised the question of sending our fleet to Constantinople to coerce Turkey into proper treatment of the Armenians. I think he was much put out when Lord Goschen's objections prevailed."

Gardiner's massive biography of Harcourt reveals the differences in the Liberal party in regard to the expansion of Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. The Gladstone

and Rosebery Cabinets of 1892-5 were not a happy family. The struggle between the "Little Englanders" and the Imperialists came to a head over Uganda, where the Chartered Company got into difficulties. The question whether the Government ought to intervene raised the larger question whether we should increase our commitments in Africa. "The East African Company", wrote Harcourt to Gladstone in September 1892, "have thrown up the sponge (being as I imagine insolvent), and a determined effort is being made to force the British Government to take the *damnosa hereditas*. . . . Every sort of bogey is invoked to involve us in this horrible quagmire which will be as bad as Khartum. . . . *Cui bono?* Is it trade? There is no traffic. Is it religion? The Catholics and Protestants are occupied in nothing but cutting each other's throats, with their bishops at their head. Is it slavery? There is no evidence that there is any slave trade question in this region." "I will die a thousand deaths rather than have anything to do with it," he wrote to Morley. Two years later, however, Rosebery had succeeded Gladstone, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer reluctantly swallowed the bitter pill.

The kernel of Lord Newton's *Life of Lord Lansdowne* is the account of his tenure of the Foreign Office from 1900 to 1905. There are notes on the conversations with the Kaiser on Russia at the time of the death of Queen Victoria; fresh light on Prince Ito's mission while the Anglo-Japanese alliance was in the making; a contemporary hint as to the menacing character of the Björko pact; regrets that the Foreign Minister had been forced to yield to an "insensate outcry" when co-operation in the Bagdad railway was discussed. A letter from Balfour, written in 1915, dismisses as a foolish piece of gossip the attribution of the policy of the Entente to Edward VII, and adds: "During the years in which you and I were his Ministers, he never made an important suggestion of any sort on large questions of policy." The fall of Delcassé is described as "disgusting" and as sending "the entente down any number of points in the market"; but Bertie, our Ambassador at Paris, explained that he would have fallen without German menaces, though not perhaps so soon. "His elimination from the Cabinet was in great part due to his treatment of his colleagues. He did not keep them fully informed of what he did and proposed to do. He had got to consider himself indispensable." King Edward's admiration of Delcassé was

known to all the world ; but it was indeed, as Lord Newton observes, a very unusual step when from his yacht in the Mediterranean he telegraphed to Paris, through the Governor-General of Algiers, pressing the Minister not to resign.

On the outbreak of war Lansdowne was taken into the counsels of the Cabinet, and in 1915 he entered the first Coalition Government. The full account of the genesis, publication and reception of his so-called Peace Letter forms one of the most interesting chapters of the book. We knew that the document refused by *The Times* and published by the *Daily Telegraph* on November 27, 1917, was practically identical with a confidential memorandum written for the first Coalition Cabinet in the autumn of 1916. We now learn that its author only decided to publish it after Balfour in a friendly letter had deprecated a peace debate in Parliament. Though violently denounced by a section of the press the Lansdowne declaration was approved by many eminent men, among them Loreburn, Haldane, Sanderson, Esher, and the Archbishop of Canterbury. His biographer regrets that it was published too late, and believes that the end of 1916 and the spring of 1917 offered better prospects for the discussion of a negotiated peace. "On the whole, it seems not inconceivable that a future generation may take the view that Lord Lansdowne was right after all."

Lord Ronaldshay's *Life of Lord Curzon* only touches European diplomacy during our period at intervals, for his term at the Foreign Office belongs to the post-war world. The first volume reveals the young Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs endeavouring to "ginger" his experienced chief—"that strange, powerful, inscrutable, brilliant, obstructive dead-weight at the top." He succeeded in securing the lease of Wei-hai-Wei as a rejoinder to Russia's swoop on Port Arthur ; but he panted for a wider sphere and found it on his appointment as Viceroy of India in 1898. The second volume takes us into the heart of the Anglo-Russian quarrel, and helps us to understand what a diplomatic revolution was involved in the Convention of 1907. Curzon's soul was filled with angry suspicions of the Muscovite, whose insidious approach towards the Indian frontier through Persia and Tibet he was determined to block. "An agreement with Russia", he wrote in 1903, "is one of those sentimental hallucinations that it is impossible to remove from the British mind." It was his policy to meet encroachments, not by concessions, but by the

demonstration of British power in the Persian Gulf and the mountains of Tibet. The disciple of Disraeli found the Anglo-Russian Convention deplorable. "It gives up all that we have been fighting for for years . . . the efforts of a century sacrificed, and nothing or next to nothing in return." He failed to realize that during his seven years in the East the European chess-board had been transformed.

Most of the leading members of the Liberal Cabinets which ruled from 1905 till 1915 have told their tale. The first to bear witness was Lord Loreburn, who resigned the post of Lord Chancellor in 1912 on grounds of health. *How the War Came* condemns as unnecessary and unconstitutional the secrecy with which Grey acted in January 1906, when on the eve of the Conference of Algeciras he made important declarations to the French Ambassador and authorized conversations between the military experts. Like the majority of his colleagues, Loreburn only learned of these momentous occurrences some years later, when they had led to an entanglement in the quarrels of France and Russia from which it proved impossible to escape, and which, in his opinion, left the peace of Great Britain at the mercy of the Russian Court. "Some of those who knew Campbell-Bannerman, and were in close confidential communication with him in December 1905 and January 1906, will not believe that he understood the scope and significance of what was in fact done unless some evidence of it is given." These doubts were set at rest by Spender's *Life of Campbell-Bannerman*, which proves that the Prime Minister was kept informed of every step.

Loreburn's dislike of the policy of Continental entanglements was shared by Lord Morley, who employed the leisure which followed his resignation in completing his *Recollections*. Appointed to the India Office in 1905 he took an active share in the rapprochement with Russia embodied in the Convention of 1907. His letters to Lord Minto on this turning-point in diplomatic history (to which the Government of India, as we learn from John Buchan's delightful life of the Viceroy and Lady Minto's chatty volume *Lord Minto in India*, submitted with a rather wry face) are tantalizing in their brevity, as indeed are his references to the Kaiser's visit to Windsor in 1907. Resolved to abstain from public criticism of his old friends and colleagues, he ended his story with the passing of the Parliament Act in 1911.

Of greater importance is the posthumous *Memorandum on*



*Resignation*, containing the first and only account of the attitude of the dissentient minority ; for John Burns withholds his testimony, though he assisted Morley in the revision of his narrative. As the Editor, his friend and biographer Mr. Hirst, observes, the Memorandum bears the mark of much labour and art ; and indeed the veteran statesman never wearied of reviewing the transactions which ended his official career. His pages are not only a record of events and impressions but a political testament. His message is the old Manchester doctrine that Great Britain should abstain from Continental adventures and commitments ; for in foreign affairs he was a Cobdenite, not a Gladstonian.

The story opens with the Cabinet meeting of July 27, 1914, when the Foreign Secretary "in his own quiet way, which is none the less impressive for being so simple, informed his colleagues that the time had come to decide between intervention and neutrality if, as seemed likely, a conflict was to break out in a few days. If the choice was for neutrality, he was not the man to carry it out." Morley followed on the other side, but was unable to gather in which direction opinion was moving. During the following days the Cabinet was pressed to examine our obligation to Belgium, but the question was forced into the background by apprehensions for the fate of France. The neutrality party was shepherded by Harcourt, who was the first to speak of resignation ; but the anti-interventionist argument was presented above all by Morley, the acknowledged leader of the group. Burns refused to approve the contingent promise of naval action if the German fleet came through the Channel or the North Sea to attack the French coast, while Morley thought such a warning defensible. Morley had welcomed the termination of our feud with France, but regretted the intimacy which seemed likely to engage us in the quarrels of our friends. "An entente was evidently more dangerous for us than an alliance. An alliance has definite covenants. An entente is vague, rests on points of honour, to be construed by accident and convenience." He determined not to be sucked into the whirlpool, and on the Sunday evening he told the Premier he must go. At Asquith's request he slept over it, but finally resigned on the morning of August 3.

The publication of the Morley Memorandum provoked some of the survivors of the Cabinet of 1914 to utterance. In a comment published in the weekly edition of the *Man-*

*chester Guardian* on October 26, 1928, Mr. Lloyd George dismissed the record as a complete distortion of what actually occurred. "With the exception of Mr. Burns, the members of the Liberal Cabinet who were opposed to the war were all in complete agreement that if Germany invaded Belgium the position would be completely changed. At the various consultations we had together, we all agreed that in such an event we should have to take up the position, which Mr. Gladstone assumed in 1870, that Britain was in honour bound by her treaty obligations to defend the integrity of that little country. Lord Morley never dissented from that view. I was just as opposed as he was to intervention in the Russian quarrel with Germany and Austria, but an act of aggression against a country whose independence we were definitely pledged to defend was another matter." In a letter published in *The Times* on October 29, 1928, Lord Beauchamp pointed out that there were two problems before the Cabinet, the Anglo-French Entente and Belgian neutrality, and that it was possible to hold Morley's views on the former without sharing them on the latter. Beauchamp was converted to intervention by the German attack on Belgium, and it is the failure of Morley to pay sufficient attention to that "insensate act" which in his eyes vitiates his reasoning.

The fullest and most valuable of the comments was the article by Herbert Samuel published in the weekly edition of the *Manchester Guardian* on October 26, 1928. While Morley's narrative suggests the division of Ministers into interventionists and abstentionists, he indicates that there was a middle group to which he himself belonged. The Belgian issue, he explains, was scarcely discussed, since no serious difference of opinion existed. On the more complicated issue of intervention on the side of France if the neutrality of Belgium was respected, he did not find it necessary to make up his mind. "For my own part I spent no anxious hours in endeavouring to decide how we ought to meet that situation, for I felt sure that it would not, in fact, arise. The information which was before us was categorical that the German strategic plan did involve the invasion of Belgium, and that there was no likelihood that it would be changed in any circumstances or on any conditions. There was every reason to believe that the Belgians would resist. . . . I did not associate myself with those who held that our duty and our interest would require us to enter the war for the assistance of France, because it

appeared to me that the case was not clear ; and although we might possibly be obliged to decide in that sense it was unnecessary to divide the Cabinet by pressing the point when the other issue, that of Belgium, would settle the matter without destroying its unity."

Lord Ripon was nearly eighty when he entered the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry in 1905 and undertook the duties of Liberal leader in the Upper House. As Colonial Secretary in the Cabinets of 1892-5 he had learned to distrust German ambitions, and he warmly welcomed the reconciliation with France; yet he recognized the difficulties of an imperfectly defined relationship, as we learn from a letter to Lord Fitzmaurice, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the official biography by Lucien Wolf. The Algeciras Conference was about to meet and the French desired to know how far they could rely on support. That a European war should arise from the Morocco question seemed almost impossible, but with a potentate like the Kaiser one could feel no real security. He doubtless desired to break the Entente Cordiale, and he might succeed. For, though we had only promised diplomatic support, the French were expecting more if the Conference broke down. "If that occurs and we decline, as I think we ought to decline, to go further than diplomacy will reach, I cannot but fear a cry of 'perfidie Albion' and a destruction of the present friendship between the two nations. The situation requires great wariness, but we may trust Grey for that."

The first British Minister to lift the veil on the crucial question of Anglo-German relations was Lord Haldane. The object of *Before the War* was "to render clear the line of thought and action followed by the Government between January 1906 and August 1914." His testimony is of peculiar value, not merely as an ex-Minister of War, but as the closest friend of Grey. His knowledge of German life and thought made him a friendly but discriminating observer, who combined a sincere desire for cordial relations with the determination to be ready for the worst. The cardinal chapter, "Diplomacy before the War", opens with a visit to Berlin in 1906 at the invitation of William II, who allowed him to study the organization of the War Office in view of the reforms on which he was engaged. His frank conversations with the Kaiser, Bülow and Tschirschky, the Foreign Minister, convinced him that the German Government desired good relations. Of no

less interest is the narrative of the Kaiser's visit to Windsor in November 1907, when co-operation in regard to the Bagdad railway was tentatively arranged, though the promising scheme was rejected by the Wilhelmstrasse, which vetoed the participation of France and Russia in the discussion. Of still greater importance is the detailed record of the memorable mission to Berlin in February 1912. To the British envoy the Chancellor seemed "an honest man struggling with adversity," Tirpitz a growing danger, with the impressionable Kaiser torn between the two. The atmosphere was very different from that of 1906, but the situation was not yet hopeless. The chief peril was that the pacific Chancellor might be dismissed or overruled, and the negotiations which followed in London illustrated afresh the lack of unified control which had ruined German policy since the fall of Bismarck.

Haldane's posthumous *Autobiography* is above all the revelation of a many-sided personality, but it adds a few items to the account of Anglo-German relations in his earlier work. Of his closest friend he writes a little more critically. "Just in his outlook and intensely desirous of preserving the peace of the world, I think that he was hampered by want of knowledge of the sources of German mentality. . . . Grey was splendidly conscientious and just, but he seemed to doubt whether the Germans were genuinely good people, and they of course knew that he doubted it. . . . I did what I believed I could to help in his attitude towards Germany, but Grey was in spirit a pure Briton and I was a good deal less so, and consequently I could not prevail with him against the tendencies of his Ambassadors and his advisers in London. Moreover the Germans were interpreting his policy most unjustly, and were becoming increasingly difficult." The Agadir crisis is more fully treated than in the earlier work, and a vivid picture is drawn of the historic meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which revealed a gulf between War Office and Admiralty plans in the event of a conflict.

The most piquant novelty in the pages devoted to the outbreak of war is the story of Ballin's visit to London in July 1914. "We had invited Grey and Morley to meet him, for we knew how desirous he was of helping to preserve peace. . . . After dinner he spoke to Grey and myself separately about the position of Great Britain and our relations with Germany. We both told him that so far these were quite good, but that

their maintenance was dependent on Germany not attacking France. In such a case Germany could not reckon on our neutrality." After his return Ballin wrote from Hamburg on August 1 a letter which its recipient declined to publish during the war, partly because it was private and partly because he did not wish Grey to be dragged into the hysterical attack against himself. Ballin combated the assertion that the Kaiser and Bethmann, to whose love of peace he paid a warm tribute, were precipitating a preventive war, and closed with the expression of his hope that it would still be possible for England to preserve a friendly neutrality in return for guarantees. The letter only arrived on August 3 and received no reply.

Haldane had told his story so fully in his own books that diplomatic revelations in the official biography by General Sir Frederick Maurice could hardly be expected. A brief letter from Grey, dated January 8, 1906, indicates that on the eve of Algeciras he was less anxious than the French. "Persistent reports and little indications keep reaching me that Germany means to attack France in the spring. I don't think these are more than the precautions and flourishes that Germany would naturally make *apropos* of the Morocco Conference. But they are not altogether to be disregarded." The most interesting letter in the volume was written to his mother in the train on the way back from his visit to Berlin in February 1912. "The new atmosphere which has resulted is marvellous. It is too soon to know or be sure of the outcome. But the prospect for the moment is very good. . . . I liked and admired the Chancellor. . . . Tirpitz is a strong and difficult man—a typical Prussian—and he and I fought stiffly. . . . Kiderlen-Waechter I did not trust one inch. . . . The Emperor had been delightful to me. I am sure he wants peace most genuinely, but he has Germany to deal with."

The chapter on the outbreak of war contains a long letter from Count Alexander Hoyos, who had carried the Emperor's appeal to Berlin on July 5, 1914, and whom Haldane had known while he was at the Austrian Embassy in London. Written "with Count Berchtold's knowledge", it may be taken as a communication from the Foreign Minister himself. No other way was open, he began, but to try to force Serbia to renounce her ambitions and to suppress the anti-Austrian agitation. Russia stood behind Serbia and Constantinople was her aim. "The murder of the Archduke brought a slow and

steady development to a hasty climax ; and if we are now taking matters in hand seriously, even at the risk of a general European war breaking out, we do so fully conscious that our country's existence is in danger, and that Austria would be signing her own death warrant if she continued passively enduring while her enemies are scheming to break her up as old iron." Hoyos' letter, noted Haldane, was intended to prepare the British Government for the ultimatum and to scare it into neutrality with the Russian bogey. "The one hope is that Bethmann-Hollweg's influence in Berlin will prevail." When the war began he advised Asquith to send Kitchener to the War Office, and he urged the instant despatch of the six divisions of the Expeditionary Force to France. That its organizer, "the greatest Secretary of State for War England has ever had", as Haig called him, should have been suspected and denounced as a pro-German, and have been excluded from the Coalition Government of 1915, is one of the blots on the history of the war years.

Having lost the effective use of his eyes Grey requested his old friend Alfred Spender to select from the files of the Foreign Office the most important documents ; but the new material in *Twenty-five Years* is of less interest than the revelation of the author's noble personality. The same detachment which distinguished his interventions in the party fight marks the account of his stewardship, and his temperamental serenity is reinforced by the didactic purpose of his work. "The endeavour has been made to present the facts in such a way as to discover, or help others to discover, and draw conclusions that may avoid another war of the same character. The military power in Germany chose the time and precipitated the war ; but that is not the real and final account of its origin. The enormous growth of armaments, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them, it was these that made war inevitable." No one who knew Grey can doubt his devotion to peace ; and his impressive *apologia* should destroy the legend of a Macchiavellian intriguer bent on the encirclement and overthrow of a hated rival.

The story opens with his apprenticeship as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1892 to 1895, when he was content to be the mouthpiece of Rosebery. The famous "Grey declaration", however, warning France that an attempt to occupy any part of the Nile valley would be regarded as an unfriendly act, was improvised, we are told, during the course of debate.

The announcement was approved by the country and became an axiom of British policy. Returning to the Foreign Office ten years later as Foreign Secretary, he found the Moroccan crisis in full swing and Paul Cambon knocking at the door. "Germany had forced the dismissal of Delcassé, and intended to shake or test the strength of the Anglo-French agreement." The most notable addition to our knowledge is Grey's letter to his wife immediately after the critical interview with the French Ambassador. That he was not stiffly anti-German on his accession to office is shown by his suggestion of January 9 to the Prime Minister that Germany might receive a port in Morocco.

Several passages provoked criticism at home and abroad. The statement that the Anglo-French Treaty of 1904 was all published "except a clause or two of no importance" scarcely suggests that it led up to a secret treaty envisaging a partition of Morocco between France and Spain. In the analysis of the Bosnian crisis we hear nothing of the secret negotiations of Iswolsky with Aehrenthal, for whom the wrath of Downing Street was reserved. The verdict that "the German action" created the Agadir crisis ignores the significance of the French march to Fez and the juridical strength of the German case. The unprovoked attack of Italy on Tripoli receives no censure. The importance of the naval conversations with Russia in 1914 is minimized. In declaring that our relations with France and Russia ensured that they would not enter on an aggressive or dangerous policy, he ignores the official encouragement of Serb designs on the integrity of the Hapsburg Empire. Though he disapproved Russian policy in Persia, which "tried my patience more than any other subject", he is less critical of St. Petersburg than Poincaré.

There is nothing censorious, cocksure or self-righteous in these impressive volumes, and Grey expresses his regret that the Cabinet was not at once informed of his conversations with the French Ambassador in 1906. Yet he believes that the formation and maintenance of the Triple Entente was the best available guarantee of peace. He denies the statement of Sazonoff that he declared at Balmoral that England would fight against Germany in the event of a European war, explaining that he said that if we decided to intervene we should strike with all our force. Like Asquith he argues that we retained to the end complete freedom of decision, while we were no longer exposed to the perils of "splendid isolation". The

main interest of the book as a revelation of policy ends with the outbreak of war ; for during the conflict British policy had to be co-ordinated with and sometimes subordinated to that of our allies. Turkey's belligerency, we are told, was inevitable, and the decision of Bulgaria was dictated by military events. The rescue of Serbia in 1915 was beyond our power. The record ends with the fall of the Asquith Ministry in November 1916, after eleven years of unceasing labour and anxiety.

Grey enriched a popular edition of his *Twenty-five Years* by a brief but pregnant Introduction, dated September 1928, in which he reiterated his conclusions and replied to certain criticisms. What more could the British Government have done, he asks, in the years that preceded the war ? Conscription would have precipitated the struggle before the larger army was ready. It was equally impossible to deal in a different way with the European groups, for the danger of complete isolation was even greater than was realized at the time. Moreover, isolation would not have kept us out of war unless we had withdrawn or ignored the guarantee to Belgium. In reply to the argument that Germany was unable to control her ally, he argues that Austria was more dependent on Germany than Germany upon Austria, and that in consequence the final word, for instance in regard to the acceptance or refusal of a Conference, rested with Berlin. He regrets the insertion of Article 231 in the Treaty, but declares that it cannot be cancelled. " If there be overstatement in the article as it now stands ", he adds, " it is less far from the truth than it would be to say that Germany and her Allies had no responsibility for the war at all."

Since Grey told his own tale, so far as public affairs were concerned, in his *Twenty-five Years*, and the historical materials fill eleven large volumes of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, Professor Trevelyan decided that a single volume would suffice for the official biography. What needed doing, and what he has done with his usual mastery, was to paint a picture of the man himself and to supply an authoritative summary of his achievements. Those who knew Grey rejoice to possess a portrait so true to life. Those who knew him not are grateful for the revelation of one of the noblest figures on the European stage. The biographer has no shadow of doubt as to the rightness of his policy, though he has a few minor criticisms of method. He is continually reminding us how



disastrous it would have been had he pursued a different course. Inheriting the Entente Cordiale from the Unionists, he cherished it with unremitting care. We only just won the war as it was, and without the military conversations which he sanctioned on the eve of the Algeiras Conference we should not have won it at all. Professor Trevelyan emphasizes the consistency of Grey's policy, never committing us to the military support of France, yet steadily preparing to intervene in case of need. To stand by France, first in Morocco as by treaty bound, and later over the whole field of international politics, so long as her policy was unaggressive; to complete the rapprochement with Russia which Lansdowne had begun; to strive for neighbourly relations with Germany; to maintain our traditions of an invincible navy and a small voluntary army; to be friends with the United States; to keep the alliance with Japan in repair; to labour for peace while remaining loyal to our friends; to continue Lansdowne's humanitarian efforts in Macedonia and the Belgian Congo: here were the outlines of a programme of which he had no reason to be ashamed.

France was much easier to deal with than Russia, whose domestic system and foreign policy he disapproved more than he publicly confessed. A letter to Lord Knollys, the King's Secretary, dated March 28, 1906, reveals the Tsar's desire for a return visit from King Edward. Witte and Lamsdorff had explained that relations could not be improved without the Tsar's assistance, which was impossible so long as he remained unvisited. "An entente with Russia is now possible", wrote Grey, "and it is the thing most to be desired in our foreign policy. It will complete and strengthen the entente with Russia and add very much to the comfort and strength of our position. But it all depends on the Tsar and he depends on the King." Yet the time for a visit, and even for a decision, had not come, for disapproval of the regime was too strong. "Anything like a public entente between the Governments would be repugnant." When the Convention had been signed and the Triple Entente had taken shape, Grey deprecated criticisms of the new friends. "The question for us", he wrote on the eve of the Tsar's visit to Cowes in 1909, "is whether we will help Stolypin and the Duma by being civil to the Tsar as long as he stands by them, or whether we will play straight into the hands of the reactionaries by insulting the Tsar as Keir Hardie & Co. want us to do." The luxury of

criticism had to be sacrificed to the necessities of the Balance of Power.

The chapter on the outbreak of war contains a few letters and conversations dealing with criticisms of his action during the last days of peace. Over and over again he declared that it was Germany's refusal of his suggestion of a conference which was the decisive event. To Ballin's complaints that he had not pledged the country either to intervention or neutrality, he replied that he did not understand democratic government. The notion that one individual, sitting in a room in the Foreign Office, could pledge a great democracy in advance either to take part in a great war or to abstain from taking part in it was absurd. On the publication of Lichnowsky's famous memorandum Grey wrote that he used to torture himself by speculating whether by more foresight or wisdom he could have prevented the war, but he had come to think that no individual could have done so. Nothing could have prevented it except a change of the Prussian nature. One thing only he sometimes thought he should have tried, namely more direct pressure on Austria. "I hate war, I hate war", he cried when Nicolson congratulated him on his speech of August 3, 1914; yet he believed there was something even worse. It would be better that we should all perish than fall under the domination of the Junker spirit and people.

No English book on the war compares in literary distinction with Mr. Churchill's *The World Crisis*. His work at the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915 is the theme of his first volume; but the larger issues of European diplomacy receive frequent illumination, and the story of the Agadir crisis is a precious contribution to history. Four days after the Mansion House speech of June 21, 1911, Mr. Lloyd George, who was strolling in St. James's Park with the author, at that time Home Secretary, was summoned to Grey, who greeted him with the words: "I have just received so stiff a communication from the German Ambassador that the fleet might be attacked at any moment." Warnings were sent to the ships, and Mr. Churchill, hitherto an opponent of the Admiralty's demands, began to fear Berlin. He attended the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on August 23, when a sharp difference arose between Sir Henry Wilson, Director of Military Operations, and Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord. The former dilated on the practical certainty of German troops marching through Belgium in the event of war, while

the latter argued that the British Army would be lost among the mighty hosts in a Continental struggle, and should be held ready for counterstrokes on the German coast. The divergence led to the appointment of Mr. Churchill to the Admiralty with a mandate to accept the War Office plans and to organize a Naval Staff. "For the first time Germany had made British statesmen feel that sense of direct contact with the war peril which was never absent from Continental minds."

When the crisis was over the author joined Mr. Lloyd George in endeavouring to heal the smart, inviting Sir Ernest Cassel, with the approval of the Prime Minister and Grey, to visit Berlin. The Kaiser and the Chancellor welcomed the olive-branch, and Haldane set forth on his mission; but when the negotiations broke down the alarming *Novelle* was countered by the Mediterranean Agreement. Mr. Churchill does not believe that Germany desired war in 1911; but "the hammers that clanged at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were forging the coalition of nations by which Germany was to be resisted and finally overthrown." For a time the danger appeared to diminish, and the first half of 1914 is described as exceptionally tranquil. At Easter Ballin desired the author to meet Tirpitz, which he would have been pleased to do; but Grey was of opinion that a visit might do more harm than good. When the crisis came at last, "the Cabinet was overwhelmingly pacific. At least three-quarters of its members were determined not to be drawn into a European quarrel unless Great Britain were herself attacked." The author, like the Foreign Secretary, was in the minority, believing that we were morally bound to come to the aid of France.

*The World Crisis, 1915-1918*, is a worthy sequel. The volumes are a sustained indictment of military strategy, not in one country alone. The work opens with a sharp attack on French military preparations and strategy during the early phases of the war. The first of the soldiers to be set in the pillory is Joffre, whose burly frame and sluggish brain would make him almost a comedy figure but for the tragic character of his part. But the French Generalissimo was no worse than his British colleagues or his German foes; for the offence common to them all was their incorrigible habit of frontal attacks on fortified positions. Loos, the Somme, the Chemin des Dames and Passchendaele on the one side, Verdun and the offensive of March 1918 on the other, are exhibited as classic examples of attacking the strongest foe in the strongest place

instead of the weakest foe in the weakest place. Falkenhayn, for instance, should have said "Roumania" instead of "Verdun" in 1916, and we should have broken down the easier defences in the East instead of battering at impregnable strongholds in the West.

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George were the first Liberal champions of conscription, and in the rivalry between Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George the author's sympathies are with the latter. He is as firm a believer in the authority of the statesman over the soldier as Bismarck himself, and he applauds Mr. Lloyd George's desire to be master in his own house. In an evil moment, it is true, he consented to Nivelle's offensive; but the tragedy of the Chemin des Dames effected a rapid conversion, and the horrors of Passchendaele led him to keep large reserves at home till they were needed in 1918. Though Sir William Robertson, as the leading Westerner, gets the hardest knocks, Ludendorff receives a sentence hardly less severe. The winter of 1917-18, declares Mr. Churchill, was the last favourable opportunity for peace negotiations, and he lost it. The March offensive was the suicide of Imperial Germany. Mr. Churchill's vigorous polemics invited a reply. In *The World Crisis: A Criticism*, distinguished specialists launched a vigorous counter-attack. Lord Sydenham dissects his claim to be a military historian; General Sir Frederick Maurice defends the strategy of Joffre with the aid of the French official history; Sir Charles Oman challenges the estimate of losses in the long-drawn battle of the Somme, which he declines to regard as a fruitless expenditure of blood; and Admiral Bacon champions Jellicoe.

The concluding volume, entitled *The World Crisis: the Aftermath*, carries us to the fall of the Coalition Government in 1922. The curtain rises on the night of the armistice, when the author dined alone with Mr. Lloyd George in Downing Street. "The conversation ran on the great qualities of the German people, on the tremendous fight they had made against three-quarters of the world, on the impossibility of rebuilding the world except with their aid." Defeat and famine might drive them into Bolshevism, and the author suggested rushing a dozen large food ships to Hamburg. The Prime Minister favoured the project, but the songs and cheers of the multitude could be remotely heard like the surf on the shore. "The war of the giants has ended, the quarrels of the pigmies have begun." Mr. Churchill, like many of his countrymen,

deplored the abandonment of the generous intuitions of armistice night.

Transferred from the Ministry of Munitions to the War Office in January 1919, the author saw something of the making of peace. Summoned to Paris for the first time on February 14, the day on which Wilson was due to leave for the United States, he appealed for a decision as to the policy towards Russia while the President was away. A second visit describes a meeting of the British Empire Delegation when the Prime Minister was struggling to mitigate the terms. General Smuts made a powerful appeal for clemency, to which the author gave his support. "Though there were many gradations of opinion the will of the Delegation was unanimous." It was resolved that Mr. Lloyd George should press for concessions, especially plebiscites in doubtful cases on Germany's Eastern frontier, her right to enter the League at an early date, the modification of the reparation clauses, and the fixing of Germany's liabilities. If opposition occurred in the Council of Four, the Delegation authorized the Prime Minister "to use the full weight of the entire British Empire, even to the point of refusing the services of the British Army to advance into Germany or the services of the British Navy to enforce the blockade." The results of this meeting are written on the eastern frontiers of Germany, and Mr. Churchill believes that his chief could have improved the Treaty still further but for the memory of his reparation pledges. "The crazy echoes of the General Election were a humiliating handicap, both to the Prime Minister and to Great Britain." Mr. Keynes has not condemned more sharply "the absurd and monstrous economic and financial chapters of the treaty", but the territorial clauses are another matter. "A fair judgment upon the whole settlement, a simple explanation of how it arose, cannot leave the authors of the new map of Europe under any serious reproach. To an overwhelming extent the wishes of the various populations prevailed."

A curious episode receives further elucidation in the chapter entitled "Stockholm" in Mary Agnes Hamilton's biography of Arthur Henderson. After the abdication of the Tsar the Labour leader, who was also a member of the Cabinet, was sent to Russia to establish contact with the new forces of the Left. That he was authorized to succeed Buchanan as British Ambassador and saw no reason to do so was already known. What is here fully described is his attitude towards the proposal

to call an International Socialist Conference at Stockholm. While Mr. Lloyd George approved the plan at the start, Henderson only accepted it when he realized that it was the best chance of keeping Russia in the war. By the time he was back in London the Prime Minister, influenced by his Conservative colleagues, had changed his mind. Henderson stuck to his contention that, if a conference was held, British labour should be there, and he forfeited his place in the Cabinet. The conference was not held and Russia went out of the war. He fully understood that differences as to the desirability of meeting with the enemy were inevitable: what he did not understand was the attitude of his chief. "He was too simple to fight Lloyd George. Out of the entire nexus of incidents, what remained to him was the revelation of trickery and duplicity where he had believed in loyalty and good faith." A much more favourable picture of the Prime Minister is painted in Dr. Addison's volumes *Politics from Within*, 1914-1918, which describe the rapid development of the Ministry of Munitions and throw light on the fate of the First Coalition Government.

Austen Chamberlain, like Lloyd George, emerged as a successful author after his seventieth year. *Down the Years* contains a good deal of miscellaneous information about men and things. In a frank conversation in May 1908 Count Metternich gravely complained of England's persistent hostility to Germany, concluding with the words: "I have sometimes been optimistic: I am not optimistic now." More important is the contemporary record of the action of the Unionist leaders on August 1-5, 1914, from which we learn that they were set in motion by Paul Cambon. The Ambassador admitted that there was no written obligation to intervene, but pointed to joint plans. "Our whole fleet is in the Mediterranean in consequence of our arrangements with you, and our coasts are open to the enemy." With a bitter cry he exclaimed "Honour! Does England know what honour is?" Of almost equal interest is the detailed account of the fall of Asquith's Government written to the Viceroy of India. "It was his definite refusal to serve under any one and his apparent relapse into a state of complacent satisfaction with all the proceedings of the old Government that definitely decided me—and I think my colleagues—that we had no choice but to accept office under Lloyd George."

The success of his reminiscences encouraged Austen

Chamberlain to publish a selection from the letters he wrote to his father from the time of the latter's breakdown in May 1906 till his death in July 1914. *Politics from Inside* is mainly concerned with the party fight at Westminster, but the author was keenly interested in foreign affairs. Like Nicolson he desired to transform the Triple Entente into a Triple Alliance; but he was less of a Germanophobe than the Permanent Under-Secretary, who spoke of Haldane's "most unhappy visit to Berlin". On a business journey to St. Petersburg in April 1912 Sazonoff expressed apprehension at the possibility of Curzon succeeding Grey, and blamed Poincaré's unskilful diplomacy in the Tripoli war for thrusting Italy back into the arms of Germany. The author was about to write an introduction to the German edition of his two books by Dr. Pick when he suddenly died in March 1937. His brother Neville furnished a brief tribute to his lovable qualities and his high sense of honour. The first volume of the official biography by Sir Charles Petrie, published in 1939, brings us to the outbreak of the war of 1914. Austen Chamberlain had become increasingly apprehensive of German ambitions, and when the storm was about to burst he helped to mobilize the leaders of his party in support of instant intervention. The closing paragraph records an interesting political verdict. "It makes one fairly gasp to think that we were within a hair's-breadth of eternal disgrace, and some day the country will be grateful to Amery, G. Lloyd and you for having preserved her honour." The writer was his brother Neville.

The third volume of Ian Colvin's *Life of Lord Carson* contains a good deal of information about British politics during the world war. The Ulster leader played a prominent part in mobilizing the Unionist chiefs while the Liberal Cabinet was debating whether or not we should intervene. When George Lloyd (afterwards Lord Lloyd) visited the French Embassy Cambon greeted him with the rough challenge: "M. Georges, il vous reste de l'honneur dans votre pays?" Grey, he continued in a voice trembling with emotion, had indicated that England would not fight. "He seemed to forget that it was on your advice and under your guarantee that we moved all our ships and munitions to Toulon. Si vous restez neutres, nos côtes sont livrées aux Allemands." The Ambassador's version of the Mediterranean Agreement is entirely incorrect; but the interview is a further proof that Frenchmen regarded us as morally bound to fight on their

side, while our Ministers continued to proclaim that our hands were free.

As a member of the First Coalition Government Carson lamented the divided counsels of statesmen and soldiers. Kitchener made a good start, but as a Minister he realized he was a failure. "They expect too much of me, these fellows", he whispered to Carson one day at the Cabinet table. "I don't know Europe, I don't know England, and I don't know the British Army." French, he complained, was losing the war every day, but he could not think of anyone to put in his place. Grey seemed equally disappointing, and the failure to save Servia drove Carson to resignation. The amateur diplomatist desired that Greece should be compelled to join in her defence. Asquith, in his opinion, was impossible as a War Premier. In these pages, enriched by letters and extracts from his wife's diary, Carson emerges as the driving force in the overthrow of the First Coalition and the formation of the Second, in which he held office successively at the Admiralty and as a member of the War Cabinet.

The most important item for the student of diplomacy in General Seely's *Adventure* is his account of a conversation with Marschall von Bieberstein during his brief tenure of the German Embassy in London in the summer of 1912.

M. Why can't our people be at peace together?

S. We do not want to go to war with Germany. All we want is to let things be as they are.

M. You want to maintain the status quo?

S. Yes.

M. Our people do not like the status quo. It means that for all time you will have command of the whole of the sea and all the best places on the land. Our people cannot accept your status quo.

S. You had better do so. It is the only way.

Seely, at that time Minister of War, reported the interview to Asquith, who was much perturbed and set to work with redoubled energy to prepare for the worst.

Mr. Hughes has embodied in his eloquent pæan to the Empire, *The Splendid Adventure*, some reminiscences of the struggle and the settlement. The Australian Prime Minister enjoyed a reputation for blunt speaking which these pages show him to have deserved. Arriving in England in the spring of 1916 with the Dominion Premiers to discuss the situation he formed a very unflattering opinion of the Prime Minister.



Asquith, we are told, made it a point to be at least a quarter of a century behind the times, regarded action as a kind of disease, and was perhaps too perfectly civilized to conduct a war. Mr. Lloyd George, on the contrary, saved Britain and the Empire, and under his auspices the Dominions came of age. The author took an active part in the discussion on the German Colonies, and did his best to secure that Germany should drink the cup of humiliation to the dregs. To such a man Wilsonian ideals made no appeal. The President, we are told, saw several of his cherished Fourteen Points go down one after another like skittles in a bowling alley; but his insistence on "the League first and Peace second" held up the settlement for months. "If the Peace had been made in December 1918, as it could and would have been but for the Fourteen Points, the world would have faced its great task in earnest and without delay."

Sir Robert Borden's Rhodes Memorial Lectures, entitled *Canada in the Commonwealth*, survey the war and the peace in a more detached spirit. As Premier of the Senior Dominion he presided over the British Empire Delegation when Mr. Lloyd George and Balfour were unable to be present. He regrets that the German Delegates were not admitted to the Conference, for he believes that it would have helped to produce a better peace. His posthumous *Memoirs*, edited by his son, reveal a modest and likable man, completely free from bitterness; but the book, based on his diary and speeches, lacks colour and distinction. The most interesting chapters in the two large volumes describe his visits to England in the spring of 1917 and the summer of 1918, where he attended the Imperial War Cabinet, and his residence in Paris during the Peace Conference in 1919. He is always readier to praise than to blame, and most of the statesmen of the Allies receive their meed of praise; but his hero is Botha, who possessed the elements of greatness. Hughes, on the other hand, got on everyone's nerves. No one is so sharply censured as Sir Henry Wilson, whose vanity and love of intrigue are castigated and whose reports of official discussions are described as unreliable. It is interesting to learn that Borden disapproved the suggested trial of the Kaiser and declined the offer of the British Embassy at Washington.

General Smuts lives in Sarah Gertrude Millin's vivid biography, the second volume of which opens with his appointment to the War Cabinet in the spring of 1917 when his work

in German East Africa was over. His first task was to visit our Western allies. King Albert, who was very despondent, regretted that President Wilson's attempted mediation during the previous winter had been ignored, and argued that even Alsace and Lorraine were less essential than the deliverance of Belgium. Smuts himself occupied a middle position between the knock-out blow school of the Prime Minister and the pessimism of the Lansdowne letter. He was gripped by the idea of a League of Nations before any other Minister had begun to think about it, and he realized that it had no chance unless accompanied by a moderate peace. As the so-called handyman of the Empire he was sent to meet Mensdorff in Switzerland at the end of 1917, but he found that the Anglophil ex-Ambassador was not in a position to negotiate. When the struggle was over the creation of a League became his main preoccupation, and Wilson, "the noblest figure of the war", had no more whole-hearted supporter. One of the attractions of the plan, as he frankly confessed, was to bring America into European politics. The President, in his opinion, was right to cross the Atlantic but wrong not to bring Root and Taft in his train. Nobody else could have launched the League. Yet Smuts described the Peace Conference as the unhappiest time in his life. "Powerless and desperate" he watched the making of a settlement which he could not approve. Only he and Botha, who had experienced the smart of defeat, felt any real sympathy for Germany, whom they wished to leave strong enough to resist Bolshevism and to welcome into the League. "We cannot save Europe without the co-operation of Germany", he pleaded. With regard to his advice that pensions should be included in the reparation total, we are told that he also urged the fixing of a moderate sum. Only on the retention of German colonies did he range himself with the extremists. His most dramatic experience during the negotiations was his fruitless mission to Budapest during the brief dictatorship of Bela Kun, whom he describes as "not a bad little fellow."

Sir Maurice Hankey, now Lord Hankey, discourses with inside knowledge in *Diplomacy by Conference*, an address to the British Institute of International Affairs in 1920. Though British and French Ministers exchanged visits early in the war, it was not till July 1915 that the heads of the two Governments met at Calais. In the following autumn it was decided to create machinery for co-ordinating their efforts. In January

1916 rules for the establishment of an advisory Allied Committee were approved by the two Prime Ministers, consisting of the Premiers and such members of the respective Governments and staffs as were required for the business in hand. The system of "diplomacy by conference" developed rapidly when Mr. Lloyd George, who had always been its enthusiastic advocate, was called to the helm. At the opening of January 1917 a conference at Rome considered a memorandum by him urging an Allied plan for meeting a concentration on the Italian front in the probable event of a Russian collapse. It was largely due to his persistency that plans were prepared to facilitate the rapid transport of British and French divisions to the Italian front ten months later after Caporetto. Of no less importance was the development of a new line of communications with Macedonia. "How many allied soldiers and sailors owe their lives to the development of the short sea route to the Balkans it is difficult to say." Conferences followed in rapid succession, and at Rapallo it was decided to create a Supreme War Council. "Thus in the hour of Italy's travail and distress was born an organization destined to exercise the greatest possible influence on the history of the world. For the remainder of the war the whole of the higher strategy and policy of the Allies was concerted almost exclusively at the Supreme War Council." The author modestly omits all reference to his invaluable services as Secretary of the War Cabinet.

#### IV

The life of Lord Carnock, declares his gifted biographer, is written with filial devotion but unfilial independence. Arthur Nicolson, in the opinion of his son, represented the old diplomacy at its best. He was also the most representative diplomatic figure of the generation which grew up in the isolationist tradition and was converted to Continentalism by the German fleet. In both stages he was dominated by the principle of the Balance of Power. He described the most eventful chapters of his career in his unpublished *Diplomatic Narrative*, on which Harold Nicolson draws freely; and the later chapters are enlivened by the biographer's vivacious recollections of men, places and events.

During his years at Tangier the British Minister witnessed the end of Anglo-French rivalry and the beginning of a new

Franco-German feud. Six months after the signing of the Treaty of April 8, 1904, Kühlmann, the German Chargé, told him that Germany would not recognize it, as it had not been officially communicated. Nicolson informed his French colleague of the warning, adding that it foreshadowed interference with French projects. "Nous sommes parfaitement tranquilles du côté de Berlin", was the unexpected reply. The chapter on the Conference of Algeciras exhibits Nicolson, the British plenipotentiary, as the doughty champion of French claims. The task of creating the Triple Entente was continued at St. Petersburg. Iswolsky is painted in warmer colours than is usually the case. "He always acted towards me loyally and honestly, and during our long intercourse no serious cloud ever arose between us." Nicolson regarded his handiwork with satisfaction and pride. "It can be asserted with absolute truth that there was not an aggressive or bellicose feeling or aim existing among members of what came to be called the Triple Entente. The three Powers desired nothing more than to work out peacefully their respective destinies without giving offence or causing injury to any party in the Alliance."

Our Ambassador in St. Petersburg, like his chief, worked for the localization of the Bosnian crisis. There is an amusing picture of King Ferdinand, on his visit to Russia in February 1909, placing one finger beside his enormous Coburg nose and saying: "Je serai doux comme un petit agneau." Nicolson's diary pictures Iswolsky in great alarm after receiving what he described as Germany's diplomatic ultimatum in March 1909. "He told Touchard that his diplomatic career was finished. He talked of resigning. I advised him to buck up." The Ambassador, however, was hardly less shaken by the collapse of Russia, and he regretted Grey's rejection of his advice to try for an Anglo-Russian alliance. "I am afraid we are not likely with the present people to have a well-defined firm foreign policy," he wrote on May 3, 1909. "We shall drift on from day to day". He respected Grey, but there was no intimacy. Indeed when he became Permanent Under-Secretary in 1910 and they were in daily contact, they drifted further apart. Nicolson detested the Liberal party and the Liberal programme. Domestic differences were never discussed, but the Foreign Office between 1910 and 1914, if we may judge from Harold Nicolson's picture of the four chief actors, Grey and Tyrrell, Nicolson and Crowe, was not altogether a happy family. When the storm burst in 1914 Nicolson shared

Crowe's impatience at the slowness with which the Government reached its decision. The Permanent Secretary ended his long official life in 1916. It is interesting to find this ardent Germanophobe ranging himself with Lansdowne in 1917 and appalled by the Treaty of Versailles.

The *Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, admirably edited by Stephen Gwynn, are a delight, for as a letter-writer some readers will rank him above Walter Page. No diplomatist of his generation was more convinced that a war of the Titans was at hand, and no one laboured more devotedly to prepare his countrymen. The most important chapters of the first volume describe his residence at Berlin from 1895 to 1898 and at St. Petersburg from 1903 to 1905. Arriving in the German capital on the eve of the Kruger telegram, he discovered with alarm the depth of popular hostility to his country; but he believed that good might come out of evil. "This Government thought we had no kick left in us and that they might insult us as much as they liked. They have done it with a vengeance for the last year or so. Now they have found out their mistake." The moral of the incident appeared to be the desirability of a rapprochement. "I hope that we shall recognize our real friends and shake hands again with Germany. . . . If the Teutons quarrel now, the world will be Slav, as Bismarck said long ago." Further experience of Berlin dispelled this mood. "We stand in their way everywhere", he wrote in December 1897; . . . "if England is not prepared to pay blackmail, she must be prepared to defend herself." Like his friend Chirol, the *Times* Correspondent, he carried away a haunting sense of menace.

Of greater direct importance are the chapters on the Russo-Japanese war, when for the first time his advice was sought in questions of high policy. For he was the bosom friend of Roosevelt, and his correspondence with the President and John Hay would alone render the book indispensable. Durand, our Ambassador in Washington, was never *persona grata* with the White House, and for a time the wire from Washington to Whitehall passed through St. Petersburg. No more scathing indictment of the Tsarist regime is to be found than in the vivid letters. "This country has no real government", he wrote in August 1904; "each Minister acts on his own, doing as much damage as possible to the other Ministers." He quickly learned to despise the Power whose hostility had once filled him with apprehension. The Tsar—"a religious

madman almost"—could neither fight nor negotiate, and the virile intervention of Roosevelt was needed to end the hopeless struggle. "It is a fact beyond any question", he wrote to Mrs. Roosevelt soon after the Treaty of Portsmouth, "that the President single-handed effected the Peace, against the wishes of the Japanese people and the Russian Government. Had Meyer not had this interview, the Emperor would never have consented to part with half Saghalin."

The second volume opens with the tragic winter 1905-6, during which Spring Rice was in charge of the Embassy at St. Petersburg, and humiliating defeat in the Far East was followed by an abortive revolution at home. Our entente with France, of which he warmly approved, led naturally to a rapprochement with Russia; but, however logical the process, he was sceptical about the new relationship, and his experiences at Teheran during 1906 and 1907 increased his detestation for the bullying of a backward country struggling to its feet. Promotion to Stockholm in 1908 brought him back into the gathering storm; and for four years he lived among a people who feared St. Petersburg as much as he feared Berlin, and sought shelter behind the German shield. As he surveyed the world during the Bosnian crisis he was appalled. "Well, what do you think of Europe now?" he wrote to Roosevelt. "If ever there was an object-lesson to the text, The strong man armed shall keep his goods till a stronger than he cometh, it is now. . . . Now we have a state of things which is a return to the primeval—the reign of force." The Swedes were convinced that the struggle was near and that England would go down in the fight. Compulsory service appeared to Spring Rice the need of the hour. "I think moderate people should remember what the danger is and be prepared to meet it," he wrote at the end of 1909. "They know the typhoon season is coming on, and they should make up their minds what they will do and how they will do it. . . . If we fail, the fall is final. We are not like Russia or China; we are a Parthenon, not a pyramid."

Spring Rice's appointment to Washington in 1913 opened the most important chapter in his life. He had longed for the post, and no British statesman except Bryce could count more distinguished friends beyond the seas; but the return of the Democrats to power rendered it inadvisable to see much of Roosevelt, and brought to the White House a President whom he could never understand. Mr. Gwynn believes that it was

the fault of Wilson, who, while maintaining relations of "icy courtesy", transacted serious business over his head. Yet even in these pages there is evidence of overstrained nerves; and the sudden termination of his career in the last winter of the war revealed the conviction of the British Cabinet that less highly-strung men were needed for the co-ordination of Anglo-American efforts. "I am sure you will remember that the rights we are defending are our existence", he wrote to the President in the first autumn in the war; but his argument awoke little response in the United States. "We have no right to count on the good-will of Americans", he wrote to Lord Newton rather bitterly at the opening of 1916. "They could count on ours, but we cannot count on theirs. The reason is that we wrongly suppose, because they talk our language, they are an Anglo-Saxon people. As a matter of fact they are a foreign nation, or rather several foreign nations." This was precisely what Page appeared to forget and what the President had to remember. Though Spring Rice had no love for Wilson, he confesses that the momentous decision to enter the fray could hardly have been made at an earlier date.

Sir George Buchanan's unadorned narrative *My Mission to Russia* inspires greater confidence than the subtle impressionism of his more literary colleague Paléologue. After some interesting years at Sofia he reached St. Petersburg at the end of 1910 and at once established cordial relations with Sazonoff. The latter is portrayed throughout as a staunch friend of England, where he had spent part of his diplomatic career, and as a man of peace; yet the relations of the two countries, now partners in the Triple Entente, were marked by almost incessant friction. The Ambassador's first task was to announce that his Government was following the Potsdam negotiations with some anxiety. The Tsar, we are told, was a lovable man and a loyal ally; but, though acting in good faith, he did not realize that his concessions in regard to the Bagdad railway were incompatible with the support pledged to his friends. Russian policy in Persia was still worse, and produced acute divergence of views, especially while Neratoff held the reins during Sazonoff's long illness in 1911. In the Shuster crisis Russia intended to occupy Teheran despite the warnings of Downing Street, and, if Persia had not yielded, the Anglo-Russian understanding would scarcely have borne the strain. After the eviction of the American reformer the Persian question lost much of its acuteness, but it continued to

provoke friction since the Russian Consuls in Persia favoured a forward policy. So intolerable did the situation become that in June, 1914, Buchanan was instructed to complain that their conduct was alienating British sympathies and causing grave anxiety to the British Government, since North Persia was becoming a Russian province and Russian domination was extending to the neutral zone. The Tsar promised amendment; but Russian diplomacy inspired so little confidence that, when Sazonoff wished to partition the neutral zone by an exchange of secret notes, the British Government played for time. Russia, for her part, was aggrieved that we refused to make an alliance, and that in the Liman incident we afforded lukewarm support.

Neither the Tsar, nor Sazonoff, nor Russia, Buchanan assures us, wished for war; but at the beginning of the Balkan struggle in 1912 the monarch's mood varied. The pressure of the Grand Duke Nicholas and other Generals at an Imperial shooting-party gave a chauvinistic turn to his policy, till, on his return home, Kokovtsoff and Sazonoff brought him back to the paths of peace. The account of the critical weeks in 1914 supplements the Ambassador's published despatches. Thrice he urged Sazonoff not to precipitate hostilities by mobilization, but to give England time to work for peace; yet he believes that mobilization was forced on Russia, and that the whole guilt of the catastrophe falls on the Central Powers. On January 12, 1917, he performed the most painful task of his career. Applying for an audience he adjured the Tsar, in his own name though with the permission of his Government, to appoint a President of the Council whom the nation could trust. "You must regain its confidence. You are going to the abyss, to revolution, to disaster. Protopopoff must go." The Tsar, who received the Ambassador standing instead of with the usual friendly familiarity, appeared to be shaken; but his evil genius, the Empress, intervened and the Imperial couple staggered blindly to their doom.

Meriel Buchanan's *Diplomacy and Foreign Courts* may be regarded as a footnote to her father's Memoirs. In an Introduction on his character and work Sir Bernard Pares argues that he has been underestimated; that he played his difficult part with consummate skill; and that he rendered conspicuous service both to the development of constitutional liberty and to the prosecution of the war. His moral influence with the Duma leaders was enormous, but he never entertained direct



political relations with them and never worked for a Parliamentary regime. He was a close friend of Sazonoff, and it was at the advice of the latter that on the two occasions when he warned the Tsar of the danger of revolution he made no reference to Rasputin. He realized the weakness of Russia sooner than his countrymen at home, and remarked to Professor Pares, "I wish we did not ask them to do too much." Kerensky's offensive—the result of the Allies' clamour—was a costly mistake. There is a vivid picture of a lunch party at the British Embassy on July 28, 1914, when the host told the German Ambassador that Russia would not climb down as she had done in 1909. "Count Pourtalès, Russia means it". He repeated the words, and proceeded to point out the danger if Germany encouraged Austrian intransigence. His visitor—himself one of the mildest of men—was horrified, exclaiming, "A World War! War with England! Impossible! Unthinkable!" A later work, *The Dissolution of an Empire*, describes the attempt to get the Imperial family out of Russia before it was too late, and paints an unfriendly picture of Arthur Henderson at St. Petersburg.

Sir Rennell Rodd is our chief witness for Italy. The third and most important volume of his delightful *Political and Social Reminiscences* is devoted to his residence in Rome. Though on friendly terms with Bülow and Jagow, the German Ambassador, he was alarmed by the trend of German policy, and when the storm broke he joined Barrère in winning Italy for the Entente. As a lover of Italy, a scholar and a poet, he was *persona gratissima* at the Consulta and the Quirinal, and his practical sympathy encouraged our ally to persevere through the vicissitudes of the desperate struggle. Among the statesmen and soldiers who crowd his pages King Victor Emmanuel wins the highest praise.

The opening pages of Lord Bertie's *Diaries*, 1914-1918, stand out in odd contrast to the remainder of the volumes. "It seems incredible", he wrote on July 26, 1914, "that the Russian Government should plunge Europe into war in order to make themselves protectors of the Serbians. By what title, except on the exploded pretension that she is by right the protectress of all Slavs? What rubbish! And she will expect, if she adheres to her present attitude, France and England to support her in arms!" "I cannot believe in war unless Russia wants it", he added on July 27. "I cannot think the German Emperor and his Government desire war. There is no war

feeling here." He had reckoned, however, without the Russian Ambassador. "Iswolsky will do a great deal of mischief in fomenting the war spirit here", we read on July 28; and on July 31 we hear that he goes about declaring that Russia was ready and war inevitable. "What a fool, even if it be the truth!" Still more interesting is the entry on November 10, 1914. "At the beginning of the war he claimed to be its author. *C'est ma guerre*. Now he says, 'If I was in any way responsible for this war, I should never forgive myself.'" When the conflict was in full swing, the British Ambassador abandoned himself to unmeasured denunciations of Germany and of all who desired a negotiated settlement.

J. D. Gregory's *On the Edge of Diplomacy* describes the British Mission to the Vatican at the end of 1914, the first since the Reformation, of which Sir Henry Howard was the leader and the author the Secretary. Pope Benedict XV and Cardinal Gasparri, he assures us, never swerved from the neutrality which they professed. Next in importance is the account of his experiences as Private Secretary to Sir Valentine Chirol in his mission to the Balkans in the spring of 1915—a mission doomed to failure, since, as the author believes, King Ferdinand had decided his course before they arrived. The best of the pen portraits is that of Eyre Crowe, whom his old subordinate describes in a lapidary sentence: "Crowe and the Foreign Office were one and indivisible".

Lord Cromer's leading part in the Anglo-French rapprochement of 1904, first revealed in the second volume of the British Documents, receives further illustration in the official biography by Lord Zetland. A stream of letters to Balfour and Lansdowne argued that a unique opportunity of settling the Egyptian question had arrived and must be seized. "I cannot help regarding an understanding on all pending questions with France as possibly a stepping-stone to a general understanding with Russia." When the British Government grumbled at French demands he spurred them on, sending Gorst, his right hand man and destined successor, to London and Paris to help with details. When Gorst reported in January 1904 that the spirit, in which the Government and Foreign Office were negotiating was much too stiff, Cromer indicated his opinion on the points already conceded by the French. "When one sees them altogether, it is impossible not to be struck by the absolute and complete surrender of the French so far as Egypt is concerned." Complete it was not, for explicit

consent to the British Occupation had not been secured. If they declined even Cromer—on this vital matter more intransigent than Gorst—was ready to break off the negotiations. After their happy termination he erased the name of Fashoda from the map, substituting the native name of Kodoc, which Lansdowne described as a happy inspiration.

The second volume of Lord Howard of Penrith's autobiography, *Theatre of Life*, describes British efforts to keep Sweden out of the world war. So intense was the dislike of Russia that on August 2, 1914, the Foreign Minister declared that, if England supported Russia, Sweden might be forced by public opinion to take the other side. He added that he would welcome an assurance that England would not occupy any of Sweden's ports so long as she remained neutral. The assurance was promptly given, mobilization was prevented, and she proclaimed her neutrality. When in the autumn of 1914 Germany promised her Finland as the reward of intervention, the bait was refused. The main occupation of the British Minister at Stockholm throughout the conflict was to work the blockade, always bearing in mind that excessive rigour might drive Sweden into the German camp. When the Allies met at Paris after the war Esmé Howard was appointed Head of the section of the British Delegation dealing with North-East Europe. He took a leading part in mapping out the frontiers of the new Poland, which he visited in the spring of 1915 as a member of an Inter-Allied Mission. His diary of the Peace Conference breathes warm admiration for the Poles and intense dislike of the Bolsheviks. When Mr. Lloyd George invited him to go to Prinkipo and make peace between the Russian factions, he replied that if it was the wish of the Government to come to terms with the Bolsheviks it would be best to choose another envoy.

Sir Arthur Hardinge, a cousin of Lord Hardinge, has told portions of his story in *A Diplomatist in Europe*. Appointed to Brussels in 1906 he was instructed by Grey to report on the probable attitude of the Belgian Government in the event of a Franco-German war. The French Minister, Gérard, whom he consulted, did not believe that the Conservative and Clerical party then in power would resist a German violation of Belgian neutrality. German influence, adds Hardinge, was very strong at Antwerp, and the Flemings regarded the Walloons as a different race. Leopold II appears in these pages as a patriotic and far-sighted ruler, a good deal better

than his usual reputation. Appointed to Madrid in 1913 the author devotes an interesting chapter to Spain during the war. When the French Ambassador asked in anxious tones : " Vous n'allez pas nous lâcher ? " he replied that he hoped not, but he had no instructions. German sympathies predominated in the army and the Church. The moderate Conservative Dato Ministry and his Anglophil Foreign Minister Marquis Lema had favoured an understanding with France and England about Morocco ; but with the coming of war it was hoped that a German victory might remove the need of concessions to France in North Africa and restore Gibraltar to Spain. The sympathies of King Alfonso, though officially neutral, were with the Allies, as were those of the Liberal Count Romanones and all parties of the Left. The Queen Mother, an Austrian Princess, was indignant when Italy entered the war. " Ne trouvez-vous pas que les Italiens agissent comme des cochons ? " The British Ambassador discreetly replied that he could hardly apply such a term to the allies of his master. Towards the end of the conflict the destruction of Spanish ships bound for France and England by German submarines swung opinion increasingly to the side of the Western Powers.

The most valuable chapter in *Maurice de Bunsen*, by Edgar Dugdale, is entitled Vienna, 1913-14. Transferred from Madrid in the autumn of 1913 the most beloved of British diplomatists quickly made new friends. " That splendid old gentleman the Emperor " won his heart, and Berchtold extolled Grey's help in keeping the Powers together. The fluidity of the situation in south-eastern Europe was fully realized. The Servian Minister, reported de Bunsen in April 1914, believed in the break up of the Dual Monarchy, which would give the Serbs their opportunity. In preparation for this task Serbia would have to digest Macedonia, conciliate Bulgaria by a rectification of the frontier, and unite with Montenegro. In this way the Balkan States would form a compact mass, capable of holding its own against Austria and demanding access through Albania to the Adriatic. It was clear to the new Ambassador that Serbia only accepted the Treaty of Bucharest as an instalment, and that she would not be satisfied till she reached the sea. Quotations from a lengthy Memorandum and from Lady de Bunsen's diary depict the feverish atmosphere of Vienna after the Serajevo crime. Berchtold kept his secret well, and on July 19, when he visited the de Bunsens in their country house, he was

"unusually chatty and agreeable." An outline of the ultimatum was supplied on July 23 by Count Forgach, who evidently did not expect it to be accepted. "The fact is", wrote Lady de Bunsen in her diary on July 26, "the Austrians have been longing for ages to fight the Servians and did not want their Note to be accepted." On July 31 Countess Berchtold, who came to tea, said: "Do get Sir Maurice to persuade the Russians that we do not want any territory." When the Ambasador asked for his passports Berchtold remarked: "It seems absurd for good friends like England and Austria to be at war." But neither of them argued the point.

No book on the settlement compares in sparkling vivacity with Harold Nicolson's *Peacemaking* 1919. Half the volume is devoted to extracts from his diary from his arrival in Paris at the beginning of January 1919 to the signing of the treaty of Versailles on June 28. As a member of the section of the British Delegation charged with central and south-eastern Europe we hear a good deal about Venizelos and Bratiano, the former a brilliant success, the other a conspicuous failure. The author accompanied General Smuts on his fruitless mission to Budapest in April to arrange an armistice between Hungarians and Roumanians. The picture of Bela Kun, "a silly little man", with puffy white face, loose wet lips and shifty eyes, lingers in the memory. The object of the diary, we are told, is to convey atmosphere, not information, but there is plenty of both. Jules Cambon described the Conference as *une improvisation*, and such it was bound to be. The Big Four stand out clearly. Clemenceau, the dominating figure, reminded the author of an irritated, sceptical and neurasthenic gorilla, rude to the representatives of the great and small Powers alike. Balfour confessed to a deep regard for Wilson as a man and a scholar ever since his visit to America, and he was astonished to find him as good round a table as on paper. Mr. Lloyd George, generally known as the little man, is defended against irresponsible critics on the ground that he was trying to tie up a kicking hen in tissue paper. "The marvel is that he has succeeded as well as he has." Orlando was an amiable mediocrity of liberal views. Eyre Crowe, "the beloved chief", to whom the book is dedicated, receives unstinted praise. "It is a joy to be working under someone so acute and precise."

The other half of the book, entitled "As it seems to-day", contains the author's mature judgments and reflections four-

teen years later. The treaties imposed on our enemies, he declares, were neither just nor wise. In the vast confusion of the Conference and the clamour for a speedy settlement moral standards deteriorated. Only four out of Wilson's twenty-three conditions, we are told, were fulfilled. Yet Stannard Baker's belief that his hero was the victim of a conspiracy on the part of the representatives of the old diplomacy is dismissed as a legend, and Wilson is held partially responsible for the disappointing result. His spiritual and mental rigidity was his undoing. Mr. Lloyd George possessed liberalism and vision, but he was hampered by his own House of Commons with a *Daily Mail* type of mind. No British statesman, given the state of public opinion, could have achieved, or rather avoided, so much. Throughout the negotiations the men at the top were pulled in different directions. On the one hand they desired a punitive peace to satisfy their electorates. On the other they desired a reasonable settlement which should restore the tranquillity of Europe. It was an attempt to square the circle. The fairest verdict on their handiwork is that it might easily have been worse.

## V

In the second volume of Sir George Arthur's *Life of Lord Kitchener* we find the Commander-in-Chief in India advising on the rapprochement with Russia in 1907, and the British Agent-General in Egypt discussing the problem of the Mediterranean with Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill at Malta in 1912. The third volume, which is devoted to the world war, records the achievements and disappointments of a benevolent despot pitchforked into a Cabinet of civilians, and condemned to work a military machine of which he was ignorant. For the events of a life of almost incomparable service to the Empire the official biography retains its place, but to understand more of a singularly complex nature we must turn to Lord Esher's brilliant analysis, *The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener*. Though both the title and the contents of the book have provoked criticism on the ground that the shadows are too dark, the author's intimate knowledge of the War Minister and the stage on which he moved compels us to consider his verdict.

Lord French's apology, 1914, closes with a chapter entitled "Ammunition", in which the soldier utters the familiar

complaint of the civilians. "From the beginning of the battle of the Aisne to the close of the battle of Loos at the end of 1915, the scanty supply of munitions of war paralysed all our power of initiative and at critical times menaced our defence with irretrievable disaster. Deep concern at the failure of the Government to appreciate and remedy our difficulties from this cause dominated all my work." By making known the plight of the Army in May, 1915, he sacrificed his career; but he finds comfort in the reflection that the need was supplied, and that Mr. Lloyd George, "to whom we owe unmeasured gratitude", became Minister of Munitions.

The praises of his successor were sung in two important books before the appearance of the official biography. *Sir Douglas Haig's Command, 1915-1918*, by Dewar and Boraston, is a pæan to the General who, in their opinion, made a larger contribution to victory than any other soldier or civilian. In addition to his proper task of fighting the Germans, Haig was subjected to a double handicap—Mr. Lloyd George's conviction that the war could only be won in the East, and the subordination of the British command in 1917 and again in 1918 to French control. His repugnance to the Nivelle experiment was justified by the *débâcle* on the Chemin des Dames; but the unity of direction established in 1918 wears a very different aspect in these pages from that to which we have grown accustomed. In place of the belief that Foch was called in to save a situation to which Haig was clearly unequal, we learn that the main merit, both in defence and attack, was due to the British forces and their leader. Brigadier-General Charteris' *Field-Marshal Earl Haig* paints a similar picture of wisdom and virtue. Like Robertson and his own beloved chief he is an ardent Westerner, denouncing Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill for their Eastern heresies and railing at the ineptitudes of civilian interference. When the offensive of 1918 fell like a thunderbolt on Gough's attenuated lines, Haig saw that the severance of the French and British could only be averted by transferring control from Pétain to Foch; for Pétain wished to retire and cover Paris.

The official biography by Mr. Duff Cooper is a spirited defence of the Commander-in-Chief. Haig, we are told, was as good a General as is possible for a man without genius, and in moral stature he was a giant. He was the best trained soldier in the British army, and he played the game according to the correct strategical rules. He was one of the few who

never doubted that we should win, and he was convinced that victory could only be won on the Western front where the main forces of the principal enemy were massed. He had no belief in short cuts or side shows. From the Westerner's point of view the battle of the Somme was a success, and the long-drawn horrors of Passchendaele were not in vain. He was never master in his own house, for the former battle was fought to save Verdun and the latter to hold the enemy after the catastrophe of the Chemin des Dames. The most modest and unselfish of men worked harmoniously with everybody, French and English, soldier and civilian, except Mr. Lloyd George, whom he described as "quite a pleasant little man when one has him alone, but I should think quite unreliable." The two leading actors on the British stage were divided not merely by temperament but by their conceptions of the grand strategy of the war. It is the thesis of the second volume of this dramatic narrative that the steady and realistic soldier was absolutely right and the impatient civilian demonstrably wrong. The same conclusion is reached in the official history of the war by General Edmonds, though it is presented in less controversial form.

Sir William Robertson's *Soldiers and Statesmen*, 1914-1918, surveys in greater detail and with less reserve the ground covered in the later chapters of his autobiography, *From Private to Field-Marshal*. He complains that no one had sufficiently thought out the organization of Government and of a High Command for war purposes. The Cabinets are censured for their neglect, and Lord Roberts is blamed for not using his great authority to insist on the creation of a General Staff when the Boer war had revealed our weak points. The ultimate responsibility is traced to the nation itself, which refused to occupy its mind with the possibility of European complications. The author prints a memorandum, written in 1902 when he was head of the Foreign Intelligence section at the War Office, in which he argued that "instead of regarding Germany as a possible ally, we should recognize her as our most persistent, deliberate and formidable rival." The creation of a General Staff in 1905 and Haldane's reforms improved the situation, yet we were inadequately prepared for the struggle in 1914.

Robertson's employment in France during 1914 and 1915 taught him the defects of our war machinery; but it is with his return to Whitehall as Chief of the Imperial General Staff



in December 1915 that the most valuable part of his narrative begins. He refused the succession to French on the ground that Haig had the better claim, and at a later date he declined the War Office on account of Parliamentary inexperience. His position as the chief military adviser to the Government afforded him the best opportunity of expounding the thesis that the war must be won in the West. This fundamental conviction made him the champion of Haig and the enemy of "side shows". Though Mr. Lloyd George's services in the supply of munitions and the creation of a War Cabinet are fully recognized, these volumes vigorously condemn his interventions in military affairs. The root of the trouble was the antagonism between Westerners and Easterners. "The General Staff continued to assert that the main road to victory lay straight ahead across the Rhine, while Mr. Lloyd George insisted that the road was too hard, and that the best one lay, if not via Italy, Trieste and Vienna, then via the Mediterranean, Jerusalem and Constantinople." With the appointment of an independent military adviser on the newly formed Supreme War Council at Versailles and his own consequent resignation the narrative comes to an end. The moral we are asked to draw is that soldiers know their own business best.

Sir Henry Wilson, declares Mr. Churchill, was the most comprehensive military mind of our day in Great Britain; and the publication of his *Life and Diaries* by his friend Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell enables us to test this claim. The volumes bristle with indiscretions, but their historical significance is not less than their personal interest. Sir Henry kept a full daily record of his doings. Although his biographer assures us that he has omitted a good deal of material unsuitable for early publication, he reveals the unvarnished opinion of men, policies and events entertained by the clever, high-spirited, cocksure, acrimonious Ulsterman. A Preface by Marshal Foch pays homage to "one of my dearest friends" and claims immortality for him in a sentence: "It was entirely due to his prevision that the British army was enabled to disembark rapidly in France and to take part with effect in the campaign". We hear little of the services of Haldane, the creator of the Expeditionary Force, to whom Haig paid a well-deserved tribute at the moment of victory. This glorification of the soldier at the expense of the civilian is typical of the whole work, which breathes a lofty disdain of statesmen and Cabinets. The "Frocks" are necessary evils, to be coached,

vilified or shunted by the superior wisdom and foresight of the supermen in uniform.

As Commandant of the Staff College from 1907 to 1910, and Director of Military Operations from 1910 to 1914, Wilson was in a position to prepare for the struggle which he regarded as inevitable. He met Foch in 1909, and introduced him in 1910 as "the man who is going to command the Allied armies when the big war comes on". He supported the campaign of Lord Roberts for compulsory service, and he was dissatisfied with the loose texture of the Entente. The Agadir crisis led him to advocate "an offensive and defensive alliance of England, France, Belgium, Denmark and Russia." He loved France next to his own country, and when the hour of fate sounded he joined the little group of Unionists who mobilized their leaders to put pressure on the Cabinet. "But for me England would never, could never have gone to war, and therefore it was the literal truth that I had saved France." These words were addressed by him to General Castelnau in 1916.

Grey's caution during the years of peace prompted the diarist to hasty censure, but it is not till the war was in full swing that his measureless contempt for civilian statesmen breaks forth. Asquith's conduct of affairs is roughly condemned, and the first Coalition is described as "the Government of all the indecisions". For a time Mr. Lloyd George was his hero. Milner was on the whole the most congenial of the "Frocks", and repaid his approval by saluting him as "by far the ablest soldier in the army". Wilson was not much of a success during his short command in the field, and it was as one of the architects of the Supreme War Council and as our military representative thereon that he rose to his full stature. Orlando called him "le Rothschild des bons espoirs", and his certainty of victory led him to denounce peace feelers from Austria and peace talk at home. The chief honour of securing unity of command in the crisis of 1918 is here assigned to Wilson, who succeeded Robertson as C.I.G.S. in February 1918. With the coming of peace the despised "Frocks" regained control, and we find him railing at President Wilson as "a dangerous visionary" and dismissing the League of Nations as "nonsense". The indictment of Mr. Lloyd George's management of the later stages of the struggle is pursued in General Sir Frederick Maurice's *brochure, Intrigues of the War*, in which the ex-Director of Military Operations

examines the figures and arguments adduced by the Prime Minister in the historic "Maurice debate". In his brightly written volume, *At the Supreme War Council*, Captain Peter Wright records the impressions of an official interpreter. The Chief of the Imperial Staff and the British Commander-in-Chief shrink to very small dimensions, while Mr. Lloyd George emerges as the man of vision and the author bows in reverence before the genius of Foch.

Macdiarmid's *Life of General Grierson* is of interest for the years (1896-1900) he spent as Military Attaché at Berlin, and for the shorter period (1904-06) when, as Director of Military Operations, he helped to make the *Entente Cordiale*. His first lively letters and reports suggest that the Kaiser, whom he liked and admired, remained friendly to England despite the Kruger telegram; but closer acquaintance aroused his suspicions. "We must go for the Germans and that right soon or they will go for us later", he wrote at the end of 1897. He had in mind the ruler's ambition to combine the Dual with the Triple Alliance by bringing Russia into his orbit. Since a preventive war was ruled out, the first task was to make friends with France, and General Huguet testifies to Grierson's services in their expert discussions of 1905-6. "Sir James was one of the first to realize that war was inevitable. He knew that it would be a formidable affair and that only the union of England and France could avert its dangers." When he left the War Office for Aldershot in the autumn of 1906 he had laid the foundations on which Sir Henry Wilson was to build.

No Military Attaché has a more varied or interesting tale to tell than General Waters. *Secret and Confidential* describes his residence in Russia 1893-8 and again for a few crowded weeks in the late summer of 1916. Nobody, he declares, knew the Tsar and the Tsarina better and few so well. He liked them both, particularly the kindly ruler, who never resented his frank remarks. His sympathy with the people, however, never blinded him to the weakness of the regime. As early as 1898 he foretold that the whole system would be swept away in a torrent of blood. At the height of the war he found the Tsar unchanged. He was resolved to fight on till the enemy was beaten. "Better that we should all be dead than live under the German heel." He explained the dismissal of Sazonoff on the ground that he wanted to go too far and too fast, "raising hopes which, with an illiterate people like mine, could not be

realized for generations. If a revolution should occur those moderate men like Sazonoff would be swept away in two weeks and then there would be chaos. He does not know his own countrymen." Unfortunately Protopopoff, the rising star, who made the worst possible impression on the author, was far more dangerous to the dynasty, and his errors dragged it to its doom. *Private and Personal* transports the reader from St. Petersburg to Berlin, where the author served as Military Attaché from 1900 to 1903. William II appears in a rather attractive light, occasionally rash in speech but never desiring war. The Crown Prince was neither intellectually nor morally fitted for his destiny. Bülow was clever but shift. A third and slighter volume, *Potsdam and Doorn*, depicts the Kaiser in eclipse, a kindly, cheerful, pious old man.

*With the Russian Army 1914-1917*, by Major-General Sir Alfred Knox, is based on his diary while he was Military Attaché. He claims to have enjoyed greater opportunities than any other foreign observer, and his knowledge of the language unlocked many doors. The book takes high rank among our authorities for the weaknesses, the trials and the collapse of the Tsarist regime. The Introduction on the state of the army in 1914 prepares us for the tragedy which follows, and the military narrative is peppered with political reflections. There was no strong patriotism to weld all classes together, the average Russian could not persevere long in an uphill task, and the Government was hopelessly incompetent. The eviction of the Grand Duke Nicholas by the Tsar in September 1915 was madness, and a few days later the author reported: "If there has ever been a Government that richly deserved a revolution, it is the present one in Russia. If it escapes, it will only be because the members of the Duma are too patriotic to agitate in this time of crisis."

The later part of the second volume gives a first-hand account of the revolution, the effect of which on the waging of the war was more clearly foreseen by the foreign observer than by many highly placed Russian patriots. "My dear Knox, you must be easy," remarked Rodzianko, President of the Duma. "Everything is going on all right. Russia is a big country, and she can wage a war and manage a revolution at the same time." Kerensky was a patriot, full of energy and eloquence, but subtle, vain and ambitious. "With him the Revolution came first and Russia only second." His worst offence was to discourage Kornilov's attempt to restore disci-

pline in the army. The Bolshevik *coup*, of which the author was an eye-witness, was the work of a handful of fanatics ; but they were men of action, and they realized that the army, like the people, wanted peace. General Knox left Russia in January 1919 with Sir George Buchanan, to whose high character he pays repeated tribute. "No Ambassador that England had sent to Petrograd ever loved Russia more or worked harder in her interests."

In *The Experiences of a Military Attaché in the Balkans* Colonel H. D. Napier tells a story of lost opportunities. His policy from the beginning was to win Bulgaria "at any price", but his views were opposed by his chief, Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, who objected to forcing sacrifices on Servia. When O'Beirne succeeded the Serbophil Bax-Ironside at Sofia in July 1915, he realized the urgency of the situation, but it was too late.

Lord Fisher possessed a streak of genius, but he is singularly unreliable, and his books are of interest as a revelation of personality rather than as a storehouse of facts. He defines his *Memories* as "a compromise between the No-book of Lord Fisher's inclination and the orderly, complete autobiography which the public wishes to possess. There is no plan nor sequence. Just as the thoughts have arisen, so have they been written or dictated." The chief figure in his portrait gallery is King Edward, who is depicted as "a splendid and steadfast friend", whose support encouraged him to carry through his drastic reforms. The most sensational revelation is that of his desire to "Copenhagen" the German fleet in time of peace, on the model of 1807, before it grew too strong. "Alas ! we had no Pitt, Bismarck or Gambetta." Such timely intervention, he believes, would have averted the war. That it would have inflicted indelible disgrace on our country does not occur to him. The sequel, entitled *Records*, yields even less material.

Admiral Bacon's breezy biography of Lord Fisher adds nothing of political consequence. We hear a little more of the plan to "Copenhagen" the German fleet and of the eccentric design to land troops on the shores of Pomerania. We are told once again of the blackness of Lord Charles Beresford, the greyiness of Mr. Churchill, the whiteness of King Edward and Mr. McKenna. But the great sailor was a child in politics. In a conversation with Iswolsky during his visit to London in 1908, recorded and developed in a letter dated October 15, he urged a quadruple alliance of Russia,

England, France and Turkey as "an obvious necessity" for all four Powers. The alliance with Japan was "the very worst thing that England ever did for herself." Russia and England should take care not to weaken or alienate the Turks. Iswolsky was advised not to mention the Dardanelles at present, as a great agitation in England would arise. "Wait some little time, and then let Russia make her own private arrangements with a grateful Turkey, and you may rest quite sure that England won't then object, for the simple reason that anything that will bind Russia, England and Turkey together is to England's advantage and far outweighs any objections to what Russia naturally and rightly wishes in regard to the Dardanelles."

Jellicoe's modesty is a refreshing contrast to Fisher's schoolboy exuberance. *The Grand Fleet* 1914-1916, published directly the war was over, came as a revelation of the narrow margin by which we had won. Warm tributes are paid to Fisher, Mr. McKenna and Mr. Churchill for their provision of capital ships. The German claim to victory at the battle of Jutland is gently repudiated. The shadow of the submarine looms over the whole story, and when the author was transferred from Scapa Flow to Whitehall at the end of 1916 he confessed that there was an undoubted risk of our being forced into an unsatisfactory peace. How the submarine peril increased and was gradually overcome is the theme of a second and less interesting volume, *The Crisis of the Naval War*. In the official biography Admiral Bacon fights the battles of his friend and hero with abundant vigour, sparing neither Mr. Churchill nor Mr. Lloyd George in the process.

Two chapters in the *Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss* by his wife throw light on the making of the Armistice and the Versailles treaty. Succeeding Jellicoe as First Sea Lord at the end of 1917 he took an active part in the formulation of the naval terms to be presented to Germany, and he was present with Foch at the historic meetings in the Forest of Compiègne when the German Deputation received and accepted the Allied demands. He disliked Wilson, distrusted his sincerity, and had no faith in the project of a League unable to enforce its decisions. Balfour, he declared, was too old, and his subtle brain was ill-fitted for the quick decisions required. Mr. Lloyd George seemed to him an untrustworthy egotist. He regrets that at the signing of the treaty on June 28 there was not more dignity and restraint.

King Constantine had no stouter champion than Admiral Mark Kerr, who was in command of the Greek Navy at the beginning of the war. In *Land, Sea and Air* he testifies that he never knew a straighter man, and that his word was his bond. Queen Sophie sent her telegrams to the Kaiser when her husband was ill. When he told his brother-in-law that personal sympathy and political opinion drew him to the German side, he was only, he told the Admiral, sugaring the pill in order to avoid a German attack.

## VI

A good deal of information is supplied by men who, though they occupied a subordinate position or were entirely unofficial, stood close to the leading actors. In the first instalment of his Memoirs, entitled *Politicians and the War*, 1914-1916, Lord Beaverbrook sets out to describe the civilian aspect of the direction of the war, which, in his opinion, most writers tend to neglect. The hero is the author's fellow-Canadian Bonar Law, to whose ability, foresight and unselfishness he pays affectionate homage. It is indeed from this friendship that the volume derives its value. When hostilities appeared to be inevitable Mr. Churchill, seeing the Cabinet to be divided, worked with his friend F. E. Smith for a coalition. The scheme was rejected by Bonar Law, who regarded it as the last step, not the first. To the question whether the Unionists would fill up vacancies when the Pacifists resigned, he remarked that if Asquith wanted help he would ask. Balfour's attitude to Lord Beaverbrook's hero was "not helpful", a "slightly cold but absolute correctitude" forbidding any thought of genuine confidence or intimacy. The portrait of Mr. Lloyd George is drawn with a recognition of his great qualities not always found among his political opponents. "Fame is the passion of his soul and the light of his life; it has supported him in his terrible labours and nerved him against cruel attacks." The most valuable portion of the book describes the fall of the Liberal Government in 1915. The cause, we are told, was not, as the public believed, the shortage of shells, but Bonar Law's refusal to tolerate the continuance of Mr. Churchill at the Admiralty after the resignation of Fisher. The first Coalition Government, however, was by no means to the author's taste; for Asquith kept the best places for Liberals, and Bonar Law had to content himself

with the Colonies. The Prime Minister, indeed, "hopelessly underrated Bonar Law's talent and character," while equally overestimating Curzon. Even though not taken very seriously by his chief, Bonar Law was able by cogent arguments to secure the evacuation of Gallipoli. The first volume ends with the death of Kitchener, who, we are told, had disenchanted all his colleagues.

The second volume continues the eulogy of Bonar Law, who is described as the greatest figure on the political stage. It was his sure judgment and invisible power which upheld every Ministry, just as it was the Unknown Warrior who won the war. Asquith is blamed for slackness and instability of purpose. The Triumvirate of malcontents Carson, Lloyd George and Bonar Law, were brought together by Beaverbrook, who overcame their mutual suspicions. Bonar Law was the last to be converted, partly from disbelief in Lloyd George's unselfishness, partly from loyalty to Asquith. It was an uphill fight, as Lloyd George was alone among the Liberal Ministers, except possibly Montagu, and Bonar Law alone among the Conservative Ministers in wishing to see Lloyd George head of a new War Council. While Lloyd George and Carson desired Asquith to be a member, Bonar Law was less convinced. Lansdowne had been converted to peace by negotiation and therefore wanted to retain Asquith, who, he thought, might follow his example; and he hoped to exclude or control Lloyd George and Bonar Law as bitter-enders. "We were never nearer peace by negotiation than in the summer and early autumn of 1916." Thus it was a fight against Lansdowne as well as against Asquith. Northcliffe and Lloyd George, we are told, contrary to the general belief, did not co-operate to overthrow Asquith, as they distrusted and disliked each other.

In a democratic age journalists are often makers of history, and from time to time the veil which hides their activities is withdrawn. Mr. Alfred Spender's *Life, Politics and Journalism* is not only a singularly modest record of a distinguished career but a contribution to our knowledge of high politics. During the decade which followed the return of the Liberals at the end of 1905, the Editor of the *Westminster Gazette* was more than a skilful interpreter of the politics of his party. He has been described as a Minister without portfolio, and if he had been inclined to blow his own trumpet his importance in the history of our time would have been more widely recognized.



The chapter entitled "The Men of 1906" will long be read by those who seek to visualize the personalities of the Liberal team. He has a kindly word for them all, though Asquith, Grey and McKenna receive the best marks. The chapters on Foreign Affairs are a sustained tribute to the Foreign Secretary with whom his relations "were rather those of a friend than a journalist." Yet he steered an independent course. "The Germans appeared to think that he used me to test opinion and to throw out ideas which it was inconvenient to espouse officially. . . . I cannot remember a single occasion on which Grey asked me to write an article or prompted me to say one thing and not another. . . . He faced everything and discussed everything in an extraordinarily impersonal way, as if he were off the scene and bringing the cool judgment of the impartial outsider to bear on it." A more elaborate picture of Grey is painted in the author's later work, *Men and Things*.

Mr. Spender's portraits of the Ambassadors bring some notable figures clearly before our eyes—the courtly Cambon, the distinguished Benckendorff, the agreeable Mensdorff, the magnificent Whitelaw Reid, the beloved Walter Page. Metternich receives the affectionate tribute that he deserves. "He was a very honest man and very loyal servant of his Government, so loyal that he would never admit even in private that any step that he was instructed to take was open to question. . . . But it has since come out that no German abroad was more faithful in warning that Government of the peril they ran when they threatened Britain at sea." In view of the legends that cling round the name of Kühlmann, it is useful to have the opinion of a shrewd observer who knew him well. "He was a very able man of somewhat enigmatic character, but the notion that he was a deep kind of anti-British intriguer is, I believe, unfounded. . . . He was neither pro-British nor anti-British, just doing the business of his country, and doing it according to his own lights, with great dutifulness. . . . I think his judgment was undoubtedly that friendship with us was politically desirable for Germany, but if so there was no sentiment about it, and he never pretended that there was."

Among the author's contacts with foreign affairs none was more interesting than his visit to Germany with British journalists in 1907. In an astonishing conversation at Potsdam the Kaiser, seated on an enormous horse, complained bitterly that Englishmen did not come to Berlin. "Go back and tell

them to come ; tell your Government people to come ; tell Sir Edward Grey to come." The impression left on him was "that this Emperor on the high horse was clearly a very human kind of human being. He evidently had a grievance. It was just as if a newcomer was complaining that the county did not call on him. It was incredible to us that the great German Empire, by far the strongest thing in Europe, thought itself slighted and side-tracked. But so it was." A longer conversation followed with Bülow in his official residence, where he was surprised to meet the formidable Holstein, who had fallen from power in the previous year.

The chapter in the second volume on the last days of peace is most dramatic. On July 15, 1914, Baron Franckenstein arrived from the Austrian Embassy at the author's house late at night in a state of great anxiety. The Austrian Government, he declared, had satisfied itself that the plot against the Archduke had originated in Servia, and it felt bound to obtain satisfaction. Would the Editor of the *Westminster Gazette* use his influence against encouraging Belgrad to resist? On the following night Schubert arrived from the German Embassy in equal anxiety, declaring that Germany would have to support her ally. A more important communication reached him on August 1, when he received a telegram from Bethmann, begging him to publish his despatch of July 30 to Tschirschky exhorting Austria to negotiate with St. Petersburg. He promptly published the document, which was omitted from the German White-Book ; and, despite the charge that he was playing the German game, he never regretted his decision.

While Grey's foreign policy was steadily supported by Mr. Spender, it was sharply criticized by the *doyen* of Liberal journalists. Dr. J. L. Hammond's sympathetic biography, *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian*, contains valuable material on the contacts of the famous editor with Liberal Ministers. His most intimate friend in the Cabinet was Loreburn, who never overcame his suspicion of the Liberal Imperialists, disapproved the whole policy of Continental commitments, and resented his exclusion from any share in the control of foreign affairs. In the autumn of 1911 Alfred Lyttelton mentioned to him that the Unionist leaders had been asked whether they would support the Government if the Agadir dispute led to war. Loreburn was indignant, and agreed with Morley and Harcourt that a protest should be made against the habit of secrecy in the Foreign Office.

Morley accordingly raised the question on October 20, and the Cabinet decided that there should be no future military conversations with a foreign Power without its knowledge. The leading Ministers explained their policy to Scott, whose notes of conversations with Grey, Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George at the height of the Agadir crisis are of great interest. The latter, he found, was "not immune from the microbe of Germanophobia", but all three approved Germany's desire for expansion in Africa. When Grey argued that the diplomatic support of France implied, if it was to be of any value, the possibility of military support, Scott rejoined that no such obligation had been suggested or understood when we came to terms, and that she would never dream of giving us military support if our position in Egypt were challenged. While he admired Grey's character, he never trusted his judgment.

With his dislike of Continentalism Scott naturally disapproved our entry into war. When Loreburn resigned owing to ill health in 1912 his special friend in the Cabinet was Mr. Lloyd George, with whom he had a curious conversation on July 27, 1914. There could be no question of our taking part in any war at the outset, declared the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He knew of no Minister who would favour it. If, however, the German fleet attacked French towns in the Channel, it would be difficult to stand aside. He was ready to go a certain distance with France and Russia in putting diplomatic pressure on Austria. If war began he would keep Italy out by remaining neutral, thereby relieving France of one antagonist.

During the war Scott remained in close touch with Mr. Lloyd George, whom he considered a far better leader in stormy times than Asquith, and who had the greatest respect for his advice. At the end of 1917 the Prime Minister was no longer a bitter ender. "I warn you", he remarked, "that I am in a very pacifist temper. . . . The thing is horrible beyond human nature to bear, and I feel I can't go on with this bloody business. I would rather resign." For some time, he continued, he had been thinking that there ought to be a restatement of war aims. There was a good deal of feeling in the War Cabinet towards peace. Balfour was not opposed, Milner was the most inclined of all, Carson was nothing like so violent as he seemed. Before making the historic pronouncement in January, 1918, Scott helped him to secure the approval of Asquith and Grey. He denounced the decision to hold an

election directly the war was over, and warned President Wilson, who consulted him during his visit to England, as to the weaknesses of the Prime Minister. "I said I had good hopes of L.L.G., that he responded very greatly to his surroundings, and could, I believe, be greatly influenced by him; but he was extremely elusive and in dealing with him you had to keep an extremely bright look-out. He replied with a twinkle that, though he liked G. very much, he was quite conscious of that."

Sir Valentine Chirol's *Fifty Years in a Changing World* is largely devoted to Asiatic and Egyptian problems, but we are only concerned with the chapters which deal with the recent European diplomacy. As correspondent of *The Times* in Berlin in the 'nineties, the author made the acquaintance of Holstein, of whom he writes with a friendly appreciation rare either in his own country or abroad. He trusted Caprivi, who, like Bismarck, was "satiated"; but he had no confidence in Marschall, who informed him that the Kruger telegram was "eine Staatsaktion", and that it was high time to give us a lesson. Still less does he admire the plausible Bülow, with whom he had a disagreeable experience in 1901. Accepting an invitation from Holstein to visit Berlin for a discussion of Anglo-German relations with the Chancellor, he listened to the outline of a scheme of a defensive alliance. Bülow was extremely cordial, and he promised his visitor, in tones of impressive sincerity, that he would never allow the anti-British sentiments of an ignorant public to deflect him from his course. Shortly after he indulged in his stinging rejoinder to Chamberlain's criticism of the German army in 1870, and all the dogs of the press began to yelp. This episode convinced the author that the Chancellor was a false friend, and coloured the tone of *The Times* during the years when he was its Foreign Editor.

The most novel and important chapter in the book is entitled "A War Mission to the Balkans". In June 1915 Chirol was entrusted by the Foreign Office with a semi-official mission, the main object of which was to secure the aid or at least the neutrality of King Ferdinand. At Nish he found the Serbs desperately suspicious of their neighbour and unwilling to make concessions, but the main responsibility for the loss of Bulgaria is placed on the statesmen of the Great Powers. "The Allies never pulled their weight because they never tried to pull all together at the same time and in the same

place." The British Government should have substituted O'Beirne for Bax-Ironside at Sofia at a much earlier date. The situation was complicated by the Secret Treaty of London, the provisions of which quickly leaked out. "If the Adriatic is to be an Italian lake," argued the Crown Prince Alexander, "how can we let Bulgaria hold the line of communication with the Aegean down the Vardar valley? If Serbia could have Albania and reach Durazzo, she could find compensation for Macedonia." Chirol advised that the Tsar should issue a solemn appeal to Servia to make the necessary sacrifices; but nothing was done, and "the fox of the Balkans" sold himself to the highest bidder.

Further light on the wooing of Ferdinand is thrown by Lord Noel-Buxton in *Balkan Problems and European Peace*. His papers have been utilized by Mr. Conwell-Evans in *Foreign Policy from a Back Bench* 1904-1918. The founder and Chairman of the Balkan Committee played a considerable part in the politics of the Near East, where he strove unceasingly for the interests of all the Balkan peoples. During the Bosnian crisis he visited Aehrenthal, who remarked that he need not consider England. "Your Sir Edward Grey wants peace." When he was warned not to underrate British influence, he rejoined: "What can England do to us?" As a Liberal Member of Parliament Buxton laboured for an Anglo-German rapprochement, and his criticism of British policy in the Agadir crisis was echoed by two of our Ambassadors. "It has undone all our work", was Sir Edward Goschen's verdict on the Mansion House speech. Sir Maurice de Bunsen wrote from Madrid that the Foreign Office attitude amounted to a declaration that France could do no wrong, but he added that Germany's responsibility was the greatest.

On the outbreak of war in 1914 Buxton strove to secure the adhesion of Bulgaria, where he was *persona gratissima*. The desire of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill to entrust him with an official mission was frustrated by Grey, who preferred an unofficial journey of inquiry. His Private Secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, was even less encouraging. "Don't go; Bulgaria has gone over already." Bax-Ironside, the Minister at Sofia, who had no love for the Bulgarians, was equally pessimistic, and it was clear enough that the King and Radoslavoff sympathized with the Central Powers. The Opposition leaders, on the other hand, and probably a large majority of the Bulgarian people, favoured the Entente. After listening to

an appeal to join the side of the old friends of his country, Ferdinand refused to commit himself. "J'écoute, mais je ne répons pas. Nous devons rester comme dans un petit cocon." The Fox of the Balkans put himself up to auction. The Central Powers were bound to win; for they had every reason to support his claims on Macedonia, whereas Grey and Sazonoff refused to put pressure on their ally at Belgrad. Though Pasitch scouted the notion of territorial sacrifice, Buxton believed that he would have yielded to pressure from the Allies and thereby have facilitated the creation of a pro-entente *bloc*. The Buxton brothers visited King Carol at Bucharest on the last day of his life, and a day or two later a young Turk attempted their assassination. Interviews took place on the way home with Pasitch, Venizelos, King Constantine, Delcasse, Clemenceau and Iswolsky. On his return to London Buxton renewed his efforts, which continued to be backed by his friends in the Cabinet; but it proved impossible to persuade Grey of the necessity of squaring Bulgaria without delay. Lady Grogan's *Life of Bouchier* adds a few particulars from the papers of the famous *Times* Correspondent who found in Bulgaria his spiritual home, and who returned to live at Sofia when the war was over.

No unofficial autobiography of our time is richer in interest than Mr. Wickham Steed's *Through Thirty Years*. As the correspondent of *The Times* in Rome from 1896 to 1902 and in Vienna from 1902 to 1912, he recalls the strained relations of the partners of the Triple Alliance, records the confidences of Visconti Venosta and Nigra, and reviews Aehrenthal's stormy reign at the Ballplatz. Recalled to London by Lord Northcliffe as Foreign Editor of *The Times*, he exerted himself to the utmost to rally public opinion and the Government to the support of France and Russia in the struggle which he had for some years regarded as the inevitable outcome of German ambitions. The dominant theme of the second volume is the author's efforts for the dissolution of the Austrian Empire, the creation of Yugoslavia and the revival of Bohemian independence.

The campaign for the disintegration of Austria was pursued along a number of parallel lines. *The New Europe*, a weekly journal founded and edited by Dr. Seton-Watson, laboured with skill and success to interest British readers in the problems of Eastern and East Central Europe, and no student of the diplomacy of the war can afford to neglect its pages, to

which Mr. Steed, Ronald Burrows, Sir Bernard Pares and other specialists were frequent contributors, and in which Masaryk expounded his policies. When at the beginning of 1918 the Government accepted Lord Northcliffe's suggestion of a propaganda department, the staff included Dr. Seton-Watson and Mr. Steed, under whose auspices the literary attack on Austria was developed. The story of this campaign, and of the hesitating attitude of the Government towards it, has been told in Sir Campbell Stuart's *The Secrets of Crewe House*. A German version of the book bears witness to the interest aroused in a country whose spokesmen lament the clumsy efforts of their own Government in the same field.

A good deal of material on the settlement became available before Mr. Lloyd George told his story in 1938. The six stately volumes, *The History of the Peace Conference*, edited by Harold Temperley and published under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs, were compiled mainly by members of the British and American Delegations who were in close touch with events. Though neither official nor semi-official, this scholarly work will always remain indispensable. Among individual contributions to the story Mr. Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* towers above all competitors by its incisive brilliance. Long after his indictment of the "Carthaginian peace" has lost interest for the general reader, his sketches of Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George will continue to challenge and delight. We recapture the atmosphere of excitement and intrigue in which the peace-makers had to labour in the testimony of four British journalists. Of these Mr. Wilson Harris's *The Peace in the Making* is the most balanced. Mr. Sisley Huddleston's *Peace Making at Paris* breathes a similar spirit of humane Liberalism. Dillon's *The Peace Conference from Within* is of special value on the claims and problems of South-Eastern Europe. Mr. Vernon Bartlett's *Behind the Scene of the Peace Conference* is a sparkling impressionist sketch.

The first authoritative record of the *Daily Telegraph* incident was given by the second Lord Burnham in his own paper on July 7, 1930. His friend Colonel Stuart-Wortley told him that he had made notes of conversations with William II and offered them for publication. J. B. Firth, a member of the editorial staff, and others helped to put the notes into literary form. The Firth manuscript was carefully typed, with a broad margin for corrections, and the document was sent to the

Kaiser through Stuart-Wortley. It was returned six weeks later, signed by the Kaiser, who expressed a hope that its publication would improve relations. The following issue of the *Daily Telegraph* contained a letter from Stuart-Wortley correcting this version in certain particulars. In the autumn of 1908 he was invited to attend the German manœuvres at Saarbrücken. On the concluding day the Kaiser sent for his guest as he sat on horseback, and proceeded to talk. He ended by saying that he would like the gist of his remarks to be published in some leading paper. Stuart-Wortley accordingly dictated an account of the interview to J. B. Firth. The typescript was forwarded through the German Embassy to the Kaiser, asking if he considered it correct. The Kaiser did not sign the document, but he wrote an autograph letter dated October 15, 1908, saying that he had carefully examined it. "It embodies correctly all the principal items of our conversation during the recent manœuvres. . . . In three places only I propose some small alterations in the wording of the draft. With these alterations I authorize you to make a discreet use of the article in the manner you think best. I firmly hope that it may have the effect of bringing about a change in the tone of some of the English newspapers." The same story appears in *A Guardsman's Memories* by Lord Edward Gleichen, to whom Stuart-Wortley showed his notes and confided the details of a historic incident.

A footnote to history is supplied by Leo Maxse's *Retrospect and Reminiscence* in the *National Review*, August 1918. Starting with the assumption, natural to the editor of an ultra-Conservative monthly, that everything depended on His Majesty's Opposition, he describes how a little group of determined interventionists, including Sir Henry Wilson, Mr. Wickham Steed, Mr. Amery, Mr. George Lloyd and himself, mobilized the Conservative leaders on August 1 and 2, 1914, and secured the delivery of the letter of Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law at 10 Downing Street on the Sunday morning, in time to strengthen the hands of the interventionists in a divided Cabinet.

Diplomacy during the war was not carried on exclusively by professionals. *Mark Sykes*, by Shane Leslie, contains valuable information on the Middle East that he knew and loved so well. In December 1915 the brilliant Conservative Member of Parliament was invited to co-operate with Georges Picot in framing an agreement on Syria, Mesopotamia and



Asia Minor. The earmarking of Mosul to France was his idea, but he resented the use of his name in the much abused "Sykes-Picot treaty", for he did not possess a free hand. He strove to combine the interest of the Arab cause, of which he was an ardent champion, with loyalty to the French; and he believed that the treaty, which was submitted to and accepted by Russia, embodied the best available solution. It was shaped by the historic French claim to Syria, which necessitated a compromise between French and British demands in the Arab portions of the Turkish Empire. Jerusalem and its district were to be placed under international administration. It was natural that the Arabs should resent the prospect of Arab states being placed under French and British control.

No Englishman of our time has done so much to interpret the Russia of Nicholas II as Professor Sir Bernard Pares. *My Russian Memoirs* are a primary source, for he knew most of the leading actors on the stage and saw them at work before and during the war. As a warm champion of constitutional Government he writes with special authority on those who strove to make the Duma a success. A later work, *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy*, examines the same period with the aid of all the material down to 1939. The cause of the ruin, he concludes, came not from below but from above. Bruce Lockhart's *Memoirs of a British Agent* is an even more thrilling story of Russia in revolution. Sent to Moscow by Mr. Lloyd George as an unofficial representative in 1918 he paints the new rulers from the life, and indeed no Englishman knew them so well at that stage of their career. Russia, he declares, with the exception of Trotsky, was sick of war.

The passionate antagonisms which sundered Venizelists and Constantinists swept even Englishmen off their feet. Sir Basil Thomson's *The Allied Secret Service in Greece* is dedicated to Admiral Dartige du Fournet and two other French naval officers "who sacrificed their careers in the cause of justice and truth". While the British Minister, Sir Francis Elliot, was hypnotized by Venizelos, the author admires and trusts the King. It is a legend, he declares, that he or any Greek Government ever dreamed of attacking the allied forces at Salonika. The author's trump card is the facsimile of an autograph order on the visiting-card of Venizelos to the Master of the Port at Peiraeus to allow the coaling of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* in their flight to the Straits. The French receive as hard knocks as Venizelos, and Commander de

Roquefeuil, the Naval Attaché, is the hero or villain of the book, according to our taste. He was the "stage-manager" of Venizelos, and he organized the French and English secret police. Baron Schenk, the German agent, is described as unimportant, and Anglo-French propaganda is depicted as much more formidable. Some agents, we are told, worked for both sides. General Sarraïl, as usual, comes out badly.

Another English witness, Compton Mackenzie, the novelist, strikes a very different note in *First Athenian Memories*. Attached to the British Legation in the latter half of 1915 for secret service he breathed its Venizelist atmosphere, though he pictures the King as weak and stupid, not clever and wicked. He quotes a revealing despatch from the Foreign Office at the end of 1915. "We have no policy in Greece except when possible to exercise a moderating influence on the French." England throughout played second fiddle. A second volume, entitled *Greek Memories*, equally vivid and controversial, carries the story through 1916, when he was head of the British Intelligence Service at Athens. As an ardent Venizelist he criticizes everyone who does not share his enthusiasm. His chief, Sir Francis Elliot, the British Minister, though honoured as a man and praised as a Venizelist, dreamed idle dreams of a reconciliation between Constantine and the greatest of his subjects. Grey is denounced for his watery Whig mentality, whatever that may mean. The French were playing for their own hand, and at certain moments were ready to let Venizelos down. The Italians, fearing a strong Greece, worked against Greece's strongest man. "It looked as if the policy of the Foreign Office was to encourage Venizelos in every way sentimentally while withholding all practical support." No one receives quite so many knocks as Sir Basil Thompson, who is accused of ignorance and inaccuracy. The volume ends with the landing of the Allies on December 1, 1917, and the collision with the King's troops, in which, we are assured, the Constantinists fired the first shot.

Five political diarists of different colour claim our attention. *The Journals and Letters* of Lord Esher, edited by his son, reveal a cultivated and thoughtful man who shunned publicity, refused high office, possessed a genius for friendship, and played a significant part behind the scenes. His passion for independence added weight to his counsel, for every one knew that he wanted nothing for himself. He was *persona gratissima* at Court, on terms of intimacy with the leaders of both parties,

and, though a civilian, a specialist in military matters. The main interest of his life was national defence. The first volume, covering 1870-1903, reveals his intimate contacts with Court and Parliament during the Chamberlain era. We watch the Colonial Secretary at the opening of 1898 fretting at the caution of Salisbury, and arguing that we should stand fast for Imperial expansion, whatever the result. At the height of the Fashoda crisis Salisbury was the most worried member of the Cabinet, his colleagues consoling themselves with the view that the row would have to come and that it might as well come then as later. Rosebery, never very friendly to the French, inclined to think that a war with France would simplify difficulties in the future. A characteristic letter from Chamberlain two days after the outbreak of the Boer war illustrates his robust conviction of British strength. "I am not in the least anxious about foreign complications. It is a pleasant habit of our dear friends on the Continent to show their teeth when we are engaged with another dog. But in certain tempers of the British public these demonstrations are dangerous, and if I were "a Frenchman or a Roosian or a Proosian" I should be inclined not to twist the lion's tail at this precise juncture." Esher, like Edward VII, regretted the decision in 1903 not to co-operate in the Bagdad railway, which the Defence Committee strongly favoured on strategical grounds. "The German Emperor is a bogey just now in certain quarters, and the English, led by a foolish half-informed press, are children in foreign politics."

The second volume, covering 1903-10, displays Esher as a permanent member of Balfour's creation, the Committee of Imperial Defence, and a valued helper in Haldane's military reforms. The Committee, he notes in 1905, regarded our non-participation in the Bagdad railway as a grave political and strategical mistake. A Memorandum for the King in January 1906 describes a recent talk between Beit and the Kaiser, who declared that there would be no war with France unless England incited her, that he was willing for her to have an exceptional position as regards the police on the Algerian frontier, but that he would not allow a second Tunis. No one welcomed the *Entente Cordiale* more warmly than Esher, not merely as the reconciliation with a formidable neighbour but as an insurance against a new peril. "The Entente is getting on", he wrote in September 1906, "not before it is required. There is no doubt that within reasonable distance there looms

a titanic struggle between Germany and Europe for mastery. The years 1793-1815 will be repeated, only Germany, not France, will be trying for European domination. . . . The great fear is that war may come before we are ready." Germany, he added, must stretch out her limbs seawards, which involved perpetual threats to England and Holland. "*L'Allemagne c'est l'ennemi.*" The British army was wholly inadequate for a great war, and conscription was required.

Esher never feared that France would misuse the Entente. "The French have behaved perfectly", he wrote in November 1908, after the Casablanca crisis. "Grey was touched by their self-restraint. They never asked whether we were going to their assistance. In point of fact Asquith, Grey and Haldane had decided to do so. Haldane told Asquith that if we failed France he would not give ten years purchase for the British Empire." The volume closes with the death of Edward VII and a finely phrased characterization of his friend. He associates himself with the verdict of Soveral, the Portuguese Ambassador: "Vous êtes un grand diplomate, un homme d'état remarquable, et vous l'ignorez."

The third volume covers the first five years of George V, whose simplicity and devotion to duty evoke unfailing admiration. The Agadir crisis moved Esher to meditations on the slender margin of our security. "Fifteen ships alone stand between Great Britain and conquest and the annihilation of Empire. Just a small knot of vessels in one small harbour." His admiration for Fisher knows no bounds. "The navy as we know it today is your work." The decision of the Admiralty virtually to abandon the Mediterranean in 1912 was resisted by Esher in the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the first plan of sweeping reduction was abandoned. "Anyway we can now hold up our heads once more in the Mediterranean—and beyond. Whatever the cost, it is cheaper than a conscript army and any entangling alliance." He was very glad to be France's friend and backer, but nothing more. "Any attempt to rely on 'alliances' or the naval forces of friendly Powers is bound to prove illusory. . . . It means an alliance with France under cover of 'conversations' . . . Rome had to call in the foreigner when the time of her decadence approached." When in 1913 Asquith denied the existence of an arrangement with France Esher commented: "But how we can get out of the commitments of the General Staff with honour I cannot understand. It all seems so shift." When

the hour of decision arrived in 1914 he had no doubt as to the response. "If ever a nation was bound, we are encircled by our acts and tacit promises."

During the war, which fills the greater part of the third and fourth volumes, Esher played the part of a mediator between the British soldiers and between the British and French commands. The hero of the earlier part of the story is Kitchener, "a noble creature", to whom he paid homage in a separate work. The hero of the later part, despite his affection for French, is Haig, whom he compares to Wellington. Grey was like Castlereagh, but only the names of Lloyd George and Haig would survive, the former for genius, the latter for character. At Kitchener's suggestion Esher spent most of his time in Paris where, owing to the inadequacy of Bertie, he played the part of a supplementary Ambassador. After the disaster of the Chemin des Dames in May 1917 he noted the weakening of French morale, and expected a speedy peace of exhaustion. The Lancken and Sixtus negotiations, he argues, should have been followed up, and he approved the Lansdowne letter. Wilson, on the other hand, struck him as a dreamer, and he had little belief in the League. The French politicians make a poor show throughout.

Though Wilfrid Blunt won his spurs as a poet, his prose is of equally high quality, and his *Diaries* will be consulted when his verse is forgotten. If the sufferings of Egypt are the text of his first volume, the storm brewed by competing Imperialisms dominates the second. The elderly invalid kept in touch with the great world through devoted friends, among them George Wyndham and Winston Churchill, who appear to have revealed the secrets of their respective parties with the utmost freedom. These conversations are brilliantly rendered in the diary which, we are assured, was written up every night; but such unilateral records cannot be trusted to reproduce the *ipsissima verba*, and the embitterment of the diarist imposes a special measure of caution. Of equal interest are the *Memoirs* of Sir Almeric Fitzroy. Between the radical *Frondeur* and the complacent Conservative there is a gulf; but the Clerk of the Council, moving easily in Court and official circles, and spending his week-ends in the great country houses, used his opportunities to the full, and has drawn a picture of the rulers of England in the days of King Edward and King George which is not likely to fade. "The new Greville" is less of a politician and more of a student than the old. Among the

celebrities who throng his pages it is significant that he dwells with greatest admiration on the venerable figure and mellow wisdom of Lord Morley.

Lord Riddell's three books, *War Diary*, *Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference*, and *More Pages from my Diary*, 1908-1914, are a primary source for the personality and achievements of Mr. Lloyd George. Riddell delighted in the buoyant and almost boyish temperament of his friend, whom Balfour described as "a most attractive being". Balfour's own distinguished figure flits gracefully through these lively pages. Riddell was a lawyer and a newspaper proprietor by profession, but he knew how to write. From Colonel Repington's vivacious but rather cold-blooded diaries, *The First World War*, we glean interesting gossip about soldiers, statesmen and society hostesses. Agnes Fry's Memoir of her father, based on an unpublished autobiography, is a primary source for the Second Hague Conference, where Sir Edward Fry skilfully led the British Delegation.



THE UNITED STATES





## THE UNITED STATES

## I

THOUGH the United States in almost every case held aloof from the complications of the old world till they plunged into the fray in 1917, there are European gleanings in the documents published by the State Department, in the biographies and autobiographies of their statesmen and soldiers, and in the records of unofficial observers. The annual volumes entitled *Foreign Relations of the United States*, which correspond to our own *British and Foreign State Papers*, continued to appear as usual during the war; but it was impossible at that time to publish a mass of confidential material. The pledge conveyed in an editorial note to the volume on 1914, "diplomatic correspondence concerning the world war will be printed in separate volumes", has been fulfilled. The supplementary volume on 1914, edited by Joseph V. Fuller, opens with the detailed reply by Secretary Bryan, dated January 20, 1915, to a letter of Mr. Stone, Chairman of the Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, which complained of breaches of neutrality during 1914. This lengthy Memorandum forms a useful introduction to the items on neutral rights which fill the bulk of the volume. The more purely diplomatic material is collected in Part I, entitled *The Outbreak and Spread of the War, Projects of Mediation*. It is interesting to read the telegram of the American Ambassador in Berlin, dated 'July 31, 4 p.m.: "In my opinion Russia's mobilization makes war inevitable." The first suggestion of mediation from Washington occurs on July 28, but it was quickly realized that the belligerents were in no mood for compromise. When in December 1914 Spain asked Wilson if he thought the time had come for peace discussions, since she desired to co-operate with the United States, there could only be one reply. The volume on 1915, like its predecessor, is mainly devoted to neutral rights; but once again Part I, *Continuation and further Spread of the War, Efforts towards Peace*, contains material of direct political interest such as the reports

from the capitals on public opinion. Though during 1915 Wilson made no further attempt to stop the carnage, we hear something of two famous American citizens, Jane Addams and Henry Ford, who travelled to Europe on unofficial and unsuccessful missions of peace.

The 1916 volume reveals the dawn of a conviction that America might perhaps be drawn in. Danger threatened from both sides, for while German submarines sank ships with American passengers, the Allies trampled on neutral rights and embarrassed American trade. So heated was the correspondence between London and Washington that the Secretary of Commerce was asked to prepare a memorandum on possible retaliatory measures. The increasing dangers strengthened the President's desire to end the conflict. The German Government promised to amend its ways after the destruction of the *Sussex* brought war within sight, but the promise might be withdrawn as easily as it was given. Indeed the defeat of Roumania strengthened Germany's conviction that she could win and that the submarine campaign could be renewed without undue risk. The American Chargé in Berlin telegraphed on October 1 that an early resumption of indiscriminate submarine warfare was not unlikely. "It is doubtful whether the Chancellor can continue to withstand steadily increasing public sentiment in favour of such a step, in view of his increased weakness in the Reichstag." Thus when at the close of the year Wilson invited the belligerents to state their terms, the replies, either by their vagueness or their intransigence, indicated that the time for mediation had not come.

The volumes on 1917 illustrate the manifold reactions of belligerence. It is interesting to compare Page's official despatches here published with the well known letters. From the British point of view America intervened at the psychological moment, for the submarine challenge was at its height. The American Ambassador learned much more than the ordinary citizen and was thoroughly alarmed. "If the public here or in the United States knew all the facts", he wired on July 5, "the present British Government would probably fall." Yet he was for war to the bitter end. He regretted the Lansdowne letter, adding the curious comment that the latter's friends attributed it to his feeble health and depression caused by the death of his son. The detailed report of the American Mission to England and France at the end of the year, led by Colonel House, was by no means optimistic. "Unless a

change for the better comes, the Allies cannot win and Germany may. What discourages one most in the whole situation is the lack of unity of control and of action. There is but little co-ordination anywhere between the Allies. Jealousies are everywhere rife. None of them at heart like one another, and I doubt whether any of them like us. It is the thought of "hanging together or separately" that keeps them going. Fortunately a like condition exists in the Central Alliance." Of conditions and cross-currents in Germany and Austria we learn most from Switzerland, where would-be peace-makers like Professor Foerster came and went. The Ambassador in St. Petersburg welcomed the overthrow of the Tsar and repeatedly assured his chief that there was not the slightest fear of the Provisional Government making a separate peace. Among other valuable items in this vast collection are the documents on the Stockholm Conference, for which Washington refused passports, and on the formation of the Polish National Committee in Paris under the leadership of Dmowsky and Paderewski.

The volumes on 1918 are overshadowed by two great themes, the German offensive and the coming of peace. The brief telegraphic summaries of the sessions of the Supreme War Council provided by Frazier, the First Secretary of Embassy, who acted as Diplomatic Liaison Officer, are the more welcome because the publication of the actual minutes was vetoed by the other Governments. The reports of the armistice negotiations, in which Colonel House took part, are more detailed. The agonizing fear during the second quarter of the year lest the Central Powers should win is reflected in urgent appeals for help from Paris, London and Rome.

More interesting, because less familiar, are the numerous documents illustrating the desire for peace entertained by certain individuals or circles in Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. Owing to his unofficial status and his wide circle of acquaintance Dr. Herron was the chief recipient of confidences from the other side. The most interesting of these interviews were with Professor Lammasch, who journeyed to Switzerland at the opening of 1918 at the wish of his old pupil, the Emperor Karl. The Emperor, urged on by the Empress, he began, was becoming more and more anxious, and desired to get a confidential message through to the President without the knowledge of his allies. Though liberal in a sense, Czernin had the Prussian mentality and was under the influence of Prussia.

Could Lammasch form a Ministry, inquired Herron, if some preliminary understanding with Washington were reached? No, was the reply, but he would probably be Foreign Minister. The Emperor wished to federalize his realm, liberate it from Prussian tutelage, and initiate a new foreign policy. America would have to help, for the Magyars and Prussia were obstacles which unaided he was too weak to overcome. The President should make it a condition of peace that Austria should give autonomy to all her races. Do you mean, asked Herron, that you would permit us to dictate the constitution of your Empire? "We will not only permit you", was the reply, "we beg you. The Emperor will embrace you." Austria would then urge peace on Germany, who could not refuse lest the south broke away. Herron pressed the question, But if Germany does refuse? In that case, replied Lammasch, Austria would make her own peace.

These striking exchanges took place before the March offensive, but it was not only Karl who looked to Washington. On May 4 the Vice-Consul at Zürich reported that his son-in-law had had a long conversation with the German Chancellor. If he could communicate direct with the President, in whom he placed the greatest confidence, declared Hertling, an amicable understanding might be reached, despite the offensive and the objections of the Pan-Germans. The old Chancellor was terribly in earnest, and expressed the ardent hope that the President would start the exchange of peace ideas. Another German, Dr. Mühlön, ex-Director of the Krupp works, who was living in Switzerland, told Herron at the opening of 1918 that he had at last begun to believe in a German revolution. "A revolution is under way. It is coming right out of the soil, like the French Revolution. The earth is trembling down beneath, and for that reason don't compromise. Hold on!" Only defeat could change the heart of Germany, for the people were like sheep, obeying orders without question. Herron described Mühlön as the biggest man he had met in Europe since the war began. The collection concludes with the relations of the United States to the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Polish national movements, new ideas and structures rising on the ruins of the old.

The prolonged discussions of the Treaty of Versailles in Washington during the summer and autumn of 1919 are of considerable interest. The bulky volume entitled *Treaty of Peace with Germany, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign*

*Relations, United States Senate*, contains not only the evidence and cross-examination of the President, Lansing, Baruch and other officials, but the testimony of private American citizens. The main attack was directed against certain articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and against the cession to Japan of Shantung. The President's declaration that he was unaware of the Secret Treaties concluded by the Allies until he reached Paris was so startling that it found little credence. The threads scattered through the thousand pages of the Senatorial inquiry are firmly grasped in Senator Lodge's posthumous work, *The Senate and the League of Nations*. Disregarding the limitations of his title, the veteran Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee delivers a slashing attack not only on Wilson's foreign policy from Mexico to Versailles, but on his character, which, we are told, was disfigured by timidity, vacillation, obstinacy, untruthfulness, and above all vanity. "The thought of self always overshadowed and effaced every other consideration." These polemical fireworks are less impressive than the narrative of events in which the author played a leading part. Lodge, like Lansing, desired to postpone the creation of the League; but when the Covenant was imbedded in the Treaty he was prepared to accept it subject to amendments. Since the Lodge reservations, which involved the repudiation of coercive measures, appeared to the President to spoil the scheme, the Treaty remained unamended and therefore unratified. The kernel of the book is the verbatim report of the memorable discussion between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the President at the White House on August 19, 1919.

The treasures of the Hoover War Library at Stanford University are being gradually revealed. The two massive volumes entitled *Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918*, selected and edited by Professor R. H. Lutz, throws light into many dark corners. The editor's Introductory Notes to each chapter are brief and clear, while the full table of contents, the chronology and the index enable the reader to pick his way. We are told where each of the 523 documents, published or unpublished, is to be found. The larger portion of the work consists of material already known, though for the most part untranslated and difficult to find. Where else can the ordinary student procure the debates of the Reichstag, the Prussian Parliament and the Berlin City Council, or the complete files of German newspapers? How is he to lay his hand on army

orders, departmental regulations, expert memoranda, strike proclamations, lectures and pamphlets? The variety of the feast is suggested by the titles of the chapters—the outbreak of the war, war guilt, propaganda, censorship, internal policies, submarine warfare, war aims, peace proposals, conversations with Herron, the army, the navy, Belgian relief, the control of foreign affairs, negotiations with Bulgaria and Italy, the Kingdom of Poland, the peace of Brest-Litovsk, the treaty with the Ukraine, negotiations with Roumania, Turkey and the Baltic States, the League of Nations, the socialists, industrial development, Mitteleuropa, the food problem, war loans, strikes, the crisis of July 1917, the Reichstag in 1917-18, the Prussian electoral reform, the armistice negotiations, the abdication of the Kaiser.

For the student of diplomacy chapter 9, entitled "Conversations with Herron" and filling over a hundred pages, is the most valuable. Dr. Herron, a former American Professor who had been living in Florence before the war, had a wide acquaintance with Continental Intellectuals. When the storm broke he moved to Geneva, whence he despatched reports not only to Washington but to London. Switzerland was the meeting-ground for official and unofficial representatives of the belligerents, and no one strove more earnestly for a peace of reconciliation. "I really did make Europe believe in Wilson, and to what proved to be an amazing degree—far beyond any hope or expectation I had when my erstwhile purely private and journalistic propaganda began. Thus there grew up the legend, which no effort or denial of mine was ever able to counteract or diminish, that I was Wilson's personal spokesman and interpreter in Europe and his intimate friend." It was known, however, that his opinions were highly valued by the President, and indeed he received confidences from men who could never have spoken freely to official representatives of an enemy Power.

The most important of these conversations were with a Bavarian, Dr. de Fiori. Since the German envoy requested that his utterances should be conveyed to the President, as they would be to the Chancellor, Herron proposed that they should be taken down in shorthand. The correctness of the reports was recognized by de Fiori, and we may therefore accept the picture painted in June 1918 as an accurate presentation of the aims of influential Germans just before the tide of victory began to turn. Germany was still undefeated, and

Herron urged that her Government should do something to redeem itself in the eyes of the world by proposing "a peace that will make possible the Society of Nations". He held German Imperialism responsible for the war, and was ready to continue the struggle indefinitely rather than see it triumph; yet he longed to end the carnage, and he believed that the Wilson programme would benefit both sides. Next in interest to the Herron reports are the papers of Dr. Kanner, the Viennese journalist who denounced the policy of the Ballplatz as sharply as Förster condemned the Wilhelmstrasse and Morel the diplomacy of England and France. It is also a boon to find a translation or summary of some of the documents of the Bulgarian Yellow-book on the entry of that country into the war. Among other items of interest we may note a telegram from Erzberger revealing the active part played by the Pope in the attempt of the emissaries of the Central Powers to prevent Italy joining their enemies. Further treasures from the Hoover War Library are utilized in *George D. Herron and the European Settlement* by M. P. Briggs, published by the Stanford University Press, which exhibits him in contact not only with Germany but with Austria, Hungary, Russia and the Balkan states.

## II

Theodore Roosevelt's official biography by J. B. Bishop records not only his successful mediation between Russia and Japan in 1905 but his less known endeavours to harmonize French and German claims in Morocco in 1906. The detailed narrative of his triumphal progress through Europe in 1910, in the form of a letter to Sir George Trevelyan, contains some penetrating character studies of his royal and Imperial hosts. *The Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and H. C. Lodge, 1884-1918*, is full of references to public affairs in both hemispheres. Both men were good haters, and they found a common object of their dislike in Woodrow Wilson. His share in terminating the struggle in the Far East is described in Tyler Dennett's admiring narrative *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, based on the Roosevelt papers in the Library of Congress. The most piquant revelation is that of the President keeping in touch with the British Foreign Office through his bosom friend Spring Rice, at that time a member of the British Embassy at St. Petersburg.



No President since Lincoln has been the subject of so many biographies and the object of such conflicting testimony as Woodrow Wilson. His secretary, Joseph Tumulty, a warm-hearted Irishman, has written a rather garrulous volume, *Woodrow Wilson as I knew him*, in which foreign affairs play a minor part. No less laudatory and scarcely more informative is the shorter work of Josephus Daniels, his Secretary of the Navy. Of higher value is *The True Story of Woodrow Wilson*, in which David Lawrence, a thoughtful journalist, draws on his own recollections. The biography by William Allen White was pronounced the best of the unofficial lives by Colonel House, who supplied material. In this penetrating study the President emerges as a man with two natures, the Irish and the Scottish, struggling within him, and producing a curious blend of generous emotions with repellent angularities. Some interesting details are added in James Kerney's sympathetic and well-informed biography, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson*.

Wilson's official biographer Ray Stannard Baker began his long journey at the end. *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* takes rank with Tardieu's masterpiece, for the Chief of the Press Department of the American Delegation enjoyed exceptional opportunities of observation at Paris. The mass of material in the two narrative volumes and the supplementary volume of documents would alone render the work indispensable; but its value is enhanced by the personal knowledge of the narrator, who never hesitates to criticize the men with whom the President worked, not excluding Lansing and Colonel House. No one should accuse Wilson of turning his back on the Fourteen Points till he has studied this dramatic record of his difficulties. "No one who really saw the President in action," testifies Stannard Baker in his first intimate little sketch *What Wilson did at Paris*, "fired at in front, sniped at from behind, will for a moment belittle the immensity of his task or underrate his extraordinary endurance, energy and courage. He worked longer hours, had more appointments, granted himself less recreation, than any other man, high or low, at the Peace Conference."

The immense official biography begins to concern the student of diplomacy with the fifth volume, described in the sub-title as *Neutrality, 1914-15*. Wilson's instinctive reaction, like that of the vast majority, was to keep out of the scrimmage. "The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name,"

during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action." He recognized that a final judgment on war guilt was impossible with the information at his disposal. This capacity to see both sides separated him increasingly from Walter Page. "Here is a matter of life and death for English-speaking civilization," wrote the Ambassador during the dispute on neutral commerce; "it is not a happy time to raise controversies that can be avoided or postponed." What seemed to the Government at Washington and to American traders of capital importance appeared to Page a trifle in comparison with the task of beating Germany. Mr. Baker, who writes about England with marked coolness, rejects his partisanship with impatience. "We find Page," he writes, "our most important representative on the firing line, actually taking the part of our chief diplomatic opponent, playing the game of the British." The climax was reached when, after communicating a protest against British treatment of neutral commerce, he offered Grey his assistance in framing an answer.

If the strictures on Page are justifiable, the attempt to belittle Colonel House is a blot on the work. Mr. Baker recognizes the good will and idealism of the man with whom, in an evil hour, his hero was later to break, but praise is quickly qualified by open or covert rebuke. The President wrote to House in June 1914, during his so-called peace mission to Europe: "You have, I hope and believe, begun a great thing, and I rejoice with all my heart. You are doing it, too, in just the right way with your characteristic tact and quietness, and I wish you Godspeed in what follows. I could not have done the thing nearly so well." This tribute to House's tact and quietness, declares Mr. Baker, was well deserved. "It is a fact that House had no rough edges whatsoever. He was likely to convince those he met that he understood them perfectly: he rarely disagreed with anyone openly." According to Mr. Baker, he took himself much too seriously as an emissary of the President, and he declares him to have been "used by the Allies as a pawn in their deliberate and most effective policy of delay." He was even guilty of falling a victim to the charm of Grey. The portrait of an ineffectual idealist bustling about Europe, and falling blindly into the traps set for him by designing statesmen, fails to convince.

Mr. Baker is kinder than most writers to Bryan, who "looms up as the statesman of largest calibre among Wilson's

advisers. His views were not only broadest and most constructive, but most in accord with the President's own conception of America's rôle in the world." That he was a passionate lover of peace has never been doubted, but he was hardly the man to steer the State Department through a hurricane. As one of his Cabinet colleagues remarked, he was too good a Christian to run a naughty world. The legal work was done by Lansing, who succeeded him when a divergence of policy on the issue of Americans sailing in belligerent ships drove him to resign. Though the *Lusitania* crisis did not bring America into the war, it brought her near enough to the brink for Bryan to draw back in horror and alarm. The two men had learned to like each other, and the story of their parting is honourable to both. Wilson knew that his people desired to keep out of the war, but he was prepared to take risks in defence of American interests which Bryan declined to face.

The sixth volume, entitled *Facing War*, which carries us to the break with Germany in April 1917, is the story of a troubled mind and a tortured soul. Wilson was not a pacifist; yet Bryan himself was no more anxious to avoid being sucked into the whirlpool than the lonely idealist in the White House. Once again Colonel House is belittled and the differences in the methods and policies of the two friends are stressed. "All along there was a continual failure to secure a genuine and frank meeting of minds as to what was to be said or done. It was the fatal flaw in their relationship, and led to infinite confusion and thwarted effort. It was Wilson's lifelong error to suppose that men whom he accepted as his friends—sorely needed intimate friends—not only loved him but understood completely his clear and swift-running mind, and agreed with him in all things." House, he complains, was like Walter Page, always looking at things through British spectacles, as eager for intervention as was the President for mediation. "The fatal defect of his method was in placing so much confidence in House's hopeless 'missions', which did two things: favoured the British policy of delay until Allied victories should give terms satisfactory to the Allies, and prevented any attempt—for a year or more—to explore an open and direct approach to mediation." The author admits, however, that such an attempt would probably have failed, as it was to fail when Wilson attempted it in December 1916.

The impression left by the complicated story of American neutrality is that the President was unlucky in his choice of

agents and friends. Lansing, who is treated with respect, shared the impatience for action of House and Page. Having no particular affection for England, Mr. Baker resents American attempts to hustle the President; yet the narrative suggests that his advisers had in some respects a clearer vision. "Wilson continually made the mistake of assuming that the chief end the belligerents sought was a just and durable peace. He himself took the better world order which he was now passionately advocating to be the highest goal. The Allies did not: the Central Powers did not." When the resumption of the unlimited submarine campaign forced his hand he sadly realized the price America would have to pay. "Once lead this people into war", he remarked to a friend a few hours before his historic announcement in Congress, "and they will forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into every fibre of our national life, infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on his beat, the man in the street." Only an Association of Nations, such as he outlined on May 27, 1916, at a meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, could save civilization—"some common force which shall safeguard right."

The seventh volume, entitled *War Leader*, which carries us from April 1917 to the end of February 1918, is of slighter political interest. Negotiations with the Entente were at an end and peace negotiations with Germany had not begun. Since the waging of war dwarfed all other occupations, the author tells his story in strict chronological form. "Thus we may watch, in the daily records, Woodrow Wilson's intimate goings and comings, his hours of labour, his method of rest and recreation, his visits to the theatre, his golf, his rides in the country; when he had breakfast, whom he entertained at luncheon or dinner, and the people who came to see him." There are far too many such familiar details, even if we share the biographer's conviction that his hero was "probably the foremost, certainly the most powerful and significant statesman of his times."

The most interesting novelty is that on May 18, 1917, Balfour, then on a special mission, sent the President, as he had promised, texts of secret treaties between England and her allies, adding that he doubted whether they would add much to his knowledge. Among them were the Treaties which brought Italy and Roumania into the war, the Sykes-Picot

Agreement, and the Notes embodying the consent of England and France to Russia's annexation of Constantinople, with England's demand for the neutral zone of Persia. The collection was incomplete, for it omitted the agreements with Japan relating to the German Pacific Islands and Shantung, and the Anglo-French agreement on the division of Togoland and the Cameroons. We could not communicate the Franco-Russian agreement on Germany's frontiers, for it was made behind our back. The recent negotiations with Italy at St. Jean de Maurienne supplementing the Treaty of London were withheld, perhaps because they might be regarded as unfinished. The President sent no reply. Though no man could have worked more strenuously for victory, he watched his partners with critical eyes. "England and France have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means", he wrote to House in July 1917. "When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking, because by that time they will be, financially speaking, in our hands; but we cannot force them now." In February 1918, after the Fourteen Points had been proclaimed, he was still conscious of the gulf. "I must say I am afraid of *any* expression of policy framed jointly at Paris," he wrote to Lansing. "There has been none yet what seemed to me even touched with wisdom." One of his many trials was nearer home. "I really think the best way to treat Mr. Roosevelt is to take no notice of him. That breaks his heart and is the best punishment that can be administered."

The eighth volume entitled "Armistice, 1918", carries us to the end of the war and concludes the biography. Once again we are supplied with chunks of miscellaneous material instead of a narrative, and the reader has laboriously to separate the gold from the dross. The main interest lies in the private letters and unofficial conversations of the President, who emerges as a very attractive figure, fighting like Lincoln without bitterness and bearing the problems of a just settlement anxiously in mind. "We have no selfish ends to serve" was much more than a phrase. The most valuable items concern the project of a League. A Constitution, he wrote to Colonel House in March 1918, must grow and not be made. "We must begin with solemn covenants, covering mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity (if the final territorial agreements of the peace conference are fair and satisfactory and ought to be perpetuated), but the

method of carrying out those mutual pledges should be left to develop itself, case by case. Any attempt to begin by putting executive authority in the hands of any particular group of Powers would be to sow a harvest of jealousy and mistrust, which would spring up at once and choke the whole thing." He rejected a suggestion that Bryan should be one of the Peace Commissioners on the ground that it would unjustly but inevitably be taken for granted that he would be too easy and that he would pursue some Utopian scheme. The legend of a lonely and inaccessible man in the White House melts away as we study the record of his visitors and consultations. His chief intimates, in addition to Colonel House, were his son-in-law McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Newton Baker, the Secretary for War, whom he desired to succeed him as President. A touching letter from Walter Page written on his death-bed a few days after the Armistice shows that the old friendship had revived in all its force. "You will find the heart of England most grateful to us, and the admiration of your extraordinary management of the world's most extraordinary events beyond bounds. It would be the greatest joy of my life to see them receive you. You have set the moral standard for the world to become a new world." Mrs. Wilson's vivid and temperamental *Memoirs*, published in 1939, may be regarded as a pendant to the official biography. Under her loving scrutiny the President emerges as something like a saint, bearing his heavy burden of responsibility and sickness with uncomplaining fortitude. She never spares the rod. There are hard words for open foes such as Lodge and uncertain friends such as Lansing and House. How far her strictures are justified the critical reader must decide.

*The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* are the most important American contribution to the diplomatic background of the war. "My chief desire," he explains in a brief Preface, "is to let the papers tell their own story, and for this reason I have preferred to leave their arrangement in the hands of a historian." The choice of Professor Charles Seymour for the task was justified by the skill with which he transformed the raw material presented to Yale University into a readable narrative. Of no less importance than the letters and telegrams are the extracts from the diary in which the events and conversations of each eventful day were recorded. The dangerous state into which Europe had drifted in the opening years of

the century filled House with growing anxiety, and when Wilson was installed his friend dreamed of using the good offices of the United States to diminish the tension between Great Britain and Germany. The essence of his plan was the co-operation of the Powers in developing the backward regions of the earth, combined with a limitation of armaments, an open door, and "equal opportunity to everyone everywhere". Encouraged by the President and fortified by the approval of Bernstorff, who emerges as a broad-minded and trustworthy man, House started in May 1914 on what he called The Great Adventure. The Kaiser was favourable, and Grey entered eagerly into the plan of economic co-operation; but the latter was too much afraid of offending French and Russian susceptibilities to act before the bursting of the storm.

Dominated by his conviction that a sound international order was of greater importance than territorial ambitions, and that the indefinite prolongation of the war could only be averted by moderate terms of peace, House sailed to Europe in the spring of 1915 on his unofficial mission of peace. Grey, "the one sane, big figure here", agreed on the necessity of a moderate peace, followed by a reduction of armaments and a system of mutual guarantees. In Berlin the American envoy found the Government "as sensible and fair-minded as in England, but they are for the moment impotent." He hoped nevertheless, by confining contraband to munitions, to give Germany the freedom of the seas which she coveted, to relieve Great Britain of the submarine menace, and to remove the troublesome factor which had caused England and America to fight in 1812. Peace parleys were blocked by the *Lusitania* crisis. The growing danger that the United States might be sucked into the whirlpool suggested a plan to compel peace by declaring the intention of his country to take arms against whichever side declined to accept American proposals for settlement. To explain and carry through his ambitious project he revisited Europe in January 1916. Since Germany, he believed, would refuse the American terms, this was in effect a conditional offer to join the Allies; but the latter, with the notable exception of Grey, preferred to wait till American aid might be given without hampering conditions. Moreover, the insertion by the President of the word "probably" in the draft agreement raised the vital question whether he would be able to carry his people. The revelations

of the atmosphere of Central and Western Europe, of the character of the rulers of Great Britain, Germany and France, and of the struggle between moderates and extremists in the three capitals, render the record of the visits in 1914, 1915 and 1916 a precious contribution to knowledge.

The immediate task of the Government on entering the war was to mobilize its resources and to co-operate with the Allies in pursuit of victory. The latter presented greater difficulties than the former. To uninitiated readers the important rôle of Sir William Wiseman, Chief of the British Intelligence in Washington and afterwards *liaison* officer between the British and American Delegations at Paris, will come as a surprise. Spring Rice was delicate and overstrained, and the volume of business would have strained the energies of a superman. One emissary accordingly followed another across the Atlantic—Northcliffe, Reading, Balfour—and in every case found a pillar of strength in House. "Wilson's power is absolute", reported Northcliffe, "and House is a wise assistant. Both are pro-English." He added that House always saw three months ahead. With Balfour, whom he described as "the most liberal member of the present British Cabinet", House formed an enduring friendship. The Reading Mission arrived in September 1917, and he greeted with delight "this imperturbable negotiator with his fine diplomatic touch." The situation demanded the best brains of both countries. "We seem on the verge of a financial disaster", telegraphed Balfour to House on June 29, 1917, "which would be worse than defeat in the field."

While the Allies in the old world were too engrossed to think much about anything but victory, Wilson and House never lost sight of the need for a new international order. No more was heard of peace without victory; but even in his declaration of war on April 2, 1917, he declared that Americans had "no quarrel with the German people and no feeling towards them but one of sympathy." From this attitude he never departed, for "force without stint or limit" was to be applied in order to remove the obstacle to a statesmanlike peace. It was easier for a Power which only became a belligerent in 1917; and whose existence was never endangered, to preach moderation; yet there was a difference in the quality of statesmanship between the two sides of the Atlantic. Such men as Grey and Lansdowne, Cecil and Smuts were not impervious to the considerations which weighed so heavily at



Washington ; but some of them were swept from office before America entered the war, and the brunt of the fight for a reasonable peace fell on Wilson and House. It was in large measure in order to decline responsibility for the secret treaties that the President defined the United States as the associate, not the ally, of the Entente.

British emissaries to the United States were not enough, and in September 1917 Mr. Lloyd George begged for an American Mission. House agreed that it was desirable, and accepted the invitation of the President and of leading statesmen in London and Paris to be its head. The efforts of the Mission to secure material co-ordination met with greater reward than those to convert the Allies to his view of the settlement. He was alarmed at the situation created by the Caporetto disaster and the withdrawal of Russia from the war. The crisis was expected in the spring of 1918, and he was convinced that diplomatic no less than military preparations must be made to meet the event. "Unless a change for the better comes", he wrote in his report to the President, "the Allies cannot win, and Germany may." The two men drew up the Fourteen Points, which were announced on January 8, 1918. The speech echoed round the globe, but it was not till the following autumn that the Allies were persuaded to accept it as the basis of the coming settlement.

The fourth and final volume opens with two valuable chapters on the antecedents of the Covenant. A doctrinaire letter from Lansing, written in April 1918, argued that no people desires war, particularly an aggressive war ; that peace could only be guaranteed by self-governing institutions ; and that the urgent task of statesmen was to make democracy universal, not to construct a League of Nations. Wilson and House aimed at a body exercising real authority. The Phillimore plan was too weak for their taste, but they were glad to adopt useful proposals from whatever quarter, such as the Council and the system of Mandates. Before, however, the President could concentrate his attention on the League the war had to be won and the Allies to be converted to the Fourteen Points. When the end was in sight House was dispatched to represent the President. His mission is described by Professor Seymour as the most difficult and important of his career ; for he had to maintain Wilsonian principles without disrupting the Allies. Reaching Paris on October 28, 1918, he was just in time for the Armistice conferences. The Fourteen

Points were finally accepted as a basis, subject to reservations on reparations and the freedom of the seas.

Even after the President's arrival House remained a leading figure not only of the American Delegation but of the Conference as a whole. Nerves were badly frayed, and on one occasion, when Wilson resisted the demand for the Rhineland and the Saar Basin, Clemenceau called him a pro-German and abruptly left the room. "It is now evident", wrote House in his diary on March 3, 1919, "that the peace will not be such a peace as I had hoped. . . . We shall get something out of it in the way of a League of Nations, but even that is an imperfect instrument." To Stannard Baker's grotesque accusation that he combined with the Allies to counterwork the principles and policy of the President during his brief absence in the United States in February and March, the reader will find a reply in the chapter entitled "Speeding the settlement". House had been empowered by Wilson to go ahead with the discussions, and the situation was reported to him by cable every day. "No commitments had been made for him in his absence", declares Professor Seymour; and a long British Memorandum, drawn up at the instance of Lord Balfour, blows into thin air the legend of intrigue. Wilson himself realized the necessity of compromise after his return, and was converted to the inclusion of pensions in Reparations. Indeed, he finally yielded so much that he has been denounced ever since for breaking faith with the German people. The judgment recorded by House in his diary on the day following the signature of the Treaty recalls the somewhat similar declaration of General Smuts. "I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months, with conflicting emotions. Looking at the Conference in retrospect there is much to approve and much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done but more difficult to have found a way for doing it. . . . How splendid it would have been had we blazed a new and better trail. . . . While I should have preferred a different peace, I doubt whether it could have been made."

*The Memoirs of W. J. Bryan* contain a chatty autobiography carrying the story to the election of Wilson, and an account of his brief official career compiled from his papers by his widow. The President and the Secretary of State worked happily together till the outbreak of war. Both men desired to remain neutral; but Wilson never ruled out intervention, and his second *Lusitania* Note was too strong a dose for his

colleague to swallow. Moreover, since the ship carried munitions of war, Bryan believed that there was no case for a rupture. The President also rejected his advice to warn American citizens against sailing on belligerent vessels, and declined in the early stages of the struggle to appeal for negotiations. The correspondence relating to his resignation is the most interesting part of a rather disappointing book.

Bryan's successor as Secretary of State in 1915 was Robert Lansing, whose knowledge of international law proved invaluable during the controversy on blockade. There was, however, no intimacy between the idealist and the jurist, and the temperamental antagonism grew rapidly on French soil. Soon after their return the President dismissed his adviser on the ground of divergence of judgment, and Lansing took up the challenge in *The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative*, published in 1921. That Wilson never exceeded his constitutional powers is admitted, and homage is paid to his many sterling qualities and great attainments; but his handling of the settlement is condemned root and branch. The book might have been entitled *My Disagreements with the President*. The first rift occurred when the Secretary of State vigorously opposed the plan of his chief to take part in the Conference. More important was the fundamental difference as to the project which Wilson regarded as the main purpose of the Conference. "His obsession as to a League blinds him to everything else." Lansing argued that the main task was to make a preliminary peace as quickly as possible, postponing the discussion of details and the unhurried elaboration of the Covenant to a later date. There was a further vital difference as to the powers of the League. The President, like most of the delegates, desired coercive authority, while Lansing objected to the use of force, and the primacy of the five Great Powers seemed to him an error of principle. He also objected to the assumption of a mandate for Armenia, which the President was willing to accept. Wilson, we are informed, never valued the opinion of lawyers except on strictly legal questions, and at the beginning of the discussions he sharply remarked: "I do not intend to have lawyers drafting the treaty of peace."

Since the Secretary of State was increasingly excluded from the discussions and decisions, his book is of less value for the history of the Conference than his membership of the Council of Ten would suggest. He fights with the gloves off. The

President, he complains, appeared to consider opposition as a personal affront. His policies were fundamentally wrong. Lansing had a keen intellect and he understood American opinion better than his chief. He foretold that the Senate would refuse automatic commitments, whether in the Covenant or in the treaty of guarantee to France, and he points to the President's failure to convert his countrymen as confirmation of his superior wisdom. He is more convincing in his criticism of the President's methods than in the attack on his statesmanship. A smaller supplementary volume, *The Big Four*, contains vivid and discriminating portraits of Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando, with slighter sketches of Paderewski, Venizelos and other stars.

Lansing's *War Memoirs*, interrupted by his death in 1928, bring his story down to 1917. Throughout the three years of neutrality, first as assistant to Bryan and then as his successor, the lawyer in him struggled with the politician. As a lawyer he condemned the illegalities of both sides in reference to commerce, but as a politician he favoured the Allies. He frankly confessed that he had two scales. In the controversy with England he never forgot that America would almost certainly become her ally, and for this reason disputes must be confined to the diplomatic field. After the sinking of the *Lusitania* his expectation of intervention became a certainty. Moreover if Americans became belligerent they would doubtless desire to employ some of the methods of which they were making complaints. Public protests during neutrality might be quoted against them under other conditions, and the Government should therefore keep its hands free. The book is less interesting and less polemical than his stories of the Peace Conference, and President Wilson is treated throughout with greater respect.

The narratives of Stannard Baker and Lansing are supplemented by the testimony of other members of the American Delegation. In *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* Baruch published a number of important memoranda, but added little commentary of his own. In *What Really Happened at Paris*, a series of lectures at Philadelphia organized by Colonel House and edited by himself and Professor Charles Seymour, General Bliss, Isaiah Bowman, James Brown Scott, and other experts describe their experiences. In their joint volume, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, the Harvard Professors Haskins and Lord sketch the

historical background of the territorial problems on which their advice was sought, among them Poland and the Saar.

David Hunter Miller's volumes, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, are a mine of information. In a modest Preface the learned jurist explains that he merely describes what he knew and saw. "I beg to tell how and by whom and when the Text of the Covenant was written." The balance is redressed in an Introduction by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, who compares the work to Madison's notes on the making of the American Constitution. Beginning with the scheme of the Phillimore Committee, "the first formulation of League of Nations suggestions in a definite text," we pass on to the House, Smuts and Cecil plans, Wilson's four drafts, and the Hurst-Miller revisions. The larger part of the first volume reports the activities of the Commission on the League of Nations, which held its first meeting on February 3, 1919. At the end of his narrative, in a chapter entitled "Looking backward", the author joyfully surveys the edifice which he helped to build. "The wisest of Wilson's many wise decisions was to put and keep the League in the Treaty of Peace. . . . If not written in 1919 as a part of the Treaty of Versailles, no Covenant would have been written at all, no League of Nations would have existed. Perhaps in some other generation some union of civilization would have come about, for that is the trend of history; but not now, not in our time." He speaks with sorrowful severity of the legends invented and believed by his countrymen in 1919-20, and with disdain for the isolationism practised by the Government of the United States. "This was too absurd to last. Our contacts with the League are now close. . . . If the League goes on, we join. The time is uncertain, but with no less certainty of the fact." The materials on which this record is based are to be found in the author's twenty volumes, privately printed, entitled *My Diary*.

Professor Shotwell's *At the Peace Conference* is the American equivalent of Harold Nicolson's book. It consists of a full diary and letters, prefaced by a singularly thoughtful and judicial Retrospect written several years later. The historian was one of the original members of the so-called Inquiry, a group of experts appointed by Colonel House after the United States had entered the war to prepare material for the settlement. They all felt his inspiring leadership, for he was the living symbol of the Wilson programme. In the course of the voyage to Europe the President remarked to his experts:

"Tell me what is right and I will fight for it." His decision to take part in the discussions is approved on the ground that he secured more of a Wilsonian peace than anyone else could have done. Mr. Keynes's celebrated portrait is rejected as a caricature. So far from the idealist President surrendering to the realist Clemenceau, some of the most hotly criticized features of the treaty of Versailles, such as the boundaries of Poland, were recommended by his experts after prolonged and disinterested inquiry. Yet whatever could be said for the special items, the treaty as a whole, in the author's opinion, was more than any country should have been asked to bear. The magnanimity of Lincoln was lacking. By a fatal error the victors overlooked the necessity of German co-operation in the rebuilding of Europe. The treaty was dictated, not negotiated. "It is not too much to say that the Peace Conference never met." One reason, we are told, why oral discussion was vetoed was the fear lest the notorious divisions among the Allies should be exploited by the delegates of the Central Powers. This, however, was a groundless alarm, for Brockdorff-Rantzau was no Talleyrand. His mistake was to attack the whole scheme, instead of concentrating his fire on selected points. The most valuable portions of a very readable Diary record the making of the International Labour Office, of which the author was one of the principal architects.

A spirited defence of Wilson's statesmanship is made by Newton Baker in his little volume *Why we went to war*, published in 1936. Disgust and disappointment at the state of Europe in the years following the restoration of peace led many Americans to regret intervention and to explain it by unworthy motives. The ex-Secretary of War replied that the decision to fight was untainted by selfish aims. "The entry of the United States into the world war was not in the least affected by munition makers or bankers." It was caused solely by the German submarine policy. "The national interests of the United States, the long range view of the nation's position in the world, would not suffer the endurance of the ruthless taking of the lives of Americans engaged in occupations which they had both a legal and moral right to pursue." The President was the right man for the emergency, combining the patience of a scholar with the grimness of a Covenantant. He was by no means inaccessible to advice, but he refused to be rushed. Every proposal was tested by its probable effect on the ultimate usefulness of the United States

when the struggle was over. The author is equally grateful to Colonel House. The whole value of his service lay in his intimacy, and he tried to find out how much hope there was in the world for the ideals which the President cherished. Since official relations were governed by traditional rules, it was necessary to have informal contacts as well. For the author's substantial contribution to victory we must turn to his papers in Frederick Palmer's volumes, *Newton Diehl Baker, America at War*.

No member of Wilson's Cabinet worked harder than his Secretary to the Treasury, McAdoo. *Crowded Years* is a primary source for the history of the financing of the war, but the most attractive pages are devoted to his colleagues and his chief. There is a kindly portrait of Bryan, whose sterling qualities attracted men of very different stamp. The closing chapter on the President is one of the most revealing studies of a complex personality, whose greatness left an abiding impression on his son-in-law. David F. Houston's *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet* is also mainly concerned with domestic affairs. As Secretary of Agriculture, and later as Secretary to the Treasury, he loyally supported the policy of his chief, though he desired his country to enter the war at an earlier moment, and regrets that the President did not return after inaugurating the Peace Conference. The most interesting portion of the book is the elaborate estimate of Woodrow Wilson at the end of the second volume. "I worked for him and with him for eight years with ever-increasing affection, respect and admiration." The portrait painted by another member of the Cabinet in *The Letters of Franklin Lane* is distinctly less friendly.

### III

The biographies of American Ambassadors at the Court of St. James's in the last years of peace throw more light on the character of British statesmen than on diplomatic secrets. Thayer's delightful *Life of John Hay* contains a few *obiter dicta* on the European situation, but his residence in London was brief. It is regrettable that the three volumes of his correspondence were privately printed, for he was an admirable letter-writer. The biography of Choate, his witty successor, is equally barren, though he was longer among us. The second volume of Cortissoz's life of Whitelaw Reid, the gilded

representative of the richest country in the world from 1905 till his death in 1912, contains selections from his correspondence with Roosevelt, Root and Knox, and describes his conversations with King Edward.

*The Life and Letters of Walter Page*, by Burton Hendrick, took England by storm, and revealed the services of a man whom to know was to love. Wilson once described his letters as the best he had ever read; and indeed it would be difficult to find political correspondence of more enduring interest and literary merit than that of the Ambassador who succeeded Whitelaw Reid and returned home to die in 1918. Page was not a great man, but he had a great heart. A supplementary third volume contained the letters to the President which could not be published during his life-time. No British writer surpasses this American observer in reproducing the tense atmosphere of the struggle, and in portraying the little group of men at the head of affairs. He learned to know and to trust Grey before the breaking of the storm increased his admiration for "this Lincoln-like man." The democratic civilization invented by England and inherited by the United States was, he believed, doomed to irrevocable ruin if the military autocracy of Germany were to triumph; and he dedicated the remainder of his life to the task of compassing her overthrow. He has been described by Grey as the most convinced believer in democracy he ever knew. Page would have liked his country to intervene at the outset, but he was aware that it was impossible. The time to strike, in his opinion, was when the *Lusitania* was sunk. What the President called patience, the Ambassador condemned as timidity and later as cowardice. Knowing little of American opinion, and sharing the view of Kitchener and French that only the entry of the United States could turn the scale, he became rather the echo of British views than the spokesman of the White House. Guessing what his letters would contain, the President ceased to pay attention to them and sent his most important communications through Colonel House, whose efforts to end the war by diplomacy Page declined to assist. No chapter in these thrilling volumes surpasses in interest the story of the Zimmerman telegram of February 1916, which invited Mexico, in the event of war, to join with Japan in an attack on the United States, and which, though despatched through four separate channels, was in each case intercepted and deciphered by British hands.



*Henry White : Thirty Years of American Diplomacy*, by Allan Nevins, illustrates the closing years of the nineteenth century in Western Europe and the first decades of the twentieth. Roosevelt called him the most useful man in the diplomatic service, and House thought him the most accomplished diplomatist that the United States had produced. For twenty years he was the right-hand man of American Ambassadors to the Court of St. James's, and he was Chargé d'Affaires during the Venezuela crisis of 1902. His charm and intelligence opened the door to the best English society. "The dearest, best and most lovable of men", declared Curzon. In 1904, at the age of fifty-four, he was appointed Ambassador to Italy, and three years later to France. The most important of the chapters before the war is devoted to the Algeciras Conference, where President Roosevelt played a leading part behind the scenes. Still more significant is the account of the Peace Conference, at which House, Lansing, White and Bliss represented their country. White was a Republican, and the invitation from a Democratic President was a surprise; but it was a good choice, for he knew Europe and desired a moderate peace. *Nothing is more interesting in this volume than his letters from Paris to Lodge, who, unlike Root and Taft, was a narrow Nationalist and clamoured for a vindictive settlement.* The more he saw Wilson at work, the more he admired his courage and wisdom. Though he loved France, he was, in his biographer's words, dismayed and shocked by the short-sighted violence of Clemenceau, Poincaré and Foch. He fought hard for Wilsonian principles, and blames House for his supposed tenderness in regard to Italy. It was a grief to him that, owing to the timid selfishness of the Lodge Republicans and the unskilful strategy of the President, the United States remained outside the League.

Brand Whitlock's *Belgium under German Rule* is no less assured of immortality than the letters of Walter Page. The American Minister at Brussels, a writer by profession, describes with poignant emotion the crucifixion of the innocent little country whose chief consolation was the sympathy of the world. He had only just taken up his post when the storm burst. Three years later he withdrew to Havre, and returned when victory came. Nowhere else do we find such a moving picture of what foreign military occupation means. Written with his heart's blood during the last year of the war and published in 1919, the volumes formed a more convincing indictment of

German methods than the frowns of Versailles. The stainless hero of the drama is King Albert, with Cardinal Mercier at his side.

*The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock*, edited by Allan Nevins after his death, supplement his monumental work. The first volume, containing the correspondence, opens with an appreciation by his life-long friend Newton Baker, Wilson's Secretary for War, and a Biographical Introduction by the Editor. The letters of the war years reveal his devotion to a martyred people whom he refused to leave when offered the Embassy at St. Petersburg in 1916. How could he desert the land, he explained to Colonel House, where the people doffed their hats at the sight of the American flag, and looked to America as a land of magic and miracles? "I felt that if they have to starve I'd be a cad if I didn't stay and starve with them." King Albert described Wilson as the only living statesman, because he alone saw what was wrong with the world and thought more of building up than of tearing down. The admiration was reciprocated by Americans. "When you see him", wrote Newton Baker after a visit to the King in March 1918, "it is entirely clear that he could do no wrong, and for a higher reason than that he is a King." The seven hundred pages of the second volume contain selections from his journals during the eight years of his official connection with Belgium. They are the raw material of his published narrative, but they are something more, for here we find the most intimate emotions of a noble heart. There is plenty of criticism, even of his own countrymen such as Wilson and Hoover, despite his admiration for their exceptional gifts. One radiant figure alone, King Albert, is beyond criticism, *sans peur et sans reproche*. The later portions are of particular value, since the published narrative only came down to 1917. A much slighter work, *A Journal from Our Legation in Belgium*, by Hugh Gibson, supplements the testimony of his chief for the opening phases of the war.

The biographies of the three American Ambassadors to France illustrate the cordial relations between the two countries during the world war. *Robert Bacon, Life and Letters*, by James Brown Scott, the most important, depicts the singularly attractive personality of a man who served as Secretary of State under Roosevelt and Taft, who represented the United States at Paris 1910-12, and who returned to his second country on the outbreak of war. He was the first American statesman

to advocate an official protest against the violation of Belgian neutrality. The entry of the United States into "this holy war" filled him with rapture, since "the nation's soul was nearly lost". *La France se bat, j'accours*, he telegraphed to a French friend. As an organizer of the American base at Chaumont and later as *liaison* officer at British Headquarters he laboured day and night for the common cause, and he only lived just long enough to witness the defeat of "the unspeakable Hun". His letters, charged with emotion, reveal the intensity of the strain. Introductory tributes by his old chief Elihu Root, Lord Haig and Gabriel Hanotaux suggest the value of his work. "C'était un ami de la France", wrote the latter, "comme elle n'en rencontrera jamais ; car il faut les jours d'épreuves pour susciter de tels dévouements."

A vivid picture of Paris at the outbreak of the war is painted in *Myron Herrick, Friend of France*, by Colonel Mott. The Ambassador loved France as Walter Page loved England ; but he was a poor letter-writer, and the book is largely based on conversations at the close of his life. He stayed in the capital when the Government fled to Bordeaux, hoping not merely to help American subjects but to be of service if the victorious Germans marched in. Herrick, who had been appointed by Taft, the Republican President, was succeeded by a Democrat. *The War Memoirs of William Graves Sharp, American Ambassador to France, 1914-1919*, contain a grateful Preface by Joffre. "He understood us because he loved us." A Biographical Introduction by Warrington Dawson, Chief of his Press Bureau, describes a man trusted and liked by every one—French, English, Americans, soldiers, civilians. The final chapter, on the making of peace, defends Wilson's decision to come to the Conference and to stay to the end.

David Jayne Hill's *Impressions of the Kaiser* provide little nourishing fare ; for the scholarly Ambassador at Berlin was never a *persona grata* at Court and knew little of the versatile ruler whom he attempts to describe. In *My Four Years in Germany* and in its inferior sequel *Face to Face with Kaiserism* his successor J. W. Gerard, as whole-hearted a democrat as Page but lacking his polish, portrays the rulers of the Fatherland, and sketches the growth of hostility to his country till the resumption of unrestrained submarine warfare produced its inevitable result. His reminiscences are supplemented by Frank Rattigan's *Diversions of a Diplomat*. Appointed to Berlin at the end of 1913 he found the French Ambassador convinced

that a European conflagration was only a matter of time. When the storm burst Jagow arrived at the British Embassy stricken with grief, and said to Goschen: "There are three very unhappy men in Germany today, the Kaiser, the Chancellor and myself." In the spring of 1915 he was transferred to Bucharest, where he found the atmosphere pro-ally. The still briefer sojourn in Berlin of Hugh Wilson, a future American Ambassador to Germany, on the eve of his country's belligerence is described in his chatty but rather thin *Recollections*.

Scenes from the reign of Nicholas II are described in the biographies of two American Ambassadors. *George von Lengerke Meyer*, by M. A. de Wolfe Howe, is a primary source for the atmosphere of St. Petersburg during the Japanese war, for the official despatches were supplemented by weekly letters to the President, an intimate friend, and by a full diary. The long conversation with the Tsar on June 6, 1905, in which he conveyed Roosevelt's offer of mediation, was extremely friendly, but the monarch was not master in his own house. "The Emperor is somewhat in the position that a weak but honest mayor might be in New York, with Tammany in absolute control." He really desired peace, but Lamsdorff was tricky, and the Foreign Office resented the acceptance of the American plan without asking its views. A second audience on August 24 was equally friendly and helped to remove the last obstacles to peace. Like most of his diplomatic colleagues Meyer became ever more convinced of the rottenness of the regime. David Rowland Francis, the last American Ambassador to the Tsarist Russia, an unimpressive figure, could merely record the coming of revolution in 1917 in *Russia from the American Embassy*.

In his *Secrets of the Bosphorus* Henry Morgenthau draws full-length portraits of the sinister Duumvirate, Enver, the Young Turk Napoleon, and Talaat, the cold-blooded murderer of the Armenians. His dramatic record is supplemented by the diary of his First Secretary, Lewis Einstein, entitled *Inside Constantinople*, which covers the critical months of the Dardanelles campaign. In *Ten Years near the German Frontier* Maurice Egan watches the gathering and the bursting of the storm from his post at Copenhagen, "the whispering gallery of Europe," and describes his successful efforts to secure the purchase of the Danish West Indies by the United States before they could be snapped up by Germany.

General Pershing's *My Experiences in the World War*, a

massive volume of seven hundred pages, is based on a copious diary. The Commander-in-Chief describes the "appalling lack of preparation", which was the more distressing since the need for American help was even more urgent than he had expected. Arriving in France shortly after the disaster at the Chemin des Dames, he was greeted by the American Ambassador with the words, pronounced in a trembling voice: I hope you have not arrived too late. So weak had the morale of the people become that he seriously wondered whether it could be restored. Even more sensational is the story told by Admiral Sims in *The Victory at Sea*. On reaching London in April 1917 he found something approaching despair as the news of sunken ships kept pouring in.

*Sims* : I had never imagined anything so terrible.

*Jellicoe* : Yes, it is impossible for us to go on with the war if losses like this continue.

*Sims* : It looks as though the Germans were winning the war.

*Jellicoe* : They will win unless we can stop these losses and stop them soon.

*Sims* : Is there no solution for the problem ?

*Jellicoe* : Absolutely none that we can see now.

#### IV

The authoritative work entitled *American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy*, edited by S. F. Bemis, reached its conclusion with the publication of the ninth and tenth volumes. The former opens with the Spanish war and closes with the Presidency of Taft. The archives of the Department of State were available up to the death of Hay in 1905, and unpublished material is used for the studies of Root and Knox. Perhaps the most valuable of the monographs is that by Professor Dennis on Hay. The short and anonymous study of Bryan, the father of the Arbitration Treaties, opens the tenth volume, and is followed by a flattering portrait of Lansing by Julius W. Pratt, who was allowed to consult official material as well as manuscripts lent by Lansing himself. The discussions of maritime rights with Great Britain and Germany are familiar enough, but there are a few glimpses of *pourparlers* with the Central Powers. In the autumn of 1917 Frank E. Anderson was sent to Holland to explore conditions in Germany. After meeting some Germans there he moved to Switzerland, where

he attempted to arrange for a meeting with Apponyi. When the Hungarian statesman failed to appear, he obtained a safe-conduct to Vienna and Budapest, where he was informed that the Central Powers were ready for peace on Wilson's terms, but not on those of France and Great Britain. The visit to enemy countries was unauthorized, the cable forbidding it not having reached him in time. Equally fruitless was the mission of Henry Morgenthau and Felix Frankfurter in June 1917 to sound the Turks, though not at war with the United States, in reference to a separate peace. The travellers went no further than Gibraltar, where they met British and French Zionists, as a rumour of their mission had spread and the project was dropped. A few notes on the Peace Conference from the Lansing manuscripts supplement his published volumes. Much of the ground covered in the *American Secretaries of State* is more intensively tilled by Professor Dennis in *Adventures in American Diplomacy*, 1896-1906. With the aid of the archives of the State Department and the private papers of Olney, Roosevelt and Hay, he has reconstructed the policy of his country from Venezuela to Algeiras; and though many of his chapters have no reference to European diplomacy, his studies of Roosevelt's mediation in the Russo-Japanese war and in the first Morocco crisis deserve attention.

Professor Charles Tansill's large and controversial volume, *America Goes to War*, is more valuable for its materials than for its judgments. He was allowed to see the papers of Bryan, Lansing and others, and he consulted the archives of the German Admiralty for details of the submarine campaign. In addition to official material and the press he has examined the correspondence and papers of banks and business firms with regard to loans and profits. The United States, he believes, would have kept out of the war if the President had from the beginning forbidden the export of munitions. The profits were so large that the Government became tolerant of the illegalities of the Allies, and prosperity was preferred to neutrality. Lansing and House, as supporters of American intervention, are scolded as sharply as Grey. Here is the fullest statement of the economic interpretation of American belligerence which Newton Baker challenges in his recent book. It is not surprising that this indictment of American policy has been translated into German.

A good deal of light on Russian diplomacy during the last year of the war is shed in the opening chapters of Louis Fischer's

comprehensive work, *The Soviets in World Affairs*. The story of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations is told from the Russian archives and the recollections of Karakhan, Secretary of the Russian Delegation. Kolchak's rebellion is described from his own papers. Information was furnished by Chicherin, Litvinoff, Karakhan and other officials concerned with diplomacy; and a few new details on the Bullitt mission are drawn from the papers of Rakowsky.

A vivid picture of Russia in the war is painted in *Revolutionary Days 1914-17*, by Princess Cantacuzène, a grand-daughter of General Grant. Her husband was aide-de-camp to the Grand Duke Nicholas, whose strong personality only knew friends or foes. The Generalissimo is the hero of the book, and the Princess never saw any sign of the violent temper he was supposed to possess. She describes the consternation produced by his fall, which the Dowager Empress, the Ministers and Count Fredericks attempted to prevent. The Tsar had been told and believed that he was too popular. Russia was ruined by "the occult party". The Empress, she declares, was not pro-German, but she was in the hands of conspirators with Anna Vyrubova at their head. The author witnessed the fall of the Tsardom without surprise and left Russia after the triumph of Lenin.

The article entitled *Three Days in Belgrade: July, 1914*, contributed to *Foreign Affairs* in January 1927 by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, is based to a large extent on the testimony of Grouitch, Servian Minister in London during the Balkan Wars, and subsequently Secretary-General of the Foreign Office. The narrative describes the events and the atmosphere at the Servian capital from the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum. The reply was mainly the work of Stojan Protitch, but its terms were minutely discussed by the whole Cabinet after the hurried return of the Premier. A notable article contributed to the *Political Science Quarterly* in June 1927, by Michael T. Florinsky, entitled "The Russian Mobilization of 1914", contains two brief letters from Sazonoff to the author, the first relating to the partial mobilization of 1912, the second to the false report of German mobilization in the *Lokalanzeiger*.

## CONCLUSION





## CHAPTER X

### CONCLUSION

**S**HORTLY after the termination of hostilities in 1918 a high official of the Wilhelmstrasse urged his countrymen no longer to divide the belligerents into sheep and goats.<sup>1</sup> "From her own point of view Serbia was right in pursuing her national aims. Austria was no less right in seeking to retain her possessions. It was the duty of Russia to fulfil her promises to Serbia. Germany was bound to try to prevent the forcible dissolution of her only trustworthy ally. France and England were compelled to honour their treaty obligations." Fully to comprehend the World War and its causes we must stand above the battle and realize the truth of Hegel's aphorism, "Tragedy is the conflict not of right with wrong, but of right with right." Though the conduct of each of the belligerents appeared to its enemies to indicate a double dose of original sin, it was nevertheless in every case what might have been expected.

It was natural that Serbia should aspire to unite under her sceptre the discontented Yugoslav subjects of her neighbour, should use their undoubted grievances in Croatia to foster the Pan-Serb idea, and should look to Russia for assistance, as Cavour in similar circumstances had looked to France. It was equally natural that Austria should resolve to defend herself against the openly proclaimed ambition to rob her of provinces which she had held for centuries. After the Bosnian crisis Serbia had promised to be a good neighbour; but she had not kept her word, and her intrigues with Russia were notorious. For Austria to sit with folded arms and wait till her enemies felt strong enough to carry out their programme of dismemberment was to proclaim her impotence, and the murder of the heir to the throne by Yugoslav assassins appeared to demand some striking vindication of the authority of the State. The ultimatum was a gambler's throw; but it was envisaged as a strictly defensive action, offering the best chance of escape from a danger which was certain to increase and which threatened her existence as a Great Power.

<sup>1</sup> B. W. von Bülow, *Die Krisis*

The conduct of Germany was no less intelligible. Austria was the only Power on whom she could rely, since Italy and Roumania were allies in nothing but name. If Austria was broken up, Germany would stand alone in Europe, wedged in between a hostile Russia and a France bent on revenge. Bismarck had repeatedly declared that the maintenance of Austria as a Great Power was a paramount interest for which Germany might fight with an easy conscience. The Kaiser's appearance in shining armour at the side of Francis Joseph in 1909 had compelled Russia to keep the peace, and it was hoped in Berlin that a fresh demonstration of solidarity might produce a similar result. If it did not, the Central Powers believed themselves strong enough to defeat the Dual Alliance; for they knew from the Japanese war that the Slav colossus had feet of clay, and recent revelations in Paris suggested that France was ill-prepared. There was, indeed, a risk that Great Britain might throw her sword into the scales, but Anglo-German relations had greatly improved since the settlement of the Morocco problem. Thus when Francis Joseph asked whether he could rely on the support of his ally, the Kaiser and his Chancellor replied that he could. Any other response, they believed, would have wrecked the partnership. Neither of them desired a world war, but they were ready for all eventualities if Russia declined to permit the localization of the Austro-Serb conflict. A struggle between the Teuton and the Slav was considered almost inevitable; and if it was to come the General Staff preferred 1914 to a later date, when Russia's strategic railways on the Polish frontier would be complete and the Three Years Service system in France would be in operation. The Navy had not reached its full stature, but the deepening of the Kiel Canal was completed.

Russia's defeat in the Far East had thrown her back on Europe, and it was obvious that as soon as she recovered her breath she would once more pursue her historic ambitions in the Near East. Her inability to take up the challenge in 1909 was a bitter memory, and no one had a right to expect that she would submit to such humiliation again. By 1914 she had regained her self-confidence and was prepared to meet a challenge from any quarter. As Berchtold saw the hand of Russia in the tragedy of Serajevo, so Sazonoff felt the ultimatum as a blow struck at Nicholas II not less than at Peter Karageorgevitch. Had she left her *protégé* to the tender mercies of Austria, she would have forfeited all claim to be

the champion of the Slav races, and have handed over the Near East to the unchecked domination of the Central Powers. Though bound by no treaty obligations, she could no more be expected to remain neutral in face of an Austrian attack on Servia than England in face of a German attack on Belgium. The same instinctive pride of a Great Power which prompted Vienna to throw down the glove compelled St. Petersburg to pick it up. It is true that while Austria fought under the banner of self-preservation, Russia, whom nobody threatened to attack, marched to battle in the name of prestige; but in the accepted scale of national values safety, honour and prestige are motives of approximately the same weight. Moreover the support of Great Britain in the event of a general war was confidently expected.

For a quarter of a century the destinies of France had been linked with those of Russia, and when the long anticipated crisis arrived she took her place at the side of her partner with as little hesitation as Germany at the side of Austria. She had no desire for war, and took no step to precipitate it. Nor, on the other hand, did she seriously endeavour to keep the sword of her ally in its scabbard. She had never abandoned the hope of recovering the Rhine provinces, and for that reason could not be included among the satiated Powers who at any given moment are the most effective champions of peace. The catastrophe feared by Jaurès had come to pass, and France was dragged into a desperate conflict to sustain the prestige of her ally. To have declined the summons would have been disloyalty to the spirit, if not to the letter, of her treaty obligations, increased the contempt for "a decadent Power" entertained in German circles, and left her defenceless against the victorious Teuton. Of Belgium it is enough to say that her heroic response to a brutal attack was the instinctive affirmation of her will to maintain the independence which she had never abused, and to preserve unsullied the honour which is its surest guarantee.

It was as natural for Italy to stand out of the opening rounds of the conflict as for the five other Great Powers of Europe to take part. As far back as 1896 she had informed her allies that she could not fight on their side if Great Britain was among her enemies. In 1902 she had pledged herself by treaty to take no share in an attack on France. In 1909 she had promised support for Russian ambitions in return for Russian support of her own. Thus in 1914 she was connected by

treaties or understandings with every member of the Triple Entente. On the other hand, though her relations with Germany were friendly enough, the longing for Italia Irredenta could only be gratified and the mastery of the Adriatic could only be secured at Austria's expense. Austria was well aware of the sentiments of her ally, and she counted so little on her support that she neither communicated her designs nor asked for assistance till the Rubicon was crossed. No Italian statesman could have persuaded his countrymen to fight for the preservation of Austria as a Great Power or for the strengthening of her position in the Balkans. If neutrality was the instinctive reaction to the outbreak of war the next step presented greater difficulty. *Sacro egoismo* was the watchword of Salandra and Giolitti alike, but in the spring of 1915 there was no infallible oracle to decide how it should be applied. The elder statesman contended that a good deal might be squeezed out of hard-pressed Austria without the waste of blood or treasure. The younger argued that extorted promises are rarely fulfilled, and that territorial concessions might be forcibly revoked. If Italy stood aside the Central Powers might win, and if they won she would be doomed to feed out of their hand. Trieste and the mastery of the Adriatic were glittering prizes, and the chance of winning them could hardly be expected to recur. Thus Italy, like other belligerents, chose the course most clearly indicated by her traditions and ambitions.

The course taken by Great Britain was marked out for her with equal clearness. "My God, Mr. Page, what else could we do?" cried the King. The violation of Belgian neutrality roused the country to righteous anger, but it was the occasion rather than the cause of our entry into the war. We fought for the Balance of Power. For better or worse we had departed from our traditional policy of "splendid isolation," and become entangled in the quarrels and ambitions of our friends. Had we stood aside at Armageddon the Central Powers would have won an easy victory, and we should have found ourselves alone in Europe. France and Russia would have scorned us as false friends who, after years of diplomatic co-operation, expert discussions and resonant protestations of solidarity, deserted them in the crisis of their fate; and the German menace, intensified by the collapse of the Triple Entente, would have compelled us to arm to the teeth on sea and land. Grey's assurance on August 3, 1914, that our

hands were free was correct in form but inaccurate in substance, and his whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be disgraced if we left France in the lurch. Mr. Lloyd George was later to describe the relationship as an obligation of honour, and such is likely to be the general verdict of history.

The decisions of the other European countries which entered the war after it had been for some time in progress were in like measure dictated by their supposed national interests and the diplomatic orientation of the last years of peace, not by the loftiest altruism or the blackest villainy as was proclaimed in the excitement of the fray. In Turkish eyes the offers of the Entente to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire were not worth the paper on which they were written. Was it not the age-long ambition of Russia to possess the key to the door of her house, and did she not dream of the day when the Cross would be restored in the church of Justinian? Had not England occupied Egypt without leave from its overlord, and was she not perpetually claiming for the Christian subjects of the Sultan autonomies that led to independence? It was the interest of Germany, on the other hand, to keep Turkey intact, to train her army, to finance her railways. Moreover there was no irritating assumption of moral or religious superiority in the Kaiser, who at a critical hour had clasped the blood-stained hand of the Great Assassin, and had proclaimed himself the champion of three hundred million Mohammedans throughout the world. To Enver and Talaat exploitation was a lesser evil than partition.

The policy of the crafty Ferdinand was equally intelligible. Russia had transferred her patronage to Serbia and had left Bulgaria to her fate in 1913. On the outbreak of the world war she had vetoed the surrender of Macedonia, which was to the Bulgars what the Rhine provinces were to the French. Promises were not enough, for the Entente might be unable or unwilling to fulfil them. A bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. When *carte blanche* was given to conquer the coveted province for herself, with the aid of the Central Powers, Bulgaria joined the side which was at that moment in the ascendant, and which, in the opinion of her ruler, was destined to win.

If Ferdinand of Bulgaria preferred Macedonia to the memories of the war of liberation, his namesake of Roumania

forgot his Hohenzollern blood in his constitutional duty. The Treaty of 1883 with the Central Powers was unknown to the country, and Bratiano, like the Coburger, put himself up to auction. While the Central Powers could give him nothing that he craved save Bessarabia, the Entente could help him to Transylvania, with the Bukovina and the Banat thrown in. The risk of joining the losing side held him neutral for half the war; but when at last he determined to plunge into the raging waters, it could only be in pursuit of the larger prize.

The war was the child of the European anarchy, of the outworn system of sovereign states. The Old World had degenerated into a powder-magazine, in which the dropping of a lighted match was almost certain to produce a gigantic conflagration. No conflict, strictly speaking, is inevitable, but in a storehouse of high explosives it required statesmen of exceptional wisdom and foresight in every country to avoid a catastrophe. It is a mistake to imagine that it took us unawares, for soldiers and civilians alike had been expecting and preparing for it for many years. It is also a mistake to attribute exceptional depravity to any of the Governments which, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George, stumbled and staggered into war. Blind to danger and deaf to advice as were the rulers of the three despotic empires, not one of them desired to set the world alight. Yet, though they may be acquitted of the crime of deliberately starting the avalanche, they must jointly bear the reproach of having chosen the path which led to the abyss.

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